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Abstract
This thesis aims to conceptualize what is often referred to in diplomacy, as a policy of
“constructive engagement”, by employing neoliberal-institutionalist theories and conflict
resolution approaches. The adopted “model for constructive engagement” serves as the
theoretical framework and centres on the basic assumption that non-coercive diplomacy
coupled with the offer of incentives is best suited at resolving conflict as well as
promoting human rights in international relations. Rather than looking at determinants of
foreign policy making, the thesis focuses, therefore, on the actual exercise of power and
influence in international relations. As such, power, both in terms of a state’s available
assets as well as seen as a form causation, is considered the crucial variable in
determining diplomatic manoeuvring and negotiation behaviour. The empirical context
for the research project is provided by the case of British-Iranian relations during the
period from 1989 to 2004. The narrative is divided into two parts: the first one deals
with the impact of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie by Ayatollah Khomeini on bilateral
relations and investigates British diplomacy towards Tehran, which followed the
European Union’s policy of “Critical Dialogue” with Iran. Whilst the promotion of
human rights was on the agenda of the “Critical Dialogue”, findings indicate that
contrary to other EU member states, most notably Germany, Whitehall was able to
genuinely pursuing a policy of “constructive engagement”, demanding meaningful
changes in Iranian behaviour. However, findings also show that Britain’s priority was at
resolving the “Rushdie affair” and not necessarily at promoting and protecting human
rights in Iran. The second part of the narrative looks at the “Comprehensive Dialogue”
which was implemented by the European Union in 2000 and established a direct linkage
between economic rewards and the improvements of human rights in Iran. Whilst the
Iranian government and parliament met EU demands, the country’s maze of power
centres, most notably those dominated by hardliners and conservatives, worked against
any meaningful improvements in the protection and respect of human rights. Both
narratives indicate to what extent diplomacy and negotiations were influenced by
domestic constituents, referred to as the Two-Level Game, as well as by asymmetries of
interdependence between the EU and Iran. Overall, the data implies that constructive
engagement, whilst subject to political and economic interdependence, constitutes an
effective form of human rights diplomacy.
1INTRODUCTION
The motivation for this thesis on constructive engagement was an immediate reaction to
the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US rationale, which eventually led to the war against
Iraq, was largely a product of the neo-conservative movement, which advocated an
American internationalism to bring “change from a position of strength” to the world as
whole and to the Middle East in particular. Confronted with such unconditional and
coercive expression of US foreign policy, the underlying rationale for this thesis was to
find a peaceful form of diplomacy towards that region. Turning towards the Middle East
strategy of the European Union (EU), it appeared that the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) approach was generally based on Europe’s “ability to persuade” with non-
coercive means as opposed to the “ability to compel” through coercive means. Neo-
conservatives, such as Kagan, may well argue that the EU’s projection of soft power in
its engagement with third countries is a sign of weakness rather than strength. It may also
be true that because of its very proximity, reliance on Middle Eastern energy resources
and deeply intertwined history that Europe’s future is embedded in the Middle East, more
so than that of the United States. 1 Whilst such political and economic realities certainly
provide for crucial foreign policy determinants, the question, which still needed an
answer, was whether Europe’s soft-power approach is actually working. Put simply, it
seemed that the EU does not change countries’ behaviour and extract concessions by
threatening to invade them, but rather, with the incentive of contractual relations or the
prospect of membership. For countries, like Bosnia, Ukraine or Turkey the only thing
worse than having to deal with the Brussels bureaucracy is being unable to deal with it at
all. EU membership and contractual relations with the Union are such powerful lures that
countries are willing to change economic, judicial, legal and political structures just to
join or enter such agreements. 2 In fact the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, also known,
as the Barcelona Process, was created to turn the Mediterranean-Middle East region into
a region of dialogue, exchange and cooperation with the objective of establishing peace,
stability and prosperity. Whilst the prospect of belonging to a free-trade area is being held
out to countries such as Jordan; Syria; Lebanon; Algeria and Morocco as the economic
1 Geoffrey Kemp, “Europe’s Middle East Challenges” in The Washington Quarterly, 27:1, p. 163
2 see Mark Leonard, “Why the US needs the EU” in Time, 28 February, 2005
2incentive, the ultimate goal is to bring political concerns such as democracy, good
governance, the rule of law and human rights in these Middle Eastern states into harmony
with EU standards. This transformative power, which the EU is wielding or attempting to
hold over the Middle East is what Nye refers to as “soft power”. This is the attraction of
ones ideas or the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of
others. 3 Europe’s penchant for such “constructive engagement” rather than coercive
diplomacy ultimately provided for the theoretical research question of this thesis: “What
constitutes a policy of constructive engagement and is it a viable strategy to achieve such
goals as promotion of democracy, human rights, peace and economic development
through foreign policy?”
While there is extensive literature on the application of hard power and negative
sanctions in foreign policy through both the use of economic sanctions as well the use of
force or coercion, international relations scholars have rarely considered the operation
and effectiveness of constructive engagement in practice nor attempted to define this
complex process theoretically within political science literature. Recognizing that realism
and national security imagery are poorly adapted to analysing problems of political and
economic interdependence, it appears that any bargaining model for constructive
engagement will have to be based on the assumptions of liberalism that international
regimes and institutions can mitigate anarchy and promote co-operation through
reinforcement of reciprocity and that states will enter into co-operative relations even if
another state gains more from the interaction. Hence, the research aspect on diplomacy in
this thesis deals with resources, tools and limits of statecraft, with the exercising of
influence and the wielding of power. Theoretically, the aim was to construct a model for
constructive engagement by drawing on international relations theory, diplomatic
practices and conflict resolution theory. In order to narrow the research focus, the model
adopted in this thesis attempts to find mechanisms for promoting human rights in foreign
policy.
3 Joseph S. Nye “The Changing Nature of World Power”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 105, No. 2
(Summer, 1990), p. 181
3The fundamental correlation between diplomacy and the concept of human rights was
based on the assumption that whilst it should be seen as a moral and legal obligation to
denounce human rights violations, human rights diplomacy should also attempt to
promote a culture in which human rights make sense. In a Hegelian sense this means that
rights are seen as a by-product of a functioning ethical community rather than as a
phenomenon that can be taken out of this context and promoted as a universal solution to
the political ills of the world. Thus, the hypothesis put forward in this thesis is that
constructive engagement constitutes a viable and sustainable foreign policy option to
promote and protect human rights in foreign policy. It essentially promotes human rights
as a distinct culture rather than as an external movement which “forces people to be free”
(in a Rousseauian sense) from without.
Objectives of Case Study
Since the theory largely deals with statecraft and diplomatic efforts to promote and
defend a normative concept such as human rights, British Iranian relations from 1989 -
2004 seemed an appropriate case study to test this hypothesis. The break of relations in
1989 between both countries over what the Iranians considered an offence of the sacred
and the British government considered a human right issue, constituted an unprecedented
event in contemporary international relations history: the break of bilateral relations over
a book! Iran’s death sentence against the author (which had prompted the bilateral
predicament) followed by British efforts to convince Iran of the right to freedom of
expression proved to be the acid test for the model adopted in this thesis. The objective of
the case study was therefore, to scrutinize how the British government implemented
Europe’s policy of constructive engagement. Given the fact that Britain implemented the
EU-CFSP of constructive engagement towards Iran (which had the improvement of
human rights as a stated objective) the impact on human rights will also be assessed. For
the sake of narrowing the research area of human rights and given the fact that the fatwa
against Salman Rushdie was treated as a violation of Article 19 of the International
Covenant of Political and Civil Rights (ICPCR), the research focus is the impact of
constructive engagement on the “Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression” in Iran.
Empirically, the thesis is thus divided into two parts:
41. Research on the first phase of constructive engagement with Iran - referred to as
the “Critical Dialogue” by the EU (from 1992 onwards) - covers the period of
British Iranian relations from 1989-2000. This part, which is the main research
focus, attempted to shed light on the reasons for the break of relations (i.e. the
fatwa) and how both sides perceived the issue at hand. The objective was to
assess how successful Britain’s policy of constructive engagement was at
defending Rushdie’s right to freedom of expression, solving the issue and at
protecting Article 19 in Iran.
2. Research on the second phase of constructive engagement with Iran, referred to as
the “Comprehensive Dialogue” by the EU, scrutinized the more institutionalised
EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue between 2001-2004 and attempted to identify
how successful this approach was at promoting and protecting human rights in
general, and the right to freedom of speech in particular.
Research Sources and Methods
Whilst the traditional secrecy surrounding Whitehall and the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) indicated the need to shed light on British foreign policy, by the same
token, it proved to be an impediment for the actual research. Throughout the course of
this study, a total of fifteen requests for freedom of information under the British
Freedom of Information Act had been forwarded to the FCO, all of which had been
denied on the ground that the enquiry “ related to the formulation or development of
government policy.” 4 In an effort to substitute for this reluctance to disclose information
on foreign policy and in order to provide a coherent picture of British diplomatic
strategies and policy towards Iran, information was attained through publicly available
primary resources, which included debates in the House of Commons and House of
Lords, reports submitted by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee as well as
parliamentary enquiries. A great deal of information on British decision making towards
4 E-mail from Ian Wilson, Information Management Group, FCO, “FOI Request 1122-05”, received 15
November, 2005
5Iran in the immediate aftermath of the fatwa was found in “The Scott Inquiry”.
Furthermore, research at Special Collections at the University of Bradford uncovered
declassified proceedings of inter-departmental government meetings and proved valuable
in portraying initial Whitehall strategy. Interviews with British diplomats in Iran and
London helped to depict what actually happened during negotiations and how perceived
leverages were being conveyed to the Iranian side. Research conducted at the Swedish
Foreign Ministry Archive in Stockholm provided significant empirical data on not only
the role of Sweden in protecting British interests during the break of relations with Iran,
but, more importantly, managed to disclose vital information on diplomatic
communications between Whitehall and the Swedish government. The most essential
source of primary information was the private manuscript by Baroness Frances d’Souza
at the House of Lords, who at the time had been Head of Article 19 and the Rushdie
International Defence Committee. This manuscript, which had been handed to the author
proved a fundamental piece of data depicting how the British government formulated and
translated its policy of constructive engagement with Iran and defended Rushdie’s right
to freedom of expression. What also proved vital in depicting perceived influences over
Iran, were primary sources from the European Union, which included the “EU Bulletin”;
the “Official Journal of the European Union”; “RAPID Press Releases” and European
Parliament debates and enquiries as well as interviews with EU Commission officials.
German parliamentary documents and declassified intelligence reports were equally
useful sources in showing how the Europeans attempted to sway Iran.
Whilst much of this related to perceived statecraft by respective actors, research on
objective political and economic factors was carried out by scrutinizing the “IMF
Direction of Trade Statistics”; the “BP Review of World Energy”; the “Economist
Intelligence Unit Report on Iran”; “Iran Focus”; the “United Nations Energy Statistics
Yearbook” and various European, American and Iranian newspapers. These documents
helped to see how subjectively perceived economic and political diplomatic instruments
actually correlated to objective political and economic realities and how this translated
into actual policy. Thus, in line with the model on constructive engagement, the
methodology adopted was to identify how asymmetries in economic and political
6interdependence between Britain and Iran influenced and dictated respective diplomatic
manoeuvring and leverages vis-à-vis one another. Research on Iranian diplomacy was
carried out at the Institute for Political and International Studies in Tehran (which is
linked to the Iranian Foreign Ministry), the archives of the state run news agency of the
Islamic Republic of Iran “IRNA”, the University of Tehran, as well as at the archive of
“Atieh Baha” - an independent strategic consultancy in Iran.5 Consulted sources in Iran
were books; journals and newspaper articles; business and political risk briefs; interviews
with government officials as well as human rights activist community, academics and
foreign diplomats. These sources provided the data for bilateral relations, the
international political context as well as respective domestic political developments.
The evaluation of the actual impact of constructive engagement on the right to freedom of
expression and speech was based on research conducted at the Archives of the Human
Rights Commission at the United Nations Office in Geneva. Consequently, reports by the
UN Special Rapporteur for Iran as well as the Special Rapporteur for the Right to
Freedom of Expression and Speech provided the empirical data on the situation of the
right to freedom of expression. The actual evaluation of the impact of constructive
engagement on Article 19 in Iran, was based on a straightforward methodology, of
subdividing the right to freedom of speech into two categories: (i) respect of the right to
freedom of speech and (ii) protection of this right:6
(i) To respect: This requires the state and its organs and agents to abstain
from carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any practice, policy or legal
measure violating the integrity of individuals or impinging on their
freedom to exercise their right.
(ii) To protect: This primarily concerns appropriate legislation confirming
the rights for all individuals and groups. It also obliges the state and the
agents to prevent the violation of rights by state and non-state actors. It
5 “Iran Focus” is published by Atieh Bahar.
6 part of this methodology is based on Gordon Crawford, “Evaluating EU promotion of human rights,
democracy and good governance: towards a particular approach”, European Development Policy Group
Discussion Papers No.22, (Development Studies Association, 2001), p.12
7requires that where violations do occur, appropriate remedies exist in
the form of accessible and well-publicized complaints and inspection
procedures. This in turn concerns the framework of the rule of law and
access to justice. 7
Literature Review
Whilst the theoretical research question of how constructive engagement should be
conceptualised in international relations theory and practice was one motivation for this
thesis, the lack of literature on contemporary British Iranian relations as well as on the
Rushdie affair proved to be another incentive. Existing accounts of British Iranian
relations are exclusively historical ones. The most recent is Alan W. Ford´s “The Anglo-
Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952” and dates back to 1954. Mary Ann Heiss’ “Empire
and Nationhood – The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954” provides
a more contemporary account of Britain’s ousting of Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq.
These accounts are useful to appreciate the historical context, but certainly do not shed
any light on contemporary bilateral relations. Concerning the fatwa on Rushdie, Daniel
Pipe’s book “The Rushdie Affair – The Novel, the Ayatollah and the West”, published
two years after the fatwa, attempted to explain why the “Satanic Verses” shook Iran and
the Muslim world. However, Pipes does not focus on British responses and the impact
on bilateral relations nor does his political agenda allow him to deliver an objective
academic account. “Fiction, Fact and the Fatwa – 2000 days of censorship” published in
1994, by the human rights group “Article 19” contains a chronology of the group’s
efforts to defend Rushdie. This proved to be valuable background reading of this group’s
campaigns, but fails to appreciate the wider picture of British Iranian relations. A similar
account is Niels Fried-Nielsen’s “Freedom of Expression: The acid test”, which looks at
the Scandinavian countries’ reactions towards Iran following the fatwa. Davina Miller´s
chapter on “British foreign policy, human rights and Iran” in “New Labour’s Foreign
Policy- A new moral crusade?” is the only existing account on contemporary British
7 Based on methodology put forward by Humanist Committee on Human Rights, Matching Practice with
Principles: Human Rights Impact Assessment: EU Opportunities – An outline for the development of
Human Rights Impact Assessment for EU policy measures with an external effect, (Utrecht, HOM, 2002),
p.49; It should be noted that in human rights advocacy, one talks of respecting, protecting and promoting
human rights.
8Iranian relations. In examining policy towards Iran, Miller argued, that one does not find
any modifications in pursuit of human rights; rather she concluded that, indeed, ethical
considerations, including human rights have been sacrificed in order to effect engagement
with the Islamic Republic. 8 Miller bases this conclusion on the observation that the
Labour government changed policy in two respects to reach an accommodation with Iran.
Firstly, it abandoned its relationship with the National Council of Resistance of Iran,
which the party had nurtured during opposition. Secondly, the Labour government
accepted the Iranian position on the fatwa, a position that the Iranian government had
held since 1993. 9 Miller concluded that the rapprochement with Iran pointed to the fact
that New Labour’s new human rights agenda was merely of rhetorical nature. A genuine
modification of policy would have required the promotion of human rights above the
narrow economic and political advantage. The author criticises the motives behind
Britain’s rapprochement, claiming that they sacrificed the human rights objectives,
officially proclaimed by Robin Cook as to be at the heart of British foreign policy. 10
Whilst Miller is right in the sense that Britain was primarily interested in solving the
Rushdie issue, research findings refute her argument that Britain was primarily interested
in re-establishing relations for economic reasons. In fact, the data of this research
indicates how Britain managed to use asymmetrical economic interdependence as an
economic incentive.
Looking at human rights literature on Iran, the most in-depth account of human rights in
Iran is undoubtedly Nazila Ghanea’s “Human Rights, the UN and the Baha’is in Iran” as
it provides an analysis of the UN system and the situation of the Baha’is, Iran’s largest
religious minority. Another valuable account is Abrahamian’s “Tortured Confessions –
Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran”, which documents the use of torture as a
means to legitimizing the ruling elite and eliminating dissent. The final secondary
resource on human rights relevant for this thesis is “Guardians of Thought – Limits on
8 Davina Miller, British foreign policy, human rights and Iran, in Richard Little, Mark Wickham Jones
(ed.), New Labour’s foreign policy, A new moral crusade (Manchester, Manchester University Press,
2000),
p. 189
9 ibid, p. 190
10 ibid, p. 186
9Freedom of Expression in Iran, published in 1993 by Human Rights Watch. Though
rather dated, it provided crucial information on the legal framework concerning the right
to freedom of expression.
Overall, the fact that the Rushdie affair constituted a unique, yet un-researched case in
international relations literature was the primary reason for this thesis. The fact that two
states essentially broke relations over a book raised so many questions, that it seemed
necessary to shed light on this issue. Ultimately, it affected British-Iranian relations for
over ten years, threatened the life of a British subject, and stimulated campaigns on both
sides of the spectrum (to kill Rushdie and to defend his right to publish), and saw
assassination attempts, bombings and murder.
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CHAPTER ONE
A MODEL FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT
1. Introduction
The aim of a “Model for Constructive Engagement” is to define constructive engagement
and to place it in historical context as well as to conceptualize it as a foreign policy
strategy by applying neo-liberal institutionalist theories of International Relations. It is
assumed that political and economic interdependence between states constitutes a
fundamental factor, determining both behaviour as well as capabilities of states.
Accordingly, the adopted model largely treats statecraft and diplomatic instruments as a
reflection of a state’s power and its ability to influence. Respective asymmetries in
interdependent relationships are recognized as factors influencing statecraft and the
diplomatic means available to governments and practitioners. The concept of power in
this thesis does, therefore, not so much reflect a realist’s view of a state’s interests
defined in terms of power, but rather their treatment of power as a form of causation and
currency available to states. Because of these premises, together with the overall aim of
formulating a universally applicable theoretical framework of the European Union’s
conditional human rights diplomacy, the model largely drew from liberal approaches on
regime formation and inter-state co-operation. Whilst the focus of the narrative is on
British-Iranian relations, the adopted model provides the overall “manual” for analysing
British efforts of engaging with Iran. Additionally, the thesis attempts to formulate a
valid theoretical model for future research on constructive engagement by the EU or any
other state.
2. Definition and Historical Context of Constructive Engagement
Since the term constructive engagement will be used throughout this discussion a clear
definition of the concept is essential. The term is recognized as denoting a deliberate
foreign policy strategy (i.e. the opposite to isolation and punitive sanctions) rather than a
11
mere continuation of normal diplomatic relations between two or more states. 11 This is
important to emphasize since the term itself often tends to remain a source of confusion.
In Chinese, the word appears to mean simply the conduct of normal relations and in
German no comparable translation exists. 12 The term itself was first used as result of the
controversial US policy towards South Africa during the terms of Nixon, Carter and then
Reagan. Advocating a “strategy of change” in the face of an internationally growing
cacophony for punitive sanctions and the failure of constructive engagement under Carter
and Nixon, Ronald Reagan´s then assistant secretary of state for African affairs became
the architect for a renewed policy of engagement rather than isolation towards South
Africa. 13 Accounts on the period of US constructive engagement towards Pretoria
describe how this policy - a combination of diplomatic pressure and extension of
favourable trade terms as a reward for South African amelioration of apartheid – was
intended to catalyse evolutionary change from within the South African polity. Aiming to
transcend the fallacies of the Carter years and approaches of the Nixon administrations,
the assistant secretary for African affairs, Chester Crocker, suggested during the 1980s a
new strategy of constructive engagement which would not only recognize significant
changes for which the Botha government had previously received little international
credit but also to reward future developments.14 Whilst discarding radical and unrealistic
demands for a speedy transfer of power, the State Department advocated a “clear Western
11 The concept of constructive engagement is widely ambiguous among policymakers and scholars. Often
condemned to be nothing more than pursuing a solicitous policy towards anathematised countries or
controversial authoritarian regimes, constructive engagement is, therefore, regarded as a controversial
foreign policy option; one that is determined by economic interests rather than genuine interest to change
certain state behaviour. The focus of this thesis is not why constructive engagement is the choice of
implementation for some governments rather than on how the mechanisms of this policy can contribute to
alter state behaviour. For a discourse on opposing US and European policies towards so called rogue
states, see Richard N. Haas , Transatlantic Tensions, The US , Europe and Problem Countries (Washington,
D.C., Brookings, 1999)
12 It is interesting to note that it was actually the European Union ´s policy of “Critical Dialogue” towards
Iran, which translated into German as “Kritischer Dialog” turned out to be the first usable term describing a
policy referred to the English language as constructive engagement. see Richard N. Haas and Meghan L. O
´Sullivan, Honey and Vinegar – Incentives, Sanctions and Foreign Policy, (Washington, D.C. , Brookings
Institution, 2000), p.1
13 see Jeffrey Herbst, Incentives and Domestic Reform in South Africa, in David Cortright (ed.), The Price
of Peace – Incentives and International Conflict Prevention (New York, Rowman and Littlefield, 1997),
pp.205-222 ; Audie Klotz, Norms reconstituting interests: global racial equality and US sanctions against
South Africa , International Organization Vol. 49, No. 3 , (Summer 1995), pp. 451- 478
14 Christopher Coker, The United States and South Africa 1968- 1985: Constructive Engagement and its
Critics, (Durham, Duke University Press, 1986), pp.154-158
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readiness to recognize and support positive development and engage credibly in
addressing a complex political agenda.”15 Although US constructive engagement towards
South Africa did not succeed in persuading the white government to abandon its
apartheid regime, assessments on the policy reveal that it was the bureaucratic failure to
implement constructive engagement effectively, rather than the failure of the concept
itself that had led to the decision after 1985 to abandon a dialogue and to re-employ
negative sanctions against Pretoria. 16 Thus, US diplomacy towards South Africa coined
the term as well as conceptual mechanism of constructive engagement.
Since constructive engagement still holds a rather elusive status in international relations
literature, it is vital to clarify the idea behind it before moving to a conceptual definition.
Embedding the idea within the history of diplomacy, we find that “great powers are often
confronted by ambitious states that are not socialized into the norms of the international
system and pose a threat to its orderly workings and stability.” 17 Numerous twentieth
century American and European diplomatic efforts, both successful as well as disastrous,
to reform these outlaw states or rogue leaders show what significance a “common
concept of legitimacy” and international norms holds for the stability of the international
system. Kissinger defined this common concept as an “international agreement about the
nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign
policy”. This implies “ the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all
major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that, like Germany after
the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy.”
18 While there exists no clear and commonly accepted definition of an outlaw or rogue
state, George defines them in the following terms:
15 ibid, p.155
16 ibid, pp. 111- 114; see also Michael Clough, “Beyond Constructive Engagement” in Foreign Policy, No.
61(Winter 1985-1986), pp.3-24
17 Alexander George, Bridging the Gap – Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.,
Institute for Peace, 1993), p. 48
18 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored, (London, Gollancz, 1973), p. 1; see also Alexander George,
Bridging the Gap – Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy, p. 48 George distinguishes between
“revolutionary” or “outlaw” states and “revisionist” states, which seek merely to rectify the status quo and
do not reject the norms and practices of international system.
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Outlaw states and their rogue leaders refuse to accept and abide by some of the most important
norms and practices of the international system. Such states may seek to dominate and reshape the
system to their own liking, and they may aim at global or regional hegemony. Some of them resort
to practices such as state terrorism and taking as hostages citizens or official representatives of other
states. 19
In looking at what defines a policy of constructive engagement and what constitutes its
success, this dissertation does not focus on why outlaw states challenge the international
order and stability, nor analyse what determinants cause countries to take an active stake
in allegedly preserving that system. Rather the focus of this study is on the strategy to
engage with such a state.
Constructive engagement is a non-coercive strategy and set of diplomatic practices for
brining “outlaw” or “rogue” states to conform to what are held by the great powers to be
legitimate international norms., in this case, protecting international human rights
standards.
Essentially constructive engagement is a strategy of what George calls “conditional
reciprocity” demanding meaningful changes in policy and behaviour in return for each
concession or benefit. 20 Within the context of using conditional reciprocity or linkage
diplomacy as a tactic to encourage changes in another state’s policies, George points to
its strategic use “as part of a long-range effort for bringing about fundamental change in
the nature of the outlaw state and its leadership, that is, the gradual replacement of its
antipathy to the norms and practices of the international system with attitudes and
behaviour more supportive of that system.” 21 Due to the absence of any systematic
scholarly study of past efforts to reform outlaw states and to draw their leaders into
acceptance of the norms and practices of the international system 22, it is, therefore, the
intention of this thesis to conceptualise and assess the strategy of constructive
engagement as a method of doing so.
19 Alexander George, Bridging the Gap – Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy, p. 49
20 ibid, pp. 50-51
21 ibid, p. 51
22 as stated by Alexander George , Bridging the Gap – Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy , p.57
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It is important to emphasize that constructive engagement is distinct from appeasement.
Whilst its tactic of conditional reciprocity is different from appeasement, its underlying
goal, that is avoidance of conflict, reduction of tension, resocialization into international
society through non - coercive means, is indeed in line with the general idea behind
appeasement. Despite differences in the two strategies, a review of the literature on
appeasement gives insights into the conditions and requirement of constructive
engagement that may or may not be appropriate.
George states “when an outlaw state not only rejects important norms of the international
system but also seeks major changes in the status quo, appeasement of even its legitimate
and seemingly reasonable demands is unlikely to contribute to resocializing it into
accepting the norms of the international system”. On the contrary appeasement “is more
likely to reinforce the rogue leader’s ambitions and strengthen his predisposition to
challenge the system.” 23 The historical case against appeasement, British diplomacy
towards Germany from 1937-1939, is well understood and deeply entrenched in the
consciousness of generations of policy makers. The traditional view against appeasement,
dominated by prominent critics such as L.B. Namier, J.W. Wheeler Bennett, Alan
Bullock, and Winston Churchill himself, considers it to be a policy of shameful weakness
before the challenge of the dictators, which was doomed to fail. 24 It was this traditional
negative image of appeasement and the conviction that the Second World War could
have been prevented by a policy of timely resistance to German aggression that
influenced western policymakers during the cold war. 25 Even four decades later this
image was still upheld in influential international relations literature. As Hans
Morgenthau denounces appeasement as:
23 ibid , p. 50
24 J.L. Richardson, “New Perspectives in Appeasement: Some Implications for International Relations”,
World Politics, Vo. 40, No. 3 (April, 1988), p. 290; see also John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue
to Tragedy (London, Macmillan Press, 1948); Lewis B. Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, (London, Macmillan,
1948); Winston Churchill, The Second World War, I: The Gathering Storm (London, Cassell, 1948)
25 J.L. Richardson, World Politics, p. 291
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[...] a foreign policy that attempts to meet the threat of imperialism with methods appropriate to a
policy of the status quo […] One might say that appeasement is a corrupted policy of compromise,
made erroneous by mistaking a policy of imperialism for a policy of the status quo. 26
Yet the failed attempt of Neville Chamberlain to appease Hitler in the late 1930s and to
bring Germany back as a responsible actor into a reconstituted European system may
only point to a disastrous misapplication rather than discredit the concept altogether. It is
not the purpose of this dissertation to provide a reappraisal of British diplomacy towards
Nazi Germany, yet any analysis of contemporary constructive engagement strategies and
the defence of its morality need to reflect upon two important considerations. Firstly, the
fault of the British government and others during the 1930s was not that they attempted
to pursue conciliation in their dealings with Germany. Other policies, such as a consistent
policy of deterrence, designed to maintain the Versailles settlement unimpaired could
never have succeeded as long as the most powerful nation in Europe harboured
resentment against it. The fault was that Britain and other governments attempted
conciliation without sufficient reserves of deterrence as an inducement against alternative
courses. 27 Conceivably, it is true that no degree of armed strength on their part could
have convinced Hitler that they really meant business, yet conciliation unbacked by
strength was certain to fail. Hence, drawing on lessons from history, constructive
engagements needs to employ both carrots and sticks in such a way that neither of the
two options outweigh each other. Effectively, it means that as much as a policy of
conciliation without strength is fruitless, so is deterrence without conciliation doomed to
indefinite stalemate.
Secondly, the original idea of appeasement (that is reasonable concessions made from a
position of strength) is still a fundamental purpose of diplomacy, “ an essential and
sometimes invaluable card in an on-going game which should not be discarded
antipathetically because it was once misplayed.” 28In fact, any charge against
appeasement, for the purpose of condemnation, levelled against a policy which aims at
26 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 3rd ed. (New York, Macmillan, 1967), p. 96
27 Evan Luard, “Conciliation and Deterrence: A Comparison of Political Strategies in the Interwar and
Postwar Period”, World Politics, Vol. 19, No.2 (Jan. 1967), p. 186
28 William R. Rock, British Appeasement in the 1930s, (London, Edward Arnold, 1984), p. 99
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easing tension and avoiding conflict and misses the mark entirely in a world where such
policies are the only means of assuring peaceful coexistence. 29 Nevertheless,
appeasement should always be implemented from a position of strength, coupled with the
political will to draw on available power capabilities and to use any leverage as
incentives for demanded concessions.
Regarding the conditions under which it is viable to employ a policy of appeasement, it is
crucial to assess whether there are signs that the object is appeaseable. Essentially,
“appeasement has a rightful place in resolving disputes through negotiated settlement and
peaceful change; but it is wholly inappropriate in dealing with force, violence and
aggression.” In making concessions the state initiating appeasement towards another
country “should never involve the surrender of fundamental principles upon the
preservation of which the claim to loyalty and respect for that government depends. That
would constitute betrayal, by the means, of the very ends which they were devised to
defend and promote” 30 In advocating precisely this case for assessing the preconditions
to employ a strategy of appeasement or constructive engagement, George attempts to
replace the simple generalization so strongly rooted in the post-Munich era “if
appeasement then World War III “ with a more differentiated analysis. He argues for
examining historical cases of appeasement in order to identify those conditions under
which it is likely to be a viable conflict avoidance strategy and those in which it is likely
to be misguided and contribute to the eventual onset of war. 31 If we recall that
appeasement only shares the underlying aims and non-coercive methods with
constructive engagement but not its coherent reciprocal technique, George´s sequence of
inter state cooperation clarifies where constructive engagement may fit. In the classic
European balance of power system the gradation among different steps for improving
relations between two states was incorporated into common concepts and practices of
diplomacy. According to George this process might begin with “détente “, which refers to
a relaxation of acute tension and which may be accompanied by the reduction of hostile
29 ibid, p. 99
30 ibid, pp. 99-100
31 Alexander George and Gordon A. Craig, Force and Statecraft – Diplomatic Problems of our Time, 3rd ed.
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 157
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behaviour without settling the prevailing disagreements or removing the underlying
conflicts of interests. “Détente” may then develop into “rapprochement”, whereby one or
both sides express a desire to address some or all of their disagreements with a view to
possible agreement. This, in turn could lead to an “entente” – in which the two sides
recognize a similarity of views and interests, but the understandings are limited to certain
issues and the improvement in relations stops short of an alliance. “Entente” could then
lead to “appeasement” – the methodological removal of the principal cause of the conflict
and possibly end in an “alliance”. 32 Constructive engagement simply describes the
process from détente to appeasement in as much as it provides the mechanisms and
initiatives for this “evolution of cooperation and conflict reduction” to move forward.
Whilst, the British appeasement policy of 1937-1939 is not likely to be easily surpassed
as a historic example of how not to conduct policy of détente, Willy Brandt ‘s 1970s
Ostpolitk towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, on the contrary proves the
success of what today would be most likely referred to as constructive engagement.
Brandt had a clear notion not only of the changes that he wished to effect, but also of the
difficulties that lay in his path, so that his initiative was based on a shrewd assessment of
potentials risks and gains and of how to utilize leverage to manoeuvre around obstacles.
33 Though Ostpolitk contained the possibility of major concessions to the Soviet Union
and the East German regime and thus contained elements of what could be regarded as
appeasement, Brandt orchestrated a complex process of détente to ensure that he gained
important benefits not only for West Germany but for Europe as a whole. Diplomatic,
economic and cultural relations with Eastern European states, which primarily aimed at
eliminating distrust and tension, were initiated by Bonn through commercial and credit
incentives for these economically depressed governments. 34 Unlike Chamberlain in his
dealings with Hitler, Brandt did not rush the détente process in order to move as quickly
as possible into appeasement. Making realistic calculations of the complexity of and
political risks of his course, Brandt knew that Europe can “approach this goal [an
enduring peace order] only step by step, in a long-drawn-out process of détente, that is by
32 ibid, p. 157 and p. 247
33 ibid, p. 254
34 ibid, p. 254
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means of mutual rapprochement, understanding and cooperation in all areas of interstate
relations: As advocates of constructive engagement would argue today, he also claimed
that “the establishment of diplomatic relations is a means to the attainment of this goal,
not an end in itself.” 35 Hence, Ostpolitk was a strategy in which diplomatic moves were
carefully controlled and timed. Brandt, aware of the two level game of diplomacy,
always aimed at solidifying domestic support before implementing his policy of détente
and appeasement. Bearing in mind that the sequence détente  rapprochement  entente
 appeasement cannot be pursued in today’s world in precisely the same manner as it
was in the European balance-of-power system, Ostpolitk proved that the implementation
of détente / appeasement remains potentially viable if employed with due caution and
with sensitivity to the greater complexity of the situation and the nature of the risks
involved. 36 Indeed, the careful step-by-step process in which Brandt pursued his non-
coercive Ostpolitk backed by German economic might and NATO deterrence bears
important similarities with what today would be regarded as a moral and successful
strategy of constructive engagement. 37
3. Power and Influence
Actions of states and statecraft in international relations are often described in terms of
influence and power. Power is often referred to as the capacity to direct the decisions and
actions of others. Influence relationships are usually viewed as being based on power.
Because of the fact that state A possesses influence over B, it is considered as more
powerful and therefore more influential than state C.
For the purpose of clarity of this research, the term power has to be further defined.
Power could be described as the “capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others”
and derives from objective strength and will. “Strength comes from the transformation of
resources into capabilities”, whereas “will infuses objectives with resolve”. If we talk
35 Willy Brandt, A Peace Policy for Europe (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 104
36 Alexander George and Gordon A. Craig, Force and Statecraft – Diplomatic Problems of our Time, 3rd
ed., p. 256
37 It should, however, be noted that unlike Chamberlain’s appeasement, Ostpolitk, was not applied in a
situation where force or aggression were employed or threatened by the target state.
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about a state’s strategy in the context of pursuit of power one should really see it as a
state’s attempt to marshal its available capabilities, whether military, economic or
political, and to bring them to bear with precision. “Statecraft then seeks through strategy
to magnify the mass, relevance, impact and irresistibility of power”. Essentially statecraft
guides the ways in which a state deploys and applies its power abroad. 38
We shall use Robert Dahl’s definition, which explains power as a relation among actors
in which one actor induces one or more actors to behave in some way they otherwise
would not do. 39 If we accept Dahl’s definition that A has power over B to the extent that
he can get B to do something that B would not do otherwise, then we ultimately have to
agree with him that power describes a situation of “coercive influence”. 40 Having
defined power as a causal relationship between actors in which the desires and intentions
of one actor affects the actions or preferences of one or more actors, Dahl goes on to
distinguish between manifest and implicit influence. Manifest influence can be
understood as causing other people to act in some particular way through one ´s own
actions.
If A wants outcome x; if A acts with the intention of causing B to bring about x; and if as a result of
A ´s actions, B attempts to bring about x, then A exercises manifest influence. 41
On the contrary implicit influence refers to a situation in which one actor shapes his
behaviour to conform to what he believes are the preferences of another actor, without
having been given explicit demands or orders about the other actor’s intentions.
If A wants outcome x, then although A does not act with the intention of causing B to bring about x,
if A’s desire for x causes B to attempt to bring about x, then A exercises implicit influence over B. 42
38 see Chas W .Freeman, Jr. Arts of Power – Statecraft and Diplomacy ( Washington D.C., US Institute of
Peace Press, 1997), pp. 3-5
39 Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 40
40 ibid, p. 50
41 ibid, p. 30
42 ibid, p. 31, see also Jack H. Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power, (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1975), pp.16-30
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While Dahl draws his conclusion from empirical data analysing the effects of elections
on elected officials, i.e. their desire to be re-elected and their expectations of future
reactions of voters or campaign contributors to their present conduct, the notion of
implicit influence is also of particular importance for this study. Hypotheses on the role
of soft power in the process of constructive engagement and the assumed influence from
the attraction of another’s ideas and preferences have to be understood within the context
of Dahl’s concept of implicit influence. Another issue at hand now is how to solve the
problem of comparability when actors have different amounts of influence with respect to
different issues. Dahl acknowledges this problem of how to describe the relative
influence of different actors in a political system or relationship. While he argues that
there is no single best way of measuring the relative amount of power or influence of
different actors, he suggests estimating an actor´s influence with a given scope and
domain. He argues that “if influence is a form of causation, then the amount of A’s
influence over an outcome should be equivalent to the amount of the outcome (B´s
actions) or predispositions caused by A’s desires.” Thus, the meaning of “more
influence” has to be understood within the context of the scope of domain. The domain of
A’s influence consists of the other participants, B and C, influenced by A. The scope of
A’s influence refers to the matters on which this actor can influence B, C. In exercising
influence, then, A influences a domain of B and C with respect to certain scope of their
actions or predispositions.43 In line with pluralist approaches Dahl ´s focus is, therefore,
not on the sources of power but merely on the exercise of it. Power according to him
means influence in decision-making and can be analysed only after “careful examination
of a series of concrete decisions.” 44
One can conceive of “power” – “influence” and “control” are serviceable synonyms – as the
capacity of one actor to do something affecting another actor, which changes the probable pattern of
specified future events. This can be envisaged most easily in a decision – making situation. 45
43see Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, pp. 32-40
44 Robert A. Dahl, “ A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model”, The American Political Science Review, Vol.
56, No. 4 (December, 1962), p. 466
45 Neslon W. Polsby quoted in Steven Lukes, Power – A Radical View, (Basingstoke, MacMillan Press,
1974), p.13
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Dahl’s central method is to determine for each decision, which participants had initiated
alternatives that were finally adopted, had vetoed alternatives initiated by others, or had
proposed alternatives that were turned down. The actions were then described as
individual “successes” or “defeats”. Consequently the participants in the relationships
with the greatest proportion of successes out of the total number of successes were then
considered to be most influential. 46
The logical complement of influence is autonomy. To the extent that A influences B on some matter
X, then B is not autonomous in relation to A with respect to X. Conversely, B is autonomous in
relation to A, with respect to X, to the extent that A does not influence B ´s actions or intentions
with respect to X. 47
The answer to the question of what constitutes power and how it will be referred to in this
thesis, is that those actors will be classified as powerful which possess the capability of
influencing the actions and decisions of others. Hence, our understanding of power
derives from our assessment of observable behaviour in a process of decision-making.
4. Power Resources: Hard and Soft Power
Though Dahl’s treatment of power as causation is vital for our understanding of power,
the treatment of power as a currency or source is inevitable to a study dealing with a
political or economic bargaining situation. Thus, power can be both, causation as well as
currency. Before further elaborating on the instruments, i.e. positive sanctions as means
of exercising power during constructive diplomacy, capabilities and resources of power
need to be identified. So what are the means at a state’s disposal when implementing
foreign policy, particularly what constitutes the spectrum of means when attempting to
influence? Hill’s pyramidal power inventory consisting of resources, capabilities and
instruments is helpful in developing at set of attributes on which a state ´s power is based.
Resources are “the elements, derived from history and geography, which constitute […]
the “basic forces” of foreign policy, which determine the limits of a country’s impact on
46 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, (New Haven and London,
Yale University Press, 1961), p.336
47 Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p.40
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the world – if not its ambition.” 48 Accordingly, a country’s resources include the
territory, population, level of industrialization, natural resources and expertise. These are
the tangible power attributes of a country. While national elements, such as sheer land
size or population by themselves do not make a state a great power, “ a large area often
comes with a generous natural resource endowment, and along, with a large population,
can support a sizable agricultural and industrial base.” 49 The obvious virtue of defining
power resources as the possession of certain resources is that it makes power appear more
concrete and certainly helps to treat power as currency. 50 To reach the level of
instruments, Hill asserts, that these resources must be operationalized into capabilities,
which he identifies as the “recognizable elements of modern government´ s
responsibilities” for which separate bureaucracies might exist and where decisions may
hope to have an effect. 51 Hill includes the armed forces, patterns of trade and general
strength of the nation’s economy, agriculture and industry. Lastly, the instruments or
strengths of power available to states that wish to channel or alter the behaviour of other
states fall into four broad categories: diplomatic or political strength, cultural, economic
and military strength. 52 Since the aim is to conceptualize constructive engagement as a
peaceful and non-coercive foreign policy option, diplomatic and economic strength shall
be the focus of this model:
1. Diplomatic strength is measured in the ability of a state to persuade others of the
wisdom of its policies. Hence, next to substantive representation and continuous
negotiation, the core task of diplomacy then “ is not just the management of order,
but the management of change, and the maintenance by continued persuasion of
order in the midst of change.” 53
2. Economic strength is measured in a country’s financial assets, output of goods
and services, and market. It finds expression in dependence or reliance by other
48 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003),
p.136
49 Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, David Kinsella, World Politics – The Menu for Choice, p. 94
50 see Hans J. Morgenthau; revised by Kenneth W. Thompson , Politics among Nations: The struggle for
power and peace , (New York: MacGraw-Hill, 1993)
51 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p .136
52 ibid, pp.134-154
53 R. P. Barston, Modern Diplomacy, ( Halrlow, Longman Group, 1988), p. 2
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countries on its capital, output and market. It is manifested in a state’s trade and
investment flows to and from other countries.54 Economic statecraft can wield
influence in world politics through two strategies:
a. Negative sanctions, which can include the boycott of imports, embargoes
on exports, restrictions on private business and travel and the imposition
of price rises through punitive duties, freezing of assets or aid suspension.
55
b. The use of positive sanctions is carried out through economic policies
such as trade preferences, technology transfer, loans and grants on
privileged terms. 56
As stated above the instruments in this model of constructive engagement are economic
statecraft, particularly positive sanctions, as well as diplomacy with its main task of
persuasion and negotiation. The other vital element involved in a strategy of constructive
engagement is linked with the muscle of soft power or what Dahl coined “implicit
influence”. In contrast with the hard (or command power) of ordering others to do what
one country wants, soft power is the power of attractive ideas or the ability to set the
political agenda and determine the framework of debate in a way that shapes other ´s
preferences. Nye argues that the ability to affect what other countries want tends to be
associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions. 57
Soft power or what Susan Strange calls “structural power”, involves the ability of state A
to influence the context or environment surrounding state B’s decisions - that is the
structure of the situation in which B finds itself. 58
Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or threats (sticks). But there is also an indirect way to
exercise power. A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other
countries want to follow it. Admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of
54 see Chas W. Freeman, Jr. Arts of Power – Statecraft and Diplomacy, p.17
55 see David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 41
56 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, p. 151
57 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, No. 80, (Fall 1990), p.166
58 Though this concept is more directed to the international political economy realm it support Nye ´s
concept of soft power influence. see Susan Strange, “What About International Relations”, in Susan
Strange (ed) Paths to International Political Economy, (London, Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 191
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prosperity and openness. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and
attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic
weapons. This aspect of power – getting others to want what you want – I call soft power. It co-opts
people rather than coerces them. 59
Because interdependence makes the use of force and even the threat to disrupt or
manipulate an interdependent relationship increasingly costly, Nye argues that the great
powers of today are less able to use their traditional power resources to achieve their
goals than in the past. Nye lists five trends, which have contributed to this diffusion of
power: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the
spread of technology, and changing political issues. 60 Hence, by contrast to tangible
elements of hard power, such as military and economic strength, the dimension of soft
power, to set the agenda and determines the framework of a debate, becomes more
important. This model for constructive engagement takes Nye’s concept further and treats
conditional human rights diplomacy, as pursued by the CFSP of the EU as well as the
practice of EU enlargement as strategies that largely draw on soft power. Concerning EU
enlargement, soft power, as manifested in the acquis communitaire, 61 established itself
as guarantor for sustainable European integration. The reason for this is more than simply
adopting common rules and norms (requirements of any international regime) member
states align their entire economic, legal and political system to EU standards. As
Schimmelfennig argues:
Community actors cannot just bargain, that is, exchange threats and promises, but need to
argue, that is legitimize their preferences on the basis of the community ethos, and to be
concerned about their image and credibility as community members. For those actors that
pursue ethos-conforming preferences, the ethos adds legitimacy to their goal and thus
strengthens their bargaining power. Conversely, actors that pursue self-serving goals not
in line with the ethos run into image and credibility problems, which compromise their
59 Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power – Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.8-9
60 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, p. 160
61 This refers to the entire body of EU law and includes all the treaties, regulations and directives passed by
EU institutions as well as judgments laid down by the Court of Justice. Any new member state must adopt,
implement and enforce all the acquis to be allowed to join the EU. see
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/europe/euro-glossary/1216329.stm, website accessed on 30 March,
2004
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future ability to argue and act successfully. As a consequence, community members
whose preferences and actions violate the community ethos can be shamed and shunned
into compliance. 62
However, what interests us here is not enlargement, but the role of soft power in Europe’s
external relations. Nye himself acknowledges that Europe also derives soft power from
its foreign policies gaining not only “credibility from its position on global climate
change, international law, and human rights treaties” but, as Jack Straw claims, the EU
has also “experience in the subtle art of soft power” […] and “tends to exerts its influence
overseas via the promotion of democracy and development through trade and aid.” 63 It is
this aspect which the model on constructive engagement attempts to conceptualize. Since
the EU has made the respect for human rights an integral part of its external and
development policies towards third countries, one could argue that European hard and
soft power assets manifest themselves on two levels. The former constitutes the short-
term inducement, the latter the long-term mechanism to get the third party to permanently
align itself to Europe’s political agenda.
Any trade, cooperation, dialogue, partnership and association agreement with the EU and
third parties contains a so-called human rights clause. This provision essentially
constitutes a suspension mechanism, which allows the EU to react in the event of
violation to end any contractual agreement. 64 What this means in theoretical terms is that
non-coercive power assets, such as A’s offer of entering a contractual agreement or
forming an economic regime with B is used as short term “inducement” to allow a
dialogue to take place and extract respective political concessions from B. Since the
adoption of A’s “normative demands” (i.e. human rights) is a condition on the agreement
as well as including a suspension mechanism once the contractual relationship had been
concluded, A essentially created a relationship which encourages B to channel or limit its
activities in ways A prefers. But as Nye suggests, if a country’s ideas, norms or culture
62 Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, European Integration Theory, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003),
p. 91
63 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power – The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York, Public Affairs, 2004),
pp.80-81
64 Vaughne Miller, “The Human Rights Clause in the EU’s External Agreements”, House of Commons,
Research Paper 04/33, (House of Commons Library, 4 April 2004), p.15
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are attractive and seem legitimate to others, the universalism of this country’s culture and
its “ability to establish a set of favourable rules and institutions that govern areas of
international activity are critical sources of power.” 65
5. The Power of Conditionality: the Exercise of Influence during Constructive
Engagement
Hill’s pyramidal relationship between resources, capabilities and instruments seems only
helpful on a methodological level since resources of power, which have always been a
vague concept for statesman and analysts of international politics, have become more
complex. Because we previously accepted the idea of interdependence as a concept
capable of explaining the overall structure of international relations as well as outcomes,
the relationship between power and asymmetries in interdependence is of great
significance for our understanding of cooperation and non-cooperation among states. The
idea that asymmetrical interdependence is a new source of power implies nothing more
than mutual dependencies on – using Hill’s terminologies - respective resources and
capabilities. The concept of dependence in international politics refers, according to
Hirschman, to a relationship in which one party needs the benefits derived from a
relationship more than the other. 66 Hirschman’s analysis of dependence is based mainly
on reversing the story illustrating the “gains from trade” in standard accounts of the
theory of international trade. 67 Yet this concept of “dependence” in terms of opportunity
costs for foregoing trade should not be depicted as mere trade dependence since
Hirschman drew attention to the intimate link between the concept of “gain from trade”
and the concept of dependence.
The influence which country A acquires in country B by foreign trade depends in the first place
upon the total gain which B derives from that trade; the total gain from trade for any country is
indeed nothing but another expression for the total impoverishment which would be inflicted upon it
65 Joseph S. Nye, “The Changing Nature of World Power,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 105, No. 2
(Summer, 1990), p .182
66 see Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1945)
67 see R. Harrison Wagner, (Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence” ,
International Organization, Vol.42 , No. 3 (Summer, 1988), p. 462
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by a stoppage of trade. In this sense the classical concept, gain from trade, and the power concept,
dependence on trade, now being studied are seen to be merely two aspects of the same phenomenon.
68
Hirschman’s aim is to show that the ability of one government to threaten interruption of
trade with another can be a means of employing power to demand certain concession
from the weaker country. Defining dependence in terms of reliance on others,
consequently implies a lack of self sufficiency, which in turns implies that it would be
costly for the dependent party to allow changes in the relationship. The capability of one
country to change or threaten to change certain patterns of a relationship are in
Hirschman’s economic model the ability to manipulate the terms of trade in one’s favour
by the use of tariffs and export taxes. Hirschman’s leap from this market power to
“relationships of dependence and influence” 69 is made in two steps: First, he points out
that if two states in a bilateral trading relationship both have market power, then the
equilibrium terms of trade between them depend on the actions of both states, and thus
are subject to the same sort of indeterminacy as they would be if the two states bargained
directly over the terms of trade. By drawing on outcomes of historical economic
negotiation Hirschman attempts to prove that “tariffs are the manifestations of bargaining
power under conditions of private trading.” 70 This statement indicates that Hirschman
assumes that the same factors that influence a government’s degree of market power also
influences the relative bargaining power of states in negotiations over the terms of trade.
71 Second, and this is more relevant to concerns of constructive engagement, he
concludes that states who have bargaining power in this sense are not only able to
manipulate terms of trade but also to use it to demand political concessions.
The ability to manipulate the terms of trade in one ´s favour depends, indeed, on the gain from trade
derived by the trading partners, and the policies we have described are directed precisely to increase
this gain. The monopolistic exploitation of a trading partner can then be considered as one of the
uses to which the power secured through the influence effect may be put. We are here concerned
68 Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade , p. 18
69 ibid, p. 15
70ibid, p. 43
71 see R. Harrison Wagner, “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence”, p. 463
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only with the methods and conditions leading to this power, not with its possible uses which may be
the reaping of advantages of any kind- military and political, as well as economic. 72
Taking Hirschman’s argument further to economic interdependence between states one
can see that what Hirschman calls the “objective gains from trade” are mutual
dependencies on respective resources or capabilities, which, according to common liberal
parlance, are made possible along the lines of comparative advantage. The commonsense
underlying much of the literature on economic dependence tells us that if one actor needs
the other’s resources or capabilities more than the other, then the first is in a weak
bargaining position. 73 As Hirschman states:
[…] If we say that the bargaining power of the entrepreneur is superior to that of the non-unionized
worker […] we think not only of the differences in bargaining skill, cunning, information, etc, but
mainly of the fact that the worker “needs” the entrepreneur more than the entrepreneur “needs” him.
This, in turn, means that we are implicitly comparing two utility gains, or at least, the levels of
satisfaction of the two opponents if there is no contract. 74
If one accepts the fact that control over resources has the potential to affect certain
outcomes, with the consequence that a more dependent actor in an interdependent
relationship is being determined or significantly affected by external forces, then we have
to ultimately agree with Keohane and Nye that asymmetries in interdependence are most
likely to provide sources of power and influence. 75 A less dependent actor in a
relationship, therefore, has a significant political resource, because changes in the
relationship will be less costly to that actor than to its partners. To understand this role of
power in interdependence, one must distinguish between sensitivity and vulnerability,
whereas the former refers to a commitment to a certain pattern of domestic and
international rules and the latter could be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs
imposed by external events. Sensitivity is measured by the volume of flows across
borders, but also by the costly effects of changes in transactions. Keohane and Nye assert
72 Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade , p. 26
73 see R. Harrison Wagner, “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence”, p. 465
74 ibid. 466
75 Robert Keohane, Joseph N. Nye, Power and Interdependence, ( New York, Longman, 2001), p. 9
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that the fact that a set of policies remaining constant may reflect the difficulty in
formulating new policies within a short time, or it may reflect a commitment to a certain
pattern of domestic and international rules. 76 The vulnerability dimension of
interdependence refers to the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives
available to the actors. 77 Thus, while sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed
from outside before policies have been changed, vulnerability refers to an actor ´s
liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered.
78 Vulnerability dependence can be measured only by the costliness of making effective
adjustment to a changed environment over a period of time. Manipulating economic or
socio-political vulnerability, while providing a source of power and influence for the less
dependent actor, however, also bears risks and are likely to lead to counterstrategies. 79 In
line with Dahl’s methodology, A is autonomous of B only if A would suffer from
changes in the relationship less than B. If A is less sensitive, and more importantly, less
vulnerable, A will be able to exert influence over B. Dependency theorists refer to this as
compliance with the core. It describes a situation, in which “ dependent states comply
with the foreign policy wishes of the core in exchange for economic rewards or to avoid
economic punishments.” 80 Nevertheless, A’s potential autonomy relative to B largely
depends on asymmetric control in the relationship, in which B’s sensitivity as well as
vulnerability is greater than that of A. Since political and economic interdependencies are
not static and generally reflect fluctuating political and economic realities in international
relations, sensitivities and vulnerabilities are just as fluid and effect respective foreign
policy behaviour.
Now, before attempting to distinguish between modes of hard and soft power (or
manifest and implicit influence), it is vital to subdivide the spectrum of means of hard
power in international relations into two broad categories: coercive and non-coercive.
International relations scholars tend to associate non-coercive strategies as the choice of
76 Robert Keohane, Joseph N. Bye, Power and Interdependence, p. 11
77 ibid, p. 11
78 ibid, p. 11
79 ibid, p 14
80 Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K. Hey, Patrick J.Haney, Foreign Policy Analysis – Continuity and Change in its
Second Generation (London, Prentice Hall, 1995), p. 210
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strategy for small and / or less developed states. The means of influence applied in a non-
coercive strategy include:
a. Support: A gives B assistance to do something which B wants to do but cannot do
for want of the necessary means
b. Stimulation: A demonstrates to B that it is feasible to carry out a certain action at
a certain point of time
c. Persuasion: A enables B to come to an understanding of his “true” situation by
means of truthful information. Persuasion by rational communication is consistent
with the Kantian categorical imperative that one should treat his fellow human
beings always as ends in themselves, rather as means to an end. 81
Dahl argues that non-coercive forms of power in foreign policy implementation,
particularly, rational persuasion, are possibly the only morally permissible means of
influence. 82 The fact that manipulative persuasion, various forms of coercion and the
physical use of force are commonplace aspects in international relations surely shows that
the idea of rational persuasion lacks universal acceptance in international society,
however it does not indicate that the concept as such is invalid. On the contrary,
constructive engagement in fact stems from this idea. Far from condemning rational
persuasion to remain in the idealistic realm of liberalism, engagement suggests that
“rational communication” is at the core of engagement between sender and target and
should be understood as a concept, which provides the theoretical foundation of
constructive engagement. Nevertheless, since there are mechanisms and tools available to
a diplomacy of constructive engagement outside the realm of non-coercion, coercive
strategies do not contradict rational persuasion if applied sensibly. These include foreign
policy tools such as negative sanctions (forms of punishment) and positive sanctions
(rewards). In popular political parlance positive and negative sanctions are respectively
referred to as the “carrots and sticks” of diplomacy.
81 see Philip Everts, Guido Walraven (ed.) The Politics of Persuasion: Implementation of Foreign Policy by
the Netherlands, (Aldershot, Hants , 1989), pp.77-78; Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 45
82 Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 52
31
The foreign policy option of constructive engagement, which essentially is the use of
positive sanctions to persuade governments to change certain aspects of their behaviour,
has received relatively little scrutiny in international relations literature. On the contrary,
scholars and policymakers tend to study and pay more attention to negative sanctions that
actively seek to manipulate, harm or diminish the capacities and resources of the target
country. Economic sanctions in particular have increasingly become the tool of choice for
policymakers to protest or coerce a change in an offending country. 83 The efficacy of
sanctions has been subject to extensive debate; in which scholars seek to find an answer
to the question of whether economic sanctions actually work in respect to stated policy
goals.84
Within the context of an interdependent relationship, it is evident that the sender will
have to consider certain basic criteria, which should be assessed when applying negative
sanctions during constructive engagement. The first criteria in weighing the use of
negative sanctions in a given situation is impact, which is the sheer economic or political
damage that sanctions inflict on the target country. 85 Quite often, sender countries prefer
to employ export rather than import controls. One reason for this choice is that A is able
to implement negative sanctions, if A enjoys a dominant market position as supplier of
83 In 1997, the U.S. President ´s Export Council reported a total of seventy-three countries that were under
some form of unilateral economic sanctions. For an analysis on the use and efficacy of U.S. laws and
executive orders imposing various sanctions against states (in particular Iran and Libya). see Troy Lavers,
“Law as a Smart Bomb or just a limited tool of Coercion: Considering Extra-territorial Economic
Sanctions”, RUSI Journal (October, 2001) Vol.146, No.5, p.17
84 In the most extensive study of sanctions, Hufbauer, Schott and Elliott measured success in terms of
achieving stated policy goals. After examining 115 cases in which sanctions were used, Hufbauer
concluded that sanctions were successful 35 percent of the time. see Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott,
Kimberly A. Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered- History and Current Policy (Washington, 1990),
pp.92-93; see also Robert Pape, “Why Sanctions Still Do Not Work“ International Security, Vol. 23
(Summer, 1998), pp.66-77; David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft , (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1985), pp-130-144; Concerning British-Iranian relations and the sanctions debate, it should be noted
that the imposition of sanctions against Iran by Britain in 1951 (together with covert operations) proved
effective for Britain to achieve stated policy goals. The success of sanctions in this historical case mainly
derived from the fact that whilst oil rents were fundamental for the survival of the Iranian economy, Britain
and other major Western powers were able to substitute oil imports from Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar. see Makio
Miyagwa, Do Economic Sanctions Work? (London, Macmillan Press, 1992), pp.30-33
85 Hufbauer and associates argue that those cases that inflict heavy costs (i.e. destabilization, military
impairment, and other major policy change cases) on the target country are generally successful. see Gary
C. Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered- History and Current Policy (pp.101-102)
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exports rather than as purchaser of imports. 86 The United Kingdom, the USA, as well as
the EU member states seem to particularly enjoy a dominant position as a manufacturer
of military hardware as well as high-technology goods.87 It should, however, also be
considered what options B has to reduce the effects of any such trade embargo. The level
of vulnerability of B to the trade embargo will also reflect B’s capability to develop
alternative sources of supply; to stimulate and diversify domestic production, develop
industrial substitutes 88 and, most importantly, attempt to use asymmetries in the
interdependent relationship in order to inflict maximum costs to A and thus minimise the
overall impacts with regards to A’s desired outcome. The freezing of financial assets held
by B in A may carry severe political and legal consequences. Financial sanctions,
including deprivation of trade finance, loans, development assistance, on the other hand,
may carry more leverage and have, as Hufbauer found, the potential to tilt the political
balance towards A’s favour. Unlike, trade sanctions, where the impact is often being
diffused through B’s population, financial sanctions, on the other hand, may directly
affect policies of the government. 89
The second criterion, brought forward by O’Sullivan is the effectiveness of sanctions;
that is the extent to which sanctions actually achieve their goal. Whilst impact and
effectiveness are theoretically related, they are far from synonymous as the former refers
to the sheer economic or political damage that sanctions inflict on B and the latter
indicates whether A’s goal had been achieved. Hufbauer’s findings have shown that
sanctions which had the most profound economic impact on a country were the ones most
likely to achieve their goals. Nevertheless, economic pain does not have to lead to
political gain. 90 The “rally around the flag” effect and especially the human suffering 91
86 see Gary C. Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered- History and Current Policy, p.65
87 ibid, for the impact of economic interdependence on British arms exports see Davina Miller, Export or
Die- Britain’s Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq (London, Cassell, 1996), pp.2-21
88 Margaret P. Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, (London, Macmillan Press,
1987), p. 91
89 Gary C. Hufbauer, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered- History and Current Policy , p.70
90 Maeghan O´Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.,
Brookings Institution, 2003), p. 27
91 for the human impact of UN sanctions on the Iraqi population see Denis Halliday, “Sanctions have an
impact on all of us” in Middle East Report, No. 209, (Winter, 1998), p.3; Roger Normand, “Iraqi Sanctions,
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law”, Middle East Report, No. 200, (July-September, 1996), pp.40-46
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associated with a sanction regime, lend support to the claim that constructive engagement
together with a sanction regimes, specifically aimed at the government’s ability to
manoeuvre (e.g. military adventures, control of financial flows) could produce the
expected outcome at less cost to a country’s population.
The third criterion to employ when considering the use of sanctions refers to the cost to
the government imposing negative sanctions. Evidently, the imposition of sanctions in an
interdependent relationship always imposes costs on A as well as B. Whilst the cost that
A suffers from imposing sanctions on B should be taken into the overall assessment of
how successful the sanctions regime was, the associated financial, economic and possibly
political detriments are also fundamental determinants to A on whether it is wise and
desirable to employ them in the first place. A’s decision to employ sanctions or not
largely - though not exclusively - depends on A’s own vulnerability on changing the
relationship with B. If A’s vulnerability is such that A is unable to substitute for the loss
of B with available alternatives, A is unlikely to employ sanctions. If, however, A’s
sensitivity is such, that it can react quickly to its own implemented changes in the
relationship without inflicting costly changes on itself, the use of sanctions against B
might seem more desirable.
Within the context of our discussion of constructive engagement (which follows the
dictum of “rational persuasion”) the use of positive sanctions seems to offer an overall
more holistic approach to maintaining communication and solving problems between
states. Positive sanctions, while not overtly coercive, aim to influence the recipient state’s
behaviour towards the sender state’s preferred direction. Positive sanctions or
inducements are defined as actual or promised rewards to the recipient state. While this
definition may seem simple enough and the concept of influence by rewards may actually
not have any definite moral standing one way or the other 92, Baldwin argues that there
are “conceptual and empirical difficulties in distinguishing between positive and negative
sanctions.” 93 In order to distinguish between positive and negative sanctions imposed
92 Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, p. 47
93 David A. Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions”, World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Oct. 1971), p.23
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from actor A to B, Baldwin establishes B ´s baseline of expectations at the moment of A´
s influence attempt. Drawing the concept of baseline from Blau, he defines it in terms of
B’s expected future value position, “i.e. his expectations about his future position relative
to the things he values.” 94 Positive sanctions or inducements, then, are actual or
promised improvements in B’s value position relative to his baseline of expectations,
while negative sanctions are actual or threatened deprivation relative to the same
baseline. 95
For our understanding of how power is exercised through positive sanctions during
constructive engagement, we need to consider Baldwin ´s three pitfalls to distinguishing
between positive and negative sanctions. The pitfalls concern B´s perception, time and
conditional influence attempts.
This is vital because a policy of constructive engagement, which employs the mechanism
of conditionality, needs to distinguish between positive and negative sanctions as well as
between incentives and bribes. What is essential, are the circumstances in which A offers
inducements to B as well as the timeline of A’s attempt to influence and the desired
outcome. If this thesis uses the concept of positive sanctions as a form of social exchange
in inter state relations, then we have to be alert to scholarly arguments against such a
presumption. As Bachrach and Baratz argue, explanations of power relations should
specify from whose point of view the situation is being viewed. When nation A gives
nation B economic aid in return for support in the United Nations, it is right to state that
nation A has used positive sanctions, i.e., foreign aid to influence nation B ´s behaviour at
the United Nations. Undoubtedly, an influence attempt has succeeded and an exchange
has occurred. This conclusion would be in line with Baldwin’s assertion that exchange
relations are simply subsets of power relations. 96 The difficulty arises when one brings in
the question of where positive sanctions end and negative ones start. What if nation B is a
least developed country and unfavourable economic and ecological conditions present a
94 ibid, p. 23; see also Peter M. Blau , Exchange and Power in Social Life, (New York, Willey,1964), p.
116
95 David A. Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions“, pp. 23.24
96 David A. Baldwin, “Power and Social Exchange“ in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 72,
(Dec, 1978), p. 1230
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serious threat to the well-being or even survival of vast amounts of its population? Hence,
though A may perceive itself as using carrots, B may perceive the promise of foreign aid
as using sticks. 97
The second pitfall concerns time and is illustrated by Dahl´s discussion of positive
coercion in which he observes that substantial rewards can be made to operate in the
same way: “For if B is offered a very large reward for compliance, then once his
expectations are adjusted to this large reward, B suffers a prospective loss if it does not
comply.” 98 Baldwin criticises Dahl ´s treatment of using two different baselines:
In referring to negative sanctions, he uses the baseline existing at the moment of A’s influence
attempt, while his references to positive sanctions use the new baseline after B has taken account of
A’s influence attempt. 99
Since the overall goal of constructive engagement is to shift B’s baseline, i.e. to cause B
to change the expected value improvements associated with doing X, it is important in an
analysis of carrot and stick diplomacy to specify both B’s baseline of expectations as well
as the time when it was established. One should be aware that todays reward may lay the
groundwork for tomorrows threat and tomorrows threat may lay the groundwork for a
promise on the day after tomorrow. 100 Since the argument runs that constructive
engagement seeks co-operation and political concessions through incentives with the long
-term aim to actually increase interdependence in the relationship, then we come to an
assertion close to Schelling’s discussion of “compellent threats”. Schelling uses the term
“compelling threat” to describe a situation in which A threatens B, intending to keep him
from starting something rather than to make B do something. 101 “The threat that compels
97 Given B’s needy circumstances it perceives conditional aid as coercive as it assumes that a political prize
has to be paid in order to meet A’s demands.
98 David A. Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions“, p. 24
99 ibid
100 ibid
101 Schelling distinguishes between the application of force and the threat of force as strategies to avoid
“zero-sum scenarios”. See Philip M. Barnett, “Rational Behaviour in Bargaining Situations” in Noûs, Vol.
17, No.4 (November, 1983), pp. 623-624; for Baldwin’s critique on “complement threats” see David A.
Baldwin, “Thinking about threats” in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 15, No.1 (March, 1971),
pp.71-78
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rather than deters, therefore often takes the form of administering the punishment until
the other acts, rather than if he acts.” For our analysis of constructive engagement we
may evolve this argument by claiming that in an interdependent relationship, the less
dependent actor A may be willing to start punishing, i.e. to withdraw rewards, even if this
would simultaneously punish A itself. Thus, what A is doing during the process of
constructive engagement is using the carrot to shift B’s baseline and subsequently would
initiate the threat of using the stick if B’s baseline shifts contrary to A’s expectations and
demands. Consequently, constructive engagement uses rewards to force a conditional
commitment of the actor it seeks to extract political concessions from, followed by a
threat to administer punishment (i.e. withdrawal of rewards or employment of negative
sanctions) only then when B ceases to give concessions to A. This observation ultimately
leads to Baldwin’s final pitfall, which deals with the problem that “it seems to be easier
to distinguish rewards from punishments than to distinguish promises from threats” 102
Schelling argues:
An unconditional commitment by A to reward (or punish) B regardless of whether he does X or not
is not a promise (or a threat). Thus a promise to reward if B complies must imply a threat not to
reward if B fails to comply. Likewise a threat to punish B for non-compliance must imply a promise
not to punish for compliance. Thus, all threats imply promises and all promises imply threats; they
are simply different ways of describing the same conditional influence attempt. 103
Contrary to Schelling’s argument that threats and promises are merely names for different
aspects of the tactic of selective and conditional self-commitment, Baldwin takes the
stance that a conditional commitment not to reward if the other actor fails to comply is
not necessarily a threat.104 An example may illustrate this line of argument: If country A
informs B that it will not be rewarded if it does not give a political concession X, this is
only a threat if B had a prior expectation of receiving the reward. Therefore Baldwin
distinguishes three kinds of conditional commitments available to A:
102 David A. Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions“, p. 25
103 ibid
104 ibid, p. 26
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(1) Conditional commitment to reward (promise)
(2) Conditional commitment to punish (threat)
(3) Conditional commitment neither to reward nor punish (assurance) 105
Thus, an assurance would make it possible for A to promise a reward to B for compliance
without simultaneously threatening to punish B for non-compliance. Instead A rather
assures B that it will not be rewarded for non-compliance.
How does Baldwin’s third aspect of conditional commitment fit in the process of
constructive engagement? Since we evolved earlier Schelling’s “compellent threat” as
part of the constructive engagement strategy, the notion of assurance corresponds,
therefore, only partly. During constructive engagement country A assures B a reward for
compliance with its demands on political concessions and may neither threaten nor
promise any repercussions or rewards respectively if B decides not to give in. Yet, the
idea of constructive engagement, in line with our definition, allows A to withdraw the
reward when B ceases to give political concessions. Accordingly, it may be conceivable
to add a fourth kind of commitment to the above list; one which could be called
continuous conditional commitment during constructive engagement. During constructive
engagement, one may thereby isolate threats and promises of positive sanctions as
follows:
1. Conditional assurance of a reward the recipient does not expect to have.
(i) No threat of punishment for non-compliance, rather sender assures
recipient that it will not be rewarded for non-compliance
(ii) Reward for compliance
2. Continuous conditional commitment that the recipient
(i) Will continue to receive the reward for compliance
(ii) Will be deprived of the reward for non-compliance
(iii) Might face the threat (and use) of negative sanctions as a last resort
105 ibid, p. 26
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Along this line of reasoning, it would be consistent to state that continuous conditional
commitment can be perceived as a threat to the recipient because the recipient, though it
may not have had expectations about a reward, would actually be deprived of it for non-
compliance or even face the use of negative sanctions as A’s last resort. It can be
summarized that contrary to the exercise of power during coercive diplomacy and the use
of negative sanctions, constructive engagement does not back the demand for political
concession with a threat of punishment for non-compliance. 106 Rather it ceases to give
rewards in the case of non-compliance. Hence, the theoretical idea behind constructive
engagement conceptually isolates threats from promises and treats both rewards and
punishments as opportunity costs to the recipient. Therefore, it can be concluded that
comparing constructive engagement with “carrot and stick diplomacy” may be
misleading since in this picture using the “stick” is merely withdrawing the “carrot” after
it had already been awarded. 107 The use of negative sanctions is only the last resort and
can be employed as a last resort if negotiations involving the promise of rewards and the
withdrawal of the latter have failed.
6. Towards a Model for Constructive Engagement
Conceptualising a peaceful policy of constructive engagement within IR theory
ultimately leads to the adoption of neo-liberal approaches to state cooperation based on
106 According to George, coercive diplomacy involves four basic variables: the demand, the means used for
creating a sense of urgency, the threatened punishment for non-compliance and the possible use of
incentives. Differences in these variables yield five basic types of coercive diplomacy: the ultimatum, the
tacit ultimatum, the “try-and-see” approach, and “gradual turning of the screw” and finally the carrot and
stick approach. Ultimatums employ demands and threats, and impose a time limit for compliance in order
to enhance the adversary ´s sense of urgency. Ultimatums are called “tacit” when the threat or time limit is
conveyed implicitly. The “try-and-see “approach makes a demand, and then opens by employing relatively
coercive force. If the adversary does not comply, coercive force is increased. When “gradually turning the
screw” the coercing power makes explicit at the outset the intention to apply increasing degrees of pressure
until the adversary complies. When the coercing power supplements its threats with incentives, it employs
the carrot and stick approach. see Alexander George, Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War,
(Washington, D.C. U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1991), pp. 3-14;
107 The threat to administer punishment must not be confused with the concept of deterrence. Contrary to
our concept of withdrawing rewards, deterrence is commonly thought about in terms of convincing
opponents that a particular action would elicit a response resulting in unacceptable damage that would
outweigh any likely benefit. Rather than a simple cost/benefits calculation for B, deterrence, therefore, aims
to influence B not to do something it will otherwise do by threatening it to deprive it of something, which
was not previously given by A. see Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, David Kinsella, World Politics – The
Menu for Choice, (Boston, St Martin´s Press, 2000), pp.90-91
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cycles of reciprocity. This is particularly applicable for a model of constructive
engagement, which, as had been established previously, essentially incorporates
economic and political cooperation regimes with the target state on the basis of normative
conditionality. The peculiarity about conceptualizing such model in an interdependent
relationship between A and B, is that asymmetries of interdependence between A and B
allow for the use of incentives, as moves to get B to join an international regime rather
than allowing A to act as hegemon to sustain it. Since we established earlier that power
can derive from asymmetries of interdependence and is subject to fluctuation, the
formation of international regimes within the framework of constructive engagement
essentially reflects the notion of achieving cooperation in an effort to coordinate
commons interests and reduce this uncertainty. Thus, considering this interdependence,
one has to conceptualize constructive engagement along the line of neo-liberal insights,
which views international regimes as interest based, rather than power based.
6.1 Interstate Cooperation and State Preferences: A Structural Explanation
Drawing an analogy from market economics, neo-liberals generally presume that states
cooperate without a centralized political authority. States, if fully informed of their
interests and those of other actors, will seek to increase their individual gains through
mutually rewarding interactions rather than engage in unrewarding conflict. In our quest
to find a formula for a successful strategy of constructive engagement, we will build upon
Keohane´s vital question of “why an actor behaved in a certain way [..] what its
incentives were: that is, what were the opportunity costs of its various alternative courses
of action ? Opportunity costs are determined by the nature of the environment as well as
by the characteristics of the actor.” 108 Hence, our analysis focuses on how incentives
affect the international environment for bilateral cooperation or non -cooperation. Our
model adopts Keohane´s definition of cooperation as “the existence of a degree of policy
coordination where actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences
of others.” 109 Cooperation essentially requires that an actor adjusts its policies to reduce
108 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), p .80
109 ibid, p. 50
40
the consequences on, or facilitates the goals, of another state. 110 If attempts are made to
adjust polices and these become significantly more compatible to one another,
cooperation follows. If, however, no attempts are made to adjust policies, discord
prevails. 111 Keohane argues that one needs to examine actors´ expectations about future
patterns of interaction, their assumptions about the proper nature of economic
arrangements, and the kinds of political activities they regard as legitimate. Ultimately,
this premise leads to the assumption that A may initiate the formation of an international
regime with B in order to alter the behaviour of the target.
A. International Regimes
Each act of cooperation or discord affects the beliefs, rules, and practices that form the
context for future actions. Each act must, therefore, be interpreted as embedded within a
chain of such acts and their successive cognitive and institutional residues.112 According
to Keohane, the concept of international regime not only enables us to describe patterns
of cooperation; it also helps to account for both cooperation and discord. While regimes
themselves depend on conditions that are conducive to interstate agreements, they may
also facilitate further efforts to create such conditions. Arguably, the concept of
international regime theory in the context of constructive engagement is vital because it
helps to explain both:
(i) The short-term mechanism for cooperation and / or rapprochement
(ii) The long-term mechanism to control the target state’s behaviour
Keohane and Axelrod’s approaches to cooperation and the entire literature on
international regimes represent a successful attempt to be neither as broad as international
structure analysis nor as narrow as the study of formal organizations. Borrowing from
behavioural science, scholars of international regime theory argue that states under
controlled conditions may reciprocate the cooperative acts of their opponents while
110 ibid, pp.51- 52
111 ibid, p. 51
112 ibid, p. 56
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international laws and norms shape states’ preferences for such cooperation. 113 Hence,
any attempt to explain the forces behind constructive engagement and its tool of positive
sanctions has to be imbedded within this theory which essentially, as John Ruggie put it,
claims that “international behaviour is institutionalised.” 114 More specifically, Ruggie
defined regimes as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans and
organizational energies and financial commitments.” 115 Stephen Krasner’s definition
seeks a middle ground between “order” and explicit commitments as it emphasizes the
normative dimension of international relations. 116 Krasner identifies a regime as “a set of
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” 117
a) Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude
b) Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and
obligations
c) Rules are specific prescriptions or prospective for actions
d) Decision making procedures are prevailing practices for making
and implementing collective choice. 118
B. Game theory and the formation of international regimes
The Prisoner’s Dilemma, which is part of game theory, has been used to explain how
cooperation can evolve under anarchic conditions. While it is vital to distinguish
cooperation from international regimes, this thesis accepts the explanatory potential of
game theory or rational-choice approaches to describe the dynamics and mechanisms of
cooperation, which, if occurring between actors, may be followed by the creation of a
113 William Long, Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation, (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan
Press, 1996), p. 9; Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, (New York, Basic Books, 1984), pp.7-
26
114 John Ruggie, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends” International Organization
29 (Summer, 1979), p. 559, quoted in Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International
Regimes”, International Organization, Vol.41, No.3 (Summer, 1987), p. 492
115 John Ruggie quoted in Stephen Krasner, International Regimes, (Ithaca, Ithaca University Press, 1983),
p. 2
116 Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes”, p. 493
117 Stephen Krasner, International Regimes, pp.1-21
118 ibid, pp.1-21
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regime. In the game theory literature, it is argued that situations in international relations,
in which states without a central authority face mixed interests and preferences,
corresponds with games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). The PD suggests that, in
discrete interactions, state preferences will prohibit cooperative interactions. The reason
is that the PD presents us with a 2 x 2 game in which the options for the players /
prisoners of cooperation and defection correspond to states’ choices in international
relations. This simplified model of a strategic interaction structure creates four potential
outcomes for each player: mutual cooperation (CC), mutual defection (DD), unilateral
defection (DC) and unreciprocated cooperation (CD). Within the context of international
relations the dynamics of the PD suggests that each states prefers an outcome of mutual
cooperation (CC) to mutual defection (DD). Nevertheless, each state also seeks its
advantage by defecting while the other cooperates (DC) to an outcome of mutual
cooperation (CC) and each state would prefer mutual defection (DD) to a situation in
which one is exploited by choosing to cooperate while the other defects (CD). Hence, the
preference order of states reads as follows: DC>CC>DD>CD. 119 The paradox of game
theory is, as Jervis suggests, that “even if each side prefers CC to DD (and each knows
that this is the other ‘s preference) the result can be non cooperation DD because each
part is driven by the hope of gaining its first choice – which would be to exploit the other
(DC) – and its fear that if it cooperates, the other will exploit it (CD). 120 Essentially, the
PD suggests that, in discrete interactions, state preferences will prohibit cooperation,
despite a certain degree of convergence of interests between them.
For neo-liberals, two inherent problems arise from the PD for the study of international
co-operation and constructive engagement respectively. First, in the real world, states
engaged in PD situations are very unlikely to confront each other only once. Secondly, as
Keohane suggests, the implication inherent in rational choice theory implies that
“relevant decisions of governments, and other actors, about whether to cooperate can be
treated as if they were voluntary” 121 Keohane discredits the assumption of “voluntary
119 Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation” World Politics, 40, No.3 (April, 1988), pp.
317-319
120 Robert Jervis, “Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation” p. 317
121 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 71
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actions” in international relations as flawed. He argues that states are “rational
egoists”122, who “calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to
maximize their utility in view of those preferences.”123 However, in analysing
cooperation and the formation of international regimes, Keohane stressed that it is
important to bear in mind that “regimes can be more or less imposed; that is, decisions to
join them can be more or less constrained by powerful actors” 124 He asserts that
“relationships of power and dependence in world politics will, therefore, be important
determinants of the characteristics of international regimes.” 125 During constructive
engagement, the asymmetries of interdependence and the inherent power of the sender
state show that the result of bargaining about political concessions and / or international
regime formation may not be entirely voluntary. Taking Keohane’ s argument about
regime formation under hegemonic scheme further 126, we see that during constructive
engagement, the sender state may wield its influence over the weaker target state to agree
upon the formation of an international regime, which may either bring more beneficial
outcomes to the sender or may be mutually beneficial for both states. 127 In this regard,
the “issue structure model”, one of the models applied by Nye and Keohane, explaining
regime change in interdependent relations, seems to fit state behaviour under constructive
engagement. In this model, the strong state makes the rules; but it is strength within the
issue area that counts. In this model, regimes are likely to change “when the underlying
distribution of power in an issue area is inconsistent with the effective distribution of
power within a regime.” 128 How can this then be applied to constructive engagement?
State A may want to use its “comparative invulnerability” 129 in one aspect of the
interdependent relations and link the formation of an international regime according to
122 A premise which the PD assumes too.
123 Andrews Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes,
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), p.29
124 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 71
125 ibid, p. 71
126 In “After Hegemony”, Keohane relies almost as much on the theory of hegemonic regime stability as he
criticises it. Stating that hegemonic stability plays an important (though not essential) role in international
regime formation, his emphasis is that international regimes facilitate cooperation if cooperation and
discord are not determined simply by interests and power. Andrews Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker
Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, p.87
127 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 72
128 Robert Keohane, Joseph N. Bye, Power and Interdependence, p. 121
129 ibid, p.120
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A’s norms and rules, whilst creating enough incentives to ensure that B will equally
benefit from mutual cooperation.
Moreover, neo-liberals also argue that the mechanism behind regime formation is based
on the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In an iterated PD, that is, if the game if played
repeatedly, it is generally agreed that players may learn to rationally cooperate. The
reason is that a multi-play PD offers players an incentive - higher payoffs in the long run
for mutual cooperation than mutual defection, as well as means - the ability to sanction a
previous defection - to cooperate which are absent in a single PD game. 130 Seen from
this perspective, cooperation takes place, because future rewards, resulting from CC, are
appreciated. Owing to accumulative experience, Axelrod points out that high probability
of repeated or future plays is a necessary but not sufficient condition for cooperation to
emerge: the future must also affect the calculations of the players in order to persuade
them not to defect in the present play. 131 Because future payoffs in iterated PDs are
valued less than present payoffs, cooperation in an iterated PD requires that the “weight”
of the next move relative to the current move on the “discount parameter, w, must be
large enough to make the future loom large in the calculations of total payoffs” 132
However, Gowa argues that the magnitude of the discount parameter needed to maintain
cooperation which is a function of the payoffs received in individual plays in the iterated
PD does not determine the most successful strategy in a iterated PD. The strategy that
will maximize an actor ‘s long-run utility depends on the strategy employed by the other
actor. Thus, if one actor ‘s strategy dictates permanent defection, the opponent ‘s
optimum strategy is also defection. 133 In such a situation of players’ respective
conflicting and complementary interests, “ a new approach is needed” 134 that draws “on
people who have a rich understanding of the strategic possibilities inherent in a non-zero-
sum setting, a situation in which the interests of the participants partially coincide and
130 Joanne Gowa, “Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International
Relations”, International Organization, Vol.40, No.1 (Winter, 1986), pp.169-170
131 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, p. 15
132 ibid, p. 15
133 Joanne Gowa, “Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Images: The Evolution of Cooperation and International
Relations”, p. 170
134 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, p. 29
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partially conflict”135 Axelrod ‘s solution to what was referred to as “permanent defection”
draws from lessons from a fictional computer tournament.
A computer tournament for the study of effective choice in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma meets
these needs. In a computer tournament, each entrant writes a program that embodies a rule to select
the cooperative or non-cooperative choice on each move. The program has available to it the history
of the game so far, and may use this history in making a choice. If the participants are recruited
primarily from those who are familiar with the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the entrants can be assured that
their decision rule will be facing rules of other informed entrants. Such recruitment would also
guarantee that the state of the art is represented in the tournament. 136
In order to increase the worth of the computer tournament as predictor of effective
choice, Axelrod conducted it in two rounds. A strategy called TIT FOR TAT (TFT) won
both rounds: It begins by cooperating and then retaliates once for each defection by the
other player. TFT discourages, therefore, exploitative strategies and can yield relatively
high payoffs against other strategies.137 This strategy of reciprocity explains the forces
behind a successful foreign policy of constructive engagement. The strategy of
constructive engagement is but a strategy of reciprocity, which punishes players who are
uncooperative and rewards compliant choices. We can expect that practitioners in such a
“reciprocal engagement cycle” tend to institutionalise cooperative strategies or choices as
a general practice, so that they will benefit from others’ use of the strategy as well as
from their own. Since constructive engagement is an iterated PD, rather than a single PD,
incentives from A may result in political concessions from B, 138 which can ultimately
135 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, p. 30
136 ibid, p. 30
137 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions” in Kenneth A. Oye, Cooperation under Anarchy, (Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1986), pp. 244-245
138 It should be noted that the term “political concession” during constructive engagement, which involves
the promotion and protection of human rights merely refers to A’s diplomatic efforts to persuade B to ratify
respective UN Human Rights Covenants or remind B of its commitments, if it is already a state party to any
of these international human rights regimes. Within the context of the CFSP of the European Union, all EU
member state are state parties to all UN human rights covenants as well to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, which represents the first specific provision for enforcement and compliance
with international human rights standards. More importantly, however, with the 1950 European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, human rights have become part of
domestic legislation in all EU member states. Whilst Article 1 provides that “The High Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this
Convention” Article 34 allows individuals to make an application to the court if any of the rights of the
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lead to the formation of an international regime. TFT is successful as Axelrod argues,
because it “is nice, forgiving, and retaliatory. It is never the first to defect, it forgives an
isolated defection after a single response, but it is always incited by a defection no matter
how good the interaction has been so far.“ 139 This assumption is supported by Homans’
argument that rewards tend to spawn more rewards and punishment to spawn more
punishment. “While the exchange of rewards tends towards stability and continued
interaction, the exchange of punishments tends towards instability and the eventual
failure of interaction in escape and avoidance […]” 140
The application of TFT during constructive engagement then looks as follows: The
sender state “A” begins by cooperating (offer of incentives), then does whatever B did in
the last move, retaliating for defection (no rewards) and reciprocating for acts of
cooperation (rewards). It can be concluded that when both players follow this line,
complete mutual cooperation results.
C. Shadows of the Future – functions of international regimes
So far, it has been established that in the iterated PD, concerns about the effects of future
actions help to promote cooperation. This follows the line of reasoning that the more
future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs, the less the incentive to defect
today- since the other side is likely to retaliate tomorrow. 141 This observation explains
why the formation and maintenance of international regimes is the ultimate goal as well
convention were violated by a state party. Judgments by the European Court of Human Rights, which are
declaratory in nature, are legally binding, providing a unique international organ of control in protecting
compliance to human rights standards. Thus, in line with international regime theory: any EU member-state
promoting human rights either unilaterally or multilaterally through the EU Commission and Council,
demands to comply with the same extraterritorial standards, rules and norms the state party itself is subject
to. The convention entered into force on 3 September 1950. For original text see Council of Europe,
European Treaties ETS No. 5, Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Rome, 4.XI.1950 Text completed by Protocol No. 2 (ETS No. 44) of 6 May 1963 and amended by Protocol
No. 3 (ETS No. 45) of 6 May 1963, Protocol No. 5 (ETS No. 55) of 20 January 1966 and Protocol No. 8
(ETS No. 118) of 19 March 1985; for proceedings before the court see Clarre Ovey and Robin C.A. White,
European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.396- 419
139 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, p. 46
140 George C. Homans, Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms (New York, Harcourt, Brace and World,
1961), p. 57
141 Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and
Institutions”, p. 232
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as a functional mechanism for a successful constructive engagement strategy. Essentially,
it is the power of the actors’ respective expectations, which makes international regimes
significant in sustaining cooperative and possible mutually beneficial relations among
formerly estranged states. The principles, rules and norms of institutions of international
regimes make states “concerned about precedents, increasing the likelihood that they will
attempt to punish defectors. In this way, international regimes help to link the future with
the present. “ 142
Functional theories help to explain regime strength, particularly the pattern of why
compliance with regimes tends to persist even when the structural conditions that initially
gave rise to them change. Keohane argues that the regime’s benefits are simply that it
provides incentives to certain forms of cooperative action, by offering:
(i) A legal framework establishing liability for actions, presumably supported by
governmental authority.
(ii) Perfect information among actors.
(iii) The reduction of transaction costs. 143
Drawing an analogy from market and the uncoordinated actions of states, Keohane,
shows - whilst acknowledging that none of the above conditions are met in world politics
–how political market failure provides a functional explanation of both why regimes are
needed and how they mitigate the collective action dilemma. 144 What Keohane refers to
as legal liability, implies that international regimes serve the function of international
contracts, “which help to organize relationships in mutually beneficial ways” 145. As
Keohane asserts
142 ibid, p. 234
143 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, pp.86- 87
144 Political market failure situations refer to situations in which the outcomes of market-mediated
interactions are sub-optimal, given the utility functions of actors and the resources at their disposal. If the
players monitor each other’s behaviour and if enough of them are willing to cooperate on condition that
others cooperate, they may be able to adjust their behaviour to each other and reduce discord. This
ultimately results in the formation of institutions set up of principles norms, rules and procedures. see ibid,
pp. 82-84
145 ibid, p. 88
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These arrangements are designed not to implement centralized enforcement of agreements, but
rather to establish mutual expectations about others’ patterns of behaviour and to develop working
relationships that will allow the parties to adapt their practices to new situations. 146
The notion of reducing transaction costs as the third essential function of international
regimes explains state’s adherence to a regime. In a regime, like in a market failure
situation, transactions costs of certain possible bargains have been increased, while the
costs of certain possible bargains have been reduced. 147 Thus, incentives to violate
regime principles are reduced in that an iterated PD increases transaction costs of
illegitimate bargains and decreases them for legitimate ones. As for the second incentive
among actors it is not merely information about other governments’ resources and
capabilities , but also accurate knowledge of their future positions. In part, this is a matter
of estimating whether they will keep their commitments and when holding to their
commitments in iterated PD, government’s reputation becomes an important asset in
persuading others to enter into an agreement with it. 148 These functional theories, put
forward by Keohane suggest that regimes thrive in situations where states have common
as well as conflicting interests and preferences on multiple, overlapping issues and where
externalities are difficult but not impossible to deal with through bargaining. Where these
conditions exist, international regimes can maintain cooperation.
6.2. Bargaining 149 and Interdependence
It has been established that positive sanctions have the potential to initiative a cycle of
reciprocity and can be seen as useful policy tools in fostering state cooperation (possibly
leading to regime formation). Now, we must identify how incentives can affect a state’s
146 ibid, p. 89
147 ibid, p. 90
148 ibid, pp.93-94
149 It should be emphasized here that throughout game theory literature, a barter situation between two
individuals or states, is referred to as a bargain situation rather than negotiation. The reason for this seems
to be that Nash´s model on bargaining is so influential and subsequently so widely used that the term itself
has become a tradition. 149 This emphasis is important to avoid any confusion, since the concept of
negotiation in this study solely refers to diplomatic practices. see Rudolf Avenhaus, “Game Theory”, in
Victor A. Kremenyuk, International Negotiation – Analysis, Approaches, Issues, (San Francisco, Jossey-
Bass, 2002), p. 208
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definition of its preferences by changing its external payoff environment and its domestic
politics, which in turn may alter its chosen policies. What is needed for a constructive
engagement bargaining model is to establish a two level (structural / agent-level)
explanation for how incentives can contribute to cooperation. Firstly, by using an
international exchange model we need to establish how positive sanctions could alter the
external environment of the recipient to produce a political concession or adjustment,
which essentially will lead to cooperation. However, by treating preference formation and
change as exogenous factors, it is obvious that the international exchange model fails to
capture how incentives can affect agent-level choices. Thus, the second goal is to identify
what role sender and recipient preference formation respectively play for cooperation to
take place. 150
6.2.1 Changing the International Payoff Structure
Hirschman’s work on market power is a useful, yet not sufficient, starting point for a
model of economic incentives. While recognizing the potential for both positive and
negative sanctions, Hirschman focuses on coercive influence stemming from the threat of
interrupting commercial or financial relations not on incentives. Wagner’s critique of
Hirschman focuses on Hirschman’s assumption that asymmetrical interdependence
necessarily translates into political influence. Rejecting that notion, he asserts that
influence cannot be conceptualised without a theory of bargaining and exchange.151 The
sender state can derive political influence from the recipient state ´s dependence on the
gains of trade only if the sender is willing to sacrifice some of its gains from trade for the
political concession. This trade-off requires that the sender places greater monetary value
on the political issue that the recipient does. Thus, political influence comes from the
willingness to pay part of one ´s gains from trade for a change in the recipient ´s political
behaviour, not from the mere existence of asymmetry. Influence is possible only “if a
150 based on William J. Long, Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation, (Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 1996), p. 19
151 R. Harrison Wager, “Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power and Political Influence”,
International Organization 42, No.3 (Summer 1988), pp.462-472
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government that is attempting to exercise influence has a bargaining advantage with
respect to the terms of trade that it has not exploited.” 152 As Wagner asserts:
Since the exercise of influence by threats to interrupt trade is commonly thought to be coercive, this
seems not to be what people have in mind when they think of the exploitation of economic
dependence for political influence. If political influence is no more than the mutually beneficial
exchange of economic resources for political concession, then “exploiting asymmetrical
interdependence” is simply a confusing way of talking about ordinary exchange relationships. It is
important to ask, therefore, whether by bargaining simultaneously over the division of the money
and Bargainer 2’s political behaviour , Bargainer 1 can force Bargainer 2 to change his behaviour
without fully compensating him for the resulting loss in his utility. 153
Wagner concludes that the use of economic interdependence for political influence
“requires that the exchange of economic resources for political concessions make both
parties to a relationship better off than they would be if they bargained over the
distribution of the gains from the economic relationship alone. “ 154 This helps us to
understand the basic mechanism behind positive sanctions. Whilst not entirely
dismissing the “power of interdependence”, his findings tell us that political
concessions may result from an interdependent relationship due to the fact that the
sender wielding political influence could, if it chose, successfully demand more
favourable terms in the existing relationship. Applying Wagner ‘s findings to see how
incentives can change an international payoff structure, we can identify that positive
sanctions can alter a state’s payoff structure under certain conditions. Firstly, although
a recipient has a declining marginal utility for the economic incentives (i.e. goods or
technology) what may be more important is the recipient’s total utility for these goods
or technology. As Long asserts that if this total utility remains substantially positive
during the sender’s influence attempt, the incentive could represent a powerful
inducement. 155 This total utility depends on what extent the recipient needed the
sender state’s offered resources or capabilities. That is:
152 ibid, p. 473
153 ibid, p. 470
154 ibid, p. 481
155 William J. Long, Economic Incentives and bilateral Cooperation, p.21
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(i) The offered goods, services, commodities are valued because they are
important to the recipients economic and political goals
(ii) Are scarce in the recipient ‘s state.
(iii) The terms offered by the sender for obtaining them are strictly in line with
our earlier definitions of reward (i.e. conditional assurance of a reward).
The success of constructive engagement thus depends on the recipient’s total utility of
the incentives, which, according to Long, is most likely when advanced technology is
part of the package. 156 This is due to the fact that advanced technology is such an
integral part of a state’s overall productive capability. 157 The second reason why
incentives can foster cooperation is that, unlike sanctions, they open up new
opportunities for trade and exchange, create opportunities for both sender and
recipient to acquire a portion of the new gains from trade. 158 This assumption is based
on the prerequisite that the sender (in line with Wagner’s model) “does not fully
exploit its market power over the terms of trade but allows the recipient to gather
economic benefit from new trade or to refrain from fully exploiting its market power
over existing trade to gain political concessions from the recipient.” 159 By creating
new gains from trade or technology transfer, or foreign aid, the sender acquires the
means for bargaining over political concessions. By not fully exploiting its market
power in the respective economic niche and not exploiting the recipient’s respective
vulnerability, rather than contributing to its relative equilibrium, both parties win and
cooperation occurs.
156 William J. Long, “Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation”, in David Cortright, (ed)
The Price of Peace – Incentives and International Conflict Prevention, (New York, Rowman & Littlefield
Publ., 1997), p.86
157 for a discussion on dependence of less developed countries on technology transfer and the importance of
advanced technology as a vital element of economic development, see Michael Todaro, Economic
Development ( New York, Addison-Wesley, 2000), pp. 131-133
158 William J. Long, Economic Incentives and bilateral Cooperation, p.22
159 ibid, p.22
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6.2.2 Agent Level Explanations
Yet, relying simply on an international exchange model misses the respective
domestic factors accounting for changes in state preference. It is argued that before an
international exchange of economic benefits for political concession can occur two
prerequisites have to be met on agent-level:
a. The sender state must establish its preference for political concessions versus
economic gains to alter the terms of trade.
b. The recipient state must adopt an internal exchange function favouring gains
from trade (and political concessions) rather than political autonomy. 160
a. Sender preferences
Advocates of positive sanctions and constructive engagement often point to the
counterproductive effects of negative sanctions on both sender and target state.
Recalling earlier mentioned vital criteria for the employment of sanctions, Hufbauer’s
study on negative sanctions confirms the argument that negative sanctions invariably
cost societal actors and create conflict between the state and society. Hufbauer
concludes that with regard to societal groups in the sender state, “business firms at
home may experience severe losses when sanctions interrupt trade and financial
contact […] After the first flush of patriotic enthusiasm, such complaints can
undermine a sanctions initiative”161 The support for positive sanctions, on the
contrary, increases as exporters and investors take a growing interest in the gain from
trade and technology transfer associated with new or expanded commercial relations.
It must be emphasized that this market based phenomenon of mutual benefits for
government and non-government actors in the sender state, which cuts across to the
recipient, supports our idea of a successful constructive engagement strategy, which
essentially attempts to construct multiple channels and informal societal and economic
160 William J. Long, Economic Incentives and bilateral Cooperation, p.23
161 Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly A. Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered- History
and Current Policy , p.78
53
ties between sender and recipient.162 Thus, unlike coercive strategies, such as
economic sanctions, economic gains initiated by incentives tend to maintain a
domestic support base for international cooperation.
b. Target Preferences
The sanctions literature suggests that domestic antidotes generated in the recipient
state (i.e. target) limit the effectiveness of negative sanctions because they tend to
unify the target country in support of the government and in resistance to an external
threat and compel the target country to search for commercial alternatives. Both
reactions move the target country away from a preference for the sender’s desired
outcome.163 Long suggests that incentives are less likely to produce this negative
impact on the recipient state. Incentives, seen as non-coercive instruments, provide a
tangible material benefit that the recipient can appropriate. Most importantly, within
the political economy of the recipient state, incentives encourage those state or societal
actors who have the most to gain economically to be more sympathetic or less
resistant to the political concession the sender seeks. 164 Overall, incentives can
provide substantial economic benefits for the recipient state, which may persuade
government as well as societal actors to enter and sustain the sender state ´s initiated
reciprocal cycle of reciprocity.
6.2.3 Playing the Two-Level Game
A crucial factor to take into consideration on the agent level during constructive
engagement is what Putnam referred to as the two-level game. Putnam asserts that
162this also refers again back to Keohane and Nye´s characteristic of complex interdependence (an ideal
state of world politics) which among other features requires multiple channels connecting societies
including informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements as well
as informal ties among non-governmental elites, Robert O. Keohane, Joseph N. Nye, Power and
Interdependence, p.21
163 Gary C. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly A. Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered- History
and Current Policy p.10
164 William J. Long, “Trade and Technology Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation”, in David Cortright,
(ed) The Price of Peace – Incentives and International Conflict Prevention, ( New York, Rowman &
Littlefield Publ.) 1997, p.89
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though Nye and Keohane are the intellectual fathers of international regime theory, the
role of domestic factors was largely neglected in their work. Rejecting states as
complete unitary actors, Putnam constructed a two-level, win-set-based model, which
incorporates a general equilibrium theory for the interaction of domestic and
international factors. According to Putnam, international negotiations have to be
divided into a two-level game:
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government
to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among
those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own
ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of
foreign developments. 165
For negotiators, this means that they have to appear at both board games. Moves that
are rational on one board may not be perceived as such on the other. The task of a
political leader / negotiator is to negotiate outcomes which are consistent on both
boards. 166 Given the fact that these two environments have different dynamics,
Putnam provides a sequential model: (a) Level I: bargaining between negotiators,
leading to a tentative agreement (b) Level II: separate discussions within each
domestic group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement. At this stage, the
domestic groups can only agree or disagree with the outcome; any amendments
require agreement from all other parties involved. 167 Accordingly, Putnam argues that
the requirement that any Level I agreement must in the end be ratified on Level II,
makes the “win-set” for any given Level II constituents the set of all feasible Level I
agreements that would “win”, i.e. gain the necessary majority among the constituents,
when simply voted up or down. 168 Thus, Level II “win-sets” are crucial for
understanding Level I agreements because (a) larger Level II “win-set”, will make
165 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International
Organization, Vol.42, No.3 (Summer, 1988), p. 434 ; see also James Fearon, “Domestic Political
Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review Nr. 88:3
(Sept. 1994), pp. 577-592
166 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, pp.434-435
167 ibid, pp. 436-437
168 ibid
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Level I agreements more likely (b) the relative size of the respective Level II “win-
set” will affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain. Thus,
the larger the perceived “win-set” 169 of a negotiator, the more he/she can be pushed
around by another Level I negotiator. 170 For Putnam three factors determine the “win-
set”: (a) distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalition among Level II
constituents; (b) Level II political institutions, (c) Level I negotiator’s strategies.
Applying these determinants to constructive engagement two-level negotiations, the
“win-set” would be determined as following:
(a) Generally, the lower the cost of no-agreement, the smaller the “win-set”. The
size of the “win-set” (i.e. the negotiation room for the Level I negotiator)
depends on the relative size of, what Putnam refers to, as “the relative size of
the isolationist forces (who oppose international cooperation in general) and
the internationalists (who offer “all-purpose” support).” 171 Again asymmetries
in interdependence tend to have impact in that “all-purpose support for
international agreements is probably greater in smaller, more dependent
countries with more open economies, as compared to more self-sufficient
countries, like the US [...]” 172 Thus, during constructive engagement B’s
relative vulnerability to no agreement with A, will make “all-purpose support”
more likely. By the same token, however, cleavages between “hawks and
doves” (i.e. factional conflicts on Level II) raises the risk of involuntary
defection on Level I. 173
(b) The greater the autonomy of central decision-makers from their Level II
constituents, the larger their “win-set” and thus the greater the likelihood of
achieving international agreement. Yet, ceteris paribus, the stronger a state is
169 Larger “win-sets” with a broader range of alternatives can achieve a broader supportive collation
170 ibid, pp. 437-440
171 ibid, pp. 442-443
172 ibid, p. 443
173 ibid, p.444
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in terms of autonomy from domestic pressures, the weaker its relative
bargaining position internationally.174
(c) Each Level I negotiator will want to maximize the other’s “win-set”, but not
necessarily his own, as whilst this will increase the likelihood of an agreement,
it will also weaken his bargaining position vis-à-vis the other negotiator. A
way around this dilemma is the use of conventional side-payments and generic
“good-will.” The two-level approach, however, emphasizes that the value of
international side-payments should be calculated in terms of its overall value to
the likelihood of ratification, rather than in terms of its overall value to the
recipient nation.175 Simultaneously, Level I negotiators have a strong interest
in the popularity of their counterpart, since state B’s popularity increases the
size of his “win-set’, and thus increases both the odds of success and the
relative bargaining leverage of state A. As such, negotiators should be
expected to try to reinforce one another’s standing with their respective
constituents and hence expand their “win-sets.” 176
Overall, Putnam’s model of the interaction between the domestic and international
spheres and treating them as mutually dependent provides a crucial variable for
constructive engagement, in that it helps us to understand domestic roots for
voluntary, and more importantly, involuntary defection during international
negotiation. In the case of Iran, this means that negotiations are subject to domestic
factions.
174 This refers mainly to totalitarian regimes, where diplomats representing an entrenched dictatorship are
less able than representatives of a democracy to claim that the domestic pressures at home make it difficult
to accept the deal. ibid, p.449
175 ibid, p.450
176 ibid, pp. 450- 451
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7. Conclusion: Constructive Engagement: A soft-power strategy
Our model for constructive engagement attempted to define constructive engagement
as well as applied neo-liberal approaches to conceptualizing it within general IR
theory. We established that unlike appeasement, constructive engagement should be
perceived as a strategy to bring about meaningful change in a state’s behaviour
without the use of force. It is also usually associated with an effort of “reintegrating”
ostracized states back into the international community. The latest example for this
perception in international relations literature and amongst policymakers alike, is
Chris Patten’s speech in Tehran during the Comprehensive Dialogue entitled “The
Iranian Choice – An Opportunity to Embrace the Family of Nations”, during which he
emphasised that human rights are universal and reminded the Iranian government that
“no nation state, however mighty, is sufficient unto itself. Cooperation with our
partners – cooperation between the EU and Iran – is a requirement, not an ideal.” 177
Reiterating that such cooperation was conditional on human rights improvements,
Patten’s vision was one of which:
I am convinced that there is a vital role that Iran, if it really wants to, can play on this
international stage, among the Family of Nations. You may seize that role tomorrow, or
in twenty years from now – the choice lies with you. Rome was not built in one day, nor
was a democratic Europe or even the European Union created overnight. But the
challenge – the imperative of working with others is one that every modern society has to
face. 178
In this light, constructive engagement was perceived as a peaceful policy, in which the
sender attempts to extract political concessions or demand political or economic
reform from the target without the use of force. Ultimately, this refers to a causation in
which the sender attempts to dominate the target’s political agenda. That the latter is
being co-opted to such extent that it aligns its preferences along that of the sender.
This ability of shaping the preferences of others is what Dahl referred to as implicit
177 Chris Patten, “The Iranian Choice – An Opportunity to Embrace the Family of Nations” in The Iranian
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XV, No.1&2, (Spring-Summer, 2003), p. 129
178 ibid, p. 131
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influence and Nye as soft power. Whilst recognizing soft power as a fundamental
aspect of constructive engagement, it was asserted that hard power in the form of
sanctions (i.e. carrots and sticks) still forms part of the dynamics of constructive
engagement. Therefore, during constructive engagement, it was argued, that hard and
soft power assets manifest themselves on two levels. The former constitutes the short-
term inducement, the latter the long-term mechanism to get the target to permanently
align itself to sender’s political agenda. Thus, it was asserted that the use of positive
(as well as negative sanctions) provides policymakers with tools to extract respective
concessions from the target state. We also recognised that respective asymmetries in
political and economic interdependence are vital for our understanding on sources of
power and influence. Given the changing nature of interdependence in international
relations, it was established that such asymmetries are potential source of power for
both sides of the relationship. As such, it was argued that either side has the potential
to influence the actions of the other. Therefore, we were careful not to exclusively
relying on Hirschman’s findings on the power of manipulating the terms of trade in an
asymmetrical interdependent relationship. Rather, we followed Wagner’s conclusion,
that asymmetrical interdependence can only be a source of power in a bargaining
situation when the less dependent actor chooses not to exploit certain asymmetries.
Instead, the more powerful actor can offer incentives, thus indicating that it could
afford to change the terms in the existing relationship.
This issue of interdependence eventually led to a structural explanation of cooperation
under anarchic conditions in which approaches explaining the formation of regimes
were used to explain (a) the short-term mechanism for cooperation and / or
rapprochement and (b) the long-term mechanism to control the target state’s
behaviour. Theories explaining the formations of international regimes have, thus,
been identified as providing functional explanations of international cooperation and
also helped to understand that an institutionalised coordination of preferences, rules
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and principles during regime formation 179 may achieve cooperation under anarchy.
Game theory, based on the iterated PD approaches to international relations, can
provide the principal tool for analysing and explaining this cooperation. Axelrod’s
TFT strategy has shown that a cycle of reciprocity, that is a situation in which the
attempt of cooperation of one egoistic actor influences the decision for cooperation of
another egoistic actor. Whilst such structural explanations were helpful at identifying
patterns of cooperation and how positive sanctions can be used to initiate a cycle of
positive reciprocity, the agent-level was considered equally important. Putnam’s two-
level game was seen as vital as it explains how involuntary defection or cooperation
during international negotiation can merely be seen as a reflection of the domestic
environment.
Overall, constructive engagement was approached as a deliberate non-coercive policy
of any given state to demand changes in the behaviour (domestic or international or
both) of another state. Since the focus was on statecraft and power and the ability to
sway, the model almost solely relied on neo-liberal accounts on achieving cooperation
under anarchy. By and large, soft power, i.e. the ability to make others believe what
you believe or co-opt rather than coerce was seen as the ultimate goal of constructive
engagement. Since the focus will be on human rights diplomacy, Chapter Three will
build on this idea and show that constructive engagement, far from being seen as
cultural imperialism, constitutes a means to establish a universal normative consensus.
179 Since 2000, the Commission of the EU offers Iran to enter a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the
EU which is subject to political and economic changes in Iran (particularly improvements in human rights)
and which gives Iran most favoured nation status.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT - PUTTING THEORY INTO DIPLOMATIC
REALITY
1. Introduction
In foreign policy analysis literature, the reference to diplomacy is often seen as
synonymous with negotiation in international relations or sometimes even used
interchangeably with international relations itself. Whilst negotiation is a central task of
diplomacy, uses of the term diplomacy in such general ways, however, do not give justice
to both the profession as such and the meaning it has in the context of international
cooperation. Accepting the common definition of diplomacy as the “management of
international relations by negotiations” 180, this study also identifies diplomacy as the
profession of persuasion and diplomats as statecraft ´s visible practitioners which, as
peaceful heralds of state power, implement respective foreign policies towards other
states. 181 Turning to Harold Nicholson for a definition we find a characterisation of the
ideal diplomatic practitioner:
Diplomacy […] in its essence is common sense and charity applied to International Relations; [it is the]
application of intelligence and tact to relations between governments […] The worst kind of diplomatists are
missionaries, fanatics, and lawyers; the best kind are reasonable and humane sceptics. The art of negotiation is
essentially a mercantile art. The foundation of good diplomacy is the same as the foundation of good business –
namely credit, confidence, consideration and compromise. 182
The essentials of Martin Wight’s conception of what constitutes diplomacy, which is
particularly important within the context of constructive engagement, are summarized in
the following set of fundamental moral principles:
Honesty or truthfulness: don’t tell lies or break promises, it does not pay and brings its own
retribution; establish a reputation for straight dealing.
180 C.T.Onions (ed.) The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford, Claredon Press, 1976), p. 270
181 Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. Arts of Power – Statecraft and Diplomacy, p. 4 While this may appear obvious to
the reader, the intention behind this emphasis is to stress the significance to accept the study of diplomacy
as an important segment in the field of foreign policy analysis.
182 Harold Nicholson, The Evolution of Diplomatic Method (London, Constable, 1954), p.180
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Moderation and restraint: keeping a sense of proportion […] requires the absence of assertiveness of
national (and personal) egotism, and a readiness to make concessions, to give way on unessentials.
Courtesy: seeking not diplomatic victories, triumphs or successes, all of which imply a defeated
antagonism, but agreements, which suggests common achievement; or perhaps seeking victories
which come without being noticed. The art of diplomacy is that which gets its own way, but leaves
the other side reasonably satisfied.
Respect for the other side: thinking the best of people […] trying to share their point of view,
understand their interests […] 183
While liberal institutional approaches explain how cooperation among states evolves
through the use of positive sanctions, reciprocity and coordination of interests and
preferences, literature on diplomatic practices actually helps to formulate a practical
model for constructive engagement. A model which surely derives its explanatory power
from liberal institutionalism, but, which on a more detailed and pragmatic level
eventually conceptualises the ideas, techniques and practices of constructive engagement.
2. Diplomatic Reality of Constructive Engagement
While game theory conceptualises negotiations as a process of strategic choice and
value maximisation, the history of negotiations makes it sometimes difficult to locate
such concepts in the diplomat’s practice. Findings from the iterated PD in game theory
tell us the dynamics of cooperation, however, various processes of diplomatic
persuasion, communication and concession are sometimes broader and looser than
theory implies. It is important at this stage to stress that while actors in constructive
engagement and the theories behind it, partly draw from techniques and findings from
conflict resolution literature, the concept of constructive engagement itself should be
understood as a distinctive process of foreign policy implementation, both from a
theoretical as well as practical viewpoint. 184 In line with liberal institutionalist
183 Robert Jackson, “Martin Wight ´s Thought on Diplomacy” in Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vo.l3, No.4
(December, 2002), p. 10
184 Conflict resolution theory distinguishes between three major types of activity to mange or resolve
conflict. The first method is bargaining and negotiation, in which parties undertake to resolve their
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approaches to international cooperation constructive engagement follows a non-
threatening, constructive negotiation style, which aims at joint problem-sharing and
problem-solving by identifying the needs underlying each party's position and by
seeking solutions which accommodate them adequately.
2.1 Prenegotiation – Bringing the Target State to the Table
The process of prenegotiation is commonly referred to as the process of getting to the
table as it establishes the need for negotiation. This process is vital for the actual
round-the-table negotiation because it covers the important phases of “defining the
problem or demand”, “developing a commitment to negotiation on the part of the
parties” followed by the third phase “arranging the negotiations” 185 The first two
phases centre about the creation of a political commitment to enter into a dialogue
regarding the sender state’s demand or to solve a problem which has been defined in
such a way as to be susceptible of mutually satisfactory management. The fourth
phase, negotiation itself, then involves efforts to come to closure or crystallize the
previous intent or search in a concrete agreement. 186 Throughout this first phase of
constructive engagement the message to be conveyed should include:
a. Parties have important common interests as well as concerns that divide them
b. If the target state is willing to enter into negotiation, incentives which the
sender conceives to be beneficial for both parties, will be on the agenda
c. There is a possible solution to the problem: this may involve the suggestion
that negotiation of the respective demand or dispute in question be linked to
differences directly, overcoming conflict and establish cooperation. The second major type is mediation
and conciliation, which describes the involvement of third parties. This creates a triangle of relationships,
which facilitates but also may complicate reconciliation. The third tactic is arbitration and adjudication.
Here the reconciling decision is transferred to a third party, leaving the binding decision on how to resolve
the conflict to a neutral party rather than to the adversaries themselves. see I. William Zartman and J. Lewis
Rasmussen (ed.) Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, (Washington, D.C.,
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 9
185 William Zartman, “Prenegotiation: phases and functions” in Robert Matthews, Charles Pentland (ed.)
Getting to the table: Processes of international prenegotiation, International Journal, Volume XLIV, No.2,
(Spring 1989), p. 239
186 ibid, p.239
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another in which the parties are also opposed, thus increasing the agenda and
scope for trade offs.
Essentially, prenegotiation is the process in which the parties move from conflicting
unilateral solutions tor a mutual problem or seemingly unacceptable demands to a joint
search for a cooperative multilateral solution. It is, therefore, vital for the sender state
during this period to convince the target state to arrive at the conclusion that some joint
solution is possible. 187 During conflicts, the decision to enter into negotiations is found to
be associated with a “plateau and a precipice” – a mutually hurting stalemate combined
with the mutual acknowledgement that a negotiated settlement may be better for all
concerned than continuing with things as they are. 188. On the other hand, constructive
engagement is a foreign policy strategy portraying a process of demanding and
persuading and may but does not necessarily have to involve a prior conflict with a
“hurting stalemate”. Hence, it is not the perceived symmetry of power and the prospect of
an impending catastrophe, but on the contrary, perceived asymmetries in power resources
and the prospect of having rewards on the agenda. It is the initial incentive that rewards
in return for compliance with demands will be on the agenda, which marks the first
trigger to start the phase of prenegotiation. In line with earlier established theory of
constructive engagement, it should be evident that the sender state will not attempt to
dominate the exchange with the less powerful target state. Quite the opposite, the sender
state should apply any perceived leverage over its counterpart only to induce the target
state to enter into negotiations by illustrating potential benefits for both parties involved.
Hence, a successful strategy of constructive engagement should attempt to make it clear
that the desired outcome will be, what scholars in conflict resolution theory refer to as a
“win-win solution”. Such an outcome, also called “positive-sum”, is a mutually agreeable
negotiating outcome in which the interests of both parties are satisfied, and which is often
the result of joint problem solving. Such outcomes are likely when the future relationship
between the conflict parties matters to both, when the interests of the parties are
interdependent and when the parties are prepared to cooperate in joint problem-solving,
187 ibid, p. 239
188 G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy – Theory and Practice (London, Palgrave, 2002), p. 30
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that is if conflict parties manage to reconcile their respective interests rather than
positions.189 As Richmond defines it:
The aim of negotiation is to reorganize the balance of power in a manner that is acceptable to both
sides, so creating stability in their relationship. While a change in the perception of the conflict as
zero-sum would be the optimum outcome, it is more likely that the two sides will be increasingly
motivated by the need to alter the balance of power in their own favour, in the process changing the
stakes into items that can be used to benefit both parties. 190
Thus, during prenegotiation, the diplomat implementing a policy of constructive 191
engagement should demonstrate that the sender does not regard the demand or issue at
hand with a winning mentality, seeking only ways to overcome and get what it wanted by
the end of the negotiation. Rather the sender’s diplomacy should represent a clear
conciliatory mentality, advocating a solution, which is to be found with and not against
the target state. Whilst emphasizing the significance and weight of the respective
demand, the sender state should at the same time show his preparedness to give a little to
get something and to settle for an attainable second best rather than hold out for
unattainable victory.
Zartman portrays the most important functions of prenegotiation, which help to
understand the significance of this first stage of engagement. Because negotiation is an
exercise in mutual power and involves the exchange of contingent gratifications (Tit-For-
Tat), initial exchanges of information during prenegotiation may lower the risk associated
with cooperation and may prepare escape hatches in case things go wrong. Secondly,
prenegotiation allows the parties to assess and come to terms with the costs of
concessions, agreements and losses and with the costs of failure before firm
commitments are made. 192 Therefore, a very significant function of prenegotiation for
189 see Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution,
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999), pp.5-6
190 Oliver P. Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus: the Cypriot communities and the United Nations (London,
Frank Cass, 1988), p. 7
191 I. William Zartman, “Prenegotiation: phases and functions” in Robert Matthews, Charles Pentland (ed.)
Getting to the table: Processes of international prenegotiation, International Journal, p. 244
192 ibid, p. 244
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constructive engagement based on a strategy of Tit-For-Tat is a requirement or a belief in
reciprocity. Zartman argues that “fear of reciprocity is its own undoing: one does not
make concessions when one is sure the other side will not repay and the other side does
not repay a concession because it is sure that the other will not either.”193 Prenegotiation,
therefore, is the time to convince the target state that concessions will be requited and
rewarded. Such exchanges are less risky during this phase because they are indicative of
future behaviour rather than representing commitments on either side. 194 Essentially,
showing the possibility for creative solutions is to suggest the possibility of exchanges,
side-payments, compensations or contingent benefits as inducement for agreements. The
success behind constructive engagement lies in the ability of the sender to show the target
that by entering into dialogue about changes of political behaviour or allegiance to
international normative regimes a new good might be jointly created. The sender must
show how the target stands to gain from the new creation, without hiding the fact that it
too will benefit; too great a gain for the target will arouse suspicion, whereas too great a
gain for the sender will not attract the other party.195 Zartman identifies these kinds of
proposals as positive exercises of power terming promises “volitional gratifications” and
predictions “non-volitional gratifications”.196 As argued earlier, constructive engagement
may make use of both. Zartman sums up this important function by stating that “it is the
idea of jointly created gain that is suggested in order to bring about a decision to
negotiate, with negotiations themselves covering the allocation of contributions and
benefits.”197 Prenegotiation also allows each party to estimate and consolidate support for
an accommodative policy and to prepare the home front for a shift, from a winning to a
conciliatory mentality. It allows each party to put together a domestic coalition of
interests to support termination or resolution rather than continuing with a conflict or
supporting a hostile position towards an issue. 198 Another important core function of
prenegotiation involves the turning of the problem into manageable issues susceptible of
193 ibid, p. 245
194 ibid, p. 245
195 I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator, (New Have, Yale University
Press, 1982), p. 72
196 ibid, pp. 72-72
197 ibid, p. 73
198 William Zartman cited in Robert Matthews, Charles Pentland (ed.) Getting to the table: Processes of
international prenegotiation, International Journal, p. 246
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a negotiated outcome by identifying the problem, searching for options and setting the
parameters along the path to find a formula which will eliminate competing zero-sum
definitions and their inherently one sided solution. 199 Lastly, prenegotiation during
constructive engagement is necessary to select those who are susceptible of coming to
agreement from among the participants to the conflict or those who are too ideologically
or emotionally attached to a certain position. What Zartman calls a “core group of
agreers” which come together and gradually expand membership describes a tactic of
building a coalition across the sender and target parties large enough to make a stable
agreement no broader than necessary to cover the issue - a tactic of participant
instrumentalism. 200 Thus, prenegotiation sets the agendas as much as the participants at
the table. In sum, during prenegotiation the sender state, who by initiating a foreign
policy of constructive engagement in the first place, clearly demonstrates adherence to a
non-coercive diplomacy seeking positive - sum outcomes, attempts to convince the target
state that it is in their mutual interest to negotiate. Once they have agreed on an agenda
and all of the multifarious questions that come up under the heading of “procedure”, both
parties will then get round to substantive negotiations. 201
Suggested methods and techniques to reach win-win outcomes before and during
negotiations
Theory on conflict resolution encompasses a wide range of literature providing valuable
knowledge to understand the roots, dynamics and processes of conflict and how to
manage them constructively in order to achieve sustainable peaceful outcomes.
Undoubtedly ever since academic approaches to peace and cooperation started to emerge
in the 1950s and 1960s conflict resolution theory developed an exceptional theory-
practice-theory nexus unprecedented in social and political science. Whilst recognizing
this abundance of patterns and matrixes offering solutions to resolve conflicts, the focus
of this thesis is solely on negotiation, the technique of problem solving and the potential
199 ibid, p. 246 see paragraph on problem-solving techniques
200 ibid, p. 248
201 G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy – Theory and Practice, p. 44
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of multi-track diplomacy as appropriate types of conflict resolution during constructive
engagement.
While in a single PD, cooperative choices are less frequent when respective gains and
losses are not known, findings of iterated PD established that the exchange of information
and the coordination of preferences leads to cooperation. 202 Equally outside the
laboratory, it has been established that the more negotiators know about each other ´s
gains and losses, the higher they raise their joint gains. 203 Hence, it would seem that a
technique of information exchange is an effective way to build integrative agreements
during constructive engagement. In a problem solving orientation on negotiation, it is
precisely the exchange of information, i.e. the sharing of mutual interests and preferences
which achieves the discovery of new possibilities of gains and the creation of win-win
solutions. As Peek puts it:
In a problem solving approach, the focus of negotiation and the starting point for generating possible
solutions are the parties’ interests. Interests represent the real motivation of parties - the needs,
wants, fears and concerns of each side which lie behind their positions ... Interests may... have
multiple layers, with more superficial interests or aspirations as well as deeper concerns representing
basic human needs which are common to all. […] Thus, it is these deeper interests which must be
understood and addressed if conflict prevention or resolution is to be effective.204
The formidable challenge of a problem solving orientation on negotiation, which
covers the phase of prenegotiation and actual negotiation, is to reflect on the causes of
conflict to arrive at a common definition and joint solutions that satisfy the basic needs
of all sides. A problem solving orientation focused on information exchange,
therefore, seeks to eliminate undermining factors such as mistrust among the parties,
selective and distorted perceptions, negative attitudes and images, poor
communication and a competitive win-lose orientation that attempts to force or extract
202 see Anatol Rapoport, N-person game theory: concepts and applications (Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 1970)
203 S. Siegel and L.E. Fouraker, “Bargaining and Group Decision Making: Experiments in Bilateral
Monopoly” ( New York, Mc Graw-Hill, 1960) cited in Victor A . Kremenyuk, (ed.) International
Negotiation – Analysis, Approaches, Issues (2nd edition) (San Francisco, Jossey- Bass, 2002), p. 53
204 Connie Peck, The United Nations as a dispute settlement system: improving mechanisms for the
prevention and the resolution of conflict( Boston, Kluwer Law International , 1996), pp.38-39
68
capitulation from the adversary. 205 There are two fundamental parts of the problem-
solving process most applicable to constructive engagement:
1. Diagnosing the conflicting demand or concern (figuring out what the cause of
the “stickiness” is, or identifying the problem)
2. Developing alterative solutions to the problem through a joint effort acceptable
to both parties 206
The shift towards a co-operative win-win orientation begins by allowing
representatives of the parties “to talk freely to one another, to exchange information
about their interests and priorities and to work together to identify the issues dividing
them, brainstorm in search of alternatives that bridge their opposing interests, and
collectively evaluate those alternatives from the viewpoint of their mutual welfare.” 207
An important way of approaching negotiations is what Fischer and Ury call
“principled negotiation”, which suggests that one looks for mutual gains wherever
possible, and that where your interests conflict, you should insist that the result be
based one same fair standards independent of the will of either side.” 208 Claiming that
“principled negotiation” is a technique designed to produce wise outcomes efficiently
and amicably which can be used under almost every circumstance, in particular when
dealing with another culture, Fischer and Ury list four basic points to follow:
People: Separate the people from the problem
Interests: Focus on interests, not on positions
Options: Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do
205 Ronald J. Fischer, “Prenegotiation problem – solving discussions: enhancing the potential for successful
negotiation”, in Robert Matthews, Charles Pentland (ed.) Getting to the table: Processes of international
prenegotiation, International Journal, p. 442
206 Eben A. Weitzman and Patricia Flynn Weitzman, “Problem Solving and Decision Making in Conflict
Resolution”, The Handbook of Conflict Resolution – Theory and Practice (San Francisco, Jossey-Bass
Publishers, 2000), p.188
207 J.Z. Rubin, D.G. Pruitt, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate and Settlement (New York, McGraw,
1994), p.169
208 Roger Fischer and William Ury, “Getting to Yes” in David P. Barash (ed.) Approaches to Peace – A
Reader in Peace Studies (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 71
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Criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard.209
The first point responds to the fact emotions and beliefs become entangled with the
objective merits of the problem. Taking positions makes it worse because people’s
egos become identified with their positions and should therefore be disentangled from
it. While this suggests that people should come to see themselves as working on a
solution attacking the problem not each other, for constructive engagement it also
means choosing the right negotiation partner, who is least emotionally attached to the
respective problem or demand. The second point is designed to overcome the
drawback of focusing on stated positions rather on the underlying interests, which
once discovered and expressed would produce an agreement which will effectively
take care of the human needs that led people to adopt those positions in the first place.
The third recommendation responds to the difficulty of designing optional solutions
while under pressure. So, rather than pushing one’s own demands against the
adversary, one should beforehand come up with a wide range of possible solutions that
advance shared interests and creatively reconcile differing interests. In fact the notion
of inventing options for mutual gain is nothing new as it clearly corresponds to
Homans’ theorem which says that “the more the items at stake can be divided into
goods valued more by one party than they cost to the other and goods valued more by
the other party than they cost to the first, the greater the chances of successful
outcomes.” 210 Constructive engagement rests precisely on this mechanism. Not only
does the sender state generate a variety of options, it is the knowledge about certain
asymmetries that will allow the sender to play the card of rewarding, that is, delivering
a good which is highly valued by the target. The insistence on objective criteria simply
means that the standards selected are fair and based on standards such as market value,
expert opinion, custom or law. Clearly, constructive engagement which ultimately
seeks the target state’s allegiance to an international normative regime to which the
sender is subject itself, insists on such a fair standard. 211 In sum, problem-solving
209 ibid, p. 74
210 George Caspar Homans, Social Behaviour – Its Elementary Forms, (New York, Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1961), p. 62
211 see Roger Fischer and William Ury, “Getting to Yes” pp.74-75
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workshops during prenegotiation can provide the sender with an opportunity to
demonstrate the feasibility of more formal negotiations and determine the basis for
future joint activity. These workshops provide unique forums for low risk exchange.
212
The discourse on implementing a strategy of constructive engagement has so far been
confined to actors of official diplomacy between governments. However, the ever-
increasing positive potential of multi-track diplomacy in the field of conflict resolution
is equally relevant to constructive engagement. The term multi-track diplomacy refers
to a conceptual framework designed to reflect the variety of activities that contribute
to international peacemaking and peace building. 213 The concept really is an
expansion of the “Track One, Track Two” paradigm. While the Track One describes
the realm of official diplomacy between governments, the phrase Track Two
diplomacy was first coined by Montville in 1982 and is the “unofficial, informal
interaction between members of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop
strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in
ways that might help resolve their conflict.” 214 The activities of Track Two have three
broad objectives:
 To reduce or resolve conflict between groups or nations by improving
communication, understanding, and relationships
 To decrease tension, anger, fear, or misunderstanding by humanizing the
“face of the enemy” and giving people direct personal experience of one
another;
 To affect the thinking and action of Track One by addressing root causes,
feelings, and any needs by exploring diplomatic options without prejudice,
212 Ronald J. Fischer, “Prenegotiation problem – solving discussions: enhancing the potential for successful
negotiation ”, p. 443
213 Louise Diamond, John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy – A Systems Approach to Peace (West
Hartford, Kumarian Press, 1996), p. 1
214 John W. MacDonald and Diance B. Bendahamne, Conflict Resolution – Track Two Diplomacy
(Washington, D.C., Institute for Multi-Track-Diplomacy, 1995), p. 9
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thereby laying the groundwork for more formal negotiations or for
reframing policies. 215
In fact studies on multi track contributions to conventional diplomacy and international
relations imply that diplomats actually welcome the outsourcing of some functions of
conventional diplomacy and extending the reach of diplomacy. 216 It is argued that the
vast and growing network of business connections and institutions on the ground, in
addition to academics and NGOs are considered the most effective avenues for
outsourcing. 217
Of particular importance is the observation that some diplomats equated multi track
diplomacy with initiatives advanced in the interest of the private business sector, taking
the example of unofficial diplomatic conduct by American oil companies in Kazakhstan
and China, a development, which is commonly referred to as Track Three. 218 Within the
context of constructive engagement, the technical expertise of multinational companies
could therefore not only be used as an incentive to come to an agreement but also a major
vehicle through which any existing interdependence is enhanced, thus creating a doorway
to mutually beneficial relations, which would be increasingly uneconomical to
jeopardize. Being deeply embedded in the respective domestic economic structure of the
sender and target country is only one aspect of this sort of business diplomacy. While the
mainstream business community is traditionally conservative, profit orientated, and
competitive, there is also a growing group of socially conscious businesses that come
from a more progressive culture, which could be described as more liberal,
environmentally conscious, peace and justice orientated, and cooperative. 219 Hence, any
215 Louise Diamond, John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy – A Systems Approach to Peace, p. 2
216 Cynthia Chataway, “Track II Diplomacy From a Track I Perspective”, in Negotiation Journal, (July
1998), p.270; Former British Foreign and Commonwealth Under Secretary John Coles demands that Track
One should increasingly engage in harnessing external advice from NGOs, businesses and academia in
order to stimulate a debate about foreign policy making but also to assist conventional British diplomacy to
better serve British interests. see John Coles, Making Foreign Policy – A certain idea of Britain ( London,
John Murray Publishers, 2000), p. 127
217 ibid, 270
218 ibid, p .273 ; This refers to the impact of private business relationships on the gradual establishment of
domestic legal frameworks for contracts and economic predictability.
219 Louise Diamond, John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy – A Systems Approach to Peace, p. 53
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government pursuing a foreign policy of constructive engagement should not only use
multinationals as incentives but actually encourage and facilitate their role in creating
strong bonds of relationships, understanding and communication between unofficial
representatives of the sender and target state. Especially those operating in less developed
countries can provide opportunities for schooling, health care, career training and
development, and other related public and private services. Whilst acknowledging that
most multinational companies produce for world markets rather than contribute
extensively for the host economy, continue to concentrate and centralize financial
resources in the core and have considerably contributed to the emergence of a new
international division of labour, the potential of Track Three during constructive
engagement lies in recognizing and facilitating the untapped financial and social
capabilities of the international business community.
Another crucial track for constructive engagement is the work of the activist community
who see their task in changing institutions, attitudes, and policies through political action.
220 Particularly, promoting human rights is seen as burden on diplomat’s and seems
increasingly being outsourced to international NGOs who, free of government
constraints, often develop new ideas and alternative approaches in advancing this goal.
The reasons for the increasing transition of responsibilities from the state to NGOs are
mainly due to their humanitarian and constitutional foundations, which work for and
through the people. Therefore, the public service that once was associated with the
government is gradually being transferred to NGOs on the belief that they enjoy greater
credibility with individual communities than governments have shown in the past. “Their
relationship with the ‘people’ is seen as giving them greater public legitimacy than the
government” 221. Hence, their development work in areas of human rights are not only
significant for the community as a whole but also for each of the individuals concerned as
each abuse directed towards them are accounted for and dealt with. Their role in slowly
taking over societal and humanitarian areas of global politics and especially the issues
220 ibid, p. 87
221 Edwards, M., and D. Hulme, (eds.), Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing
World, (London: Earthscan, 1992), p.17
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concerning global human rights has had a great effect on the general perception of human
rights and its importance worldwide.
[…] NGOs are rapidly taking over many of the functions traditionally viewed as the responsibilities
of governments, and are thus creating a new international system of governance that to a large extent
bypasses the nation-state system In particular, human rights NGOs have taken over from reluctant
governments the function of documenting compliance with international human rights standards,
and by documenting ongoing violations and abuses, provide the ‘moral spurs’ that drive the
community of nations toward the fuller realisation of rights for all 222.
The ways in which they influence and set direction for social change is through protest,
education, advocacy, support and documentation. Thus, NGOs work with or against
governments in developing agendas for action; in standard setting (that is establishing
international norms for state behaviour, set forth in legally binding treaties that have been
negotiated and ratified by governments); in preparing and providing information about
abuses based on research and investigation; in lobbying officials and the media; and in
providing direct assistance to victims of human rights abuses. 223 Working at the
grassroots level, that is, organizing its constituents, supporting victims, and educating and
mobilizing citizens, as well as working at a strategic level, that is, engaging with elites at
home and abroad makes “Track Six” a system which understands how to effectively
influence opinions of policy makers as well as the public. 224 Sophisticated
methodologies exist for one-to-one relationship building and networking and like other
organizations in the field (e.g. think tanks) NGOs have their contacts in government, the
media and other higher ranks and know how to work the system to maximise their
influence. 225 In fact international relations literature supports the argument that NGOs
have influenced international politics to a great extent and certainly have played a
significant role in bringing about some historical changes:
222 Winston, M.E., ’Assessing the Effectiveness of International Human Rights NGOs’, p.26
223 Claude E. Welch (ed.), NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance (Pennsylvania: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p.3
224 Mc Donald and Diamond list efforts by private citizens as Track Four and academic as Track Fife, see
Louise Diamond, John McDonald, Multi-Track Diplomacy – A Systems Approach to Peace, pp.80-87
225ibid, p. 89
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[…], international human rights NGOs have also been largely responsible for placing the topic of
human rights firmly in the centre of the political agenda, creating new international legal standards,
building international enforcement institutions, mobilising public opinion to oppose violations, and
even bringing about major historical changes, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of
the Berlin Wall, and the end of apartheid in South Africa 226.
It is their unorthodox and independent way that makes NGO significant in promoting
human rights and therefore viable for a government to rely on during constructive
engagement. However whilst Track Six provides a necessary counterbalance to the state,
the negative side of their activist character, which is useful most of the time, may also
feed conflict and adversarial thinking, which tends to lock people into positions rather
than fostering communication and synthesis. A government pursuing a policy of
constructive engagement should work closely with NGOs that have the same agenda,
thus allowing criticism and scrutiny but also making sure that any diplomatic momentum
is not lost in the joint search for an agreement with the target state.
2.2 Defining Solutions: The Formula Phase
If prenegotiations are successfully concluded, the next task for sender and target state
would be to move into “around the table mode”. For constructive engagement this
means that the negotiators try to agree on basic principles of a settlement: “the formula
stage”. 227 Once this important point has been reached: that is the perception by each
side that the other is serious about finding a negotiated solution, each side must now
decide how to present the case in the most convincing and tactically advantageous
light. While most scholars on negotiation assume a universal diplomatic culture, 228
negotiators, however, maintain that culture and language are formative concerning
methods of approaching the formula. Hence, two basic styles of persuasion can be
identified. The “factual-inductive” which draws conclusions on the basis of factual
evidence: eschewing a grand philosophical debate, it plunges straight into discussion
226 Morton E. Winston, “Assessing the Effectiveness of International Human Rights NGOs”, in Claude E.
Welch (ed.), NGOs and Human Rights: Promise and Performance (Pennsylvania: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p.27
227 G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy – Theory and Practice, p. 46
228 Zartman and Berman argue that cross cultural idiosyncratic differences can be accommodated within a
general model of negotiation. see I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator,
pp.225-228
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of concrete detail, building an agreement primarily through mutual compromise of
exchanged concessions. This style is the Anglo-Saxon pragmatic tradition of the
common law on which most western diplomats rely and which is also consistent with
the legal training that most public officials have received. 229 The second approach is
the “axiomatic-deductive” style which first establishes the principles, or formula,
governing the issues susceptible of a solution and then works out the implementing
details. Zartman argues that the deductive approach based on a formula is both present
and desirable in successful negotiations 230 and it is therefore viable for constructive
engagement. This approach is particularly useful for cross-cultural negotiations,
reconciling a high context 231 approach of first agreeing on axioms and philosophical
principles with a low-context 232 pragmatic approach of concession and compromise.
233
Recognizing a formula is essentially sharing a perception or definition of the conflict
and establishing the cognitive structure of reference for a solution. A formula involves
general considerations rather than precise measures, and therefore leaves room for
manoeuvring in the final determination of details. But it also supplies guidelines for
recognizing when detailed bargaining on specifics went beyond simple bargaining and
instead implied an agreement on a different notion of justice or allocation. 234 Finding
a formula during constructive engagement means confronting the basic elements of
demands and rewards. Trial and error is still the best way of reaching an agreement,
229 Raymond Cohen, Negotiating across cultures – International Communication in an Interdependent
World, (Washington D.C., US Institute of Peace Press, 2000), p. 100
230 I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator, p. 93
231 A high context culture communicates allusively rather than directly. As important as the explicit content
of a message is the context in which it occurs, surrounding non-verbal cues, and hinted-at nuances of
meaning. Loss of face (humiliation before the group) is an excruciating penalty to be avoided at all costs.
This negotiation style is therefore shame orientated rather than guilt orientated. Directness and especially
contradiction are much disliked. It is also hard for speakers of this kind of culture to deliver a blunt no. see
Raymond Cohen, Negotiating across cultures – International Communication in an Interdependent World,
p.32
232 Low context culture exemplified by the United States and Europe reserve a different role for language.
What has to be said is stated explicitly. While politeness is obviously not precluded but negotiators of low
context cultures hardly see the need for contrived formulas and verbal embellishments. Hence, guilt not
shame is the psychological price paid for misdemeanour. Ibid ,p.32
233 Raymond Cohen, Negotiating across cultures – International Communication in an Interdependent
World, p.106
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according to Zartman. 235 The sender may come up with a framework for agreement
that is comprehensive, relevant, balanced, flexible and seemingly irreplaceable, and
still the target turns it down. They only way is to try again. While both sides are trying
to make positions plain, the search for referents, criteria, perceptions, definitions, and
principles rooted in each party’s stand goes on. Working on this level, it becomes
much easier to find the elements needed to formulate a framework for the solution. 236
The process of proposing and the tactics of trial and error can be improved by first
preparing alternative formulas as well as simply gathering information. These
alternative formulas should include possible offers that the target may come up with,
along with alternatives the sender might find equally attractive followed by any other
proposal that may be salient at the moment. The greatest advantage of preparing
alternative formulas is not in seizing the other party’s acceptable proposals, but in
being ready to counter his unacceptable ones and to shift to a new proposal if the first
fails – that is what Zartman refers to as trials and errors. 237 A crucial part of the
process of making the target accept a certain formula is the way inducements are
presented. Particularly at this stage, the sender has to make it clear that good outcomes
will follow from accepting the formula. Similarly, warnings that defection of too many
proposals for a formula will naturally leave both parties with undesirable outcomes
can help shape the target’s perception or alternatives, although if too coercive they
may instead contribute to increased resistance. 238 Once sender and target agreed on a
formula either by joint discovery or by the sender’s proposal, the search for detailed
agreements can begin.
235 ibid, p. 118
236 ibid, p. 120
237 ibid, p. 121
238 ibid, pp. 127-128
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2.3 Working out Agreements: The Details Phase
If the parties have agreed to a formula, the final stage involves fleshing it out –
agreeing the details. For negotiations surrounding constructive engagement this stage
is by no means as simple as it sounds. Indeed, insofar as it is possible to generalize
about negotiations during constructive engagement, conventional strategies and tactics
of this phase give us merely a broad idea of how the final stage may be implemented
by sender and target. It is at this stage that the concept of tit-for-tat dictates the parties´
moves. Negotiators respond to the other party’s previous move but they also respond
to their own previous move and then try to make signals to the other party. As a result
negotiators: teach, learn and communicate “as they make each move, while at the
same time acting within the context of outside considerations – formulas, referents,
contexts and principles – which give meaning to and govern the magnitude of their
individual propositions.” 239 Parties continue to communicate information selectively
about their own positions during this stage. As negotiations focus more on precise
points of disagreements, each party has to continue to try to get across information
about what it wants and what it is willing to give up and why, but often without telling
what it does not want or does not care that the other side gets. 240 Hence, it is a process
of wearing down the other party’s expectations and demands so that they can fit an
agreement. A more common term for this process is “bluffing”. Essentially, both
parties want to dissimulate their real aims and demands, so that it may appear to give
in reluctantly on things it ostensibly values in order to achieve things it really wants.
The art of bluffing then refers to various types of communications: reality of
information, hierarchy of values and degree of commitment. 241
Equally parties learn from each other’s past positions and movements. Each party
observes the ways in which the other moves from initial positions. Knowing how the
239 ibid, p. 149
240 G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy – Theory and Practice, p. 52
241 I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator, pp. 152 – 153; see also
Raymond Cohen, Theatre of power: the art of diplomatic signalling (London, Longman, 1987), pp. 212-224
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other party acts or is acting in this case, one can respond properly to obtain the most
favourable outcome possible. 242
Finally each party rewards and punishes the responses of the other party. Since during
constructive engagement the target state is being approached and does not necessarily
have an inventive to reward rather than passively receive and actively concede, it is
the sender state who must be able to offer what may be called a climax of incentives
for the target willing to continue his concessions. Obviously, concession are a major
component of this process dynamic due to the belief that they will elicit reciprocal
concession from the other party. The nature and size of concessions give information
about the bargainer’s subjective utilities and are indications about one’s perception of
the opponent. A common strategy is for the sender to use concessions as a device to
misrepresent real needs, demands or preferences as well as to exchange goods valued
more by the target than they cost to the sender with goods valued more by the sender
than they cost to the target. 243 The sender state should be tough on the issues of
greatest importance to them, but can use this toughness to generate concessions and
then reward and reciprocate with own concessions on other matters less important.
Thus, in general the sender should be tough on demand and soft to reward. 244 Zartman
argues that at some point during the bargaining a “crest “ occurs after which the rest of
the outstanding issues are rapidly resolved and the general feeling is one being in the
“home stretch”. 245 This crest may be described in various ways: it is the point where
enough is agreed upon to constitute an acceptable accord, which the parties have
invested in, even if the remaining points are unresolved, or the point where enough is
agreed on favourably to outweigh any remaining disagreements or non-agreements. 246
Essentially negotiations end when sender and target have exchanged agreement’s on
each other’s positions or when, through concession or through joint discovery of
implementing details, they have both moved to a point which they feel is the best they
242 I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator, p. 158
243 Christopher Dupont, Guy- Olivier Faure, “The Negotiation Process” in Victor A . Kremenyuk, (ed.)
International Negotiation – Analysis, Approaches, Issues ,p. 46; also see George Caspar Homans, Social
Behaviour – Its Elementary Forms, (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1961), p. 62
244 I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator, p. 171
245 ibid, p. 188
246 ibid, p. 188
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can do under the circumstances. Agreement can come about simply through a full
working schedule that has carefully considered all the angles and resolved all possible
points of dispute. 247 Once sender and target reached this diplomatic momentum 248
packaging agreements vary from “treaties”, “final acts”, “protocols”, “exchanges of
notes” or even simply “agreements”.
3. Constructive Engagement: Hypotheses and Variables
It has been shown that diplomatic reality of constructive engagement can largely draw
on conflict resolution theory. Negotiation, in particular, a core function of diplomacy,
has been identified as the main pillar of constructive engagement. It has been shown
that the exchange of information between conflict parties of how to reach a win-win
outcome has the potential to achieve harmony as Keohane sees it. Since the point of
constructive engagement is to change the behaviour of the target state in a peaceful
way, the function of diplomacy is fundamental. By the same token, however, a
commitment to non-coercive measures and a tactic of negotiation in an interdependent
relationship is susceptible to changing realities of power between State A and State B.
Given this condition it is possible to propose following hypotheses and variables:
A. Most fundamentally, states are recognized as rational egoists, which can
resolve conflict through a policy of “constructive engagement”. Constructive
engagement is recognized as a policy, which is best suited at resolving conflict
between states as well as for bringing so called “rogue” or “outlaw” states to
conform to what are held by the great powers to be legitimate international
norms; in this case human rights.
1. Conditionality in the form of “cooperative moves” (referring to economic
incentives or political support) are used to initiative a “positive cycle of
247 ibid, p. 191
248 A traditional device regularly employed by negotiators in order to keep up the momentum of their
negotiations is to employ deadlines, that is, calendar dates by which either some partial, interim, or final
agreement must be reached. see G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy – Theory and Practice, p. 58
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reciprocity”, commonly referred to in political science literature as TIT FOR
TATT (TFT). In diplomatic reality, TFT implies the exchange of information
and the search for alternative solutions to the problem. Both parties shift from
respective positions to focus on common interests.
2. TFT results in harmony, as defined by Keohane, and both parties agree to a
“win-win” outcome. Rewards are exchanged for political concessions, which
in this case refers to improvements in human rights (resolution of the fatwa.)
B. Asymmetries in an interdependent relationship, which can refer to perceived or
objective political or economic leverages, are sources of power.
1. State B’s vulnerability to state A being capable of making changes in their
relationship, makes A more powerful than B. Thus, A is able to transform this
leverage into “cooperative moves” which influence B’s actions or decisions.
2. State B reciprocates A’s “cooperative moves” and TFT follows, which results
in B meeting A’s demands. 249
C. Shifts or fluctuations in an interdependent relationship affect power relations
and ultimately affects A’s ability to sway B.
1. A’s perceived or objective sensitivity to any changes in the relationship allows
B to defect or even influence A’s actions or decisions. A’s perceived or
objective vulnerability to changes in the relationship impedes any of A’s
efforts to influence B.
2. State A may be unable or restricted in its ability to sway or influence B. On the
contrary B may be in the position to influence A’s decisions or actions.
249 Ceteris paribus. “Uncooperative moves” will be punished and reciprocated with “uncooperative
moves.”
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D. All negotiations and efforts to influence are subject to respective domestic
constituents. Thus, any successful Level I negotiation or even the attempt to
initiative dialogue requires domestic consent.
1. a) Level II (domestic) “win-sets” are supported by “internationalist forces”, but
because the “isolationist” camp enjoys more influence on the domestic front, it
is able to constrain or jeopardize efforts by the “internationalists.” The more
coercive “Level I diplomacy” on the part of A, the more constraints will be
imposed on “internationalists”, thus empowering “isolationists.”
b) State B may be forced to defect from A’s “cooperative moves” on Level I
negotiations. Involuntary defection obstructs any of A and B’s efforts to come
to an agreement or even engage in negotiations.
2. a) Because “internationalists” have more influence over the “isolationists”, all
domestic camps support the “win-set.” A policy of constructive engagement is
more likely to empower “internationalist” forces by pursuing a non-coercive
diplomacy, thus making it harder for “isolationists” to jeopardize their efforts.
b) State B can reciprocate A’s efforts at dialogue, which will end in successful
negotiations reaching a “win-win” outcome.250
250 Ceteris paribus. All Level II constraints apply equally to state A.
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Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable
A. States are rational egoists and can resolve
conflict through a policy of “constructive
engagement”. It is a policy of “constructive
engagement” which is best suited at promoting
human rights.
Inducements or “cooperative moves” (referring
to economic incentives or political support) are
used to initiative a “ positive cycle of
reciprocity” commonly referred to as Tit For Tat
(TFT).
TFT results in harmony (as defined by Keohane)
and both parties agree to a “win-win” outcome.
Rewards are exchanged for political
concessions (i.e. improvements in human rights)
B. Asymmetries in an interdependent relationship
(both political and economic) are sources of
power.
State B’s vulnerability to state A being capable
of making changes in their relationship, makes
A more powerful than B. This allows A to
initiative “cooperative moves”, which influence
B’s actions or decisions.
State B reciprocates A’s “cooperative moves”
TFT follows. B meets A’s demands. 1
C. Shifts or fluctuations in interdependent
relations affect power relations and ultimately
affects A’s ability to sway B.
State A’s perceived or objective sensitivity to
changes in the relationship allows B to defect or
even influence A’s actions or decisions. A’s
perceived or objective vulnerability to changes
in the relationship completely impedes any of
A’s efforts to influence B.
State A is unable or restricted to sway or
influence B. On the contrary, state B may be in
the position to influence A’s decisions or
actions.
D. Level I negotiations are subject to respective
domestic constituents. Any successful Level I
negotiation requires domestic consent.
a) Level II (domestic) “win-sets” are supported
by “internationalist forces”, but are constrained
by the “isolationist” camp. The latter enjoys
more influence over the former. The more
coercive “Level I diplomacy” on the part of A,
the more constraints will be imposed on
“internationalists”, thus empowering
“isolationists.”
State B is forced to defect from A’s “cooperative
moves” on Level I negotiations. These
involuntary defection obstruct A and B’s efforts
to come to an agreement.
b) All domestic camps support Level II “win-
sets”. “Internationalists” enjoy more influence
over “isolationists.” A policy of constructive
engagement is more likely to empower
“internationalists”, thus making it harder for
isolationists to wreck negotiations.
State B can successfully negotiate with A on
Level I and agrees to a “win-win” outcome.2
1 Ceteris paribus. “Uncooperative moves” will be punished and reciprocated with “uncooperative moves” resulting in a “negative cycle of reciprocity.”
2 Ceteris paribus. All Level II constraints apply equally to state A.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY AND
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN
1. Introduction: The Concept of Human Rights
Before elaborating on the interaction between Britain and Iran, the research specific focus
on the human rights aspect of constructive engagement demands that we explore more
closely the concept of human rights as well its relation to foreign policy.
Human rights are literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being
251, they are equally enjoyed by everyone, are inalienable and universal. However, they
are not merely abstract values such as liberty, equality, and security. Rather they are
considered rights, particularly, social practices to realize those values. Traditionally,
human rights have been thought of as moral rights of the highest order, but have also
become international (and in some cases national and regional) legal rights, making the
object of human rights an ordinary legal right in most national legal systems. 252 Human
rights are needed not for life but for a life of dignity. Thus, theories and documents on
human rights point beyond actual conditions of existence – beyond the “real” in the sense
of what has already been realized – to the possible, which is viewed as a deeper human
moral reality. In this light of reasoning, they are less about the way people “are” than
about what they might become. Essentially, they are about moral rather than natural or
juridical right holders. 253 Promoting human rights at home or abroad means demanding
the social changes required to realize the underlying vision of human nature. Human
rights are both a utopian ideal and a realistic practice for implementing that ideal. 254 As
Donnelly puts it:
Human rights seek to fuse moral vision and political practice. The relationship between human
nature, human rights, and political society is “dialectical”. Human rights shape political society, so
251 see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution
217 A (III) of 10 December 1948
252 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights – in Theory and Practice, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press,
2003) p. 11
253 ibid, p. 15
254 ibid, p. 15
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as to shape human beings, so as to realize the possibilities of human nature, which provided the
basis for the rights in the first place. 255
Historical notions and foundational appeals, such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and of the Citizen of 1789, were attempts to converge theory and practice and produced
an impressive body of texts appealing to the inherent dignity of the human person.
Ultimately, the Universal Declaration Of Human Rights of 1948 codified the idea of
human rights. Early statements in the Universal Declaration concentrated on First
Generation rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly and the right to take part in
the government of his (sic) country, directly or through freely chosen representatives
(Art. 21). 256 The same declaration also recognized Second Generation rights and states
that “economic, social, and cultural rights are indispensable for his dignity and the free
development of his personality.” (Art.22). The right bearer in both First and Second
Generation rights are, in essence, individuals. Third Generation rights build on a
collective dimension and concerns the rights of “peoples” and grants them to freely
dispose of their wealth and natural resources. (The African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights of 1981, Art. 21 (1)) 257 According to Donnelly , this International Human
Rights regime treats internationally recognized human rights holistically, as an indivisible
structure in which the value of each right is significantly interrelated. As Art. 5 of the
1993 Vienna Declaration puts it: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and
interdependent and interrelated.” 258 Just as human rights are both negative rights, in as
they require forbearance on the part of others, as well as positive rights, in as they require
others to provide goods, services or opportunities, 259 so ought states uphold them at
home and promote them abroad. Obviously, this raises foreign policy issues, notably
whether it is either practicable or prudent to make compliance with human rights law a
touchstone of one’s foreign relations. 260
255 ipid, pp. 15-16
256 John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2001) p. 600
257 ibid, p.600
258 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights – in Theory and Practice, p.27
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There seems to be an inescapable tension between human rights of individuals and state
sovereignty. As Vincent argues: “Their constituents are different. The society of all
humankind opposed to the club of states, and one of the primary rules of the latter has
been to deny membership to the former.” 261 Nonetheless, since the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in 1948, human rights have become a significant part of foreign policy,
thus challenging the principle of state sovereignty and gradually eroding the sanctity of
the boundaries of domestic jurisdiction. In fact, numerous international agreements and
conventions on human rights, initiated a process by which the assumed sovereignty of the
territorial state has given way to shared authority and power between the state and
international organizations and the promotion and protection of human rights across
borders has inevitably become ius cogens between states.262 Authoritative texts on human
rights, such as most notably the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 263 established
both legally binding global human rights regimes with treaty-reporting and monitoring
mechanisms through the UN, as well as a legitimate duty for governments to incorporate
human rights in their foreign policy considerations. Hence, according to the conventions
of positivist international law, by their explicit agreements and by custom and practice,
foreign offices are essentially bound to pay attention to human rights. 264 According to
Hill, in the international political system it is not enough to announce a new principle; it
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has to become internalized and achieve a consensus before it will appear in actions. That
happens dialectically through the slow process of interaction between governments, some
keener than others, and private groups.” 265
The international law of human rights actually provides a legal duty for governments to
show concern for human rights violations in other countries.
The concept of implementing moral concerns in foreign policy predates contemporary
declarations and covenants. There are several normative traditions, which support the
concept of human rights. Particularly Kant and Locke’s treatises on rights represent
arguably the most authoritative accounts that present us with a defence of inalienable
natural rights.
Similar to civil or political rights, Kant’s international rights of nations conceived within
the legal framework of a federation of states are based upon shared laws to which each
member state is subject. According to Kant, the nature of international rights
[...] involves not only the relationship between one state and another [state] within a larger whole,
but also the relationship between individual persons in one state and individuals in the other [state]or
between such individuals and the other state as a whole. 266
Kant’s categorical imperative ultimately demands that states ought to conduct “foreign
affairs” as if they were moral persons since “on the cosmopolitan level… whatever
reason shows to be valid in theory is also valid in practice.” 267 Hence, the underlying
nature of republican constitutionalism and the federal contract between states, ultimately
implies that “ a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere, the idea of a
cosmopolitan rights is therefore not fantastic and overestimated; it is a necessary
complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into
a universal right of humanity. “ 268 As far as the contemporary human rights discourse is
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concerned, Kant’s ethical absolutism and his rigorous insistence on an egalitarian state of
international relations with inherent moral precepts and formal principles for states to
observe would be expressed in terms of today’s idea of human rights diplomacy. Since
Kant’s concept of human rights as well as today’s notion of human rights are both
grounded on the same principle of morality and the duty to defend those rights, 269
diplomats charged with the promotion and protection of human rights essentially aim to
realize this vision of human beings as equal and autonomous individuals living in states
that treat citizens with equal concern and respect. Human rights diplomacy then promotes
principles that are widely accepted as authoritative within the society of states. Efforts to
protect human rights emphasize individual liberty and state restraint, thus safeguarding
individuals from arbitrary rule. In line with contractarians, such as Locke and Kant two
principal dimensions of the human rights strategy of control over the state can be
identified:
1. Negatively, it prohibits a wide range of state interference in the personal, social
and political lives of citizens, acting both individually and collectively
2. Positively, human rights place the people above and in positive control of their
government. Thus, political authority is vested in a free citizenry endowed with
extensive rights of political participation (i.e. rights to vote, freedom of
association, free speech, freedom of religion etc.) 270
In the “Second Treatise” Locke argues that “voluntary union” of men “gives […]
political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects.” Accordingly, a legitimate
civil government is instituted by the explicit consent of those governed. Those who make
this agreement transfer to the civil government their right of executing the law of nature
and judging their own case. Essentially, each individual cedes his or her right to this
authority to protect his or her right from being abused. 271
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Kant’s debt to Lockean contractarianism is particularly evident in Rechtslehre, in which
he argues that “the legitimate [or sovereign] authority can be attributed only to the united
will of the people. Because all right and justice is supposed to proceed from this
authority, it can do absolutely no injustice to anyone. “ 272 Insisting on (indirect) consent
through a representative system, Kant also calls for the executive to rule on the basis of
the rule of law, which in turn reflects the united will of the people. A true republic, Kant
argues, “is and can be nothing else than a representative system of the people if it is to
project the rights of the citizens in the name of the people.” 273
Whilst it is true that the concept of “right-holders” is indebted to the contractarian school
of thought, Kant and Locke’s respective visions of republicanism are not confined to this
legal aspect of individual rights. Since rights also express a deeper concern for human
dignity, they also point to the capacity of individuals to act responsibly, a capacity, which
Kant recognizes as the human awareness of duty. For Kant, it is the awareness of duty,
which opens up the way to a profound understanding of human freedom. 274 Equally, a
crucial tenet in Locke’s theory, is that for every duty there is a correlative right to the
performance of that duty, held by another; and that for every right (excluding) liberties,
there is a correlative duty on others to allow the exercise of this right. 275 Duty, according
to Kant is, however, also more than this mutual respect between individuals, as it refers to
one’s duty to strive for emancipation (referring to man’s self-incurred immaturity
[Unmümdigkeit]. 276 Accordingly, because of the individual’s duty to respect human
dignity, people are duty bound to establish an order of legal justice by which everyone’s
right to equal freedom can be guaranteed.277
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Our modern understanding of human rights seems greatly indebted to the Enlightenment
and the legal-political order associated with contractarian accounts. Both Locke and Kant
start from the premise of inherent and inalienable human dignity and equality and
demand a contractarian union between subjects and a government in order to safeguard
those rights.
Hegel’s vision of history, however, argues that it is liberal societies in the West that have
been the freest and most generally congenial societies in history, but not because they
were built on the basis of rights in a contractarian sense. Rather because these societies
were, in certain respects, ethical communities in which “ rights were widely honored and
respected”. In his view, “ a successful rights-based politics is parasitic on features of the
polity that have nothing to do with rights.”278 The three elements of an ethical community
from Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right”: the family, civil society and the state, “constitute
individuality, that (…) construct(s) the kind of individual that liberal rights-based thought
takes as given.” 279 Broadly, the realm of family and civil society provide an
environment, where the individual can act in a context where law and government are
seen as external forces. The state is seen as the sphere, where these individuals come to
see their competitors as fellow-citizens, and to realise that the laws that bind them
together are self-made rather than an exogenous phenomenon. 280 Thus, the idea is that
the rights the community assigns each other are not the manifestations of a general moral
code or the product of universal reasoning; rather they are more like reminders that the
community gives itself as to what is regarded as proper conduct. According to Hegel,
they are enforceable against the government, the police and the corporations, but not
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against the state as such, that is the state in its role as the expression of a higher unity. 281
Thus, instead of a standard stock of rights with which all people emerge from the state of
nature, the development and emergence of rights reflects the many outcomes of freedom,
as individuals play a role in forming the content of law by maintaining and modifying
social practices as needed to secure their freedom and their individual ends. Contrary to
contractarians, Hegel argued, “achieving community and actualizing freedom are based
on recognizing this common mutual interdependence. Effecting this recognition and its
attendant freedom is the very point and purpose of the social and political institutions in
Hegel’s theory of the state.”282 Unlike the Lockean “state of nature” freedom, human
autonomy is achieved through individuals acting as self-legislators, assigning themselves
their own principles. Hegel focuses on the moral, social and political issue of bringing
people to understand how (in a well-ordered) society their needs, aspirations, and
principles form a rationally acceptable system. Ultimately, such a system leads to
integrated personal lives, where individual lives are integrated into a network of social
institutions. 283 For Brown the rational, ethical community, is the answer to the question:
“How can we live rational ethical lives in societies characterised by mass membership,
and extended and complex division of labour and, if we are fortunate enough, some kind
of representative government?” 284 The ethical community provides us with an ideal
against which existing societies can be measured, but more importantly, it represents a
communitarian concept of rights providing a universal model of human rights, as they are
constructed by civil society - which has been superseded by the movement of Geist -
rather than on rights-based individualism. 285
But how do we put the Heglian notion of the absolute morality of the movement of the
Geist into context of contemporary human rights diplomacy? Postmodernist Richard
Rorty manages to demythologise such Hegelian concepts. Whilst opposing
foundationalist accounts of rights, he argues that rights act to “ summarize our culturally
influenced intuitions about the right thing to do in various situations” thus “heightening
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the sense of shared moral identity with brings us together as a moral community”. 286
Since the Enlightenment, western political thought has created a “human rights culture”
and thereby extended the scope of this shared moral identity. 287 Rorty traces this
achievement back to a sense of “security” - conditions of life sufficiently risk-free as to
make one’s difference from others inessential to one’s self-respect, one’s sense of
worth”- and “sympathy”, the ability to put one’s self in another’s shoes, i.e. to perceive
the Other as a fellow human being. 288 What should one do then when confronted with
torture, racist policies, genocide, perpetuated because certain groups are not regarded as
fellow human beings, or even with a religious death penalty as a response to apostasy?
Rather than condemning such “human rights violators” as “wrong” or “irrational”, Rorty
suggests to see them as “deprived” of the security and sympathy that has allowed us to
create a culture in which rights make sense. Highlighting that rights are best seen as a by-
product of a functioning ethical community and not as a phenomenon that can be taken
out of this context and promoted as a universal solution to the political ills of the world,
he suggests to promote human rights as a culture, and not as a movement which forces
people to be free.
This difference between Hegel’s account and that of Kant or Locke is particularly evident
in the ongoing debate on the universality of human rights. The approval of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and both international covenants in 1966 were
based on the conviction that human rights reflect universally accepted norms. However,
this assumption is often criticized on grounds that the contemporary human rights regime
is essentially a contemporary internationalised and universalised version of the liberal
position on rights.289 Adherents of the school of cultural relativism argue that the rights
contained in the Universal Declaration mainly reflect western values and norms and
assert that “local or regional cultural traditions in the fields of religion, politics,
economics and law determine the existence and scope of civil and political rights enjoyed
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by individuals in a given society.” 290 Similar to the Hegelian notion of a communitarian
based concept of rights, the basic doctrine of cultural relativism contends that rules about
morality vary from place to place and that the way to understand this variety is to place a
right in its cultural context. Essentially, moral claims derive from, and are enmeshed in, a
cultural context, which is itself the source of their validity. 291
An argument against the cultural relativist critique is Donnelly’s account, which, whilst
universalist in its core conviction, is still sensitive to cultural claims. Like all advocates
and defenders of international human rights, Donnelly believes that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR) embodies a genuine substantive
consensus that encompasses the leading world cultures, arguing in effect, that there are
no crucial issues of substantive difference. 292 There exists what Donnelly, following
John Rawls, describes as a “realistic utopia”, and “overlapping consensus” as to norms
that lends validity to claims of universally associated with the UDHR. 293 Claims such as
those in the Covenants that “these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person” or in the Vienna Declaration that “all human rights derive from the dignity and
worth inherent in the human person” set the range of possible comprehensive doctrines
with an overlapping consensus. 294 Whilst history has shown that all major civilizations
have at times been dominated by views that treated some groups of human beings as
outsiders who were not entitled to equal rights, today the basic moral equality of all
human beings is not merely accepted but strongly endorsed by all leading comprehensive
doctrines in all regions of the world. 295 To many advocates of universal human rights,
the central achievement of the human rights movement has been to discredit moral or
political doctrines based on fundamental inequalities between human beings leading to
“social orders based on fixed status hierarchies have been replaced – in theory at least,
and in most countries to a considerable degree in practice as well- by orders based on the
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fundamental equality of all citizens.” 296 Contrary to liberal emphasis on individual
liberty and in line with a Hegelian communitarian notion, it is the radical political
egalitarianism of human rights that has had the most profound implications, both
nationally and internationally.
Arguably, the strength of the Universal Declaration model in defending universal human
rights is that it reflects to what extent different political traditions and historical
experiences have elaborated different components of human rights. Rene Cassin, one of
the main drafters of the document, drawing on the battle cry of the French revolution,
identified the four pillars of the declaration as “dignity, liberty, equality, and
brotherhood”. The twenty-seven articles were divided among these four pillars. The first,
covered in the first two articles, stands for human dignity, which is shared by all
individuals regardless of race, religion, creed, nationality, social origin or sex, the second
specified in articles 3-19 invokes the first generation of civil liberties, which emerged
during the Enlightenment; the third, laid out in articles 20-26, addresses the second
generation of rights, that is, those related to political, social, and economic equity and
fought for during the industrial revolution; the fourth outlined in articles 27-28, focuses
on the third generation of rights as advocated during the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century and throughout the post-colonial era. In a sense, the sequence of the
articles corresponds to the changing visions of universal right throughout history. 297
The charge of cultural imperialism against human rights achieves even greater potency
when it is made on the basis of religion. Essentially, the question really is, whether there
is a synthesis between these two normative concepts. If we put aside the contested
ontological debate on divine revelation, all religious texts incorporate a notion of
universalism containing altruistic guidelines that could apply if not to all individuals, as
contemporary definition would require, then to a substantial portion of humanity. 298
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Contrary to approaches that regard religion as a complicating factor in the global human
rights discourse, leading scholars in the field of human rights and divinity in fact argue
that “religion must be seen as a vital dimension of any legal regime of human rights […..]
Religions will not be easy allies to engage, but the struggle for human rights cannot be
won without them.” 299 At first such a conciliatory claim seems inappropriate given that
human rights are supposed to represent an irreligious and apolitical duty and rights based
system and, moreover, because history has shown that “the most fanatical, the cruellest
political struggles are those that have been coloured, inspired and legitimized by
religion.” 300 The value of the engagement of human rights with religion becomes evident
“when the need for nurturing a culture of human rights is appreciated.” Ghanea argues
that “as human vision can be significantly informed through visions of faith, religion
plays a significant role in deepening the vision of universal human rights […] and the
“rooting of human rights in religion will assist in widening of both the enforcement and
effectiveness of human rights.” 301 If the global human rights regime is to regulate
behaviour between the state and the individuals as well as between the multiplicity of
groups with different religions, histories, cultures, laws and languages, it “cannot be
imposed on a void”. In line with Hegel’s notion, “it needs pillars to uphold it, genuine
links that associate it with particular groups and a congruous platform which connects it
to specific peoples.” 302
What are then the implications of this normative debate for human rights diplomacy?
The contractarian account presents us with the concept of positive and negative rights,
which emphasise individual liberty, state restraint and, thus imply a safeguard from
arbitrary rule, or to use Kants’ term, from despotism. Along this line of reasoning,
political rule is subject to a voluntary agreement between individuals and the
government, which in itself is subject to the rule of law. The Hegelian notion, however,
focuses on the emergence on individual liberties and rights as a by-product of a
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functioning ethical community. Here, individuals, which became aware of their
communal interdependence, acted as self-legislators and formed the law by maintaining
and modifying social practices. Particularly with the perceived normative challenge
religion is posing to the promotion and protection of universally perceived human rights,
Hegel’s communitarian concept of rights could be seen as an appropriate approach for
conceptualizing modern human rights diplomacy.
Ultimately, the challenge of human rights diplomacy is to allow rights “to transcend all
differences in the subjectiveness and practices of peoples whilst also mediating
international human rights through the web of cultural circumstances.” 303 Seeing rights
as a by-product of a functioning and rational Hegelian “ethical community”, the short-
term objective of human rights diplomacy should be to instil, in the “target country”, a
communitarian spirit of solidarity [i.e. Geist], which will allow individuals to assign
themselves laws as well as duties. In this community rights are a product of the
correlation between individuals’ respective duties and rights. Bound by this solidarity,
any rights-bearer in such a community is duty-bound to uphold this nexus of recognition
and must know and follow the network of rules of the community. The realization of such
a community in which rights make sense will ultimately lead to the establishment of a
political framework, in which the state is responsible for strengthening these bonds of
community. Thus, in the long-term, human rights diplomacy may contribute to the
emergence of the concept of positive and negative rights, not necessarily in the
contractarian sense of the individual’s protection against the state, but rather in a
Hegelian sense of the state being responsible for the maintenance and protection of the
ethical community. 304 In a true Hegelian sense, “[…] if human rights do not entail a
claim of natural man against the state, if humans rights are in truth inseparable from
integral membership in a collectivity, then its members have deeper obligations to one
another and […] than the liberal model [contractarian] would indicate.” 305 Essentially,
the promotion of human rights in foreign policy is more likely to achieve a sustainable
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political-legal framework as well as institutions in conformity with international human
rights standards, if such a communitarian spirit had been nurtured both from within
society as well as with outside assistance.
In order to achieve this, religion, in particular could be seen as an ethical foundation on
which such “Hegelian diplomacy” could build on. Seeing it as a cooperative process with
a common objective “religions and human rights will be able to collaborate, allowing
religions to give human rights law their spirit – the sanctity and authority they need to
command obedience and respect [….] its structural fairness, its inner morality.” 306
Ghanea’s discourse on “faith in human rights, human rights in faith” convincingly
concludes that “obedience to a norm because of legal compulsion and not by virtue of
personal persuasion loses its moral significance”. A religious foundation for human rights
could not only strengthen its appeal but also rather contribute to translating human rights
into a universal culture in international society. Essentially, “the regime of law,
democracy, and human rights needs religion to survive.” 307 This premise illustrates that
promoting human rights is unlikely to be effective if a coercive diplomacy is pursued or
negative sanctions are employed. Cultural engagement, on the other hand, takes the time
“to learn how other view the world, to understand what is important to them, and to
determine what can realistically be done to help them realize their legitimate aspirations.”
Particularly with regards to Iran, because “Islamic law emphasizes faith-based
interactions rather than those among states, logic suggests that one of the more effective
ways to engage Islam would be a new form of diplomacy that effectively brings to bear
the transcendent aspects of religious faith in addressing the secular obstacles to peace.”
308 In a true Hegelian spirit, “if the ultimate aim of human rights diplomacy is to
persuade others of the value of human rights, it is more likely that the struggle to promote
human rights can be won if it is fought in ways that build on, rather than challenge local
traditions.” 309
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2. Human Rights in Islam
It is a common belief that an Islamic based government, when serving as an ideological
foundation for political rule, is poorly equipped to uphold and protect human rights. One
step in testing this claim would be to exam Islam’s basic sources (Qu’ran, Sunna, Hadith)
and Islamic law (Shari’a) in their relation to human rights, to see whether there is
evidence that Islam had laid down some universal rights for humanity as a whole, which
are to be respected and observed under all circumstances. The vital question, really,
which troubles Western and Islamic legal experts, is whether human rights can be in
accord with Islamic insight. Is the manifestation of prophecy greater than the reason of
man? Does the promotion of human rights in the Muslim world have to be approached
from a secular normative premise or does it have roots in Islam.
In order to answer these questions, it seems reasonable to approach the issue of human
rights and Islam from within an Islamic discourse. This has been distilled by Halliday
into five responses: assimilation: the argument that there is no problem about reconciling
Islam with theories of human rights; appropriation: the claim that it is only under Islamic
laws that they can be fully realized; particularism: the specific cultural and historical
context of individual Islamic societies; confrontation: the argument that international
human rights are to be rejected as some kind of ethnocentric project; incompatibility: the
claim that somehow Islam itself is irreconcilable with human rights or democratic
principles. 310
There are numerous Islamic scholars, which assert that human rights have an important
place in Islam. For example, Abdul A’la Mawdui argues that “ Islam has laid down some
universal fundamental rights for humanity as a whole, which are to be observed and
respected under all circumstances… fundamental rights for every man by virtue of his
status as human being.” 311 Some scholars have gone so far as to assert that “the basic
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concepts and principles of human rights had from the very beginning been embodied in
Islamic Law.” Nadvi and Tabendeh conclude that contemporary human rights are merely
giving recognition to 1400-year-old Islamic ideas.312 Ayatollah Abdullah Javadi Amuli
too supports the idea that human rights are recognized in Islam. According to the sura of
the Night Journey, Verse 70 of the Qur’an man is, in essence, regarded as valuable and
worthy, as man is the manifestation of all divine qualities and consequently, God’s
viceroy on earth. He concludes that “When we admit that man is in essence valuable and
worthy, we are consciously or unconsciously induced to believe that [not only] freedom,
security and so on [are] his right[s] but they should be designed in such a way which
might correspond with his dignity. “ 313 This conception of basic rights of human subjects
created in the image of God is best addressed in Malkum Khan’s 1881 essay Sirat al-
Mustaqim (The Straight Path), in which he asserts that the four basic principles of human
rights were security, freedom (ekhtiyar or azadi), equality, and achieved status, dividing
security into the security of the person and that of property. Further elaborating on the
concept of freedom, he distinguished such categories as the freedom of the body, speech,
pen, thought, business (kasb) and association. In line with Islamic thought, Khan’s
conceptualization of freedom was based on an ontological foundation of human
subjectivity: 314
“The nobility of our creation lies in [God’s] having created us as subjects [fa’el mokhtar] and
because of his nobility [he] has made us agents, who through our reason and effort [ijtihad] are
owners and protectors of our rights of humanness [i.e. human rights] 315
Equally, Abdul Aziz Said claims “ to identify precepts that establish human rights in the
Islamic tradition” and argues that in Islam “human beings have certain God granted
rights.” 316 However, all of the regulating precepts of an Islamic political system that Said
lists involve either a rights-less duty or are rights held because one has certain legal or
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spiritual status, not simply because one is a human being. 317 Initially, the main divide
between Islamic and Western approaches to human rights, seems to be with the modern,
secular tradition notion of “rights-carriers” as opposed to the “duty-bound” individual,
one finds in religion. Liberalism ‘s overwhelming concern is protecting the rights of
individuals from intrusive government. As illustrated earlier, the overriding concern with
safeguarding individual liberties is represented in the Universal Declaration as well as in
the Covenants. In contrast, Mayer argues that the human rights listed in the Universal
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) (1981) and the Draft of the Islamic
Constitution (1979), published by the Islamic Research Academy of AL-Azhar Academy,
are really obligations.318 However, given Islam’s hermeneutic heterogeneity, these
declarations do not constitute a single authoritative or representative Islamic
conceptualization of human rights. Treatises on rights by Soroush, Kamali and Montazeri
deconstruct the relationship between the individual and God in such ways as to show that
the believer in Islam is in fact of greatest importance and its God-given characteristics are
merely subject to divine guidance rather than restrained by religious duties. Similar to the
Hegelian notion, the umma is thought as an ethical community in which religion provides
for the moral code and framework of behaviour, but is still subject to realities of human
life.
Soroush’s hermeneutics focus on the aspect of justice in Shi’a fiq and sees religion as the
normative basis on which a society ought to be governed. Essentially, Soroush’s
arguments centres around his belief that human rights are dictated by reason, and as such,
317 ibid, p. 73
318 Daniel Price, “Islam and Human Rights: A Case of Deceptive First Appearances”, Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion Vol. 41, No. 2 (2002), p. 214 With regards to Islamic human rights schemes,
Mayer’s assessment identifies no real protection of individual rights and freedoms. Rather many, including
the Iranian Constitution and the UIDHR, accord priority to rationalizing governmental repression,
protecting and promoting social cohesion, and perpetuating traditional hierarchies in society, which
ultimately results in the institutionalised discrimination against non-Muslims and women. Rather than
providing security from the state, they call for obedience to authority and give political leaders complete
leeway in determining the scope of permissible freedoms. Hence, governmental authorities are allowed to
curb rights and freedoms by reference to vague Islamic criteria, which are ill defined. By basing these
constitutions and schemes on the supremacy of Islamic principles in all areas relevant for the protection of
human rights, state elites override international human rights standards by reference to “Islam”. see Ann
Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and Human Rights- Tradition and Politics (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995), p. 163
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cannot be in conflict with religion since religious jurisprudence has always been subject
to human rationality.
The Qur’an, as well as the laws laid out in the shari’a, Soroush criticises reflect the
language of duties, not rights, giving commandments by a supreme divine authority.
Human beings are required to believe, pray, be charitable, and conduct themselves in
such matters as matrimony and inheritance in accordance with prescribed guidelines. 319
The fact that the modern concept of human rights reflects the evolution from rights to
demands and that governments were accordingly charged with new tasks and
responsibilities, is, according to Soroush, one of the main reasons behind the failure of
the modern world to comprehend the principles of guardianship of the juristconsult
[velayate-e faqih] and the Islamic government [hokoumat-e Islami] that prevail in
contemporary Iran. In western political thought, people are endowed with rights and exert
them by electing their leader to a government, which guarantees to protect the public
good. By contrast, the government based on the velayate-e faqih is based on duties. This
is because some Islamic interpretations, including that of Khomeini, view human beings
as duty-bound. Everything starts with obligations: people are obliged to vote, obey the
leader, and form a government because they have already accepted a series of religious
principles and injunctions. 320 He goes on and states that, “the guiding principle of [the
duty to have a religion] is performing (as in performing prayers), while the right to have a
religion is based on the prospect of realizing a certain aim (as in realizing profits). With
the assumption of duties the society is seen as a temple whose purpose is to please its
creator. The viewpoint of rights envisions society as a marketplace where the aim is
satisfying the members. The former pursues the satisfaction of the creator, the latter of
the people.” 321
It is obvious that the problem now for any religious government lies in whether it
recognizes the rights of people on a basis that is in accordance with religious law.
319 Mahmoud Sadri, Ahmad Sadri, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam – Essential Writings of
Abdolkarim Soroush, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 62
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According to Soroush, the issue of choosing between the guardian velayat and
representation vekalat ultimately is that of two conflicting societal concepts: the former is
consistent with a duty-bound society; the latter is consistent with a rights-based society.
322 Criticising Khomeini’s construct of the velayat-e faqih from within an Islamic
discourse, Soroush’s concept of an Islamic democracy centred around the argument that
“the association of religious scholarship with political and economic power was bound to
affect that scholarship and could not be considered in the best interests of the theological
and philosophical investigation.” He claimed “that religion was greater than the ulema”,
and “that Islam as a faith was greater than the jurisprudence [fiqh] and that its
interpretation could not be dependent on a class who were themselves dependent on
maintaining a particular interpretation which could sustain them.” 323 Whilst this rejection
of the legitimacy of the velayate-faqih formed the very basis for his model of Islamic
democracy, it also manages to combine the secular idea of the rights with that of Islamic
idea of duty. As he concludes
“Religion forbids us from assuming a God-like character. Religion also commits us to serving God.
So, the place of the believer falls somewhere between negating the former and engaging in the latter.
[…] modern humanity does not tolerate the presumption of God-like character. This is especially
true in politics and government where limiting the power of the state, division of powers, and the
doctrine of checks and balances are established in order to prevent accumulation of power that might
lead to such Godly claims. Therefore, while lightening the burden of duties, the modern world has
also undermined a right that has always been a source of evil and corruption: that is, the right to act
as a God-like potentate with unlimited powers.” 324
It is evident that Soroush’s hermeneutics demands the separation of powers, but rather
than calling for secular state, he argues that “ democracy […] – of all possible forms of
government- [is] the one that best protects religion and, accordingly, God’s rights.”
Insisting on the need “to protect religion from being misused by “supposed men of God”
for purposes contrary to the will of the Creator, Soroush contends that democracy can do
322 ibid, p. 64
323 Ali M Ansari, Islam, Iran and Democracy – The Politics of Managing Change (London, Royal Institute
of International Affairs, 2000), p. 72
324 Mahmoud Sadri, Ahmad Sadri, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam – Essential Writings of
Abdolkarim Soroush, p. 64
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just that because it monitors the observance of human rights. “Where human rights are
observed”, he argues, “religion cannot be misused.” Thus, Soroush’s ideal government is
not just democratic, it is also religious – because it creates the conditions needed for
people to devote themselves to their faith. 325 Whilst this form of government bears
contractarian elements, it is Hegelian at its core. Religion becomes the handmaiden of
democracy and the body of laws and rights, rather than being imposed from without or
from above, constitutes the “normative product” of this religious community.
Clearly, his interpretation of Islamic democracy directly corresponds to the Islamic
notion that whilst the ruler is responsible for the enforcement of Islamic law, he is subject
to the law himself. As such, the ruler’s position is not inviolable, but subject to
accountability, and he could even be deposed if he failed to adhere to the laws. 326 It is
this aspect of justice, which is fundamental for Soroush in conceptualizing human rights
within an Islamic discourse. With reference to Mowlana Jalal-al Din Rumi’s verse “O
kings, we’ve killed the enemy without, but a more evil enemy resides within” Soroush
asserts that the ulema used to believe that if the ruler was just, he will extend this justice
over society and over every single individual, and will bring them into the orbit of this
justice. The notion of democracy and separation of powers, however, changed this
common conception. In a democracy, it was no longer sufficient for the ruler to be just.
According to Soroush, democracy can be achieved in three steps: “installing rulers,
criticising rulers and dismissing rulers. When the people can exercise these three steps,
we can say that we have justice. “ 327 Concerning this notion, many contemporary
interpretations point to the Qur’anic concept of shura, whereby the ruler is supposed to
consult with the leading members the community on the affairs of the state which support
325 Katajun Amirpur, “Abdolkarim Soroush’s Rays of Hope”
http://www.drsoroush.com/English/On_DrSoroush/E-CMO-20040200-
Abdolkarim_Soroushs_rays_of_hope_By_Katajun_Amirpur.html, accessed on 2 December 2006
326 It should be also noted that no democratic institution was foreseen to depose the ruler if in violation with
the law, see Katerina Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism & Human Rights (London, I.B. Tauris, 2003), p.45
327 Ali Asghar Seyyedabadi, “Democracy, Justice, Fundamentalism and Religious Intellectualism – An
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a constitutional and representative system in order to scrutinize the ruler as well as
safeguard the rule of law. Reference is often made to verses 3:110, 3:112 and 22:41
which describe believers as “commanding good and prohibiting evil” in support of the
interpretation of the duty to command good and prohibit evil in government. 328
For Soroush, the rule of law itself derives from the concept of reasoning in Shi’a
jurisprudence. Recognizing that human rights are dictated by reason, and as such may
constitute a human invention, Soroush contends that, by the same token, they do not
impinge on God’s rights either. For him, human rights cannot be in conflict with religion
because God’s will can never be unreasonable. Pointing to the repeal of many laws
currently in place in Muslim polities (e.g. the Islamic Penal Code) Soroush reminds us
that Islamic jurisprudence is primarily based on logic. Furthermore, religious laws
concerning social transactions [mo’amelat], he asserts, “are susceptible to worldly
rationalization and calculation ; they would be useless otherwise. That which is worldly,
natural and human should be treated as such.” Therefore, he concludes “ natural and
secular norms and principles of rationality [..] are all applicable to religious
jurisprudence.” 329 According to Soroush, “religious jurisprudence, however divine and
historical, inevitably becomes historical and assumes a worldly application”. Ultimately,
religious judges must be subject to public scrutiny and transparency, “so that their lapses
of policy and deliberations are minimized and their transgressions are democratically
restituted or retributed.” As such government is “established and demolished through the
will of the people”. This will is, according to Soroush “in a religious society, nurtured
and inspired by religion and religious reason, but the religious edification and inspiration
does not diminish the democratic nature of the religious government in the least.” 330
Soroush’s discourse on Islamic jurisprudence is fundamental for bridging Islamic law
and notions of human rights. At first, the conflict between human rights and the
shari’a is obvious. Human rights are conceived as rights, which demand the social
328 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Toward and Islamic Reformation – Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and
International Law (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1990), pp.78-80
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changes required to realize the underlying moral vision of human nature, whereas the
rules of the shar’ia become valid “ by virtue of their existence and not [necessarily]
because of their rationality.” 331 However, if we attempt to find human rights purely
within the teachings of Islam, one should be aware that the only parts of the Islamic
traditional texts that are sacred are the Qur’an itself, which is said to be of the Prophet
Mohammed’s divine revelation, and the hadith, or sayings of the Prophet as
subsequently codified. 332 The term shari’a literally “path” or “way” did not initially
denote a legal code at all. Rather the interpretation of this divinely sanctioned material
and its elaboration into a set of comprehensive legal code is known as fiq
(jurisprudence) and was, therefore, gradually codified into law, subject to human
understanding rather than divine revelation. 333
Thus, contrary to common belief, the progressive nature of Islamic jurisprudence
provides indeed a legal-political framework that is susceptible the protection of human
rights. This is particular true for Shi’a jurisprudence, which, in response to the crisis
created by the occultation of the Imam, developed a legal and political framework, in
which the faculty of reason (al-aql) enjoyed a prominent place. Whilst the Imamates
regarded the revelation as all comprehensive, there was a recognition of the fact that
reason acknowledged the comprehensives of the revelation by engaging in its
interpretation and discovering all the principles that the Imamates needed to know. More
than that, “there was a recognition of a fundamental need of interpretation of the
revelation by reason [ ijtihad], all the more when the authority invested with divine
knowledge was in occultation.” 334 Thus, Muslims jurists who are charged with the
implementation of Islamic Law have to guard both temporal and divine values by
331 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 203
332 Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation, (London, IB Taurus, 2003), p. 148
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University Press, 1981), p.36
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managing to resolve the very conflicts between divine command, order and justice. In
this context, most Muslim jurists “contend that the very purpose and function of the
shar’ia is to fulfil the interests and welfare of the people in worldly life and hereafter
[tahqiq masalih al-ibad fi al-ma’ash wq al-ma’ad]. They would further argue that the
values, which the shar’ia aims to safeguard, are regarded as necessities (daruiyyat),
needs (hajiyyat) and luxuries (tahsiniyyat). 335
Whilst Soroush’s political thought provides for an Islamic democracy in which both the
notion of reason and religion enjoy pivotal roles, the dichotomy of rights and duties
seems to be convincingly bridged by Montazeri and Kamali.
Montazeri’s treatises on human rights centred on a conviction that the very essence of
being human, irrespective of being Muslim or not, entitled humans to bear rights. He
bases this claim on the Qu’ranic teachings and the Hadith; one reference for which,
according to Montazeri, would be the verse “Verily we have honored the children of
Adam. We carry them on the land [and the sea], and have made provision of good things
for them, and have preferred them above many of those whom We created with a marked
preferment” [The Qur’an, XVII, The Children of Israel: 70] 336 Contrary to other Islamic
jurists who only attribute Muslim believers “M u’minun” certain rights, Montazeri asserts
that humans carry an inherent dignity and as such are to be respected (insan
mohtarameh). Montazeri refers here to the Qu’ranic verse “wa laqad karramna bani
Adama” (“Verily we have honored the children of Adam”). According to Montazeri’s
hermeneutics, God ordered the angels to prostrate to Adam, because humans have the
capacity to grow, then by that virtue humans are to be respected. The very essence of
humanity, which is capable of growth, is the cause for respecting humans, so much so
that humans can be even higher than angels. And that is why God, according to
Montazeri, ordered the angels to prostrate to Adam, namely to honor Adam’s dignity. 337
335 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2001), p. 27
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Following Montazeri’s emphasis on inherent human dignity, Kamali stresses the notion
of freedom in Islam, which manifests itself throughout the Qu’ran and the hadith and
which, in his interpretation, correlates directly to rights. For Kamali, the notion of
freedom constitutes a basic norm in the shar’ia as well as is upheld in the hadith wherein
the Prophet declares that ‘every child is born in the natural state of [freedom].” 338 For
Kamali the notion of freedom in Islam is also evident in various Qur’anic themes which
characterize the Prophet as someone who informs the believers and then leaves them at
liberty to make their own choices (e.g. “Say, O people, the truth has indeed come to you
from your Lord. So whoever follows guidance does so only for the good of his own soul,
and whoever errs, errs only against it. I am not a custodian over you.” Yunus, 10:108) 339
Rather than impinging on the individual’s liberty, the Prophet merely reminded the
believer of the consequences of the choices they made: “So remind. You are only a
reminder, you are not a warder over them”. Al-Ghahiyah, 88:21-22). 340 Whilst Kamali
also takes the notion of shura as evidence that the shar’ia validates a representative
system, which comes to power through the concept of bay’ah, the citizens’ pledge of
allegiance (see also p. 102), his main concern lies with the notion of freedom. Freedom in
Islam, according to Kamali, not only liberates the individual conscience and encourages
individual accomplishment and growth through the freedom of choice, but also bears
immediate political rights. 341 Since freedom in the Qur’an is a manifestation of God’s
favour and grace on mankind, it is inherent in every human and as thus may not be denied
or revoked. “Being God-given and sacrosanct, it commands respect and no one, including
a ruler or judge, is authorised to overrule or derogate it without a valid cause. It is an
obligation of the state to provide adequate guarantees for the protection of individual
liberties.” 342 As for Soroush, the concept of justice and jurisprudence, rather than
restricting rights, aims to draw a regulatory framework for rights and mutual duties, so as
to benefit both the individual and the community. Thus, the initial dichotomy between
religion, be it Christianity or Islam, and human rights, which, at its core, is between duty
338 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Freedom, Equality and Justice in Islam (Cambridge, Islamic Texts Society,
2002), pp.15-16
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and right, does not have to be contradictory; that is outside the political realm
concentrating on what God expects from one rather than on ones own desires, essentially
implies to look among one’s duties to find one’s rights, not vice versa. 343 As Soroush
convincingly concludes:
In any event, religious governments that are based on religious societies will be democratic only
when they seek to combine the satisfaction of the Creator and that of the created; when they are true
both to the religious and extra religious concerns; and when they equally respect pre religious and
postreligious reason and morality. In the elusive and delicate balance between the two realms lies
the rare elixir that the contemporary world, because of its neglect, finds unattainable or undesirable.
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What does all this tell us for the prospect for promoting human rights within an Islamic
context?
Reflecting the fluidity of Islamic hermeneutics, contributions by contemporary scholars,
such as Soroush or Kamali, aim to reconcile both normative concepts. By and large,
Islam continues to be determined by dynamic change, 345 which is particularly true for
interpretations of human rights in Islamic thought. Whilst, one has to acknowledge
certain analytical and historical problems and challenges of human rights applications in
Islam, there is a significant school that claims that support for human rights today can be
found in the canonical Islamic sources and accompanying juristic techniques, namely the
Qur’an, haddith, ijma, qiyas ijtihad 346 Overall, there is widespread consensus amongst
Islamic scholars that Islam teaches that “ it is the state’s duty to enhance human dignity
and alleviate conditions that hinder individuals in their efforts to achieve happiness”
providing “social and political precepts” that “reflect a strong concern for human good
and dignity, and autonomy.” 347 In this light, profound religious values coupled with
analogical reasoning can not only lend a deeper meaning to the construct of human rights
but, moreover, seem to present us with the possibility for a mutual search for a better
343 Mahmoud Sadri, Ahmad Sadri, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam – Essential Writings of
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understanding of human life, dignity and a merciful society. Undoubtedly, the discourse
on human rights and Islam is vast and deserves more elaboration than it has received
here. What one can identify, however, is that canonical Islam and Islamic jurisprudence
constitute a normative foundations on which human rights diplomacy could build; which
from a theological perceptive, will only enhance the value and belief system of human
rights.
Human rights diplomacy, therefore, should not be based on a secular dictum to shape
Islam into a Western liberal mould, but rather follow the Hegelian spirit and promote a
communitarian ethos in which the self-legislation of rights and duties will eventually lead
to the security and protection of the individual. Evidently, the challenge of human rights
diplomacy is to build on rather than to challenge respective belief systems. As Khatami
contends on the relationship between liberty and Islam: “A value system is only as strong
and durable as the realistic and practical affirmation of its tenets. It cannot exist in the
realm of thought and imagination alone.” Whilst he emphasizes religiosity as paramount
normative element for a functioning ethical society, Khatami also demands to
“distinguish between the essence of religion and the incomplete interpretations of humans
such that religion maintains its central place deep in the hearts of the believers, in a way
that we can modify religious thinking to adapt to the demands of our time.” 348
3. Human Rights in Iran and the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran
3.1 The Maze of Iranian Power Centres and Factional Divides
At the height of Europe’s “Critical Dialogue” Ayatollah Hasan Sane’i, leader of one of
the revolutionary bonyad panzdah-e khordad, a powerful state owned economic
conglomerate, increased the blood money offered for the assassination of Rushdie from
$2 million to $2.4 million. President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani’s insistence that the “15th
Khordad Foundation” was a not a government organization, and over which he had no
348 Mohammad Khatami, Islam, Liberty and Development, (New York, Global Academic Publishing,
1998), p.95, p. 104
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control, indicated that, in Iran, additional influential organizations and groups outside that
of the formal political system existed. For the purpose of understanding the limits of
Iranian diplomatic manoeuvring during engagement with Britain, it seems, therefore,
important to briefly outline the informal power structures in Iran, the various political and
ideological factions as well as the formal power structure as set out in the constitution.
3.1.1 Elites - Informal Power Structure
Iran’s informal power structure resembles that of many Middle Eastern states, and
primarily consists of hierarchical and clientalist networks. This decentralized power
structure takes the form of loose coalitions among like-minded individuals or groups;
whose dynamics are largely dictated by personal patronage links. 349 These links provide
for a fundamental mechanism behind formal decision-making procedures. The actual
informal power structure as such, could be divided into three “rings of power”. The
central ring comprises a group of the country’s most influential clerics, so called
“patriarchs” who tend to uphold the principles of the revolution and thus, in socio-
political terms tend to be conservative. These patriarchs, according to Buchta, do not only
control their own ring of power, but directly exert influence on general Iranian politics
through formal power centres such as the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts as
well as the “Society of Teachers of Qom Theological Colleges”, which comprises some
thirty high ranking clerics.350 The second ring of power consists of high-ranking
government officials, technocrats, state functionaries and provincial governors. The third
ring is made of various economic entities, the so-called bonyads, diverse security bodies,
such as the Basij, Hizbullah and the Islamic Republican Guard Corps (IRGC). 351 The
349 Wilfried Buchta, Who rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic of Iran ( Washington,
D.C., Washington Institute for Near East Policy), p.6
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last ring would comprise formerly influential figures, such as Ayatollah Montazeri, which
still enjoy religious authority and political weight. 352
3.1.2 Political and Ideological Factions in Iran
During the first decade since 1979, power was shared by what could be referred to as
fundamentalist revolutionary factions. 353 The umbrella group for these revolutionary
factions was the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), founded by devout followers of
Khomeini and included Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Rafsanjani and Hojjatoleslam Ali
Khameini. Following the consolidation of power, tensions began to emerge within the
IRP’s right and left camps. The right consisted of religious traditionalist, socio-politically
conservative clerics, and a number of religious technocrats, and it supported a pragmatic
domestic and foreign policy in order to maintain the goals of the Islamic Revolution.
Member of the left camp consisted more of left-leaning clerics, which advocated more
ideological policies, such as statist economic policies and export of the revolution. 354
When the IRP finally split in 1988, two major political unions of clerics emerged, the
Islamic-left majma-e ruhaniyun-e mobarez (Combatant Clerics Society) and its
traditionalist-right counterpart, the jame-e ruhaniyat mobarez (Militant Clergy
Association).355 With the death of Khomeini and the post-war realities, the ideological
factions split further, such that one can distinguish between three mainstream factions;
The Islamic-left (reformists), the traditionalist / conservative rights (conservative) and the
centrist-pragmatists. The traditionalist / conservative right faction, mainly represented
through the Militant Clergy Association, hold on to the religio-political view that
sovereignty ultimately belongs to God, who relegates such powers to the velayat-e faqih.
Given the uneasy balance between Islamism and republicanism in the Islamic Republic,
this faction stresses the subordination of the latter to the former. The economic outlook of
this faction could be referred to as a bazaar-mosque alliance and as such advocates a
laissez-faire economy. The most prominent members of this group are Supreme Leader,
352 Wilfried Buchta, Who rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic of Iran, p.9
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Ayatollah Ali Khameini and Parliament Speaker of the 5th Majlis Ali Akbae Nateq Nuri
and head of the judiciary Ayatollah Mohammad Sharoudi (since 1999). The Militant
Clergy Association’s formal power strongholds are the Guardian Council, the Assembly
of Experts, the judiciary as well as enjoying a majority in the jame’e e-modarresin-e
houz-ye-elmiye-ye Qom (Society of Teachers of Qom Theological Colleges). 356 The
modern right faction, or centrist-pragmatists, gained ascendancy in the post-war period
under the presidency of Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and is usually associated with a priority
shift from dogmatism to pragmatic reconstruction of the economy. This group of
technocrats and experts is mainly associated with the Kargozaran-e Sazandegi Party
(Servants of Reconstruction). Their focus is on economic modernization, facilitated
through reliance on industrial-based infrastructure and dependent capitalist development,
thus relying on low taxation, modern banking and integration into the world-capitalist
system. 357 The range of viewpoints in the Islamic Left, whose most influential group is
the Combatant Clerics Society, is extraordinary and ranges from radical ideologues, such
as Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur, who continues to advocate the export of the
revolution and favor a command economy to reformists, most notably, Hojjatoleslam
Sayyid Mohammad Khatami. Khatami’s faction generally reject the notion that the faqih
has unencumbered power and argue that the role of the Supreme Leader should be that of
supervision rather than domination. 358 Khatami’s vision of a liberal Islam as opposed to
a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam emphasized a democratic-republican system, in
which religion merely provides for the basic belief system. As such this faction’s
priorities is even political and economic restructuring, which entails “controlled
privatization” as well as a focus on the growth of civil society and the creation of
democratic institutions.
3.2 Formal Power Structure: Prospects and Constraints for Human Rights
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After the Revolution in 1979, the centerpiece of the new government was the
constitution, which primarily defined the concept of velayat-e faqih as a type of Shi’ite
Islamic government. For Khomeini, the government of the faqih or just jurist exceeds a
simply supervisory role and ultimately represents the authoritarian linchpin of the
constitution. This was based on his opinion that the absolute, appointive velayat-e faqih is
the only form of Islamic government during the occultation of the Twelfth Imam, and is
binding on the people as a religious duty. For Khomeni the idea behind the velayat-e
faqih was the assumption that people were capable of committing errors and, therefore,
needed the faqih “as the ultimate arbiter of the people’s judgement, supervising the
legislative body whose laws might reflect the people’s errors.” 359
However, the most fundamental contradiction of the text, which was also highly
contested among the drafters, was the attempt to combine popular sovereignty with
divine will. Recognizing such an inherent contradiction or not, during the process of its
drafting, the authors of the constitution tried to emphasize the fact that the revolution was
an expression of the will of the people, which was clearly reflected in their active
participation. The drafting of the constitution, however, required no popular participation,
rejecting the idea of constitutionalism altogether. As Ansari describes it:
For the conservatives, the essence of constitutionalism was anathema to Islam, and if this proved a
difficult argument to pursue in the light of Khomeini’s obvious support of the 1979 Constitution,
they turned to the Constitutional Revolution to emphasize their point, arguing that what people had
in fact wanted was Mashru’eh (the shari’a) not Mashru’ (constitutionalism); the extra “t”, it was
insisted, had been inserted by unscrupulous British diplomats.360
In fact, the disputes during the genesis of the Constitution and the contradictions the
document eventually bore reflected the need to reconcile the extraordinary range of
revolutionary forces. On one hand, the text accounts for principles of rights, equality,
justice and popular participation in political life, one the other it acknowledges the
supremacy of restrictive secular as well as religious interpretations on rights and
representative politics.
359 Reza Afshari, Human Rights in Iran – The abuse of cultural relativism (Philadelphia, University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p. 16
360 Ali M Ansari, Islam, Iran and Democracy – The Politics of Managing Change p.149
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Specific references and safeguards to human rights are made in Section II of the Iranian
Constitution, where respective articles enumerate civil rights and political freedoms and
underscore the necessity of their observance. As Art. 20 states: “All citizens of the
country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all
human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic
criteria.” 361 The Constitution focuses also on all aspects of individual freedom (Art. 2)
and notes that one of the responsibilities of the judicial system is to reinforce legitimate
freedoms, while stressing that the government must account for political and social
freedoms within the limits of the law. 362 At the same time, the constitution bears
numerous articles, which restrain the rights of the individual on issues such order,
security and public interest. Likewise, numerous clauses place restrictions on the
democratic rights of individuals and of certain religious and ethnic groups and set up
institutions whose task is to ensure the Islamic character of the state. 363
The constitution also establishes that the government would be popular in the sense that it
is approved by the people through elections as well as is accountable to an elected
parliament. Article Six of the constitution also vests the public with the full power to
elect the Assembly of Experts (a clerical body in charge of selecting and supervising the
faqih), and the municipality councils. Evidently, the parliament, which is given the
constitutional powers by Art.96 to pass legislation, accede to international treaties and
conventions as well as to impeach ministers of the executive and the president himself, is
a significant democratic element in the political system, particularly with regards to
protecting human rights. A crucial constitutional prerogative reserved for the president,
which under Khatami was interpreted as instrument to promote and protect the rule of
law, is Art. 113, which gives the executive the responsibility for implementing the
361 Jamshid Sharifian, “The International Human Rights Law & Strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran” in
The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XII, No.4, (Winter, 2000-2001), p. 638
362 ibid, p.639
363 Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran – Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic (London, I.B.
Tauris, 1997), p. 8
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constitution. Furthermore, Art. 13 states that the President can take any “measure he may
find necessary” to safeguard the constitution. 364
On the other hand, there are articles in the constitution, which, according to some of the
drafters, were intended to safeguard Islamic values and principles and to achieve an
“exemplary society” with the assistance of “Islamic ideals”. Thus, the constitution also
assigns Islamic tasks to the organs of the state, in which the executive power must pave
the way by “putting into effect Islamic regulations and prescription” and the judiciary is
to defend “ the rights of the people in the Islamic movement.” 365 The shari’a is
considered the supreme law over everybody and is the source of legislation in Iran. Art. 2
acknowledges legislation as a power reserved for God and states that revelation has a
fundamental role in the promulgation of laws. Most importantly, Art. 72 forbids the
Majlis (parliament) to pass laws, which “contradict the principles and ordinances of the
state religion of the land […]” 366 Particularly with regards to legislation, the Guardian
Council, is after the velayat-e faqih, the second most important and powerful
constitutional institution. This organ, which is a body of 12 jurists, occupies the right to
veto parliamentary enactments that are thought not to be in conformity with the shari’a.
Moreover, the constitution vested this body with the interpretation of the constitution,
supervision of presidential and parliamentary elections and with that of referendums. 367
This authority reserved for the Council derived from an amendment to the constitution,
which “provided the Council of Guardians with automatic scrutiny over parliamentary
legislation, a power to review greatly in excess of that of the highest court in, say, France
or the United States, and something which was to have major political consequences.” 368
Once the Guardian Council rejects a particular parliamentary bill or law, it is sent back to
the Majlis with specific objections. The parliament must then, on the basis of the
directives given, revise and amend the law and return it for further scrutiny. Given the
364 Mahmood Jalali, “An Independent Constitutional Court: Essential Prerequisite for Peaceful Resolution
of Vast Majority of Current Crises in Iran” Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, Vol.5, No.2 (Fall 2003), pp.9-
10
365 ibid, p. 10
366 ibid, pp.10-11
367 Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, UN
Doc.E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.2, 12 January, 2004, paragraph 19
368 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, p, 179
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factional divide in Iranian politics, it is evident, that bills and policies are bound to be
held in abeyance and that the conflict between the elected parliamentarians and appointed
jurists has the potential to considerably paralyses Iran’s legislative process. 369
Responding to the ever increasing conflicting constitutional / legal authority between the
Majlis and the Council of Guardians, Khomeini, by relying on the concept of maslahat,370
ordered the establishment of a mitigating body, the Expediency Council, which began its
work in February 1988.
The constitution also created an independent judiciary, which, in practice, however, is
directly linked to the Supreme Leader. This highly centralized judiciary was given broad
powers in investigation, prosecution, and rendering judgement in the interest of justice
and Islam. (Art. 156) As the highest judicial body, the Supreme Judicial Council, under
Art. 157 has the ultimate authority over the appointment, promotion, suspension, and
dismissal of all judges in the country. It is important to note that the members of this
body, which must be learned scholars in Islamic law, are only answerable to the faqih not
to the president or parliament. Moreover, the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, which were
first established in 1979 as a temporary tool to prosecute officials of the Pahlavi
monarchy, have persisted throughout the post-revolutionary period and continued to deal
with ”political crimes”. 371
It is evident that the above stated contradictions between not only the democratic and
undemocratic elements of the Iranian constitution but also the popular and divine
sovereignties, upon which the Islamic Republic is presumably based, are bound to lead to
tensions and political deadlocks. Looking at the factional divide in Iranian politics, the
constitutional “balance of power” provides for multiple institutional layers of influence
and political-religious authority through which political players can intervene in the case
of conflict. As a result, state institutions regularly and systematically compete for power,
369 see Mehrangiz Kar, “The Deadlock in Iran: Constitutional Constraints”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14,
No.1, (January, 2003), pp.134-135
370 Also referred to as Zaruat) (transl. overwhelming necessity) which derives its validity from the idea that
the basic purpose of legislation in Islam is to secure the welfare of the people by promoting their benefits
and by protecting them against harm.
371 Mehran Tamandonfar, “Islam, Law and Political Control in Iran”, Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion, Vol. 40, No.2 (March, 2001), p. 217
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and defeated political players simply move to other institutions instead of leaving public
life. 372
By the same token, the factional divide also bears opportunities for engagement and
human rights diplomacy in particular. By and large, the hermeneutic pluralism, which
took centre stage after the reformists’ victory in the 1997 presidential elections, centred
on the notion of rationality, pluralism and human rights and constituted a radical break
with Khomeini’s thought and that of the religious establishment. Khatami’s agenda was
based on the “rule of law” (hukumat-i qanun), freedom of speech, as well as introduced
concepts, such as “civil society” (jamai’a-i madani), “legality” (qanun-mandi) and “law-
orientedness (qanun-gira’i). Overall, Khatami’s presidency and the reformist camp
emphasized both in their political discourse as well as their proposed policies the
importance of “political development” and “Islamic democracy” which has to be based
on the rule of law and human rights. 373 Inevitably the reformist discourse on
constitutionalism challenged Khomeini’s interpretation of the velayat-e faqih as it
asserted that neither the absolute appointive velayat-e faqih nor a secular liberal
democracy is entirely fit to govern. Rather, by altering and combining the two forms of
government, one can arrive at a type of Islamic democracy that can be labelled elective,
conditional velayat-e faqih. According to this reformist interpretation, the people elect a
jurist as a vali-ye amr for a limited period to take over the spiritual guidance and
management of society according to the law approved by the jurist and the people. Under
this form of Islamic government, the elected jurist would be accountable directly to the
people. Overall, the reformist discourse put great emphasis on the Qur’anic correlation
between right to seek justice and the duty to do justice, as well as stressed the aim of
shar’ia to maintain justice and public welfare.
372 After Khatami's purge of the intelligence service after 1997, many officials who had previously staffed
the Interior and Information Ministries began to influence institutions outside Khatami's control, such as the
judiciary, the Revolutionary Guards, and the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council then further
intensified its role in vetting all electoral candidates, thus undercutting the Interior Ministry's authority to
hold elections. At the same time, the judiciary coordinated with parts of the Revolutionary Guards to create
its own security and intelligence institutions that it now regularly uses to arrest opponents for a variety of
alleged political crimes.
373 For a full overview of the reformist movement see Said Amir Arjomand, “The Reform Movement and
the Debate on Modernity and Tradition in Contemporary Iran”, International Journal of Middle East
Studies, No.34 (November, 2002), pp.723-727
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As previously noted, Shi’a jurisprudence and its notion of enjoining religious authorities
on the need to change laws or add new legislation on the basis of the exigencies of time
and reason was indeed viewed by reformists as viable concept to advance human rights in
Iran’s political and legal realm. In fact, it was Khomeini’s interpretation and application
of maslahat, which added a series of new laws and regulations to Iran’s body of law. As a
principle or method of law, there is some disagreement over the interpretation of
maslahat. According to Al-Ghazali, maslahat refers to considerations that secure a
benefit and prevent harm but are, simultaneously, in accordance with the objective
(maqasid) of the shari’a. As noted previously, these objectives consist of protecting the
five essential values, namely, religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. Any measure
that secures these values falls within the scope of maslahat. Thus, maslahat only applies
if it is harmonious with the shari’a and as long as the shari’a provides no specific ruling
about it. 374 Khomeini, however, disagreed and contended that Islamic rulings can be
waived if the very existence of the state is threatened or when inaction by the government
would result in “wickedness or corruption” 375Arguing that all Islamic laws are pliable
according to government rulings, Khomeini asserted that “The government is empowered
to unilaterally revoke any shari’a agreement which it has concluded with the people
when these agreements are contrary to the interest of the country or Islam.” He even went
so far as to say that “the government can also prevent any devotional (Ibadi) or non-
devotional affair if its opposed to the interest of Islam and or so long as it is so. The
government can prevent hajj on a temporary basis, in cases when it is contrary to the
interests of the Islamic country.” 376 Thus, Khomeini suggested that a government under
the rule of velayat-e faqih is entitled to make any laws it wishes as long as it serves the
interest of the republic, which naturally coincide with Islam. Following Khomeini’s line
of thought, the Islamic Republic has witnessed the adoption of a bulk of laws, statutary
instruments, and resolutions that have no demonstrable relationship to the shari’a. As
Tamandonfar puts it“ […] the shari’a requirements are becoming redefined according to
what is politically expedient, intelligible and appealing to a mass audience. In the course
374 Mehran Tamandonfar, “Islam, Law and Political Control in Iran”, p. 213
375 Shaul Bakhash, “The Politics of Land, Law, and Social Justice in Iran”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 43
No. 2,(1989), p. 196
376 Mehran Tamandonfar, “Islam, Law and Political Control in Iran”, pp. 213-214, see New York Times,
November, 10, 1999 for the trial against Abdullah Nuri
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of this ideologization and the politicization of the shari’ah, the connection to the Islamic
Sources is growing more tenuous.” 377 Ultimately, Khomeini’s insistence on the need for
mashlahat or “public good” was intended to strengthen the republican character and thus
ensure the survival of the revolution after his death. In fact, the Expediency Council is
entrusted with the task of protecting the public interest and the good of society does have
the potential of genuinely reaching consensus between dogmatic interpretations of
Islamic law and legislation, intended to advance human rights.
It is evident that two ambiguities emerged out of the process to formulate an Islamic
constitution for Iran. The first is between the document’s Islamist legalist and non-
Islamic secular elements which flows largely from the claim that a state set up on the
basis of Shi’ia law and ruled by Islamic jurists is capable of offering solutions to all
problems not only in Iran, but throughout the world even though itself incorporates many
non-Islamic and non-legalist elements. The second is the contradiction between its
democratic and non-democratic elements, arising mainly from the inherent conflict
between the two notions of popular and divine sovereignty, the latter, which is exercised
by the jurists as God’s deputies. 378 Engagement with Iran, particularly promoting human
rights, ultimately requires comprehension of these constitutional contradictions in order
to identify potential safeguards as well as to overcome obstacles to human rights
standards. Appreciating the rule of the Two-Level Game in Iran is, therefore, paramount
both for the country that wishes to engage and for Iran itself. Human rights diplomacy
towards Iran can only have a sustainable effect if it manages to empower those groups
and constitutional institutions with the agenda and authority respectively to advance
respect and protection of political and civil rights. In fact, a human rights strategy of such
kind could support an indigenous human rights tradition as advocated by the reformists
and thus substitute for the dominant ruling tradition established by Khomeini. Essentially,
it could help to uncover secular elements of authoritarian control and contribute to give
human rights a genuine ethical-religious foundation.
377 Mehran Tamandonfar, “Islam, Law and Political Control in Iran”, pp. 208-209
378 Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran – Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic, p. 1
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4. The Right to Freedom of Expression: Blasphemy and Islamic Law
The fact that many laws have even circumvented the shar’ia in order to maintain the
supremacy of the velayat-e faqih indicates that the operation of the system is driven by
political calculations than Islamic principles and seems to reflect a drive to control
political behaviour and ideas rather than protect Islamic traditions. 379 This is particularly
evident in Iran’s legal framework provided for the right to freedom of expression.
Common arguments put forward to justify free speech consider the importance of
discovering truth, which as an autonomous and fundamental good is necessary for the
development and progress of society. Another major theory, which sees freedom of
speech as the ultimate manifestation of a person’s opinion, claims it to be an integral
aspect of each individual’s right to self-development. A third theory advocating freedom
of expression argues that it is indispensable for the discovery and spread of political truth
and thus is crucial to the working of a democratic constitution. Whilst these arguments
largely constitute positive theories of freedom of speech another argues that there are
strong reasons to be suspicious of states and churches and highlights the evils of
regulations and suppression of such freedoms. 380 It is this aspect, which interests us here.
Freedom of speech and expressions are liberties against the state, yet ultimately bear a
logical connection to an obligation not to harm others or incite hatred in society and as
such have always faced restrictions imposed by state and church. In fact, the drafters of
the two most fundamental documents on civil and political liberties appreciated that
freedom of expression may be used as a dangerous tool, and thus Article 19 of the UDHR
and ICCPR state respectively:
UDHR Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to […] impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers.
379 see Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Islamic Rights or Human Rights – An Iranian Dilemma”, Iranian Studies,
Vol. 29, No. 3&4, (1996), pp. 284-289
380 see Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.6-23. [Barendt uses
the term “church” here for all organized religions.]
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ICCPR Article 19: 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to […] impart information of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers.
3. The exercise of the right provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall only be as such are provided by law and
are necessary: (a) for the respect of the rights of others (b) for the protection
of national security or public order, or of public health and morals.381
The charge of blasphemy in particular had always cast a long shadow on the freedom
of speech. Blasphemy can be many things, but essentially constitutes an offence
against the sacred. It may involve the abuse of God’s name or irreverence to highly
respected religious figures or sacred objects and is always perceived to be an
expression that is beyond the pale. 382 The significance of the fatwa against a British
citizen on charges of blasphemy against Islam is that both British and Islamic law
consider blasphemy a common law offence and thus bear limitations to the freedom of
speech. We shall briefly depict limits of the right to free speech in the Islamic legal
system. The common law in England and Wales is discussed in Chapter V, which will
help to understand the pressure the British government was subject to as well as the
frustration felt by opponents of the novel.
According to Khamenei’s account, Islam entitles man to think any way he wishes and
knows no limitations for his thoughts and opinions; yet law invalidates ill-founded
thoughts bound to hurt or destroy society and disturb the general order. Art. 22 of the
Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, entitles man to the enjoyment of freedom of
thought and opinion, however, these freedoms are banned when they disturb the general
order or hurt the public opinion. 383 Kamali’s notion on limitations of freedom classifies
381 Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context – Law, Politics, Morals,
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 750; see also Kofi Anan, “Freedom of speech is a right to be
fought for”, UN Press Release SG/SM/6978 PI/1128 30 April 1999
382 see James Piscatori, “The Rushdie Affair and the Politics of Ambiguity”, International Affairs, Vol.66,
No.4 (Oct.,1990),p. 769, also see David Lawton, Blasphemy, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1993), pp.2-13
383 Sayyid Muhammad Khamini, “Individual Rights in Islam”, in Organization for Islamic Culture and
Communications, Directorate of Research and Education Centre for Cultural-International Studies, Islamic
Views on Human Rights- Viewpoints of Iranian Scholars, p.57
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them into “moral restraints” and “legal restraints”. Moral restraints are essentially
“addressed to the conscience of the believer and include offences such as defamation,
lying, derision, and acrimonious disputation.” The legal restraints, which are backed by
specific sanctions include inter alia “public utterances of evil or hurtful speech,
slanderous accusation, libel, insult, cursing, seditious speech, and blasphemy.” 384 Whilst
it should be noted that the Cairo Declaration does not openly confront the issue of
blasphemy 385, under Islamic law blasphemy is commonly referred to as “Sabb Allah aw
Sabb al-Rasul”, meaning “reviling God or reviling the Messenger”. 386 In fact, Muslim
born Rushdie’s deed amounted to blasphemy as well as apostasy, which according to
classical jurists carries the death penalty under the shari’a.387 However, Kamali stated
that the Qu’ran has made no reference to the death penalty for blasphemy, neither does
the text warrant the conclusion that it is a Qu’ranic obligation or a prescribed punishment
or a mandate. On the contrary, Kamali argues that “we should submit that the general
language of the Qu’ran can only sustain the broad conclusion that the perpetrator of
blasphemy disgraces himself and invokes the curse of God upon himself”. He further
commented that “it is a criminal offence which carries no prescribed mandatory
punishment, and, as such, automatically falls under the category of ta’zir offences, whose
punishment may be determined by the head of State or competent judicial authorities.” 388
It is evident that the prohibition of blasphemy in Islamic law as a limitation of expression
serves to protect the sensibilities of believers and as Mawdudi argues, therefore, does not
prohibit intellectual and religious discourse but rather forbids speech that encroaches
upon the beliefs of others. 389
384 cited in Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law, (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2003), p.127
385 see Katerina Delacoura, Islam, Liberalism and Human Rights, pp.50-51
386 Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law, p. 128; An alternative to this
definition is given by Shariati, who did not apply blasphemy to “those who deny the existence of God and
soul, but to those who are unwilling to take concrete and objective action for the casue.” Assef Bayat,
“Shariati and Marx” A Critique of an “Islamic” Critique of Marxism”, in Alif: Journal of Comparative
Poetics, No.10, Marxism and the Critical Discourse (1990), p.23
387 In 2004, an Iranian court imposed a death sentence against liberal academic Hashem Aghajari for saying
that Muslims should not blindly follow religious leaders. (see pp.304-309). This ruling demonstrates that
the death penalty for charges of blasphemy may still to be employed in Islamic law.
388 ibid
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5. The Right to Freedom of Expression in Iran: The Legal Framework
The guarantees of freedom of expression vested in the Iranian constitution are subject to
such stringent qualification as to effectively impede the free exchange of ideas and
information. It is conditional on compliance with the government’s interpretation of
Islamic norms and public interests. As Art. 24 reads: “Publication and the press have
freedom of expression except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of
Islam or the rights of the public. The details of this exception will be specified by law.”
390 Furthermore, the “political, cultural, economic, and military independence or the
territorial integrity of Iran” may not be infringed in any manner “under the pretext of
exercising freedoms” (Art. 9). The Constitution also permits control of expression by
requiring that every citizen’s conduct, including speech, serve the government’s notion of
propriety. In this regard, Art. 8 imposes on every citizen in the Islamic Republic an
affirmative and perpetual duty “to enjoin the good and forbid the evil”, pursuant to the
identical Qu’ranic injunction. 391 Given these restriction on Art. 24, the constitution does
not protect the right to freedom of opinion and expression as “the right to hold opinions
without interference” and “the right to freedom of expression [which] shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media” as defined in the UDHR and the ICCPR. 392
Until the 5th Majlis passed a new press law in 2000, the Press Law of 1985 controlled the
circulation of newspapers, which not surprisingly constitutes the most important political
medium in the country. Article 2 of the Press Law expanded on the constitutional and
religious duty to “enjoin the good and forbid the evil” and contemplated a specific role
for the press, which consisted of the following:
390 Middle East Watch, Guardians of Thought – Limits on Freedom of Expression in Iran, (New York,
Human Rights Watch, August 1993), p. 23
391 Middle East Watch, Guardians of Thought – Limits on Freedom of Expression in Iran, p.23
392 Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of expression. UN Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.2, paragraph 19
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a) To enlighten public opinion and to raise the level of people’s
knowledge and awareness in areas such as news, commentary, social,
political, economic, religious, scientific, military affairs, as well as arts
and sports.
b) To promote the goals that are expressed in the Constitution
c) To struggle against false and devise classification and to avoid pitting
different strata in society against one another on the basis of race,
language, tradition, and custom […]
d) To fight against the manifestation of colonial culture […] and to
promote and propagate authentic Islamic culture and diffuse virtuous
principles.
e) To protect and strengthen the policy of “neither East, nor West.” 393
Moreover, the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance must license all publications. 394
Anyone who attempts to publish without such license is subject to prosecution by a
religious judge. 395 The body responsible for the review of license applications is the
Press Supervisory Board, which consists of a state Supreme Court judge, the Minister of
Islamic Culture and Guidance, a Majlis Deputy, a university professor and a director of a
publication. 396 Individuals wishing to obtain a press license, must among other
requirements, be an Iranian citizen at least 25 years of age, possess a Bachelor’s degree
and be free of criminal record or “moral corruption.” 397 The most stringent application
concerns the actual content of any circulars and newspapers. While the press may cover
both domestic and international news, it must “consider the best interests of the
community” and “observe the provisions of the existing law.” 398 The provisions for
criticism are that it must be based on reason and logic, rather than ad hominem attacks. 399
Moreover, anyone who insults Islam through the press is subject to the penal code, unless
393Middle East Watch, Guardians of Thought – Limits on Freedom of Expression in Iran,, pp.24-25
394 Article 7,8, Press Law accessed on http://www.parstimes.com/law/press_law.html 25 March 2004
395 Article, 3, Press Law
396 Article, 10, Press Law
397 Article, 9, Press Law
398 Article, 5, Press Law
399 Article, 3, Press Law
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the insult amounts to apostasy, which creates liability as an apostate. 400 The Press law
passed by the 5th Majlis in 2000 contains additional restrictive provisions on the right to
freedom of expression. Article 12 of the new law requires the Press Supervisory Board to
ban a publication that violates Articles 6, 24 to 29 and 32 of the Law, which deal with
issues such as “publishing atheist articles or issues which are prejudicial to Islamic
codes” or which promote “subjects which might damage the foundation of the Islamic
Republic”, national security, dignity and interests, insulting Islam or offending the Leader
and religious authorities, publishing libel against officials or institutions or insulting legal
or real persons who are “lawfully respected” publishing writings “containing apostasy
and matters against Islamic standards” and quoting articles from the “deviant press,
parties and groups which oppose Islam.” 401 Consequently, the legal framework of the
Islamic Republic fails to provide any guarantee of freedom of expression, as the
constitution is crippled with exceptions that require conformity to Islam and principles of
the state. The Press Law expands on these restraining exceptions and further, sets the
limits for intellectual, cultural and political discourse as well as dictates its contents.
With respect to the actual administration of justice concerning “press offences”, the
Rapporteur for the right to freedom of expression continuously questioned the
competence of the Revolutionary Courts in dealing with press or opinion- or press-related
offences. Emphasising that these courts only have jurisdiction over serious security
related cases, such as offences against internal and external national security, espionage,
sabotage and terrorism 402, these and other courts evidently pursue a political agenda
rather than serve justice. Common charges, such as “insult against Islam”; “criticism”;
“propaganda against the state”; “matters against Islamic standards”; “deviant press parties
and group”; “anti-revolutionary forces” are open to subjective and arbitrary interpretation
by judges implementing them and, therefore, contrary to Article 19, paragraph 3 of the
ICCPR.403 It is clear that the restrictions posed on the right to freedom of expression owe
more to political manoeuvring than religious authority. Engagement with Iran then means
400 Article, 26, Press Law
401 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.2, 12 January, 2004, paragraph 26
402 ibid, paragraph.27
403 ibid, paragraph, 95; UN Doc. A/56/278, 10 August, 2001 paragraph 9
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to uncover political motives for these restrains and identify Islamic sources in support of
the right to freedom of speech.
6. Human Rights Diplomacy and the “Critical and Comprehensive Dialogue” with
Iran – A Case of Constructive Engagement
6.1 Human Rights Diplomacy
The Memorandum “Human Rights and Foreign Policy”, which was published by the
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1979 begins with the statement that “the rights of
man, human rights, or fundamental rights, are names given to those elementary rights
which are considered to be indispensable for the development of the individual.” With
these opening lines, a government made a commendable effort at clarifying its views
on the subject; it opted for emphasising the rights of individuals. 404 More importantly,
human rights became part of foreign policy considerations.
All this brings us to a deeper sense in which human rights have become part of foreign
policy. Since the state is the central institution for effectively implementing these rights,
the legitimacy of a state can consequently be measured by the extent to which its subjects
enjoy human rights. As Vincent argues: “It is not enough anymore for a state to be, and to
be recognized as, sovereign. Nor is it enough for it to be a nation state in accordance with
the principle of self-determination. It must also act domestically in such ways as not to
offend against the basic rights of individuals and groups within its territory.” 405
Therefore, references to human rights in international relations literature potentially go
beyond the inviolability of state sovereignty and even seem to present the international
community with a duty to intervene in internal affairs. Faced with a sovereign state’s
failure to protect humanitarian standards, the UN Security Council sanctioned
interventions in Kosovo (SC1203) in Somalia (SC794) and created Safe Havens for the
404 Peter R. Baehr, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, p. 3
405 R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, p. 130
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Kurds in Iraq (SC688) on grounds of human rights violations.406 The right to
humanitarian intervention is beyond this research on constructive engagement. However,
its implication for human rights diplomacy is that human rights have become a
“hegemonic political discourse” and have “moral and political authority that goes well
beyond their backing by power (force).” Because they universally “respond to some of
them most important social and political aspirations of individuals, families, and groups”
Donnelly argues that “human rights have become internationally hegemonic in
Gramscian sense of the term.”407
How can human rights then be promoted through diplomacy? So far, we have established
that amongst the measures of statecraft available to policymakers, constructive
engagement was identified as an effective peaceful strategy at exerting influence and
resolving conflict in international relations. Hence, if we accept the fact that human rights
diplomacy is the “use of foreign policy instruments in order to promote human rights ” 408
then we have to ultimately conclude that promoting and protecting human rights abroad
requires engagement with the target rather than coercion and isolation. Whilst channels of
communications should be maintained, violations of human rights in the target state
should continue to receive scrutiny and public criticism through parliamentary resolutions
or formally at the United Nations or joint diplomatic démarches: 409 hence, constructive
engagement should maintain dialogue whilst at the same time continue to emphasize the
legal character of human rights.
With regards to the use of sanctions in human rights diplomacy, Baer supports the
premise of constructive engagement and argues that “positive sanctions may be more
effective than negative ones.” Aside from the cooperative character of engagement with
406 For a discourse on humanitarian intervention and the dilemma between a state’s perceived duty to
intervene and the concept of state sovereignty see Anthony F. Lang, Just Intervention (Washington, D.C.,
Georgetown University Press, 2003); Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity – The Struggle for
Global Justice, (London, Penguin Books, 1999), pp.401- 436
407 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights – in Theory and Practice, p. 40
408 Rein Müllerson, Human Rights Diplomacy, (London, Routledge, 1997) p. 2; see also Nazila Ghanea,
“Diplomatic Efforts to Protect Human Rights in Iran”, Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, University of
Leicester, (Leicester, Diplomatic Studies Programme Discussion Papers, 1999)
409 Peter R. Baehr, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, p. 32
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respect to conflict resolution and problem solving, one could also establish a more direct
link between economic assistance / incentives and human rights. After all development
aid is intended to improve economic and social human rights and can equally be used to
support local and national institutions that try to promote and secure civil and political
rights. This may entail to strengthen the role of the media, assisting the development of
independent trade unions, giving training to judges, the police and armed forces, helping
prison reform, designing legislation that is in accordance with international standards and
supporting relevant UN projects. 410
Incorporating our assumptions on the merits of following a ”Hegelian diplomacy”, it is
evident that the key factor in successfully promoting human rights is dialogue.
Essentially, the European Union’s human rights and democratisation policy towards third
countries implements such strategy. The prospects of political and economic cooperation
with the EU is being given as incentive to the third country to meet respective demands
on human rights improvements. As the Commissioner for External Relations puts it:
In general, the human rights dialogues aim at seeking information about the human rights
situation in the country concerned, expressing EU concerns about the country’s human
rights record and identifying practical steps to improve it, in particular through co-
operation projects, and discussing questions of mutual interest and enhancing co-
operation on human rights in multinational fora such as the United Nations.411
Thus, dialogue can serve on two levels: exposing human rights violations as well as
finding solutions of how to overcome political, institutional and legal obstacles to
human rights protections. The case of engagement with Iran shall test whether
Europe’s soft power strategy really is a effective human rights diplomacy.
6.2 Europe’s Policy of Constructive Engagement with Iran
410 Peter R. Baehr, The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Policy, p. 36
411 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/human_rights/intro/index.htm#6, website accessed 27 June
2006
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The policy of constructive engagement pursued by Britain towards Iran from 1992
onwards was essentially crafted by the European Union and was a common foreign
and security policy (CFSP) aimed at maintaining contact with Iran in order to
influence its regime on certain areas of concern for Europe. This policy was coined
“Critical Dialogue” and was endorsed by the European Council at the European Union
(EU) summit in Edinburgh on December 11-12, 1992. The critical dialogue was
adopted to pursue a range of goals which all were officially articulated by the
European Council of Ministers:
Given Iran ‘s importance in the region, the European Council reaffirms its beliefs that a dialogue
should be maintained with the Iranian Government. This should be a critical dialogue, which reflects
concern about Iranian behaviour and calls for improvement in a number of areas, particularly human
rights, the death sentence pronounced by a Fatwa against the author Salman Rushdie, which is
contrary to international law, and terrorism. Improvements in these areas will be important in
determining the extent to which closer relations and confidence can be developed. 412
The conclusion further stated that the Council “accepts the right of countries to acquire
the means to defend themselves, but is concerned that Iran ´s arms procurement should
not pose a threat to regional stability.” Within the context of the Israel Palestine peace
process the Council “expressed the wish that Iran will take a constructive approach
here.” 413 Contrary to the European proposal, the US rejected any engagement and
pursued a policy of “active containment “ 414 against Iran. From 1995 onwards,
Washington implemented increasingly severe sanctions aiming to “isolate” Iran until it
halted its alleged plans to acquire nuclear weapons, obstruction of the Middle East
peace process, and support of international terrorism.415 The EU’s refusal to support
the sanctions led to transatlantic tensions in particular with respect to the Iran Libya
412 European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, European Council, RAPID, DOC/92/8,
Conclusions of the Presidency
413 ibid paragraph 15 -17
414 Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration ‘s Approach to the Middle East” cited in Matthias Struwe,
“The Policy of Critical Dialogue: An Analysis of European Human Rights Policy towards Iran from 1992-
1999)” Durham Middle East Paper Series No. 60 (Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies,
1998), pp.1-2
415 Matthias Struwe, “The Policy of Critical Dialogue: An Analysis of European Human Rights Policy
towards Iran from 1992- 1999”, pp. 1-2
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Sanctions Act (ILSA) and the 1997 conflict over its extraterritorial aspect. 416 Thus,
the first European CFSP was a genuine constructive engagement approach refusing to
employ negative sanctions but actually seeking a dialogue with Tehran to improve
Iranian behaviour and, in the long run, to re-integrate it into the international system.
In fact, based on the geo-political significance of Iran in the region, the EU dismissed
any policy of isolation and containment, stating that “security and stability cannot be
achieved without Iran or even against it”. European governments were convinced that
the only way to approach Iran about their demands and to make it observe
international norms was through direct contact and dialogue. 417
When on April 10, 1997 a German court found the highest Iranian authorities -
including the leader of the revolution - responsible for killing members of the Kurdish
opposition in Berlin critical dialogue was suspended. The conclusion of this so-called
Mykonos trial forced the immediate end to the policy and all European ambassadors
were withdrawn from Tehran. 418 It was only the election of President Khatami and the
promise of a new moderate rhetoric in Iran’s foreign policy notably the call for
“dialogue between civilizations” which persuaded Europe to restore relations with Iran
and to enter into what henceforth was called a “comprehensive dialogue”. Convinced
that the election of Khatami and new developments in Iran vindicated a policy of
active engagement, the “Comprehensive Dialogue” reaffirmed previous demands and
concerns but offered incentives for cooperation more publicly. Having agreed that
renewed contacts with Iran should be “comprehensive, leading to a dialogue on both
the areas of concern [...] and on issues of mutual interest”, 419 specific enticements on
financial and technical cooperation regarding the areas of energy, drugs, refugees and
416 The US - European dispute over French Total and its operations in Iran reached a fragile truce in April
1997 when the Clinton administration decided, contrary to pressure by Congress to impose sanctions, to
exercise the national interest waiver under sec. 9 (c) of ILSA which indicated that EU companies making
investments similar to Total ‘s in South Pars could also expect this “national interest waiver” see Peter
Rudolf, “Critical Engagement: The European Union and Iran” in Richard N. Haas, Transatlantic Tensions:
The US, Europe and Problem Countries ( Washington DC, Brookings Institute, 1999), p. 87
417 “Iran Politik der Bundesregierung; Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Grosse Anfrage“ ,Deutscher
Bundestag, Drucksache 13/3483, 16. Januar 1996
418 see “Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Iran” RAPID PESC/97/32,
7009/97 (Presse 97) , (Brussels, 10 April 1997)
419 “Declaration by the European Union on Iran”, RAPID PESC/97/41, 7569/97 (Presse 125) E/41/97,
(Luxembourg, 29 April 1997)
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trade and investment were made should Iran show progress on the issues of human
rights, its intention to develop WMD, the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, its support
for radical groups as well as greater domestic economic reform. 420
The critical and comprehensive dialogue was a policy of constructive engagement
with the aim of reintegrating a revisionist state back into the international community.
Whilst it was the first ever Common Security and Foreign Policy endorsed by the
European Union and at times lacked coordination, coherence and was subject to
asymmetries in EU-Iran interdependence, 421 the following assessment of its success
or failure mainly focuses on its implementation by Britain.
6.2.1 Origins of engagement
While the scope of this study does not focus on determinants but on statecraft and
diplomacy, a brief discussion of the factors that shaped Europe’s critical dialogue
towards Iran are nonetheless useful in order to fully appreciate how and why the
critical dialogue policy was adopted. It is necessary to understand several factors that
framed the environment in which the policy was crafted. First, at the time the “Critical
Dialogue” was adopted, European trade relations with Iran were not only considerable
but also held promise of further development, as Iran was in the process of
reconstruction after its eight-year war with Iraq. 422 Statistics show that in 1991 Iranian
oil exports to Europe peaked and in the following year European exports to Iran
420 Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council – EU relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran”, COM (2001) 71 final,
(Brussels, 7 February 2001); see also “Declaration by the European Union on Iran”, RAPID PESC/97/41,
7569/97
421 Since human rights was one of the main area where the European Parliament can exert pressure on the
Commission, it played a crucial part in shaping EU public opinion on relations with Iran by consistently
scrutinizing policies and developments and passing critical resolutions. see European Parliament,
Resolution on human rights in the world in 1993-1994 and the Union’s human rights policy, Official
Journal C126, 22 May 1995 ; The European Parliament, Resolution on continued human rights violations in
Iran, Official Journal C166, 3 July 1995 The European Parliament, Resolution on the violation of political
and human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Official Journal C096 , 1 April 1996; The European
Parliament, Resolution on Iran, Official Journal C 176 , (2 June 1997)
422 Johannes Reissner, “Europe and Iran: Critical Dialogue”, in Richard N. Haas and Meghan O´Sullivan,
Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions and Foreign Policy , p. 37
131
reached their highest level for the decade 1986-96. 423 While France and Italy were
primarily oil importers of Iran, by 1990 Germany had become the most significant
importer of Iran ´s non-oil exports (34.4 percent). In 1992 German – Iranian trade
relations reached a volume of more than U.S. $ 6.8 billion, the highest since the
Iranian revolution, and Iranian shares in German stocks amounted to DM 600 million.
424 In addition to commercial relations, Germany and Iran are looking back on a
special historical relationship that began in the nineteenth century and had continued
to unfold until the reign of the Shah. 425 More recently, in 1984 Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, as foreign minister, was the first Western official to visit Tehran after the
Revolution and was also the first one to blame Iraq publicly for attacking Iran in 1987.
This constituted a step towards encouraging Iranian acceptance of UN Resolution 598
that brought an end to the Gulf War. Iran ´s acceptance of the resolution was
interpreted as a major success of German diplomacy. 426 The critical dialogue was a
joint German-British initiative, which crafted a diplomatic strategy with clear political
objectives and demands on areas of concern. It will be shown that whilst German-
Iranian economic interdependence largely dictated diplomatic manoeuvres to the
favour of Tehran, it be wrong to state that the Critical Dialogue was endorsed by
Europe solely on commercial grounds. Since the focus is on British foreign policy
implementation rather than on EU-CSFP, an analysis of Whitehall ´s approach
towards Tehran will attempt to prove that, at least for Britain, the Critical Dialogue
was a policy genuinely aiming at achieving political change in Iran, rather than merely
maintaining good economic relations.
The second factor, which led Europe to adopt the critical dialogue, was the recognition
of new political forces in Iran and the assumption that it was moving toward
423 ibid, p. 37
424 ibid, p. 37; see also International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1999
(Washington, D.C. 1999) p. 2260
425 On the historical relationship between Germany and Iran see Yair P. Hirschefeld, Deutschland und Iran
im Spielfeld der Mächte. International Beziehungen unter Reza Schah 1921- 1941 (Düsseldorf : Droste
Verlag, 1980); Phillip W. Farby, Iran, die Sowjetunion und das Kriegsführende Deutschland (Göttingen,
Muster-Schmidt,1980)
426 Matthias Struwe, “The Policy of Critical Dialogue: An Analysis of European Human Rights Policy
towards Iran from 1992- 1999”, p. 20
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moderation and compliance with internationally recognized norms. Ayatollah
Khomeini’s death in 1988 and Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani’s accession as first executive
president were widely perceived as the end of the revolutionary period in Iran. What
Ehteshami coined the “Second Republic” laid the groundwork for Khatami ´s reform
attempts of today. Under Rafsanjani, pragmatists favoured a gradual approach to the
West, moderation in Iranian foreign policy, and reconstruction of the war-damaged
economy based on decreased state intervention and increased privatisation. 427 After
the war with Iraq, Iran “experienced a dual military stalemate with states outside the
Islamic revolutionary wave” 428. In other words, because Iran did not bring about the
downfall of Saddam Hussein, and emerged out of the conflict with a war torn
economy, the ruling elite eventually had to follow a foreign policy of reconciliation. It
had to moderate its ideological rhetoric in order to establish good relations with those
nations that could financially support Iran in its reconstruction efforts. Appreciating
Iran ´s vulnerability, i.e. the absence of foreign investment and diversification which
reinforced the country ´s dependence on oil , Rafsanjani initiated a conciliatory foreign
policy towards Iran’s Arab neighbours as well as the West. 429 Iran proved this new
attitude by staying neutral during the Gulf War of 1990-91. In response to Iran ´s
position, the European Union lifted the economic boycott imposed at the time of the
Iran-Iraq war. Finally when the last Western hostages in Lebanon were freed with
Iranian help in December 1991, thereby removing a major impediment to
rapprochement, the European Commission argued in favour of the political and
economic integration of Iran into the international community to “assist its economic
reconstruction” and “strengthen the hand of the pragmatic wing of the regime”. 430
Clearly, Europe had appreciated changes within the Iranian political system, and
aware of its own strength, recognized the country ´s economic vulnerabilities and,
therefore, the opportunities for dialogue.
427 Mohsen M. Milani, “The Transformation of the Velayat-E Faqih Institution: From Khomeini to
Khameini”, in The Muslim World, Vol. LXXXII, No3-4, (July- October 1992), p.184
428 Mark. N. Katz, Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves, (New York, St Martin’s Press, 1997), p.109
429 Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “The Foreign Policy of Iran”, in Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan
Ehtesshami, The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (London, Lynne Rienner, 2002,) p. 288
430 Johannes Reissner, “Europe and Iran: Critical Dialogue”, in Richard N. Haas and Meghan O´Sullivan,
Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions and Foreign Policy , p. 38
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The final factor shaping the formulation of the dialogue was Europe´s newly
established common foreign and security policy. The CFSP reflected the commitment
of the European Union to promote human rights as “a core element” of its foreign
policy, particularly in light of several events involving human rights abuses in Iran. 431
While integrating human rights actively in foreign policy has only been apparent since
the early 1990s, the concept itself was first outlined in the “Declaration of Human
Rights” of 1986 432 in which the foreign ministers outlined the principles of human
rights in the Community ´s external relations:
Respect for human rights is one of the cornerstones of European cooperation […] The protection of
human rights is the legitimate and continuous duty of the world community and of nations
individually. Expressions of concern at violation of such rights cannot be considered interference in
the domestic affairs of a state. 433
In line with Article 1 and 55 of the UN Charter the “1991 Declaration Concerning
Human Rights stated that “tensions and conflicts arising from flagrant and systematic
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in one country […] are often a
threat to international peace and security. “ 434 Declaring the promotion of human
rights as cornerstone of a foreign policy inherently needs to adopt a constructive
engagement approach. As has been shown, this is because encouraging democratic
reforms and actively pushing other states for the respect of human rights and other
norms is best implemented through a non-coercive strategy. The extent to which the
EC legally bound itself to a strategy of “conditional reciprocity” (i.e. constructive
engagement) is reflected in the Community´s bilateral trade and co-operation
agreements with third countries. Since the early 1990, the EC has systematically
included a so-called human rights clause in its trade and co-operation agreements with
other countries, including association agreements such as the Europe agreements,
Mediterranean agreements and the Cotonou Agreement (former Lomé Convention).
431 ibid, p. 38
432 Matthias Struwe, “The Policy of Critical Dialogue: An Analysis of European Human Rights Policy
towards Iran from 1992- 1999”, p.13
433 ibid
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435 In line with an earlier communiqué from 1995, the Commission stated in 2001
“that respect for human rights and democracy should be an integral, or mainstream
consideration in all EU external policies”. In its dialogue with third countries the
document stressed that “the most effective way of achieving change is [...] a positive
and constructive partnership with governments based on dialogue, support and
encouragement. This should aim to improve mutual understanding and respect, and
promote sustainable reform.” Whilst giving high priority to a positive approach, the
“suspension clause” foresees that if a state lacks a genuine commitment to pursue
change through dialogue and consultation, and if all avenues for progress have been
explored the EU will resort to negative measures such as sanctions. 436 In line with the
theoretical model for constructive engagement, the CFSP includes two types of human
rights conditionality: ex ante and ex post. The first relates to certain conditions, which
have to be fulfilled in order to enter a regime with the EU. Conditionality ex post then
refers to what this thesis’ model termed ‘continuous conditional assurance” and
manifests itself in the human rights clause, which grants the possibility of suspending
the agreement. 437
Hence, by committing itself to promoting human rights in third countries through
dialogue rather than sanctions, the EU implemented the Critical Dialogue towards Iran
with the objective and expectation to genuinely achieve changes in Iranian behaviour.
Looking at the evolution of the human rights clause in external relations, it is evident
that for the EU the promotion human rights advanced to an imperative grounded in the
435 see Commission of the European Communities , “Report from the commission on the implementation of
measures intended to promote observance of human rights and democratic principles in external relations
for 1996 – 1999”, COM (2000) 726 final , (Brussels, November, 2000) ; Commission of the European
Communities, “The inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between
the Community and third countries”, COM (1995) 216 final, (Brussels , May 1995) ; see also “Resolution
of Human Rights, Democracy and Development”, 28 November 1991 , adopted by the Council, “EP,
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, Subcommittee on Human Rights”, PE 156.345, 26 February
1992
436 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, The European Union ´s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries”,
COM (2001) 252 final, (Brussels, 8 May 2001) p. 8
437 see Elena Fierro, The EU’s Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice, (The Hague,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), pp.98-102
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character of EU co-operation itself. With Lomé, the protection of human rights
eventually became a precondition for political and economic co-operation with third
countries. Consequently, institutionalised economic and political co-operation as well
as development aid became subject to human rights conditionality.
6.2.2 The Agenda of Engagement
The main stated objective was to induce changes in Iranian behaviour to move this
“important country towards responsible and constructive cooperation.” 438 This policy
was based on two closely related assumptions. First, European diplomacy should
engage with different political forces in Iran aiming at persuading moderates in Iran
that a change in policy is in Iran’s basic self-interest. Convinced that a policy of
“isolation and speechlessness” 439 would prove ineffective, supporters of critical
dialogue argued that keeping open lines of communication forces the Iranian political
elite to face the issues of greatest concern for Europe. 440 Second, critical engagement
has rested upon the assumption that Iranian behaviour can be influenced through
communication and incentives within an approach, which Peter Rudolf characterized
as, diffuse linkage. While it was stated that further improvement of European Iranian
relations is linked with Tehran’s living up to European demands, linkage may be
termed diffuse because before the adoption of the “Comprehensive Dialogue”
incentives had not been publicly explained or tied to specific changes in Iranian
behaviour. While it was expected of Iran to fulfil as many expectations as possible,
before progress in relations is offered, the time frame for Iranian concessions,
however, remained open. 441 Yet the most specific public linkage was made
concerning the fatwa against British novelist Salman Rushdie. It was stated that
without progress on this case no bilateral cultural agreement and no treaty with the EU
438 Plenarprotokoll , Deutscher Bundestag 13. Wahlperiode-104. Sitzung, Plenarprotokoll 13/104, p. 9217
439 ibid, p. 9217
440 Peter Rudolf, “Critical Engagement: The European Union and Iran” in Richard N. Haas, Transatlantic
Tensions – The US, Europe and Problem Countries, p. 76
441 ibid, p. 76
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would be made. 442 Facing a death sentence issued against a British national by a
foreign head of state, the British government’s stance was obviously more resolute on
this issue as the prime minister stated in 1993: “The continuing failure of the Iranian
authorities to repudiate this incitement to murder inevitably prevents the establishment
of full and friendly relations.” 443 In fact the demand to lift the fatwa against Salman
Rushdie became the most specific European demand, repeatedly emphasising the
respect for human rights and international law and demanding a written assurance
from Iran not to pursue any attempt to kill him. In December 1993 Commissioner for
external relations Hans van den Broek met Rushdie and declared that “improvements
in human rights and the lifting of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie are important in
determining the quality of relations with Iran. […] Respect for fundamental human
rights and international law remain essential for the development of closer relations
with Iran.” 444 Whilst Europe did not publicly repeat all the demands on its agenda,
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel presented a very specific list of expectations to the
Bundestag in 1996:
1. A positive attitude towards the Middle East peace process
2. Recognition of the democratically elected Palestinian national authority
3. Implementation of the commitment made to the EU not to sponsor terrorism in
the Middle East, neither financially nor logistically
4. Concrete contribution towards a sustainable and peaceful solution in Lebanon
by exerting a moderating influence towards Hezbollah
5. Pledge to assist in cooperative and peaceful solutions in the Near East
6. Improvements in human rights, in particular full freedom of press, speech and
religion
7. Effective control of compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention
8. An end to all intelligence activities, designed to target Iranian dissidents
abroad. 445
442 ibid, p. 76
443 House of Commons Hansard, 18 February 1993, Column 320
444 “Mr van den Broek meets Salman Rushdie” European Commission Press release, RAPID, IP/93/1080,
(Brussels, 9 December 1993)
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The agenda item of improving human rights in Iran is the scope of this thesis and shall
be evaluated by using following methodology:
(iii) To respect: This requires the state and its organs and agents to abstain
from carrying out, sponsoring or tolerating any practice, policy or legal
measure violating the integrity of individuals or impinging on their
freedom to exercise their right.
(iv) To protect: This primarily concerns appropriate legislation confirming
the rights for all individuals and groups. It also obliges the state and its
agents to prevent the violation of rights by state and non-state actors. It
requires that where violations do occur, appropriate remedies exist in
the form of accessible and well-publicized complaints and inspection
procedures. This in turn concerns the framework of the rule of law and
access to justice. 446
7. Conclusion
The essential assumption brought forward in this discussion on human rights was that a
holistic and sustainable way of promoting human rights through diplomacy should be by
following a Hegelian interpretation of rights. Civil and political rights should be seen as a
by-product of a functioning ethical community in which members of that community
assign themselves rights and mutual duties. Thus, rather than imposing a contractarian
political system from outside, human rights diplomacy should nurture a culture in which
rights make sense. Ultimately, the realization of such a community, which assigns itself
rights and mutual duties, will lead to the establishment of a political framework, in which
the state is responsible for strengthening these bonds of community. Thus, in the long-
term, human rights diplomacy may contribute to the emergence of the concept of positive
and negative rights, not necessarily in the contractarian sense of the individual’s
protection against the state, but rather in a Hegelian sense of the state being responsible
446 Based on methodology put forward by Humanist Committee on Human Rights, Matching Practice with
Principles: Human Rights Impact Assessment: EU Opportunities – An outline for the development of
Human Rights Impact Assessment for EU policy measures with an external effect, p.49
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for the maintenance and protection of the ethical community. It was also argued that
rather than viewing religion as a normative challenge to the concept of human rights it
should be incorporated into human rights diplomacy. In a true Hegelian sense, the
inclusion of religion in human rights diplomacy could actually lend a deeper meaning to
human rights.
This is particular relevant for engagement with Muslim countries. At first, Islam is often
seen as an obstacle to the promotion and protection of human rights. This presumption
seems to be primarily based on the charge that Islam fails to assign rights to individuals
but rather emphasizes their duties towards God. It is true that the Cairo Declaration on
Human Rights falls into this pattern. However, given the fluidity of Islamic
interpretations and also looking at apparent secular political motives behind the
document, the Cairo Declaration cannot be seen as a single authoritative pronouncement
on human rights in Islam. Rather, the multitude of Islamic hermeneutics and the history
of Islamic jurisprudence (particular Shi’a) itself provide a strand, which lends support to
the modern understanding of human rights. Essentially, advocates of this “reformist
school” agree that Islam recognizes the dignity of man and, as such, individual rights.
Islamic law also seems to provide a legal-political framework, in which the ruler is
responsible for the enforcement of the law but at the same time subject to it as well. Thus,
rather than restricting human rights, Islamic Law aims to draw a regulatory framework
for rights and mutual duties in order to meet the benefit and protection of the individual
as well as of the community. Moreover, references to fundamental techniques in fiqh
indicated that it is not religious dogma, but rather it is the faculty of reason which central
to Islamic jurisprudence.
Divergent views on human rights within the Islamic tradition particularly manifest
themselves in Iranian politics. The genesis of the constitution as well as the ongoing
debate between mainstream conservatives and reformists in Iran show the inherent
contradictions of Islamic and secular elements of the Iranian political system. It has been
shown that the conflict between the notion of popular and divine sovereignty led to a
political system, which bears obstacles as well as institutional safeguards for the
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protection of human rights. Whilst conservatives maintain the supremacy of the faqih, the
reformist movement advocates the rule of law and constitutionalism in which religion
ought to serve as the handmaiden of democracy. Engagement with Iran then can only be
effective if it manages to empower those who see human rights as vital element of the
political system and of Islam. Therefore, it seems that the key to successful human rights
diplomacy in Iran is to support an indigenous human rights culture to evolve, thus
assisting that the body of laws and rights, would constitute the “normative product” of an
ethical community rather than a concept which is being imposed from without or from
above.
Since economic and political external relations of the European Union are conditional
upon the respect and protection of human rights, thus serving as an incentive for a formal
“human rights dialogue”, it was argued that EU human rights diplomacy effectively
follows a policy of constructive engagement. Constructive engagement with Iran - which
encompasses two periods: the “Critical Dialogue” which was the EU’s official policy
towards Iran between 1992-1999 and the “Comprehensive Dialogue” which was
implemented following Khatami’s election victory in 1997 – shall test the hypothesis that
constructive engagement is best suited at promoting human rights.
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CHAPTER FOUR
BRITISH IRANIAN RELATIONS: THE FATWA YEARS 1989-1990
1. Introduction
The impact which the “Satanic Verses” had on British-Iranian relations have ultimately to
be seen in historical perspective, taking Britain’s imperial legacy in that country into
consideration. If one thinks of Iranian nationalism and Islamism as crucial determinants
of post-1979 Iranian foreign policy, revolutionary anti-imperialism has certainly to be
depicted as third of such core components. In fact, the impact of anti-imperialism not
only on Iranian foreign policy but also on Iranian identity as a whole can directly be
linked to Britain’s legacy in that country. Iranian resentment of foreign influence and the
rejection of superpower hegemony largely derives from this experience and have, as
Abrahamian observes, led to a conspiratorial mindset among all periods of and factions in
Iranian politics. 447 As the British Foreign Affairs Select Committee itself conceded in its
2003 Report on Iran: “Given this history, it is hardly surprising that Iranians are said to
see the hand of the United Kingdom behind every suspicious development in their
country […]” 448 The following historical milestones in British-Iranian relations
undeniably serve as prerequisite to understand Iranian perception towards Britain: the
Definitive Treaty with Britain in 1814, which made Persia a pawn in the Great Game, the
Reuter Oil Concession of 1872, the tobacco concession awarded to Britain in 1882,
Britain’s ambivalent role in the Constitutional Revolution between 1905 and 1911,
Britain’s role in the rise of the Pahlavi reign from 1921-1941, the Allied invasion of 1941
and above all the ousting of Prime Minister Mossadeq by the British-American instigated
coup d’état in 1953. 449 These historical milestones reflect Britain’s grand imperial
strategy of keeping Persia as a buffer zone against Russian expansionism in order to
protect interests in British-India. By and large, Persia was a pawn in the Great Game and
thus was never perceived as an equal ally to Britain. Rather, various 19th century bilateral
447 Shilbey Telhami and Michael Barnett, Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, 2002), p.101
448 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Iran – Third Report of Session 2003-2004, HC 80,
published 19 March 2004, p. 7
449 see Appendix A
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treaties and agreements between London and the court in Persia testify to Iranian military
defeats, diplomatic concessions, and commercial capitulations before the great powers.
Persia’s economic predicament and increased dependence on outside powers equally
applied to the political realm, in which mainly Britain dictated the agenda and influenced
major policies. Shrewd political manoeuvring on part of London against the Russian
backed Qajar Shah eventually culminated with the Constitutional Revolution (1906-
1911). However, Britain’s ambivalent role eventually strangled the country’s first
genuine attempt at democracy. More significantly, Britain’s decision to oust the
democratically elected Prime Minister through a coup d’état in 1953 in order to maintain
an asymmetrical relationship with the Iranian oil industry heralded the rise of an
increasingly authoritarian monarchy.
With the rise of Reza Shah, the times when Whitehall dictated the terms in Iran were
finally over as Washington now acted as the “Patron Power”, preserving the monarchy
and influencing the direction and agenda of its policies in line with western regional and
international interests. In return for Iran’s dependence on the US and alliance with the
West, the monarch expected the consolidation of his rule. Undoubtedly, extensive U.S.
support, which helped the Shah to transform the country from an inefficient autocracy
into a stronger oil-funded neo-patrimonial state, initially enabled his regime to control the
country, but eventually resulted in the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
Nonetheless, it was the fundamental role of the British government, which had sown the
seeds of anti-imperialism, and Khomeini’s agenda against “foreign oppressors”. More
than that, Britain’s continuous coercive diplomacy towards Iran shaped an entire mindset
of Iranian politicians as well as intelligentsia, which essentially reflects deep suspicion of
Western, particularly British, policy towards Iran. Ironically, however, this negative
undercurrent also carries an admiration for British statecraft in the sense that whilst
Iranians resent the British the most, they also perceive Britain as one of the most
powerful players in international relations. 450 Ultimately, Khomeini’s fatwa against a
450 Interview with Italian Official, (Tehran, 2 September, 2004)
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British citizen can only be fully appreciated if one takes this historical context and
reciprocal cycle of interference and mistrust into account.
2. Immediate Historical Background
The Revolution in 1979 had a considerable impact on British-Iranian relations and
significantly reduced Britain’s economic as well as political stake in that country.
Following the takeover of the American embassy in Tehran and anti-British
demonstrations in 1980, Britain was advised by the Iranian Foreign Ministry that the
authorities could no longer guarantee the safety of British staff, thus prompting the
departure of Britain’s Ambassador. Because of the “Rushdie affair”, it was to be nearly
twenty years before a new one was appointed. 451 In the end, the Iranian embassy in
London turned out to be at greater risk. In April 1980 an armed group from Iran took the
embassy staff hostage and demanded autonomy for the Iranian province of Khuzestan.
During the siege and, finally, the dramatic rescue operation by the Special Air Services
(SAS), two members of the embassy staff were killed by the hostage takers and all but
one of the gunmen were killed by the SAS. Although the Iranian Foreign Ministry
thanked Britain officially for the way the crisis was ended, the incident cast a further
shadow over bilateral relations and it was followed by a long-drawn-out negotiations
concerning compensation for damage done to the premises during the rescue. 452 By far,
the most detrimental impact on post-1979 bilateral relations was Britain’s policy during
the Iran-Iraq war. Whilst the U.S. and the EU did observe an arms embargo towards both
warring parties, Britain for its part, operated an official policy of restraint on arms sales
to Iran and Iraq and an unofficial one of supply. The “Scott Inquiry” of 1996 showed that
the official guidelines in the FCO and MoD were aimed not at affecting the progress of
the conflict but rather at the maintenance of relationships with the belligerents – hence an
apparent policy of even-handedness. Far from fulfilling the requirements of wartime
neutrality, guidelines on arms exports to Iran and Iraq were dictated by a general desire to
continue to trade with both countries. An abundance of evidence proved how the British
government’s review process of Export Licensing Application (ELA) by British
451 Christopher Rundle, (former FCO diplomat / Iran Desk) Iran –UK Relations since the Revolution:
Opening Doors, (2005) Manuscript handed to the author
452 ibid, p. 4; see also Chris Cramer and Jim Harris, Hostage, (London, J.Clare, 1982)
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companies did not meet the standards one would expect from a country which declared
neutrality. Moreover, the British government knew about the widespread diversion of
military goods via Saudi Arabia, Egypt and particular Jordan to Iraq. While the British
government’s policy of allowing this illicit supply of arms to Iran and Iraq may have not
had a significant impact on sustaining the war, it clearly failed to actively seek to resolve
the conflict. 453
Nonetheless, by 1988 Iran began to conduct what it called an 'open door’ policy towards
all countries with the exception of Israel, the United States and South Africa. Following
the Iran – Iraq war, the Iranian government seemed eager to get closer to European
countries in particular, as well as the Arab states, most of which had favoured Iraq during
the war. The prospect of re-establishing relations with Britain largely resulted from
negotiations, which took place at the United Nations in Geneva and were held by Sir
David Meyer and the Iranian Director General for West-European affairs Mahmoud
Vaezi. 454 These negotiations eventually settled the rival claims for compensation for the
damage of the Iranian embassy in 1980 and, from the British side, damage done to the
British embassy building by a mob at the time of the revolution. 455 When acting Charge
d’Affaires, Gordon Pirie eventually ran up the Union Flag on 3 December 1988 for the
first time in eight years 456, it was based on the joint announcement in Geneva which
stated that “full diplomatic relations […] were based on reciprocity, mutual respect and
non-interference in each other’s affairs.” 457 For policymakers in Whitehall, a British
presence in Iran mainly served to establish channels of communication with the
Hezbollah in Lebanon, which was holding three British citizens hostage. The idea was
that Iran would be an intermediary with the kidnappers and thus contribute to their
release. Another priority for Britain was the release of Mr Roger Cooper and Mr Nicholas
453 Davina Miller, Export or Die – Britain’s Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq (London, Cassel, 1996),
pp.192-196
454 Interview with former Deputy Foreign Minister for Iran, Mahmoud Vaezi (Tehran, 6 September, 2004);
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Nichola, two Britons who were held in Tehran’s Evin prison on charges of spying. 458
Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe linked any further improvements of bilateral relations
to the release of both Britons and maintained that none of the prisoners who were being
accused of spying have ever been tried by the Iranian authorities. Whilst Cooper was not
released until 1991, the Iranian government eventually freed Nicholas Nicola on
December 27, 1988. 459 Tom Clark, then Labour MP for Monklands West, Strathclyde,
who joined a delegation to Iran that year stated that “it [the release] suggests that it was
right to restore diplomatic relations and reopen the British Embassy. It is very important
we should keep pressing for the release of Roger Cooper from Iran and the British
hostages from Beirut. It has taken time to recover from the shooting down of the Iranian
airbus over the Gulf but it would appear that things are now beginning to move in the
right direction.” 460 However, the fatwa issued against Salman Rushdie for writing the
“Satanic Verses” derailed this potential rapprochement.
3. The “Satanic Verses”: The Prelude to the Fatwa
3.1 The Novel
Before examining the impact on British Iranian relation of the fatwa issued by Ayatollah
Khomeini on Salman Rushdie for publishing the “Satanic Verses”, it seems appropriate
to briefly portray the contents of the novel, which Rushdie claims he sat down to write
with the dictum “better a spectacular fiasco than a mediocre success.” 461 A concise
synopsis of the novel should help to highlight the opposing concepts of blasphemy and
freedom of expression and put subsequent events into perspective. In hindsight, actual
public engagement with the text could have contributed to a contested literary discourse
and may have potentially prevented the tragedy which followed. As Said rightly states “
[…] only a tiny proportion discussed the book itself; those who opposed it and
458 Roger Cooper was a British businessman employed by the American firm McDermott International, a
leading marine construction company. He had been visiting Iran from Dubai on business when he was
arrested and imprisoned on a charge of spying. He was sentenced to “Death Plus Ten Years.” see Roger
Cooper, Death Plus Ten Years. (Scranton, Harper Collins, 1994)
459 The Times, 28 December 1988
460 ibid
461 Axel Jensen, “God does not read novels”, in Niels Frid-Nielsen(ed) Freedom of Expression: the Acid
Test (Stockholm, Nordic Council, 1994), p. 43
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recommended its burning and its author’s death refused to read it, while those who
supported his freedom to write left it self-righteously at that. “ 462 Whilst the novel does
address religious beliefs and narratives of Islam, critics claim that this is only one aspect
of a complex and highly allusive novel that produces a broad and provocative
commentary about the philosophical and religious problems of good and evil. The
underlying theme of the “Satanic Verses” is about British and Asian politics and culture,
in particular Asian and African immigrant identities, and it is concerned with the nature
of truth and revelation. These ideas are incorporated into an eventful storyline involving
the characters of Gibreel Farishta and Saladin Chamca, two figures with complex British-
Indian identities caught in a seemingly epic battle that takes place between Bombay and
London in the 1980s. Both of Rushdie’s protagonists begin to take on supernatural
qualities and visit alternative worlds, such as that of Gibreel’s extended dreams about the
prophet Muhammad. These episodes, which essentially refer to the founding of Islam
only constitute one seventh of the novel as opposed to the rest which is taken up by the
present day lives of Saladin and Gibreel, thus lending weight to the issues of
immigration, denationalisation and integration. 463 Nonetheless, it was this part of the
book, which aroused fundamental questions about religious belief and truth and which
ultimately was considered blasphemous. In the “Satanic Verses”, Rushdie narrates the
genesis of how the prophet character “Mahound” founded a religion called “Submission”.
Referring to the contested historical account of the “Satanic Verses”, Rushdie subjects his
fictional character to the struggle between the divine and political ambitions. Ultimately,
the reader learns that his revelations are not of divine origin but rather stem from
Mahound’s own imagination in an effort to strengthen his position with the ruling elite.
464
Essentially, Rushdie was charged with blasphemy on two counts: On ontological
grounds, his narrative questions the nature of divine revelation and thus the very basis of
Islam and its prophet founder. As the incident of the satanic verses has been contested in
462 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London, Vintage, 1994), p. 397
463 D.C.R.A. Goonetillke, Salman Rushdie (London, MacMillan, 1998), p. 94
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Islamic historical records, Rushdie reiteration of the matter constitutes more than joining
the ranks of Orientalists. As Sardar argues
The reasons for Muslim anger, profound offence and dubbing of Rushdie’s words as blasphemy
reach much deeper and far more central to the entire thrust of his book than this one incident. It is
the precision and careful selection of the satanic verses incident as a vehicle for advancing his
proposition about the nature of religion and revelation, the encrusted and encoded theses of
Rushdie’s book, that so offends. 465
Whilst the chapter “Jahilia” and “Return to Jahilia” questioned the infallibility of the
revelation, the profanities and offences in “The Curtain”, which were directed against the
Prophet, his spouses and his followers, which according to Rushdie were intended to set
up an opposition between the sacred and profane worlds, even failed to convince some of
his admirers, and thus played irreverently with figures held in deep reverence by
believers. 466
3.2 The Protest
The controversy surrounding Rushdie’s novel eventually spilled over from the literary
circles and entered the public realm when it became a matter of blasphemy versus
freedom of speech. It all started in October 1988, when the Indian government, bowing to
pressure from Muslim groups and politicians Khurshid Alam Khan, MP and Syed
Shahabuddin, MP, banned the publication of the Satanic Verses in India. 467 The
implication of this decision was that the book was banned in several other countries,
including South Africa, Pakistan, Malaysia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The
prospect of an even more widespread ban and legal proceedings was reinforced when in
November Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Gad el-Haq Ali Gad el-Haq
called on all Islamic organisations based in Britain to join in legal steps to prevent
continuing distribution there. He ruled that the novel contained “lies and figments of the
465 Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, Distorted Imagination – Lessons from the Rushdie Affair,
(London, Grey Seal, 1990), pp.150-151
466 see Aamir Mufti, “Reading the Rushdie Affair: An Essay on Islam and Politics”, Social Text, No.29
(1991), pp. 102-103
467The Independent, 6 October, 1988
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imagination about Islam which were passed off as facts” and demanded that the Islamic
Conference Organisation (OIC) should take concerted action against what he described as
“a distortion of Islamic history”. 468 Whilst this ruling carried considerable weight,
particularly for Britain’s Sunni community, protests there had already been organised.
Frustrated by the fact that the British government remained largely oblivious to the
blasphemous nature of the book, Faiyazuddin Ahmad, Public Relations Director of the
Islamic Foundation in Leicester photocopied the offending passages of the Satanic Verses
and sent them to numerous Islamic organisations in Britain. Copies were also dispatched
to the 45 embassies in London of the member countries of the OIC, including Iran.
Having received a copy containing the offending passages, Dr Syed Pasha, Secretary of
the Union of Muslim organisations, an umbrella organisation for Muslims community
groups in Britain, summoned the union’s 19 council members to a crisis meeting on
October 15. It was decided to launch a country wide campaign to get the novel banned.
469 Reiterating that Muslims groups in Britain did not object to accounts, which are
critical or irreverent about Islam or Muslims, numerous letters, such as that of the Islamic
Defence Council to Penguin Publishers emphasised “that no individual much less a whole
world community can accept to be abused and insulted in the filthy way this “novel” has
sought to do.” 470 Such petitions and lobbying efforts to the publishing house to refrain
from any further distribution of the novel were unsuccessful. Penguin maintained that to
withdraw the novel “would be wholly inconsistent with our position as a serious
publisher who believes in freedom of expression” and reminded critics that perception of
its blasphemous nature was based on “failure to read it in its entirety, what is after all a
work of fiction.” 471 Pressure on the British government remained equally futile. On
behalf of the Union of Muslim Organisations, Pasha and two Members of Parliament
sought initially to prosecute Rushdie and Penguin under the Public Order Act (1986) and
the Race Relations Act (1976) for the incitement to racial hatred. 472 However, failing to
468 The Times, 22 November, 1988
469 Sunday Times, 19 February, 1989
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realize the changed dynamics and sensitivities of Britain’s multicultural society, the
government made it clear that these were no grounds on which the government would
consider banning the book. Prime minister Thatcher further stated that “It is an essential
part of our democratic system that people who act within the law should be able to
express their opinions freely.” 473 The government’s only concession was to refer the
matter to the Attorney General, Sir Patrick Mayhew, who decided that the novel
constituted no criminal offence. 474 Demands to have the book banned under the common
law of blasphemy, which was supported by various MPs, such as David Young and Peter
Thurnman, were rejected on the grounds that the ambit of the offence of blasphemy did
not extend to non-Christian religions. The government further reminded MPs that in its
“Report on Offences against Religion and Public Worship” published in 1985, the Law
Commission recommended by a majority that the existing common law offence of
blasphemy should be abolished and only a minority took the stance that the existing
offence would be repealed and replaced with a criminal offence which applied to all
religions. 475 Evidently, this statement by the British government failed to address the
wider picture of the common law and thus ultimately failed to give the issue the attention
Muslim constituents expected. Frustrated by the fact that the democratic and legal
process proved unsuccessful for their demands to have the book banned in the United
Kingdom, Muslim Community leaders followed the advice of a solicitor in the North of
England who suggested that publicity was the key to get their message across. He advised
that they could always try burning the book in public, as there was, he pointed out, no law
against that. 476 Bradford with a community of 50 000 Muslims became the centre of
protest in Britain and members of Bradford mosque ritually burned the book after Friday
prayers. The irony of these campaigns was that it did not necessarily convey to the public
that the novel polemically distorted facts about Islam and offended religious feelings.
Rather, many commentators interpreted the demonstrations as the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism in Britain and feared a crusade against the liberal democratic value
system. With regards to exerting pressure on the government, these demonstrations in
473 Sunday Times, 19 February, 1989
474 House of Commons, Hansard, 5 December, 1988, Column 19
475 see House of Commons, Hansard, 20 December, 1988, Column 181
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fact proved counterproductive and even allowed Rushdie himself to comment that
“Unable to accept the unarguables of religion, I have tried to fill up the hole with
literature. The art of the novel is a thing I cherish as dearly as the bookburners of
Bradford value their brand of militant Islam.” 477 It is against this background that one
has to understand the events that followed.
3.3 The fatwa
The immediate event, which seemed to have provoked the until-now relatively silent
Ayatollah Khomeini to comment on the Rushdie issue, were the deaths of Pakistani
demonstrators in Islamabad. The day before the Iranian head of state issued his
statement, he had been told that five people were killed and dozens injured at a rally
against the “Satanic Verses”, which ended in the attempt by the crowd to storm the US
Information Centre in the Pakistani capital. 478 On February 14 1989, Ayatollah
Khomeini’s office in Tehran eventually released the following statement:
In the name of God Almighty. There is only one God, to whom we shall all return. I would like to
inform all the intrepid Muslims in the world that the author of the book entitled “The Satanic
Verses”, which has been compiled, printed and published in opposition to Islam, the Prophet and the
Koran, as well as those who were aware of its contents, have been sentenced to death. I call on all
zealous Muslims to execute them quickly, wherever, they find them, so that no one will dare to
insult the Islamic sanctions. Whosoever is killed on this path will be regarded as a martyr, God
willing. In addition, anyone who has access to the author of the book, but does not possess the
power to execute him, should refer him to the people so that he may be punished for his actions.
May God’s blessing be on you all. Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini. 479
At first, it was not too apparent why Khomeini issued the fatwa 480 and sentenced
Rushdie to death, as Iranian foreign policy had gradually been moving towards détente
477 The Observer, 22 January, 1989
478see The Independent, 13 February, 1989
479 The Observer, 19 February, 1989
480 It should be noted, Khomeini’s statement was first described as a death sentence by European and US
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with Europe and particularly Britain. There is evidence that the petitions sent by
organisations in Britain via the Iranian embassy demanded that Rushdie should be judged
by Khomeini.481 Evidently, Khomeini as mujtahid was a qualified fatwa giver and his
verdict to have Rushdie killed has to be seen as a response to the initiative of istifta’ (i..e.
he was asked for a fatwa). Usually such questions ask for clarifications on certain
matters, which cannot be found in the Qu’ran or hadith. 482 In this case, however, it
seems that it resulted more from Khomeini’s ambition of exporting the revolution.483
Though the application of Islamic norms to Iran’s foreign policy was not new, the fatwa
was an unparalleled effort by the leadership to take the intrinsically universal character of
Shi’a Islam and its fight for the oppressed (mostazafin) 484 against the oppressor
(mostakbarin) as far as Great Britain. Essentially, the fatwa resulted from what
Ehteshami refers to as “messianic Shi’ism” 485 and hence was Khomeini’s way of
appealing to his worldwide umma constituents.
The fatwa, however, also must be seen within the wider picture of the Iranian political
system. After the war with Iraq, which enjoyed little support after 1982, when an Iranian
counter-offensive managed to drive Iraqi forces out of Iranian territory, the Islamic
Republic faced tremendous economic and political pressures. By 1989, Iran suffered
from a war torn economy, which was further heavily burdened by the loss of oil
revenues. 486 Moreover, as a result of the human toll of the war, an increasingly alienated
society had lost confidence in the leadership and its ability to govern.487 Mehdi Moslem
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further argues that the most troubling aspect in post-war Iran, however, was the growing
tension and disagreement among powerful figures loyal to Khomeini. Far from being a
monolithic entity, the leadership disagreed on a broad range of issues from
socioeconomic policies to foreign policy orientation. 488 Khomeini had to deal with two
camps. Prominent figures, such as Hojjatoleslams Karrubi, Sadeq Khalkhali, Mohammad
Khoinia and Ali Akbar Mohtashemi wanted to ensure that the radical agenda would
dominate foreign and domestic policy. On the other side, there were the emerging
pragmatists, most notably Majlis Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rfsanjani, who demanded
reforms and détente abroad. 489 Appreciating the realities, that emphasis on Islam and
revolutionary discourse were insufficient for governing the country, Khomeini himself
attempted to break the ideological deadlock. Through various decrees from late 1987
until his death in August 1989 Khomeini paved the way for the rationalisation of the
Islamic Republic. The new constitution and various proclamations strengthened the
populist republican dimension of the state at the expense of its religious revolutionary
one and once again ensured Khomeini’s prerogative as the vali-ye faqih. 490 In fact, it was
the interpretation of vali-ye faqih, over which the factions fundamentally disagreed. The
two ends of the spectrum are the traditional interpretation fiqh-e sonnati and dynamic
fiqh-e puya. Adherents of traditional interpretation believe that primary ordinances (i.e.
Qu’ran and Sunna) provide sufficient means to govern the umma. Only in special
circumstances should jurists deviate from this premise and enact new decrees. The idea of
the dynamic fiqh agrees with the premise that primary Islamic ordinances provide a solid
foundation for Islamic governance. Supporters of this interpretation further argue that as
society progresses, new issues and problems arise, and hence the shari’a must be
constantly changing, adapting and producing new decrees. 491 Khomeini’s series of edicts
in the late 1980s addressed numerous domestic and socio-economic and political issues
and ultimately strengthened the role of the state. However, he was increasingly criticised
by radical circles in Qom when he went so far as to argue that “the government [state]
who no longer wanted war, privation and social control. see Economist Intelligence Unit, Iran Country
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that is part of the absolute vice-regency of the Prophet of God is one of the primary
injunctions of Islam and has priority over all secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting
and haj.” He further declared that “The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke
any shari’a agreement that it has conducted with people when those agreements are
contrary to the interests of the country of Islam.” 492 This highly controversial decree,
which fundamentally undermined the Islamic nature of the state, again bolstered its
republican dimension. Whilst dismissed and contradicted by figures, such as Ayatollah
Ahmad Azari-Qomi, it was political capital for Rafsanjani and the pragmatist camp.
Because Khomeini had initially supported the radical leftist camp before the election for
the Third Majlis (1988-1989) by publicly asking the electorate to “vote for the candidates
who have experienced poverty and who in word and deed defend the Islam of the bare-
footed, the Islam of the oppressed” the radical left enjoyed a majority in the Third Majlis.
493 Thus, the parliament was particularly hostile to Rafsanjani’s minority pragmatist camp
and continuously opposed his post-war reconstruction plan, which was aimed at
maximizing use of industrial production and to increase economic growth, on the grounds
that “it pushed aside important social issues” and “that the programme is not clear on the
direction of the country’s culture.” 494 This latest ruling coupled with Khomeini’s
insistence on immediate reconstruction provided Rafsanjani with enough leverage from
the Supreme Leader to push his bill through parliament.
More significantly, in late 1988, Khomeini ordered the establishment of the Expediency
Council as an arbiter between the parliament and the Guardian Council, dominated by the
conservative right faction, thus further supporting the pragmatists in their effort to gain
political momentum. It was during this period, when Khomeini’s edicts created a
favourable political environment for the technocrats / pragmatists that ultimately
witnessed the ascension of Rafsanjani and other pragmatists. In fact, days before
Khomeini issued the fatwa against Rushdie, he uttered his most direct and harsh criticism
492 ibid, p. 74
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of the radical camp. Referring to statements by members of a religious seminary
(howzeh) in Qom, who questioned the Imam’s ruling that the game of chess and certain
Western films were permissible, Khomeini attacked this faction by calling them “pseudo-
religious people [who] destroy the essence of the revolution from within. With self-
righteous faces and in support of religion and velayat, they accuse everyone of
irreligiousness.” 495 Though one should be careful not to interpret too much into
Khomeini’s political motivations for issuing the fatwa against Rushdie, during that period
a certain pattern of political manoeuvring on his part to avoid explicitly siding with either
faction is evident. During the post war period of strengthening the republican nature of
the state, Khomeini was at the same time always cautious not to alienate the radicals too
much and many decrees were followed by efforts to appease this faction. Following his
public attack on the howzeh, the fatwa against Rushdie could be seen as such an attempt
at redressing the balance between the rival factions. In fact, shortly after the fatwa Iranian
officials commented that Ayatollah Khomeini has made a practice of re-establishing the
balance every time it tilts too much in one direction and that lately, events had been
tilting towards pragmatists like the Speaker of the Parliament, Rafsanjani and
conservative allies, like President Khameini. To the detriment of more radical leaders
such as the Interior Minister and the Prime Minister, pragmatists were thus able to
promote liberalisation policies in and outside parliament. Hence, after the fatwa, Prime
Minister Mir Hussein Moussavi seemed eager to exploit the situation and immediately
declared a public day of mourning. 496 A more significant move with regards to the
unfolding Rushdie affair as a whole, was one by Ayatollah Sanei, Head of the 15th
Khordad Foundation, who within days after the sentence, offered a bounty of US $ 1
Million to anyone who would kill Rushdie. Undoubtedly, in the eyes of disillusioned
radical circles, the fatwa succeeded in re-establishing Khomeini’s credentials as leader of
the Islamic revolution as it seemed to have put revolutionary Islam back on the agenda. It
is noteworthy, however, that the pragmatists too jumped on the bandwagon and managed
to interpret Khomeini’s decision according to their interests. When Rafsanjani addressed
the parliament he declared that what had angered Ayatollah Khomeini “was not merely
495 ibid, p. 76
496 The New York Times, February 16, 1989
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the publication of the book or novel against Islam.” Rather it constitutes “a well-
calculated and extensive plot, [which] has been orchestrated against Islam behind the
curtain.” 497 In an attempt to read the edict within his dynamic interpretation of the faqih
he concluded his address:
Therefore, the importance of the issue merits our great leader – who usually does not involve
himself in personal issues- involving himself in force to express his anger. It is always incumbent
upon us to obey his orders. We always know that he raises issues related to Islam in a timely manner
and that he makes a confrontation in due time. 498
Notwithstanding such centrist interpretations, the fatwa proved a useful tool for the
conservative (and radical) camp to regain short-term political momentum and also
strengthened their legitimacy in religious terms. Whilst, compared to previous rulings, the
fatwa did not have significant impact on domestic policies; it somehow re-established a
balance of power between the factions. As Khomeini himself declared:
For the sake of maintaining a balance amongst various factions, I have always issued
bitter and sweet instructions […] However, I am worried about the confrontation and
discord among the factions which believe in the revolution, lest should it lead to the
strengthening of the comfort-seeking and carefree faction which does nothing but nag and
complain. 499
Whatever, the true reasons for the death sentence, its implications was a diplomatic
disaster and would trouble British Iranian relations for the next nine years.
4. The Immediate Aftermath: First Reactions
The reactions which the fatwa created, can be divided into three stages. At first,
confusion and panic dominated the private and public domain. The British government
was unsure how to react and, therefore, initially refused to publicly discuss the matter.
Moreover, various book chains, concerned for their safety, immediately cancelled orders
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to receive editions of the “Satanic Verses”. However, after the realization that the edict
was genuine and constituted a threat to a British subject, the government moved quickly
to publicly condemn Khomeini’s decision and developed a strategy to confront Iran.
Likewise, literary and intellectual circles interpreted it as an attack on liberal values and
human rights and emphasised a writer’s freedom of speech. The third stage witnessed an
increased public debate on the issue of blasphemy and the offence the book constituted.
Faced with the seemingly volatile nature of Iranian politics, British politicians and
intellectuals soon turned against Rushdie and openly questioned the wisdom of Rushdie’s
work. This resulted in efforts by NGOs and other groups to actively lobby the British
government to publicly side with citizen Rushdie and defend his freedom of speech. It
was a period when the British government confronted Iran, yet at the same time was
confronted at home.
After the fatwa was issued, the British government faced a similar situation as the US
government did, when the US embassy in Tehran was taken over in 1980. A public ruling
by a head of state and government, which incited the killing of a subject of another
country on grounds of blasphemy, seemed unprecedented in international relations
history. As such, the British government had no Standard Operating Procedure to fall
back on, thus preventing any of the governments departments from efficiently
responding. Eventually, the Home Office decided to put Rushdie under police protection
as well as the premises of the publishers. Members of Viking Penguin Publishing were
advised to take care of their own security precautions. 500 Since Special Branch
Metropolitan Police did not know what to expect and seriously considered the possibility
of a suicide bomber storming any place they occupied with the author, it was decided to
keep him hidden in undisclosed locations in the countryside. 501
On 16 February, thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the British embassy in
Tehran and protested against the publication. The crowd was further incited by radical
500 House of Commons Hansard, 16 February, 1989, Column 489
501 Baroness Frances D'Souza (House of Lords) Former Head of Article 19 and the Rushdie Defence
Committee, unpublished diary and memories on her defence of Salman Rushdie “Fighting the Fatwa”
(1989-1998), given to the author 14 November, 2004 (hereafter Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of
“Fighting the Fatwa”)
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Member of Parliament, Fakhreddin Hejazi, who addressed the demonstrators with the
words that “Britain was the enemy of the Qur’an and Islam and the manifestation of all
evil” and declared that “Iranians were disgusted at having relations with Britain.” 502
Thus, it became obvious that the fatwa represented more than a threat to a British citizen,
as the Iranian government seriously considered the British government’s active
involvement in the publication of the book. This was a view shared by many decision-
makers in government and parliament and certainly amongst the Iranian ulema. On the
other hand, the British were coming to a similar conclusion regarding Iran. During a
meeting between British Chargé d’Affaires Nicholas Brown and senior Iranian diplomats,
in which he expressed London’s grave concern at the Ayatollah’s death sentence, the
Iranian government representatives found themselves unable to condemn or even distance
themselves from the fatwa.503 Failure to do so reinforced Whitehall’s position that the
fatwa represented more than revolutionary rhetoric and considered it as being supported
by the Iranian government as well as parliament. On this basis the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office summoned the Iranian Charge d’Affaires in London and protested
“in the strongest terms” over Ayatollah Khomeini’s death threat and indicated that recent
moves toward establishing closer relations with Iran would be shelved. For the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO) it proved impossible to “establish a normal
relationship with Iran while the Iranian Government failed to respect fully international
standards of behaviour.” It was decided not to build up the embassy in Tehran, thus
showing Tehran how unacceptable a threat it considered the fatwa. 504 It should be noted
that from the onset the fatwa’s impact was not confined to Anglo – Iranian relations.
Rather it created worldwide turmoil both on an intellectual and political level. The
American based human rights organisation PEN immediately started to lobby the British
government to secure the safety of Rushdie and defend his freedom of speech. Viking-
Penguin’s New York offices had to be closed for an hour after bomb threats. Pakistan
announced a concerted action among Islamic nations to achieve a worldwide ban of the
“Satanic Verses” and the Iranian Embassy appealed to Pope John Paul II to intervene and
502 IRNA, 16 February, 1989
503 The New York Times, 17 February 1989; Given Khomeini’s status in Iranian politics, it was impossible
for any Iranian official to condemn the fatwa.
504 FCO press statement, cited from The New York Times, 17 February 1989
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block any further publication of the book in Italy. 505 Nevertheless, it was up to Britain to
deal with the issue and to find a solution to the impending diplomatic crisis.
Following Britain’s protest, President Ali Khameini carefully moved to de-escalate the
situation, which he realized was increasingly being exploited by the radical camp and
suggested that if Rushdie repents and apologised to Muslims it would be possible that the
people may pardon him. Likewise Iran’s Charge d’Affaires, Muhammad Mehdi Akhoond
Zadeh Basti, described Khomeini’s execution order as “purely religious statement” which
was not meant as a political gesture against Britain. 506 Given the fact that Iranian
diplomats worked hard on the rapprochement with Britain, it seems that its diplomatic
corps was somewhat frustrated by the fatwa and thus tried to carefully manoeuvre
between diplomatic courtesy and Khomeini’s authority. Nonetheless, given earlier
consultations with Iranian diplomats, this move did little to impress the FCO. Rushdie,
however, was advised to issue a statement of regret. Whilst his previous statements
emphasised the philistine nature of governments and individuals, which have banned and
condemned the book, Rushdie moved on to sound more apologetic:
As author of the Satanic Verses I recognize that Muslims in many parts of the world are genuinely
distressed by the publication of my novel. I profoundly regret the distress that publication has
occasioned to sincere followers of Islam. Living as we do in a world of many faiths this experience
has served to remind us that we must be conscious of the sensibilities of others. 507
To the frustration of some officials in the Iranian Foreign Ministry and certainly to the
dismay of the British FCO and Rushdie, Khomeini rejected Rushdie’s statement as
falling short of the public repentance required for a pardon and added that “It is
incumbent on every Muslim to employ everything he has got, his life and his wealth, to
send him to hell.” 508 For British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe Khomeini’s
reiteration of the threat in such manner was “an attack not only on the author and
publishers of the book, but on the fundamental freedoms for which our society stands: the
505 see Article 19 Carmel Bedford (ed), Fiction, Fact and the Fatwa – 2000 Days of Censorship, (Article 19
International Centre against Censorship, August 1994), pp. 2-3
506 IRNA, 18 February, 1989
507 The New York Times, 19 February, 1989
508 IRNA, 19 February, 1989
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freedom of expression, religious tolerance and the rule of law. “ 509 The British
government then quickly moved to gain support from its European allies, thus seeking a
more powerful forum as well as attempting to rid itself of some of the burden the British
author had brought upon the Tory government.510 Following a General Affairs Council
Meeting on 20 February, a joint statement was issued by the 12 Ministers of the EU. In
unprecedented unity they condemned, what they called “incitement to murder” and
regarded it as “an unacceptable violation of the most elementary principles and
obligations that govern relations among sovereign States “ underlining that “such
behaviour” was “contrary to the Charter of the United Nations”. Whilst the resolution
paid respect to the religious feelings of all peoples, the European Union statement also
emphasised that “ they remain fully committed to the principles of freedom of thought
and expression within their territories” and that the member states “will ensure the
protection of the life and properties of their citizens” and that “in no case will they accept
attempts to violate these basic rights.” 511 More than anything else, the declaration
established that what was at stake was freedom of speech and ultimately served as the
normative basis on which British diplomacy towards Iran would thereafter be founded.
Following this meeting the immediate strategy was to recall the heads of missions from
the 12 member states in Tehran and at the same time to restrict the freedom of movement
of Iranian diplomats in member state countries. 512 From the onset of the crisis, however,
the British government was aware that its power to sway Iran was somewhat limited and
any diplomatic strategy had to take this into consideration.
5. A Question of Power: How to Confront Iran?
Secretary Howe’s statement that “it is neither possible nor sensible to conduct a normal
relationship with Iran” 513 prompted the break of British Iranian relations. With reference
to Iran’s continuous failure to renounce the use or threat of violence, the FCO asked the
509 House of Commons, Hansard, 21 February, 1989, Column 839
510 It should be noted that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union was not
established until 1993 with the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht.
511 Bulletin EU, 2- 1998 , paragraph 2.4.3
512 House of Commons Hansard, 21 February, 1989, Column 839-840
513 ibid; In his memoirs Howe describes this decision as “there was no option but to put this relationship
back into the icebox”. Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty, (London, Macmillan, 1994), p. 512
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Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to withdraw their Chargé d’Affaires and the other
Iranian-based member of his staff from London on 28 February.514 Britain had withdrawn
its entire diplomatic staff from Tehran on 20 February and requested the Swedish
Embassy in Tehran to protect its interests. Referring to the Swedish offer to act as
Protecting Power for Britain in Iran, the cable sent to the Swedish Foreign Ministry by
the British Embassy in Stockholm read:
Her Britannic Majesty’s Government would be grateful for formal confirmation that the Swedish
Government will consent to this arrangement in accordance with Article 45 of the Vienna
Convention. As the British Embassy staff are to withdraw as a matter of some urgency […] 515
The Iranians eventually reciprocated by 1 March with a parliamentary declaration, which
gave Britain one week to withdraw support for the book and its contents or face a break
in diplomatic relations. 516 The official statement was given to the Swedish Embassy in
Tehran and cabled to the FCO and read as follows:
From the date of approval of this law, if the British government does not officially declare, in a
maximum period of a week, its opposition to the unprincipled stands against the worlds of Islam, the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the contents of the anti-Islamic Book ‘The Satanic Verses”, the Foreign
Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran is obliged to break all bilateral political ties. 517
Britain’s refusal to do so lead the Iranian Foreign Ministry to formally break relations on
8 March, 1989. 518 The Swedish Flag had been raised at the British Embassy the day
before 519 and the Swedish Ambassador presented its compliments to the Iranian Foreign
Ministry the day after the parliamentary deadline:
514 House of Commons, Hansard, 9 March, 1989, Column 895
515 Note sent from the British Embassy to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Note No:55 Utrikesdepartement,
No 52/001, 21 February, 1989 all correspondence documents between the Swedish and British government
were given to the author by Tommy Lindberg, Regierungskansliet (Swedish Foreign Office, Archives,
Stockholm), 27 December, 2005
516 IRNA, 1 March, 1989
517 Cable from Swedish Embassy to the FCO, Ambassaden Teheran to Utrikesdepartement ACF Cable B-
AVD, 1989-03-01,
518 The New York Times, March 8, 1989
519 Cable sent from Swedish Embassy in Tehran to Foreign Office, Stockholm, MSG No: 890307-340,Pol
IV/Kr Ganslandt, eo, 1989-03-07, Misio Tehran, exp 890303/eo
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As was stated in the Notification by the Swedish Embassy of February 16 1989 (No 49/89), the
Swedish Government has been requested to temporarily assume the responsibility to protect he
British interests in Iran. […] Following the Breaking of the diplomatic relations between the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland the Embassy hereby requests […] the formal approval of the aforesaid assumption of British
representation. […]. 520
With the break of bilateral relations, the British government also expelled a number of
Iranians living in the UK. On security grounds, the FCO and the Home Office decided
that twenty Iranian citizens, resident in the UK, were required to leave the country.
Moreover, the Home Secretary demanded to keep the activities of remaining Iranians
in the UK under very close review and it was decided that further action towards these
individuals could be taken as necessary. 521 Most of the Iranians who had been
deported were students, who had been working as locally employed staff at the Iranian
Embassy in London. The decision to deport these students was not merely to
communicate to Tehran how unacceptable a threat the British governments viewed the
fatwa. Rather it was grounded in genuine security concerns. According to the Home
Office, most of the students had been affiliated with Iranian intelligence and were
believed to have been plotting to execute the fatwa. This conclusion seemed to have
been largely based on evidence, which showed that they had been strengthening the
activities of different Shi’a and revolutionary organisations in the United Kingdom,
most notably the “Islamic Students Society”. This group in particular was under close
scrutiny as it declared itself prepared to carry out the death sentence against Rushdie.
522 Whilst these actions reflected determination on behalf of the British government,
the British Foreign Secretary’s remarks on a radio interview on 9 March, ironically,
also reflected the government’s first signs of disenchantment at being Rushdie’s
unsolicited advocate. In an effort to somewhat appease the volatile situation of British-
Iranian relations, Foreign Secretary Howe commented that:
520 Cable Sent from Swedish Embassy in Tehran to Foreign Office, Stockholm, MSG No: 890309-330, B-
avd, Larsson, 1989-03-09 Ex t: Britt amb, relex t: London exp 890309
521 House of Commons, Hansard, 9 March, 1989, Column 895; That day the Iranian Government was also
asked to close their Consulate General in Hong Kong; Cable sent from the Swedish Embassy in London to
the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm, MSG No: 890309-576, London, to UD/B-AVD, 1989-03-09
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We understand that the book itself has been found deeply offensive by people of the Moslem Faith.
[…] The British government, the British people, do not have any affection for the book, which is
extremely critical, rude about us. It compares Britain with Hitler’s Germany. We don’t like that any
more than people of the Moslem Faith like the attacks on their faith contained in the book. 523
Evidently, the attempt to adopt the posture of an equally injured party did little to solve
the deadlock. On the contrary, to a certain degree it actually endorsed Khomeini’s death
sentence and must have seemed alarming for British and international human rights
NGOs, which were about to launch their lobbying campaign against both the British and
Iranian government.
5.1 Britain and Iran: Economic Interdependence
Essentially, the break of political relations was the premise on which Britain now had to
change its defence export policy towards this country.524 After the Iran-Iraq war, Britain
had decided adopting a more flexible approach to arms sales to the two states. The
exchange of notes between the FCO, MoD and DTI, which followed the diplomatic break
of bilateral relations, may only concern the adjustment of Britain’s defence export policy
to Iran. It does, however, help to demonstrate to what extent economic and political
levels of interdependence between Britain and Iran influenced overall British diplomacy
towards that country.
By and large, two important factors, besides the principles involved, proved important for
the Thatcher government in mapping out a strategy was the situation of British hostages
in Lebanon and prisoners in Iran and the overall trading prospects that post-war Iran had
to offer.
On 3 March, Lord Howe sent a Minute to the Prime Minister examining the various
options of by the Government “in the event of further Iranian outrages”. One of the
523 Financial Times, 9 March, 1989
524 After the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, the British government had just relaxed the guidelines of
defence equipment exports to both countries.
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options was a “Defence Sales Embargo” which did not seem desirable to the Foreign
Secretary. He commented in his note that an “ embargo on lethal equipment is in force
since 1985.” Having consulted with senior Ministers at the FCO, Lord Howe’s statement
of 7 March indicated that with regards to a “ban on military equipment […] we could
take the opportunity of the Iranian break in relations to halt all residual military sales. But
the disadvantages outweigh the advantages.” Since the military sales only constituted £ 1
m in 1988, Lord Howe concluded that “any actions by us would be presentational rather
than substantial. More significant, it could provoke the Iranians to take to arbitration their
substantial claims […] against IMS [International Military Services Limited], which
could amount to as much as £220 million.” 525 At the meeting of the Inter-Departmental
Committee (IDC) held on 14 March, the implications of the Rushdie affair were
discussed. Whilst the Summary Record of this meeting stated that the possibility of a
defence sales embargo was a matter for the MISC 118 committee, they agreed that:
[..] in the present uncertain circumstances the more flexible implementation of the guidelines which
Ministers had decided to take since the ceasefire would no longer be appropriate for Iran. The exact nature
of the new guidelines for Iran would have to be agreed once it was known where the downward spiral in
bilateral relations began to level out. In the meantime, the IDC agreed to recommend that decisions of all
defence-related export license applications be deferred. 526
With regards to strategic considerations of the British government, a dilemma was
evident. On one side, Britain was concerned about the safety of its Armilla Patrol 527 in
525 The Right Honourable Sir Richard Scott, Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment
and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions, HMSO House of Commons 115, Volume 1-5, (15
February, 1996) paragraph D3.66, pp.399-400; hereafter the Scott Inquiry
526 Summary Record of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Defence Sales to Iran and Iraq, 14 March
1989, (Secret), Matrix Churchill Trial Reference Number 000148, given to the author by Special
Collections, University of Bradford; Generally the guidelines adopted by the British government in 1984
towards defence equipment towards Iran and Iraq were as follows:
1. We should maintain our consistent refusal to supply any lethal equipment to either side.
2. Subject to that overriding consideration, we should attempt to fulfil existing contracts and
obligations.
3. We should not, in future, approve orders for any defence equipment which, in out view, would
significantly enhance the capability of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict
4. In line with this policy, we should continue with the supply of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq.
quoted from Davina Miller, Export or Die – Britain’s Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq, p. 65
527 The “Armilla Patrol” is a Royal Navy escort vessel and was sent to the Persian Gulf as a response to the
increased danger to British shipping and other British interests during the Iran –Iraq war.
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the Persian Gulf and the threat the naval branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) would pose if the FCO were to adopt a hard-line stance towards Iran. On
the other hand, diplomatic efforts to appease Iran would be jeopardized if such ban had
been made public policy. Whitehall was also wary of public opinion, which it deemed
would have opposed any major arm sales to Iran if regulations were made public. As the
IDC record remarked:
[…] the MoD might conclude that the increased risk or renegade IRGC activity in the Gulf required a
reintroduction of the ban on sales to the Iranian navy. There would also be major presentational difficulties
involved in any large-scale defence exports to Iran for some time. 528
The decisive decision by the IDC meeting of 14 March was that “we should not penalize
Iraq for the crisis with Iran, and so should continue to use the more flexible interpretation
with Iraqi applications”. 529 What followed, however, was not a firm direction resulting
from this assessment, but a continued debate on how to deal with Export License
Applications (ELA) for exports to Iran. This uncertainty is reflected in a note sent on 23
March, 1989 from the FCO to the British embassy in Baghdad “Ministers were prepared,
with some reservations , to adopt the more flexible approach to defence sales “ but that
“the Salman Rushdie affair has forced us to rethink, and it is likely that we shall have to
return to a more strict approach to Iran..” 530
Generally, with regards to economic British-Iranian interdependence during the post-war
period, two trends were apparent. One was that, even if Iran had not been highly
dependent on oil rents to create foreign exchange, it could have not used the oil weapon
against Britain, which by the early 1980s had become self-sufficient with regards to
hydrocarbon energy. The other economic fact, however, was that following the Iran-Iraq
war, Britain was careful about jeopardizing future trading prospects with Iran,
particularly with regards to defence goods. This generated potential of diplomatic
leverage on both sides.
528Summary Record of the IDS, Matrix Churchill Trial Reference Number 000149, p.84
529 ibid, p. 85
530 Scott Inquiry, D3.71
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By 1989, exploitation of North Sea oil produced 91.0 millions tonnes, which constituted a
3% share of world production and managed to cover British national energy consumption
of oil, which in the same year had reached 81.7 millions tones. 531 In the same year Iran
produced 142.2 million tonnes, a 4.6 % share of world production. 532 Particularly, the
increase of crude oil prices from $15 per barrel in 1988 to $18 per barrel in 1989 533
proved beneficial for Iran, which significantly depended on oil rents to rebuild its war
torn economy. Above all, the refining industry was badly damaged during the war,
effectively putting the Abadan, Esfahan and Tabriz refineries out of action. More
crucially, however, oil export facilities had proven equally vulnerable to Iraqi air raids
during the war, both on Kharg Island and on Iran’s mainland. Therefore, following the
ceasefire in August 1988, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) began to rebuild its
damaged oil export facilities in order to catch up with shortages of foreign exchange. 534
Thus, oil was not an asset of diplomatic leverage for Iran, as it desperately needed foreign
exchange and investment.
Neither was Britain, which by 1988, due to its hydrocarbon energy self-sufficiency, only
imported 3381 thousand metric tons of crude oil from Iran, in a position to threaten to
reduce oil imports from that country. However, this was not the case for Britain’s
European allies. In 1988, German, French, Dutch and Italian crude imports from Iran
constituted a total of 18,378 thousand metric tons.535 By March, the French government
quietly signalled its major oil companies Total and Elf Aquitaine to slow the purchase of
Iranian oil. Since France had just lifted its oil embargo after the ceasefire, it was evident
that the decision reflected the common European stance against the death threat, as well
as being seen as an attempt not to be at the forefront of those states buying Iranian oil
during a diplomatic crisis. Likewise, Japan directed its oil companies to reduce by a third
the amount of oil they had been buying from Iran, reducing its purchases to 200,000
531 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1992, p. 7; BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June
1990, p.4
532 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1990, p.4
533 ibid, p.1
534 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile Iran, 1989-90, (EIU, 1990), pp.30-33
535 1989 Energy Statistic Yearbook (New York, United Nations), p.160
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barrels a day.536 Whilst both decisions had only modest short-term economic impact and
could have been exploited more fully, they did, nonetheless, convey a decisive message
to Tehran.
The situation with regards to wider European-Iranian and particular British-Iranian
trading relations however was a different matter. After West-Germany, and Japan, Britain
had become one of Iran’s major trading partners. In 1988 Britain exported $ 441 US
million worth of goods to Iran and imported $249 US million and by 1989 exports from
the UK to Iran stood at $421 US million and imports to the UK rose to $410 US
million.537 Therefore, most West European countries, in particular Britain, enjoyed good
trade relations with Iran. What was also evident to policymakers in Britain and elsewhere
in Europe was that Iran was highly dependent on imported goods, which it needed for its
reconstruction efforts and which were mainly chemicals and pharmaceutical products,
iron steel and manufactures as well as road vehicles and machinery and defence related
equipment. When the governments of the European Union member states were
confronted with the threat against Rushdie, an appreciation of such economic weight
certainly came into play when tabling the common stance against Iran. In particular,
Iranian dependence on credit lines during the early post war period was substantial and
appreciated by Europe. What could have been exploited as a viable strategy of
conditional reciprocity and hence would have qualified as constructive engagement (in
line with the theory) were initial European threats at depriving Iran of such credits.
Immediately, following the fatwa, West German, French, Spanish, Dutch and Japanese
delegations all stopped scheduled economic negotiations with Tehran, depriving the
Iranian government of $3 billion to $4 billion in credit lines that it had hoped to secure
from those countries over the next few months. 538 What was more, the German
government under Chancellor Kohl, which at this point was Iran’s largest trading partner,
suspended talks on the financing of some of Iran’s large-scale reconstruction projects.
The German government indicated further that the state guaranteed exports credits to
536 The New York Times, 3 March, 1989; The New York Times, 2 March, 1989; In 1988 Japan imported a
total of 9379 thousand metric tons of crude from Iran making it Iran’s second biggest importer of oil. 1989
Energy Statistic Yearbook (New York, United Nations), p.160
537 IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, (IMF, Yearbook 1991) p. 227
538 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, March, 3, 1989
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German exporters of goods to Iran would not be available. At that time, Iran was seeking
as much as to $ 2 billion in credits from West Germany. 539 As will be shown, however,
these threats did not translate into a coherent pan-European strategy at extracting
concessions from the Iranians. Rather what would have been an effective exploitation of
asymmetrical interdependence by European creditor countries gave way to unconditional
trading and provisions of credits to Iran.
Evidently, military requirements, in particular, became increasingly important for Iran
during the 1980s, constituting as much as 30-40 % of all imports by 1985. 540 Iran was
first and foremost concerned about its security and the post-war situation with Iraq. As
far as the government in Tehran was concerned, the ceasefire with Iraq was fragile. The
most crucial impediment for Foreign Minister Velayati and his negotiators to agree on a
lasting peace agreement within the framework of Resolution 598 was Iraq’s continuous
attempt to abrogate the 1975 Algiers accord, which fixed the international border down
the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Velayati claimed that as much as 2600 square kilometres are
still being occupied by Iraqi troops despite the provisions of the Security Council
Resolution. Moreover, navigation in the waterway was not possible due to the number of
wrecks and hulks in the channel. Another urgent problem for both sides was the situation
of POWs, which at that point had still not be exchanged. 541 The stalemate over the
waterways and Iranian frustration at the UN Security Council for failing to enforce
Resolution 598 ensured that bilateral relations remained tense and thus did not provide
for the immediate implementation of any sustainable peace agreement. Thus, both sides
were too aware of the unstable ceasefire and therefore concerned about their respective
security and new alliances. As stated earlier, Iran, in particular, was seeking a new post-
ceasefire role in the Persian Gulf and essentially attempted to create a regional axis in full
partnership with the Arab states to ensure that outside powers were excluded and, by
implication, that Iraq too was kept under some form of constraint by its close neighbours.
542
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The British government was aware of such Iranian aspirations as well as of the fact that
rearmament and reconstruction of Iran’s military infrastructure was a fundamental
premise for any such political ambition. Therefore, as a major defence exporter, the
Thatcher government enjoyed some considerable leverage over Iran, but at the same time
saw endless opportunities for selling highly government regulated military equipment to
that country.
Developments in the Rushdie affair and the assessment of the impact on trade relations
were further discussed at the IDC meeting on 23 March. Following the break in relations,
the FCO reported that “Tehran had not imposed economic sanctions, but Lloyds Bank
had reported signs of Iranian transferral of assets out of the UK.” Moreover, “there had
been difficulty in opening Letters of Credit [in Iran].” 543 The MoD reported that the
“Iranians were still anxious to press ahead with the Plessey Radar Project but would
perhaps be prepared to let the project ride until circumstances became more favourable”
544 Against this background, it was recorded under the heading ELAs for Iran: “In
accordance with the IDC recommendation of 14 March, the MoD Working Group has
made its recommendations for Iranian application on the assumption that the IDC would
return to the strict implementation of the guidelines which operated before the ceasefire.”
Since FCO Under Secretary Mr Waldegrave recommended in his letter to Mr Clark and
Lord Trefgarne at the MoD to defer all applications for Iran until mid-April, the IDC
recommended that ELAs for Iran be deferred with the exceptions of where the MoD
Working Group had already recommended refusal of an ELA for Iran and except where it
was content that an application was completely innocuous and without military
application. 545 Eventually, government policy was made firmer and clearer by Mr
Waldegrave’s letter of 28 March to Mr Clark, which read “As a result of the ceasefire we
agreed in February to interpret the export guidelines more flexibly so as to refuse orders
for non-lethal equipment only if they would be of direct and significant assistance to
543 Summary Record of the Inter-Departmental Committee (IDC) on Defence Sales to Iran and Iraq, 23
March 1989, (Secret) Matrix Churchill Trial Reference Number 000160
544 ibid
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either side in the conduct of offensive operations in breach of the ceasefire.” 546 Lord
Trefgarne agreed with the proposal in the FCO Minister of State’s letter and confirmed in
his agreement that “ we should interpret the guidelines more flexibly as you propose in
respect of Iraq” and “that we should revert to a stricter interpretation of the guidelines
along the lines before Iran accepted Resolution 598.” His letter continued “ As for the
exact form of the restricted interpretation should take, I would suggest that instead of a
blanket embargo on any kit intended for the Iranian navy or IRGC, as we had before the
ceasefire, we should stop anything which we believe would pose a direct threat to the
Armilla Patrol.” 547
The DTI, however, was unenthusiastic about Mr Waldegrave’s proposals for Iran. A
letter from a Minister at the DTI stated that “as a result of the Rushdie affair both the
FCO and the MoD have sought to back pedal on the Ministerial agreement reached on 20
December for a more relaxed application of the guidelines controlling the sale of defence
equipment to Iran and Iraq” and added that “The Minister may prefer to reject the
proposed hardening of the line against Iran.” Eager to secure a green light to supply Iran
with non-military equipment including civil aircraft and helicopters and spares,
communications equipment of all types, radar systems and all defensive military
equipment, the note concluded that “the FCO proposals, whilst having considerable
political attraction would be most unwelcome to UK exporters.” 548 Moreover, the
department’s concerns reflected the fact that EC Foreign Ministers agreed on 20 March
that their heads of mission, who had been temporarily withdrawn from Tehran for
consultations, could return to Iran. They carried a strong message that the Iranian death
threats remain unacceptable, 549 but, had reestablished their presence and thus were able
to continue their countries’ respective economic policies towards Iran. On 24 April, a
meeting between FCO ministers was arranged, which proposed “ to adopt “relaxed”
implementation of existing guidelines in respect of Iraq, and return to restricted
546 The Scott Inquiry, D3.73
547 The Scott Inquiry, D3.75
548 ibid, D.3.77
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169
implementation for Iran.” The proposal also listed three FCO objectives with regards to
the strategy towards Iran:
 To agree the FCO’s proposals
 To resist DTI calls for guidelines to be lifted
 To remind MoD and DTI that FCO has additional concerns (human rights, CW [Chemical
Warfare]) beyond the guidelines […]550
It should be noted that from the onset of the crisis, the FCO condemned the situation
of human rights abuses in Iran and reminded Tehran that “anyone living in this
country [Britain] lawfully and abiding by our laws and institutions, is entitled to the
full protection of the law against threats or the actuality of violence.” 551 Thus the
fatwa was directly linked to the continuous violation of human rights in Iran 552 and at
the same time emphasised the rule of law in Britain and, thus, Rushdie’s rights.
Another priority for the FCO decision-making process was the fragility of the
ceasefire and the fact that the original guidelines were not “appropriate for [...] dealing
with the Rushdie affair […].” 553 It was also for this reason that three Royal Navy
ships and one Royal Fleet Auxiliary Vessel continued to being deployed in the Persian
Gulf. 554
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alleged, had been disguised as referring to offences of drug-trafficking in order to avoid international
condemnation. In 1989, more than 1500 executions were officially announced, most of which referred
officially to drug offences. Interim Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission of Human Rights in accordance with
Commission Resolution 1989/99 and Economic and Social Council decision 1989/148 UN Doc.A/44/620,
2 November 1989; paragraphs 64-65, paragraph 111
553 Letter sent from Mr Clark to Mr Waldegrave, 24 April 1989, The Scott Inquiry, D3.82; In fact, more
than linking any newly changed policy to the fatwa, the FCO was also concerned about the fragility of the
ceasefire and British interests in the region. As noted in Mr Waldegrave’s letter to Mr Clark: “ But for the
reasons I described - the fragility of the ceasefire while no progress is made in the negotiations, and the
importance of not supplying the kind of offensive equipment which might enable or induce either side to
renew hostilities – we nevertheless concluded that it was not right at the present to withdraw the [stricter]
guidelines, and that it was preferable not to have to announce publicly any change in them.” Letter from Mr
William Waldegrave to Mr Alan Clark, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Confidential) Matrix-
Churchill Trial Reference Number 000169, 27 April, 1989
554 see House of Commons, Hansard , 11 April 1989, Column 721
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Eventually, the FCO’s insistence on holding on to the stricter guidelines paid off and
the Minister reached an agreement on 24 April 1989, which was reflected in a
submission on “UK policy on Iran/Iraq” dated 28 April 1989 drafted by Lord Howe.
In his draft Mr Young advised that “in view of the worse recent behaviour of Iran
(relative to that of Iraq) and the subsequent collapse of bilateral relations, even-
handedness is no longer possible, particular over arms sales” and continued in his
remarks that “we are not contemplating a major change of policy. Given the fragility
of the ceasefire and the risk of resumed hostilities while there is no progress towards a
negotiated settlement, the existing guidelines on arms sales will remain in place.” He
contended that while “exports of defence equipment to Iran will be a trickle, we can
afford a degree of flexibility in dealing with defence export applications for Iraq.” 555
In parliament, Waldegrave eventually announced that “the guidelines on the export of
defence equipment to Iran and Iraq are kept under constant review, and are applied in
the light of the prevailing circumstances” 556 thus implying that the guidelines applied
equally to both countries. While in fact Britain had tilted toward Iraq.
5.2 Britain – Iran: Political Considerations and Leverages
The reluctance to choose an overtly confrontational position towards Iran, namely the
decision not to make the revised interpretation for Iranian ELAs public, also reflected two
political considerations. One was the FCO’s appreciation that bilateral relations had
reached such a volatile juncture that any diplomatic initiative would have been futile
from the start and possibly made matters even worse. Evidence of this was Khomeini’s
unremitting stance on the fatwa, which prevented any attempt at de-escalation from either
side. The second important political factor was the situation of the British hostages in
555 The Scott Inquiry, D3.85
556 Letter from Mr William Waldegrave to Mr Alan Clark, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Confidential) Matrix-Churchill Trial Reference Number 000170, 27 April, 1989
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Lebanon and the role Iran played, as an intermediary between western governments and
the Hezbollah, as will be discussed below.
5.2.1 Futility of Conditional Diplomacy in the Immediate Aftermath
Weeks after he had issued the fatwa, which was the period when British policymakers
were discussing options, Khomeini declared that the “dispute over the Salman Rushdie
novel “The Satanic Verses” proved that it was pointless to pursue moderate policies in an
attempt to win favour abroad.” Reiterating his calls for the death of Rushdie to senior
clergy members, he declared that compromises on what were the fundamental principles
of the Islamic Republic of Iran might lead true followers of Iran to ”feel the Islamic
Republic is retreating from its principal stands.” He further confirmed that the
revolutionary aims that had guided Iran for the last decade, remained its guidelines and
that the actions of members of the European Community in supporting Rushdie’s right to
publish the book and their opposition to the death sentence, were “desperate attempts” to
defeat Islam. 557 It was evident that radicals had successfully exploited Khomeini’s
continuous endorsements in support of the fatwa culminating in a letter signed by 115
Majlis deputies, in which they asked the government:
[To] take a mighty and steadfast stand against this blatant aggression aimed at the
sanctity of our spirituality and convictions. [Policymakers] must do so not reactively but
aggressively […] Continuation of the policy of keeping aloof from the great Satan,
rejection of any thought of friendship with the arch enemy, the cutting off relations with
colonialist Britain, and reciprocal actions toward the stances and plots of European
countries […] 558
Whilst Rafsanjani tried to somewhat deescalate the situation by endorsing Iranian
commitment to relations with Europe,559 the pragmatists were in no position to make any
557 IRNA, 22 February. 1989
558 Bahman Baktiari, Parliamentary Politics in revolutionary Iran, p.168
559 On 18 February 1989, Rafsanjani welcomed a French delegation and publicly stated that “relations
between the two countries cane be reciprocal and sincere if forged on the basis of mutual interests.” IRNA,
19 February, 1989; see also ibid
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meaningful diplomatic gestures and certainly were in no position to distance themselves
from the fatwa. Likewise, Ayatollah Ali Montazeri, who, at that time was still designated
as the next Supreme Religious Leader of Iran, went so far as to publicly question the
wisdom of the fatwa. During Iran’s celebration of the first decade of the revolution,
Montazeri said that internal repression and radical international policies were “ grave
errors that ruined the image of Iran and frightened the world by making it believe that our
only objective is to kill.” 560 With the exception of religious heavyweights, such as
Montazeri, Rafsanjani’s pragmatist camp and his conservative allies had to appreciate
Khomeini’s absolute dominance over Iranian politics. In fact any diplomatic move to
somewhat question the ruling would have had severe ramifications in terms of their
factions’ overall legitimacy and domestic political standing. By all accounts, negotiations
with the Iranians proved futile as the government was in no position to even consider any
of the demands raised by Britain.
5.2.2 Hostages
Whilst such domestic constraints largely dictated Iranian diplomacy, the government in
Tehran did also enjoy substantial political leverage over Britain. This derived from Iran’s
role in Lebanon, where British subjects were still being held hostage. Iranian presence in
Lebanon and support for Hezbollah initially was an effort to aid the resistance against the
Israeli occupation of Lebanon, and had begun with the dispatch of Iranian Revolutionary
guards in 1982. Based in the Bekaa Valley, the Iranians served as conduits for
transferring financial and military assistance to Hezbollah. 561 Under Syrian
acquiescence, Iranian IRG forces supported the group in establishing a network of social
welfare and financial services for the Shi’a community. Funds from Tehran were,
however, mainly used to provide sophisticated armaments and military training for
Hezbollahi and Islamic Amal militiamen. 562 Between 1982 and 1992, the group launched
560 The New York Times, 23 February 1989
561 Eric Hooglund, “Iranian Views of the Arab-Israeli Conflict”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.25, No.1
(Autumn, 1995), p. 92
562 Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon- The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, (London,
Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 36; Daniel Byman, Jerrold D. Green, Political Violence and Stability in the
Persian Gulf, (Santa Monica, RAND-Monograph Series MR-1021-OSD, 1999), pp.61-63
173
spectacular and deadly suicide attacks against Western and Israeli targets. Through the
employment of various freelance hostage-taking cells they also adopted the tactic of
taking Western hostages. According to Ranstorp, Hezbollah’s sophisticated
organisational framework was closely integrated with several key Iranian institutions,
such as the Supreme National Security Council and the Office of the Islamic Liberation
Movements, which provided for necessary weaponry and training. Whilst the Hezbo-
ollah should not be seen as a unitary rational actor as internal decision-making and tactics
were mainly subject to the realities of the Lebanese civil war, Iran did enjoy considerable
influence over the group. Thus the process of abduction and release of hostages reflected
not only individual Hezbollah motives but was also often convergent with Iranian
interests. 563 However, what was also evident by 1989 was the fact that rivalry within the
Iranian leadership had a direct result on the group’s activities, most notably in the process
of the release of hostages rather than in the actual abductions. 564 Britain had been
following a hard line policy of refusing to either conduct any negotiation with Hezbollah
and its patrons or to concede to any demands, and only the ascendancy of Douglas Hurd
as Foreign Secretary under John Major, and the release of all remaining French hostages
in May 1988 brought an appreciation by the British government that communication was
key to bringing the hostages home. 565 The fatwa and the break of relations was, however,
a turning point for the Thatcher cabinet in their management of the hostage situation.
Hence, the decision not to disclose the new stringent guidelines towards Iran mainly
reflected the concern to avoid further alienating the Iranians, which evidently served as
the sole “intermediary” between Britain and the hostage takers. Both Lord Howe and
Lord Trefgarne’s expositions of the reasons to keep it undisclosed attributed a significant
role to the plight of British hostages in Beirut and prisoners in Tehran and the concern “to
do nothing that would have made their circumstances worse” as one of the reasons why
there should not be a public announcement. 566 Mr Waldegrave too, referred to the danger
563 Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon- The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, pp.60 -61
564 ibid, p. 109
565 ibid, p. 142
566 see transcript of Lord Howe’s oral evidence of 29 March 1994, Day 81, pp.158-159. Lord Trefgarne
reiterated that the hostages were a pretty important consideration.” Lord Trefgarne relied on Lord Howe’s
letter (although Lord How did not ) to the Prime Minister of 31 August 1988 which said that: “Iran presents
a rather more serious problem as the pace at which relations can grow depends above all on Iranian
readiness to obey civilised rules of behaviour.” Lord Trefgarrne’s Counsel submitted that this statement
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to the hostages, “whose fate was in the hands of the Iranians” as one of the reasons for
not announcing the stringent approach to Iran after the fatwa. 567 Ultimately, the hostage
situation carried considerable weight in Britain’s overall decision-making process. Given
established channels of communication between Tehran and the Shi’a of Lebanon, if not
the Iranian leadership’s relative authority over Hezbullah, there is no doubt that Iran was
enjoying considerable leverage over the British government between 1989-1992. (i.e.
from the declaration of the fatwa to the release of the last British hostages)
6. Conclusion
The fatwa constituted a diplomatic disaster for British-Iranian relations. Under the
leadership of Khomeini, bilateral relations in 1989 had reached such a volatile stage, that
Britain was left with no other option but to break relations with Iran. The same was true
for Iran, which was increasingly alienated by the fact that, what religious and political
elements amongst the Iranian elite considered to be an offence against the sacred, was so
vehemently defended as a human right by Britain and Europe. The immediate period
following the fatwa also reflected to what extent economic and political interdependences
between both countries influenced British statecraft and the capability to sway Tehran.
Findings indicate that, in addition to the principle of defending Rushdie’s freedom of
speech, political and economic factors, which according to Foreign Secretary Howe were
“ the plight of the hostages and prisoners, [and] the possible impact upon trading
prospects” 568 proved fundamental in crafting a strategy towards Iran. It is evident, that
what was at stake for both countries were fundamental belief and value systems. It also
became apparent during that period that the respective export and defence of either of
those belief systems, was subject to power leverages caused by asymmetries of
interdependence. It has also been shown that both governments were subject to domestic
constraints thus preventing any diplomatic initiative aimed at deescalating the situation.
was a “portmanteau expression” which included the concern for the hostages in Beirut. See transcript of
Lord Trefgarne’s oral evidence, 30 March 1994, Day 82, p.187-188, cited in Scott Inquiry, D3.107
567 Scott Inquiry, D3.107
568 The Scott Inquiry, D.3.108
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By and large, Khomeini’s fatwa proved an effective ruling to tilt the balance between
pragmatists and the radical faction. Following the fatwa, the latter managed to regain
political momentum after Khomeini had issued a series of edicts, which emphasized the
republican character of the state. When radicals interpreted the “Satanic Verses” as a
deliberate conspiracy by the British government against the Islamic Revolution calling
Britain “ the enemy of the Qur’an and Islam” 569, pragmatists were in no position to seek
a diplomatic solution.
569 statement by Majlis Deputy Fakhriddin Hejazi, IRNA, 28 February, 1989
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Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable
A. NA NA NA
B. NA NA NA
C. Political and economic interdependence
between Britain and Iran affected power
relations and ultimately affected Britain’s
ability to sway Iran.
The British government’s perceived
vulnerability to changes in the relationship
with Iran, influenced Whitehall decision-
making and overall strategy towards that
country: Existing economic relations
precluded the use of negative sanctions. The
plight of the prisoners and hostages and the
possible impact upon trading prospects
following the end of the Iran-Iraq war,
dictated a cautious and non-confrontational
policy.
The British government was restricted to
sway or influence Iran in a decisive manner.
In an effort not to alienate Iran further and
jeopardize British interests, the government
chose not to publicly announce the changes
in guidelines for arms-exports to Iran.
D. (i) Level I negotiations / decision making
procedures were subject to domestic
constituents in Iran.
a) Level II (domestic) “win-sets” were
somewhat supported by “internationalist
forces”, but were considerably constrained
by the “isolationist” camp. The latter
enjoyed more influence over the former:
Whilst the Iranian Foreign Ministry initially
attempted to downplay the fatwa, the
government was in no position to abrogate
or distance itself from the ruling. On the
contrary, because of active support for the
fatwa and advocacy for the break of
relations by parliament and Khomeini
himself, the government too moved on to
call for its implementations.
b) NA
The Iranian government was neither willing
nor in any position to meet any of Britain’s
demands concerning the fatwa.
Constructive Engagement: Hypotheses and Variables
CHAPTER FOUR
Table 2
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D. (ii) Level I negotiations / decision
making procedures were subject to domestic
constituents in Britain.
a) Level II (domestic) “win-sets” were
somewhat supported by “internationalist
forces” (MoD, DTI), but were considerably
constrained by the “isolationist” camp
(FCO): Inter-bureaucratic bickering between
the MoD, DTI and FCO reflected the
differences in departmental agendas and
interests towards Iran. Contrary to the MoD
and DTI who were eager to exploit the post-
war Iranian market as well as protect
existing British commercial interests, the
FCO advocated a more confrontational Iran
policy. Because of the plight of the prisoners
and hostages, increasing public support for
Rushdie’s right to freedom of speech, and
the overall normative issue at stake, the
FCO’s position of implementing stricter
guidelines for ELAs to Iran (even if not
made public) was eventually adopted.
The British government became Rushdie’s
unsolicited advocate and considered Iranian
rhetoric and behaviour as adverse to British
interests.
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CHAPTER FIVE
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE GERMAN CONNECTION: THE YEARS
1990-1994
1. Introduction
Essentially, the furore the Satanic Verses had caused, reflected a deeper debate about the
limits of freedom of speech. The contestation amongst intellectuals, politicians and
religious figures, which took place in Britain, places the Rushdie affair within the overall
discourse between human rights and religion and, most importantly, shows to what extent
the British government was confronted at home both by advocates of Rushdie, who
lobbied the government into publicly upholding his freedom of expression as well as
opponents, who denounced what they regarded as a blasphemous text and consequently
sought to have it banned.
2. Freedom of Speech vs. Blasphemy: The UK-Debate and Britain’s Verdict on Rushdie
Similar to the Shar’ia, in England and Wales, blasphemy and blasphemous libel is
considered a common law offence with an unlimited penalty.570 The legal notion of
blasphemy dates back to when faith was seen to be the root of society’s political and
moral behaviour and any offence against it was to seriously threaten the very fabric of
political and moral society. No blasphemy case has been reported since the passage of the
Human Rights Act in 1998 (incorporating elements of the European Convention of
Human Rights) 571 It should also be noted that the current law only protects Christianity
as the established churches espoused it, and does not cover any other denominations or
570 It should be noted that there had been no prosecution under this law from 1922 until 1977, which made
it possible to consider the offence obsolete. It was only in 1979 that the House of Lords upheld the
conviction of the editor and publisher of Gay News for printing a poem depicting homosexual acts with
Christ’s body after death. This verdict was justified under the premise that a rational discussion of religious
matters should be free, but not insults which cannot provoke a reasoned response and so contribute nothing
to a worthwhile debate. It is obvious that it is very difficult to defend such a distinction between a rational
and emotive discourse. Another difficulty from the perspective of freedom of speech is that it is
unnecessary for the prosecution to prove that the publisher intended to outrage the feelings of Christians.
see Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, pp.186-187
571 Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales, Volume I –Report, House of Lords
Session 2002-03, HL Paper 95-I, p.10, p.46
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religions. Designed to provoke a public discussion on this matter, in 1981, the Law
Commission produced a “working paper”, which constituted a cogent evaluation of
blasphemy. It unanimously favoured abolition of the common law. Yet the commission
also advocated abolition of the law without replacement by a new statute. Commissioners
believed that any new statute ought to protect non-Christian religions as well as
Christians ones, however, knew of no way to define religion and believed that a failure to
do so would make a new statute dangerous to freedom of expression. 572 Equally, the
House of Lords Select Committee Report in 2002 concluded “that the constitution of the
United Kingdom is rooted in faith – specifically the Christian faith” and that “we do not
see it as our task, in discharging our remit to consider the law of religious offences, to
challenge the constitution or question the Church’s part in it, although there is little doubt
that the pre-eminent role enjoyed by the established church is probably outdated.” 573 It is
therefore, not surprising that the Rushdie affair reignited the question whether the
common law should be extended to protect other religions.
In an open and authoritative letter, the Director of the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies
emphasised that in current serious writings on Islam, as in the long tradition of Islamic
scholarship, real differences of interpretation and opinion continue to be vigorously
expressed without recourse to book burning. The issue regarding the “Satanic Verses”,
however, showed to what extent freedom of expression needs to be used responsibly.
Whilst literary imagination or artistic license may be legitimate tools for a writer, one
should not, he argued, confuse them with deliberate and injurious insult or blasphemy.
Stressing the importance for Muslims in Britain to abide by the law, he further stated that
a review of the common law of blasphemy would seem appropriate. 574 In an effort to
sympathize with Muslim believers and stress the universality of blasphemy, Bishop
Lesslie Newbigin claimed that the blasphemy laws were not designed to protect the
Christian religion rather than constitute an acknowledgement of the fact that since God is
572 Leonard W. Levy, Blasphemy – Verbal Offences against the Sacred, from Moses to Salman Rushdie
(New York, University of North Carolina Press, 1993), pp.553-554
573 Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales, HL Paper 95-I, p. 38
574 The Times, 22 February, 1989
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the creator of our being, to blaspheme him is to inject poison into public life. 575 The
Chief Rabbi also expressed his solidarity and stated that he deprecated not only the
falsification of established historical records but also the offence to the religious
convictions and susceptibilities of countless citizens. In his view, however, Jews should
not seek an extension of the blasphemy laws. Living in a predominantly Christian
society, he commented, the Jewish community should be quite content to leave the
legislation on blasphemy as it stands enshrining the national respect for the majority faith.
What should concern everyone, however, were not religious offences but socially
intolerable conduct inciting revulsion or violence. 576
Opposing any such demands, the International Committee for the Defence of Salman
Rushdie, which was founded days after the fatwa under the umbrella of the human rights
NGO “Article 19”, emphasised Rushdie’s undeniable right of freedom of expression.
Acknowledging that the novel had caused distress, the group reiterated that those critics
should discuss their concerns free from censorship, intimidation or violence.577 This
group would prove to be of fundamental importance in lobbying the British government
as well as its European allies in defending the author.
Eventually, John Patten for the Home Office made it clear that Rushdie had not violated
any law and would, therefore, not face prosecution. According to Pattten, the government
was guided by two principles: “the freedom of speech, thought and expression and the
notion of the rule of law”. He pointed out that the same freedom that enabled Muslims to
hold their protest meetings and marches against the book, allowed Rushdie to say
whatever he pleased, short of breaking the law. He further noted that the government had
considered the claim that the law of blasphemy ought to be amended so that books such
as the Satanic Verses could be charged with an offence. For several reasons, however, an
alteration of the law seemed undesirable. No agreement existed on whether the law
should be reformed or repealed. Furthermore, the difficulties in redefining blasphemy
575 The Independent, 21 February, 1989
576 The Times, 4 February, 1989
577 World Statement by the International Committee for the Defence of Salman Rushdie and His Publishers,
cited in Jorgen Nielson, The Rushdie Affair: a documentation, p.14
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seemed irreconcilable as opposing views on this notion between religious groups were
evident, nor was there any agreement what constituted a religion. Even if an agreement
on such issues could have been reached, the Home Office believed that a new law would
be too divisive, and might lead to a wave of litigations, which would damage relations
between faiths.578
Another statute, which in itself limits the freedom of speech and which also underlines
the frustration British Muslims had felt during the Rushdie affair, was the British
legislation on hate speech laws. Incorporated into the Public Order Act 1986, this statute
is defended in terms of the hurt racist speech causes members of minority groups. As
noted previously, MPs had tried to prosecute Rushdie with reference to this law. The law
provides for prosecution of publishers of hate speech, which was considered threatening
or intending to stir up racial hatred against a particular group. Racial hatred, however,
refers only to groups defined by reference to colour, race, nationality […] ethnic or
national origins and with the exception of Jews and Sikhs, which constitute mono-ethnic
religions, the provision does not cover hate speech against religious groups.579 Therefore,
Rushdie could not have been prosecuted with reference to this statute. The entire debate
eventually culminated into a series of legal proceedings, all of which ended in favour of
Rushdie and in a legal sense supported the government’s position.
One case applied to the magistrate to issue a summons for blasphemous and seditious
libel against Rushdie and Viking Penguin, in which the applicant contended that the book
was blasphemous to all major religions as its refered to Almighty God, common to all
major religions, the prophet Abraham and his Ishmael, Muhammad, his wives and
companions. The magistrate, however, rejected the application on the ground that the
common law offence of blasphemy applied only to Christianity. The verdict was that
even if it were up to the court to extend the law of blasphemy to cover other religions, it
would not do so since the matter raised difficult and complex considerations of public
policy and it would be virtually impossible by judicial decision to set sufficiently clear
578 The Times, 6 July, 1989; Regina v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary, Queen’s Bench Division, [1991] 1
QB 429, 9 April 1989 (accessed on Lexis Nexis)
579 Eric Barendt, Freedom of Speech, p.186
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limits to the offence. The magistrate also stressed that since the right of freedom of
religion protected by Articles, 9,10, and 14 of the European Convention did not require
the law of blasphemy to be extended to other religions, the UK did not breach European
human rights law. The court stressed that it was a question solely for the parliament
whether the law should be altered. With regards to seditious libel, the court’s verdict was
that it was not sufficient that there was an intention to promote feelings of ill-will and
hostility between different classes of subjects. It also had to be shown that there was
violence or resistance or defiance for the purpose of disturbing constituted authority. 580
Another case refered to an Iranian national living in Britain, Sayid Mehdie Siadtan, who
informed the Horseferry Road Magistrate’s Court that Penguin Books had committed an
offence contrary to Section 4 (1) of the Public Order Act 1986 by distributing the Satanic
Verses whereby it was likely that unlawful violence would be provoked. The grounds of
the application were that the novel had provoked unlawful violence, including a bomb
attack on the Penguin Books shop at 157 Kings Road and the break of diplomatic
relations with Iran and that the publisher must be been aware of such risks. Again the
application was dismissed on grounds that a person is only found guilty of such an
offence if there was intent to provoke the immediate use of violence by that person or
another. 581
Essentially, these rulings established that what was at stake was freedom of speech and
legally confirmed the government’s position towards Iran. However, the debate and the
verdicts had also further sharpened the controversy concerning the scope of blasphemy.
Dissenters of the law were not convinced that it would be difficult to define religion and
demanded an extension of the scope of the “incitement to hatred” provisions in the Public
Order Act to cover hatred against groups by reference to religious belief. In fact, it was
only during the aftermath of 11th September 2001, which witnessed increased threats
against Muslims groups in Britain that the government proposed in the Anti-Terrorism
580 R v Bow Street Magistrates Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Lexis UK CD 92, 91 Cr App Rep 393, 9
April 1990; Moreover, during the hearing Rushdie’s counsel proposed that even if the law of blasphemy
extended to cover Islam, when read in their context and properly understood the passages complained of
are not blasphemous in as much they do not amount, as is alleged by the applicant, to a scurrilous and
insulting attack by the author on that religion.
581 R v Horseferry Road Metropolitan, Queen’s Bench Division, [1991] 1 QB 260, 9 April 1990
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Bill to make incitement to religious hatred an offence. Though this amendment, which
would have created a more comprehensive approach to this matter, had been dropped in
2001, a “watered down” version of the new Racial and Religious Hatred Bill became law
in 2006. In what they considered an effort to defend freedom of speech, MPs ensured that
the final version of the law, (which is designed to stop hatred being whipped up against
people because of their religion) would only ban threatening words or behaviour.
Parliamentarians also ensured that the offence had to be intentional and specified that
proselytising, discussion, criticism, insult, abuse and ridicule of religion, belief or
religious practice would not be an offence.582 Finally, it should be added that no case of
blasphemy has been prosecuted in England and Wales since the passage of the Human
Rights Act in 1998. Even if a case of blasphemy would meet the criteria as proscribed in
the law, it is likely to fail on grounds of either discrimination or denial of the right of
freedom of expression.583
3. British-Iranian Relations: Human Rights Violations and the Reestablishment of
Relations to the Chargé d’Affaires level
Following the death of Khomeini 584, Rafsanjani emerged as the new president and Ali
Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader. Whilst the latter lacked the religious credentials
and support base of his predecessor, Rafsanjani moved quickly to consolidate the post of
the president by abolishing the post of Prime Minister and transferring his prerogatives to
the Presidency. According to Ansari, the most fundamental change in Iran’s post-
Khomeini political system was the alliance of interests between the “mercantile
bourgeoisie”, with a political and economic base in the bazaar and the patrimonial
presidency of Rafsanjani who succeeded in establishing a loyal bureaucracy and
commercial powerbase. 585 At the heart of Rafsanjani’s administration was recovery of
582 see Times 2 February 2006
583 Select Committee on Religious Offences in England and Wales, HL Paper 95-I, p. 48
584 On the question whether the Foreign Secretary will express sympathy to the people of Iran on the death
of their nation’s spiritual leader and if the government sought to be represented at the funeral, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Waldegrave replied: “No, in both cases.” House of Commons, Hansard, 9 June, 1989,
Column 262
585 see Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921, pp.243-245
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the war torn economy and as such foreign policy would soon become synonymous with
economic policy.586 The British parliament realized the changed political setting and
hoped that the new Iranian executive would follow a more pragmatic approach, which
should be reciprocated by the British government. Therefore, it was suggested by
parliamentarians that the British Foreign Office should abstain from “an unnecessarily
cautious line [towards Iran]” and take Iran’s economic potential into consideration as
well as the fate of the three hostages in Beirut and Mr Cooper in Iran. 587
However, before Britain could consider any rapprochement with Iran on the Rushdie
issue, it continued to insist on assurances from Tehran that the fatwa would be
withdrawn. However, contrary to gradual de-escalation on either side, the Iranian
government continued to crack down on dissidents at home and abroad and did little to
discourage the assassination of Rushdie.
The level of volatility in bilateral relations mainly reflected previous attacks on
bookshops in the UK, which the government directly linked to the fatwa. Six months
after the fatwa, in August 1989 a French Muslim blew himself up in a hotel room in the
Beverly House Hotel in Paddington. According to Scotland Yard’s anti-terrorist branch,
Moustafa Mazeh, who was of Moroccan descent and who had entered Britain from
France, accidentally triggered his 5lb explosive devices whilst seemingly preparing for an
attack on Rushdie or anyone linked to his book. A previously unknown Lebanese group
called the Organization of the Mudjahedin, immediately claimed that he was the first
martyr in the attempt to kill the apostate.588 A series of bomb attacks against bookshops,
which stocked the Satanic Verses followed suit. In July, Collet’s International Bookshop
in Charing Cross Road was badly damaged by an early-morning firebomb attack. In
April, Collet’s Penguin Bookshop near by was also attacked and a hitherto unknown
Islamic group claimed responsibility. Another arson attack took place in May on a
bookshop in King’s Road, Chelsea which was owned by Penguin. On 4 September 1989,
four people were injured after a bomb exploded outside the Liberty store in the West End
586 Interview with former Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki, Tehran 6 September , 2004
587 House of Commons, Hansard, 14 July, 1989, Column 1274
588 The Times, 17 January, 1990, The Times 5 August, 1989
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of London. According to Scotland Yard most of the bombs were crude amateur devices.
589 For this reason, it seems unlikely that Iranian intelligence or any other group linked to
the Iranian authorities were involved in all of the attacks. Yet, whilst most of the
firebomb campaigns were organised by groups in Britain and only a few were linked to
the Iranians, the government ultimately linked these atrocities to the fact that the
President of the Supreme Court in Iran and prominent Iranian politicians and clerics
continued to incite the death sentence and promised rewards for Rushdie’s murder.590
There was also reason to believe that Iranians working on behalf the government
contributed to incite the violence and were involved in the plotting of Rushdie’s
assassination. As a result, between February 1989 and February 1990, the British
government expelled a total of 31 Iranian citizens on the grounds that this would be
conducive to the public good for reasons of national security. 591 Again, the Iranian
authorities reciprocated and expelled numerous British citizens from Iran. The FCO
immediately protested via the British Interest Section in Tehran for a move they
considered “wholly unwarranted” and reminded the Iranian authorities “to continue to be
responsible for the safety [of British residents] in Iran.” 592
3.1 Diplomatic Manoeuvring and the Assassinations of Dissidents in Europe
A seemingly first diplomatic effort by Rafsanjani to de-escalate the situation, was his
declaration in August 1989 which emphasised the Iranian government’s respect for
international law and that any government position or policy would be limited by such
589 The Times, 4 September, 1989
590 see House of Commons, Hansard, 2 April, 1990, Column 457- Column 458
591 House of Commons, Hansard, 15 February, 1990, Column 372. One of the expelled was the London
Bureau Chief for Iranian Television, The New York Times, 2 February 1990. One of the students was
Merhdad Kokabi who was arrested and charged with conspiracy to firebomb several bookshops. Despite
evidence, such as fingerprints on two pipe bombs, the Crown Prosecution Service dropped the case,
claiming insufficient evidence. Communication sent to the Interest Section in Tehran, however, indicates
that the Iranian FM threatened “unspecified reprisals” Kokabi was not freed. On his arrival, Kokabi
received a hero’s welcome and was appointed Special Adviser to the Education Ministry where he was put
in charge of placing Iranian students abroad. see Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the
Fatwa”
592 Cable from Counsellor G H Boyce to Ambassador N Larsson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden,
British Embassy, Stockholm, 29 June 1989, B-avd/ Göran Zetterström-GR 1989-06-30 MISO amb Teheran
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legal constraints. 593 In October 1989 an Iranian Delegation arrived in London to settle
the debts to Kensington and Chelsea Council, which amounted to nearly £ 500,000. The
debts accumulated because of work done by the council to make safe the former Imperial
Hotel in West London, which had been destroyed by fire after being bought by the
Iranian government. Months before the delegation arrived the council announced a
compulsory purchase of the premises to assure the safety of the building. This was
reciprocated by the Iranian government’s threat to seize part of the British Embassy
compound in Tehran and turn it into a car park. 594 The purpose of the delegation was
strictly to settle the dispute concerning the debt and Whitehall made it clear that no talks
to re-establish relations would be on the agenda and continued to demand Iran to remove
any threats against British subjects. 595
Behind Rafsanjani’s public diplomacy, however, were Iranian efforts to crack down on
dissidents, as well as to follow up the death sentence against Rushdie. Successful
assassination campaigns against dissidents, most notably in Austria and France in 1989
and in Germany and Switzerland in 1992 exemplify to what extent Iranian intelligence
was involved in human rights violations abroad and portrays how real the threat against
Rushdie was. According to a German Federal Police assessment in 1992, Iran
systematically misused its diplomatic staff abroad and their privileges of immunity as
well as dispatching hit squads from the intelligence services to liquidate dissidents in
Europe. As far as Iran was concerned, dealing with dissidents was an internal Iranian
affair and at the very core of national security and as such any violent measures needed
were seen as legitimate. The report further noted that the new line adopted by Rafsanjani
had little impact on this policy of state sponsored terrorism. 596 Particularly, Kurdish
dissidents and their networks in the Diaspora were on top of the agenda in Tehran. Thus,
by 1989 the Iranian government decided not only to fight the leadership of the
Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) but essentially to liquidate them. The assassination
593 Deutscher Bundestag , Plenarprotokol, 12. Wahlperiode, 117. Sitzung, Bonn, Donnerstag, 5. November,
1992, p. 9980
594 The Times, 5 October 1989, The Times, 3 August 1989
595 The Times, 5 October 1989
596 see [Country Risk Assessment: Iran, German Federal Police], Bundeskriminalamt ST 33, Meckenheim,
15.07.1992
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of former chair of the DPK Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and his two aides Abdullah
Ghaderi-Azar and Fadel M. Rasoul in Vienna on 13 July 1989, as well as the murder of
Kurds in Berlin in 1992 were a direct result of this policy. 597
Parliamentary enquiries and legal evidence seem to prove the involvement of the Iranian
government. Moreover, with regards to the Rushdie affair and Britain’s efforts at taming
Iran, this evidence also shows, as will be detailed below, how two important allies with
considerable influence on Iran tried to avoid to prosecuting the perpetrators and, thus,
worked against the policy the EU adopted in defence of Rushdie. The meeting in Vienna
in 1989, during which the Kurds were shot was initiated by the Iranians and was
supposed to establish official contact between the Iranian government and the DPK. The
three Iranian envoys were Mohammad Djafari Sharoudi, Amir Mansour Bozorgian Assl
and Moustafa Ajvadi. Immediately after the shooting all three sought refuge in the
Iranian embassy. Sharoudi accidentally injured himself during the shooting and was taken
to hospital before returning to the embassy. 598 A warrant of arrest was issued the next
day by the prosecutor’s office against Bozorgian and Ajvafi. However, in what Secretary
of State Shulz referred to as an effort to avoid any diplomatic implications, the Foreign
Ministry immediately exerted pressure on the criminal judge dealing with the case and
appealed to him to refrain from criminal proceedings against the persons, who were in the
Iranian embassy. After considerable pressure on behalf of the Iranian Ambassador to
Austria who threatened punitive measures against Austrian interests in Iran as well as
cancelling a planned economic delegation which was to visit Iran the following month,
the Austrian government ceased all police operations and eventually allowed all suspects
to return to Iran. It was only after all suspects had fled, that parliamentary pressure in
Austria and solid evidence against all envoys, including Sharoudi allowed the courts to
issue warrants of arrests against all of them. Since Iran has no extradition agreement with
597 Parlament Österreich, Parlamentskorrespondenz/RO/06.05.1997/ Nr. 286
598 Stenographisches Protokoll,. 84. Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich, XX,
Gesetzgebungsperiode, Donnerstag, 18. September 1997, Nr. 2432-AB XX. GB
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Austria it has continuously refused to hand over any of the suspects to the Austrian
authorities. 599
To the dismay of the British government, which hoped that the new president would be
someone to immediately make deals regarding outstanding quarrels, Rafsanjani’s rhetoric
soon turned uncompromising. In an effort to appease hardliners and the radical majority
in the Majlis in exchange for a reduction on their part of their continuing opposition to his
efforts to introduce a measure of economic liberalization, he emphasised that the death
sentence against Rushdie was still operative and also dashed recent hopes of an early
release of Roger Cooper. On the hostage issue, rather than reaching out and offering any
intermediary role to Hezbollah, he accused Britain and the US of failing to take the
necessary steps to secure Iranian help in freeing Western hostages in Lebanon. 600
The years 1989 to 1992 were difficult ones for Britain to formulate a policy towards Iran.
Whilst Britain maintained a hard line on human rights in Iran, mainly through the UN
Human Rights Commissions and parliament, it also attempted to play down the Rushdie
case in order to re-establish relations. Whilst the government continued its protective
measures for the author, the fates of the hostages ranked higher on the agenda in
Downing Street. Ultimately, reestablishment of relations to the Chargé d’Affaires level
was seen as a prerequisite to achieve any of those objectives. What was more, the fact
that Iraq had invaded Kuwait and was defeated by a multinational force, produced a
dynamic in the region that positioned Iran to fill the vacuum left by a weakened Iraqi
regime and to act as a reliable economic partner and diplomatic player. Thus, Britain
could not afford not to have relations with Iran.
By the end of 1989, Rushdie had been moved 56 times to various safe houses in Britain
and continued to receive “grade-one”– the highest, usually accorded to visiting
dignitaries - Special Branch Protection. Ironically, Rushdie was an outspoken critic of
Thatcher and showed little respect for Douglas Hurd because when asked what his most
599 Stenographisches Protokoll,. 76. Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Österreich, Xx
Gesetzgebungsperiode, Donnerstag, 5. Juni 1997, Nr. 2364-AB XX. GB
600 The Times, 24 October, 1989
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difficult task in government had been, the Foreign Secretary had replied: “ Reading the
Satanic Verses.” The fact that Rushdie commented “I did not vote for Ms Thatcher and
will not, and continue to dislike her policies but I thank her for protecting a British citizen
against a death threat from a foreign country” may have been an irony, yet somewhat
provided a powerful symbol for the defence of freedom of speech. 601
Concerning the situation of dissidents and freedom of speech in Iran, the years 1989 –
1992 witnessed a continued crackdown of political opponents. Whilst Britain had no
specific human rights strategy towards Iran it continued to work via the Human Rights
Commission in Geneva. Of primary concern to Britain at that time was the increased
number of summary executions and the imprisonment of political prisoners. Following an
attack by the Mujahedin led Iran Liberation Army (ILA) which marched into Iran602 from
Iraq during the last days of the Iran-Iraq war and which resulted in bloody battles in
western Iran, the Iranian government prompted a series of summary executions of rebel
forces. British parliamentarians, however, sent petitions to the UN Special Representative
for Iran alleging that summary executions also involved the killing of dissidents and
political prisoners. Reports referred to persons arrested long before the invasion of the
ILA and happened in places that were not affected by subsequent military operations. 603
The most prominent political prisoners at that time were former Mayor of Tehran and
leading member of the Movement for Freedom Mr. Tavassoili and former Prime Minister
of the provisional government and President of the Movement for Freedom, Mehdi
Bazargan. Both were arrested in June 1988 on charges of activities against the security of
the government, activities to topple the government and provide assistance to the enemy.
The party was founded by Bazargan in 1961 and only participated in the first election
after the revolution, but not in subsequent elections as they were prevented from running
for office. Though the party did not violate the principles of independence, freedom,
national unity, the criteria of Islam, or the basis of the Islamic Republic as laid out in Art.
601 The New York Times, 4 November, 1990
602 see Wilfried Buchta, Who rules Iran ? The Structure of Power in Iran, p. 114
603 Report on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special Representative of the
Commission on Human Rights, Mr Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, UN Document E/CN.4/1989/26, 26 January
1989, paragraph 15; paragraphs 67-70; see also House of Commons, Hansard, 16 June, 1989, Column 559
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26 of the Constitution as condition to form a political party, the legal situation of the
party was kept in suspense. Members were frequently intimidated or harassed and its mail
was opened and phones lines tapped. 604
By and large, the period following the Iran-Iraq war large-scale, witnessed concentrated
efforts to remove political opponents from the political scene. Arrests and executions
were carried out with reference to the war and national security. Political prisoners, some
of whom were non-violent, have also shared the brunt of executions with criminals, most
commonly, drug offenders. By 1990, the government moved on to increasingly intervene
in the free flow of information in the form of letters, telegrams and telephone
conversations. In this regard, a large number of disabled veterans had been hired and
placed in the communication offices throughout the country to monitor telephone
conversations between citizens. Moreover, despite the government's proclamation about
the right of political parties to operate freely, the list of bona fide parties was still limited
to pro-regime or apolitical bodies, most of which were proxies for different factions of
the clergy. The application of other parties that had filed for legal status met with outright
rejection or bureaucratic procrastination. An open letter by Mehdi Bazargan to the
President which criticized the government for the worsening economic and social
situation and the lack of freedom and security in the country resulted in the arrests and
detention of Bazargan and fellow signatories. The main points of the letter demanded to
safeguard and guarantee freedom of activity for those political parties and associations
and press which have legal and open activities. Regarding freedom of speech Bazargan
urged his government to provide the opportunities for free and undisturbed debates, talks
and exchange of views for the purpose of resolving problems of the country. Political and
intellectual participation of society would thus provide the foundation for the legitimate
rule of the people. 605 The restrictions of freedom of speech, which he criticized, applied
both to political groups in and outside the Majlis as well as to the printing media. Whilst
604 Report on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special Representative of the
Commission on Human Rights, Mr Reynaldo Galindo Pohl UN Document E/CN.4/1990/26, 12 February
1990, paragraph 218
605 Report on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special Representative of the
Commission on Human Rights, Mr Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, UN Document E/CN.4/1991/35, 13 February
1991, paragraphs 445-446
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the Freedom Movement was still kept in a legal limbo, the revolutionary prosecutor in
Tehran dissolved the Association for the Defense of Freedom and Sovereignty of the
Iranian Nation. This was contrary to Iranian law as it should have been done by a Special
Court of the Ministry of Justice upon a complaint by the Ministry of the Interior backed
by relevant evidence. In parliament, several MPs had been removed as a consequence of
critical statements, 606 one of which was Ghorban-Ali Saleh-Abadi from Mashad who
was taken to the Islamic Revolutionary Court at Evin Prison on 16 May 1991 where he
was questioned about critical remarks he had made during plenary sessions.607
The situation of the British hostages in Lebanon and Iran’s role as influential
intermediary put the British government in a situation in which it needed direct channels
of communication with Tehran. Thus, reestablishment of relations with Iran was seen as a
prerequisite to negotiating on all other outstanding concerns. The Iranians were aware of
mounting pressure in Britain regarding the cost of the defense of Rushdie 608 and the
seemingly unsuccessful strategy of no negotiation with hostage-takers. Following an
address to the Majlis by Speaker Mehdi Karrubi at the first anniversary of the fatwa on 15
February 1990 in which he proclaimed “ However much Salman Rushdie may be kept
under guard, eventually a Muslim will carry out the edict” 609, the EU Troika met with an
Iranian delegation in Dublin two months later. The ever-uncompromising stance on the
part of the Iranians and the deadlock regarding the hostages allowed the Iranian envoy
Hussein Moussavi to actually link Rushdie with any improvements in Lebanon stating
that “ if the UK government was prepared to expel Rushdie they would see to it that the
British hostages were released.” 610 Unlike the USA and France, Britain was not
militarily involved in the Lebanese civil war and had no concession to give other than
606 ibid, paragraph 447
607 Report on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special Representative of the
Commission on Human Rights, Mr Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, UN Document E/CN.4/1992/34, 2 January
1992, paragraph 175
608 MPs increasingly questioned the government on the cost of special security measures afforded to
Rushdie, which have, however, never been disclosed by the Home Office, see House of Commons,
Hansard, 15 February, 1990, Column 37
609 IRNA, 15 February, 1990
610 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
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some compromise on the Rushdie front. By this time, however, the Rushdie Defense
Committee had made it very difficult for the government to think of any compromise. 611
During the first formal Iranian meeting with the EU since the fatwa had been issued, an
agenda was set. Having started the negotiations with demands the Iranians themselves
knew that the British could not meet, Moussavi indicated that no further hostages were
likely to be released until the West used its influence on Israel and Lebanon’s Christians
to release Arab prisoners. 612 The agenda during the meeting was to agree on a basic Tit
For Tat strategy. Israel had to release prisoners in return for any further Western
hostages. Given the fact that Britain, France and Germany did not want to formally
negotiate with the groups that held their nationals, this quid pro quo tactic allowed
European governments to somewhat keep face and pretend not to deal with terrorists.
Furthermore, before Iran could consider any direct discussions with the British
government, Moussavi demanded that the House of Commons would have to pass a
resolution disavowing Rushdie’s novel. 613
Despite Iranian verbal commitments giving during the talks not to arrange Rushdie’s
murder, Britain maneuvered carefully as there was continuing evidence of hit men
arriving to do just this. Therefore, Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, did not encourage
the Rushdie Defense Committee to give this commitment much credence. 614
Nevertheless, the British government needed to show some good will in order to get back
into Iran. The only move seen as somewhat acceptable to the Iranian side without
publicly compromising any principles was to hold back a paperback edition of the
Satanic Verses. Usually a common procedure for bestsellers, Penguin Books decided in
June 1990, therefore, not to go ahead with a paperback in order to avoid jeopardizing the
release of the Western hostages in Lebanon. 615
611 ibid
612 The New York Times, 17 May, 1990
613 IRNA, 17 May, 1990
614 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
615 The New York Times, 14 June, 1990
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A second initiative by the British was rather unforeseen as it referred to humanitarian
efforts by Thatcher’s government in the aftermath of an earthquake in the Gilan and
Zahjan Province later that month, which cost the lives of more than 38 000 and
hospitalized over 45 000 Iranians. 616 In a note sent from the British Prime Minister to
Rafsanjani she conveyed her “heartfelt sympathy to [Rafsanjani] and the families of all
those who have suffered. “ It further said “We shall do all we can to help the enormous
efforts which will be needed to cope with this tragedy. A consignment of relief supplies
from Britain will shortly be on its way to Tehran.” 617 Unlike US foreign policy towards
Iran, this move by the British suggests that policymakers appreciated the distinction
between political and humanitarian matters. Consequently, the fact that the British
government sent a team of doctors specializing in post-trauma surgery, medical supplies
and emergency shelter 618 did not go unnoticed in Tehran, who had to play by the rules of
the Two-Level Game. Diplomats in the Iranian Foreign Ministry needed such gestures in
order to lobby hardliners for the rapprochement with Britain. As long as Britain
continued to put pressure on Iran through the EU and try to reduce EU –Iran political and
economic exchanges, conservative elements were unlikely to agree to renew ties with
Britain. 619
The third British move, which was reciprocated by the Iranians, must be seen as an
immediate strategic calculation by the British following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990. As far as the Iranian Foreign Ministry was concerned, Britain could not
afford to be the only European power without ties to Iran during and after that crisis. 620
In fact policymakers in Whitehall appreciate strategic and political opportunities, which
616 Cable sent from the British Interest Section to the Swedish Foreign Ministry Tehran, 1990-06-27, B-
avd/Larsson/GR, Pol4 Ambassaden Tehran, 1990-06-27
617 Note sent from the British Embassy to the British Interest Section in Tehran, Pol IV/kr Ganslandt/1p
1990-06-29 Ex t: Amb Tehran, Ink Utrikes Dep, D. No: 176/001, 1990-0607 25 June 1990
618 Note sent from the British Embassy to Ambassador Nils Larsson, B-avd/gk Nils. R Larsson/SA 1990-
07-02 MISO t. amd: en Tehran Tehran, Ink Utrikes Dep, D. No: 13/B356 29 June 1990, 29 June 1990 ; It
should be noted that Rushdie himself pledged $ 8650 to help Iranian earthquake victims. A move which did
not go unnoticed in Tehran. see The Independent, 26 June 1990
619 Interview with Dr Mahound Vaezi, Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, 6 September, 2004, Tehran
620 ibid; The US-led war left Iran in an unparalleled strategic position in the Gulf. Anxious to channel all of
its resources to the Kuwait crisis, the Iraqi leadership accepted all of the Iranian peace terms in August
1990, releasing Iranian POWs and withdrew Iraqi troops from occupied border areas. Iran Focus,
(September, 1990), Vol.3, No. 8 , p. 2
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the Kuwait conflict awarded to Iran. 621 Reestablishment of relations was thus paramount.
In a letter to a Member of Parliament Douglas Hurd called “Islam one of the world’s
great religions.” He added that “we have the greatest respect for it and its values” and that
“the British Government had nothing to do with the publishing of the Satanic Verses, nor
has it encouraged its publications in other countries. There is no question of the British
government or people wishing to insult Islam.” 622 Ayatollah Mohammad Emami
Kashani of the Guardian Council welcomed this remark and stated that “by condemning
Salman Rushdie and respecting beliefs of the Muslims, Britain has almost met the
conditions set by parliament.” 623 With the backing of the National Security Council,
Rafsanjani then formally offered to restore relations with Britain via a note sent to the
British Interest Section in Tehran. 624 Following that move, Britain, who publicly stated
that “ the Iranians have a very significant part to play” 625 in getting the hostages released,
demanded Iran pledge its support to help release the hostages and the British prisoners in
Iran, as well as assurances to not to carry out the fatwa. 626 Since it stepped down from
previous demands to annul the sentence – the FCO’s approach was that once relations are
established, they could take Rushdie’s case further – the Iranian government
reciprocated. Avoiding a direct comment on the fatwa, Iranian diplomats went only so far
as to assure the British to “respect international law and not to interfere in the internal
affairs of any other country” 627 Britain made the renewal of ties conditional upon Iran
living up to its promise to use its influence and achieve the release of hostages in
Lebanon and to release Roger Cooper from prison. 628 Therefore, it was decided not to
exchange ambassadors as relations were subject to Iranian behavior. David Reddaway
621 As confirmed in British-Swedish correspondence; Cable sent from British Embassy in Stockholm to
British Embassy in Tehran B-sekr./Nils-R Larrsson/ SA, 1990-10-24 MISO t.amb:en TEHRAN, 23
October, 1990
622 The Times, 4 August, 1990
623 IRNA, 5 August, 1990
624 see Cable sent from the British Interest Section to Swedish Foreign Ministry, MSG No. 900806-523, Pol
IV/kr Ganslandt/1p 1990-8-09, Relex t: amb Tehran
625 The New York Times, 5 August, 1990
626 Note from British Embassy in Sweden to Swedish Foreign Ministry, B-sekr./nils-R Larsson/SA 1990-
10-24, MISO t.amb:en Teheran, Ink Utrikes Dep, D. No: 13/B579 23 October 1990
627 ibid
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was acting Chargé d’Affaires and reopened the British embassy on 27 October 1990. 629
It should also be noted that parallel to the negotiations through the British Interest Section
to reestablish relations, the Rushdie Defense Committee was approached by an Iranian
intermediary, who allegedly representing the Iranian Ambassador to the UN, Kamal
Kharrazi, proposed to solve the fatwa issue. The proposed deal, however, was rejected by
the FCO as senior Ministers doubted its sincerity. According to a FCO assessment the
initiative, if it had any validity at all, appeared more to reflect complex Iranian politics
and may have just been a device to play off internal factions against one another.630
3.2 Release of the Hostages, Human Rights Developments and Attacks on Persons
Associated with Rushdie
Following the reestablishment of relations with Britain the years, 1990-1991 witnessed
the inconsistency of pragmatists openly engaging with the West and helping to release
the remaining hostages while at the same time radical elements, mainly associated with
the Iranian intelligence (VEVAK) and the Ministry of Information (MOIS) as well as
radicals in and outside the government, continuing to crack down on dissidents at home
and abroad.
Domestically, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance proved the major
institutional impediment to the freedom of press, as any permit for newspapers or
publishing houses needed the ministry’s prior consent. Equally all literary work needed
629 see Fax sent from British Interest Section, Tehran, to Swedish Foreign Ministry, B-sekr/Gk Nils R.
larsson/GR Ext, brittiska ambassaden, Ganslandt, Pol 4, 29-10-1990
630 The intermediary was an Iranian post-doc fellow at Harvard, who claimed to represent the Iranian
Ambassador and who got in touch with the Defence Committee via Mike Wallace, presenter of the US
television series “60 Minutes”. During meetings between the First Secretary Khooshro at the Mission and
Wallace, he was told that the content of the deal had been approved by Khameni. The deal was as follows:
Rushdie would issue a statement of regret about any offence he had caused Muslims, which would be
video-taped; the publication would be halted temporarily; meanwhile a new edition would be prepared to
include a warning preface acknowledging the offence the book might cause. Furthermore, Rushdie would
assist, financially, in setting up a fund for the families of those killed during the riots. Once the Iranian
government would have received the videotape, they would issue a video response. Not exactly knowing
what the Iranians’ response would be and overall doubting the sincerity of the deal, the FCO thought any
video message from Rushdie to be counterproductive if not disastrous. According to the FCO, this initiative
was too risky and, precisely because of the wide margin of deniability, it was not to be trusted. cited from
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the approval of the ministry, which prevented non-violent opposition groups and writers
from independent publications. 631 The fact that printing houses were required to obtain
formal permission by a political body and that printing paper was distributed by the
Ministry only for those publishing houses who publication had been approved proved an
effective means by the state to control media and limit public debate. On this matter the
government stated in 1991 that “the press is free to publish unless what they print
prejudices the Islamic tenets or public rights. The Ministry of Islamic Culture and
Guidance has, therefore, invited printing houses to consult with this Ministry prior to
their publication in order to prevent the appearance of such articles.” 632 In relation to the
provision and distribution of printing paper, the government referred to the fact that
because of the war it was not financially in a position to provide all the hard currency to
import paper and thus only allocated a limited amount of paper to respective printing
houses and writers. 633 These restrictions equally applied to members of the religious
circles, such as Ashgar Hashemi, a cleric from Mashad and the editor of Khorrasan who
was convicted in a secret trial and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for having
published features criticizing certain policies as being contrary to the late Imam’s edicts.
634 By 1991, the Special Representative for Iran noted some improvements concerning
the freedom of the press and the policy relating to the publication of books. The
publication of several new magazines had been authorized and the office for the
censorship of books in the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance had been dissolved.
Hence, authors were no longer required to obtain authorization prior to publication of
their work. 635 For Britain and other members of the Human Rights Commission, this
must have been interpreted as one step in the right direction. However, whilst books no
longer required prior authorization, authors were still liable if they disregarded mandatory
“literary principles”. 636 Since the substantive restrictions remained in force, writers were
631 Report on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special Representative of the
Commission on Human Rights, Mr Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, UN Document E/CN.4/1991/35, paragraps373-
377, paragraph 440
632 ibid, paragraphs 188-190
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being kept subject to a form of self-censorship. Therefore, the choice Iranian writers,
journalists and artists had to make was whether to write and then to face the
consequences. On the Rushdie issue, Ambassador to the United Nations Office in
Geneva, Syrous Nasseri strongly rejected previous memorandums by the Special
Representative and Resolutions by the HR Commission because they had failed to take
into account the many deaths that Rushdie’s books had caused all over the world. 637
From the onset of the crisis, the Iranian government refused to accept that it constituted a
human rights concern and rejected all multilateral diplomatic efforts, which denounced
the fatwa as being purely politically motivated.
Whilst there were no improvements on Rushdie’s case, the Iranian government
eventually released Roger Cooper in April 1991. However, Britain continued to exert
pressure on Rafsanjani to live up to his commitments concerning the hostages. 638 The
agenda had already been agreed between the Europeans and Iran. What was needed was
someone neutral to offer good offices to negotiate with Iran. Given the fact that the USA
and Israel were deeply involved in the Lebanese civil war and neither of which enjoyed
ties with Iran, Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar and his Special Envoy
Giandomenico Picco took over the role as negotiators.639 Moreover, following the
revelations of the Iran-Contra affair, Iranian pragmatists did not trust the Americans to
keep any direct meetings secret. Direct talks with Israel were out of the question for
either side. At this point Iran needed to show some real progress on the hostages issue as
Rafsanjani faced economic and political pressure at home. Economically, foreign
investments were needed for the first postwar development plan, which called for $ 120
billion in spending over five years to rebuild oil, energy and other industrial sectors. The
plan, however, was staggering under the weight of demands from the growing population
(the birth rate added one million Iranians every six months) and rigid business codes had
caused many foreign investors to balk. 640 For the government, any success to bring the
hostage crisis to an end was meant to undermine the hard-liner majority in the Majlis,
637 ibid, paragraphs 346-348
638 The New York Times, 3 April, 1991
639 see Giandomenico Picco, Man Without a Gun, (New York, Random House, 1999), pp. 88- 263
640 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile Iran, 1990-91, (EIU, 1991,) pp.40-45
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who argued that Israel and the United States would fail to respond to Iranian good will
gestures. 641 Hardliners in the Majlis continuously questioned the wisdom of détente with
the West and as Mussavi emphasized the need “to maintain the principles and causes of
the Islamic Revolution”. Rather that meeting demands by foreign powers in order to take
the country out of isolation, he demanded that “Iranian diplomacy must be […] based on
the deep-rooted beliefs of the Iranian people.” Whilst such a foreign policy line “might
offend some governments” it would also have the “support of the Muslim masses.” 642
Faced with continuous defiance on part of Iranian lawmakers to government bills of
privatization of certain trade ventures, foreign borrowing and the possible devaluation of
the Rial to attract foreign investment, Rafsanjani put considerable weight on his
diplomatic initiative to have the hostages released.643 The President’s rationale was that
success on this front, would vindicate him as skillful statesman and thus ultimately
strengthen Iran’s standing abroad and his own at home. 644
Talks at the United Nations between Iran’s Ambassador Kamal Kharrazi and the
Secretary General had already begun in March that year. During that details phase, the
strategy crafted was straightforward: give something to everyone without violating
American and British determination not to make concession to hostage holders. Because
the US and Britain refused to negotiate, Israel became the broker for the West. For
Kharrazi the plan seemed acceptable, as it was a package that took into account that the
Lebanese wanted their detainees, the West wanted their hostages and the Israelis wanted
their servicemen. 645 Iran for its part was promised by Picco that in return for
intermediary efforts the UN would deliver Paragraph 6 of UN RES 598, which would
formally blame Iraq for the war. With the benefit of being true, the report by the
Paragraph 6 Commission was needed for Iran to come to terms with the war and to
641 see The New York Times, 13 September, 1991
642 Iran Focus, Vol.4, No.5, (May, 1991), p.8
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4, No 8, (September, 1991), , p.4
644 In fact after the hostages had been released, media outlets in Iran praised the governments efforts. Even
Mohtashemi remained from criticising the deal brokered by Rafsanjani,. see ibid and IRNA, 13 August,
1991
645 The New York Times, 6 December 1991, see also Giandomenico Picco, Man Without a Gun, pp. 88-
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establish a basis for war claims against Iraq. 646 A welcoming side benefit of all this for
Iran was of course, the release of Arab detainees out of Israel prisons.
Following meetings with Kharrazi in Geneva and Rafsanjani and Velayatti in Tehran,
Picco’s step-by-step approach materialized with a series of moves from Tehran.
Mohammed Javad Larijani, a member of the National Security Council and longtime aide
to Rafsanjani indicated to David Reddaway that the Revolutionary Justice Organization
was going to release the British hostages. At the same time Islamic Jihad over which Iran
had less influence released two Americans and the British journalist John McCarthy,
which carried a message that all Western hostages would be released in return for Sheik
Abdel Karim Obeid, who had been abducted by Israeli commmandos in July 1989 and
the release of Arab prisoners held by European countries and Israel. From the onset,
America was opposed to any deal that would allow the early release of two Lebanese
brothers in a prison in Germany for their role in the hijacking of Trans World Airlines
flight in 1985. 647 Whilst European countries were equally reluctant to release any
convicted prisoners, Israel declared itself willing to release all Arab detainees including
Sheikh Obeid, but only after they received authoritative information on its own
servicemen. It should be noted that Israel captured most of the fighters as a bargaining
chip in the first place. By September, the Secretary General solidified the hostage deal.
Having not only met Iranian officials but also the families of the four Iranians who had
disappeared at a Christian checkpoint in Lebanon in 1982, his humanitarian intentions
and impartiality was reinforced. Hence, by the end of September, the Revolutionary
Justice Organization released the British hostage, Jack Mann and less than a month later,
Israel received confirmation of the death of an Israeli soldier missing in Lebanon, and
two days later released 15 Arab prisoners. 648 On 18 November, Terry Waite and an
American hostage, Thomas Sunderland were freed from captivity. Their release was a
direct result of the previous release of Arab detainees from Al-Khiam prison as well as
an American-Iranian agreement at the International Court of Justice in The Hague under
646 Paragraph 6 of the Resolution specifically requested the Secretary General to “explore, in consultation
with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the
conflict […]” see Giandomenico Picc, Man Without a Gun,, pp. 149-151
647 The New York Times, 6 December 1991
648 IRNA, 20 September, 1991, IRNA, 24 September, 1991
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which the US government committed itself to return $ 278 million for military claims by
Iran and American exoneration of Iran in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. 649 With the
release of Waite, the last British hostage returned home to Britain and closed a chapter in
British-Iranian relations. Whilst Israel released hundreds of prisoners throughout the
hostage negotiations, the fate of other Arab detainees continued to be a primary concern
for Lebanon, Syria and the PLO and would eventually be dealt with at the Madrid Peace
Conference.
Though Britain welcomed the end of the hostage saga, it continued to be concerned about
the continuous crack down of dissidents abroad, which in 1991 also involved the
targeting of persons associated with the publication of the Satanic Verses. On 3 July
1991, Alberto Ettore Capriolo, who translated the novel into Italian, was stabbed in Milan
by a hit squad demanding the address of Rushdie’s place of residence.650 Nine days later,
Hitoshi Igarashi, who translated the novel into Japanese, was murdered at the University
of Tsukuba, near Tokyo. Britain immediately raised the issue of these attacks to the
Iranian government, which denied any involvement. 651 Another attack on French soil,
which was linked to Iran, was the assassination of former Iranian Prime Minister
Sharpour Bakhtiar and his secretary Katibeh Fallouch on 8 August 1991. Having formed
a national resistance movement in France with its own newspapers and two clandestine
radio stations beaming messages into Iran, Bakhtiar ranked high on the dissidents list in
Tehran. A communication from the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence to one of its
intelligence posts in Europe, which reportedly requested confirmation of Bakhtiar’s
death, was intercepted before his body had been discovered by the French authorities. 652
Following that lead, the French authorities eventually were able to link the Iranian
government to the assassination, as three men connected to the Revolutionary Guards
were found guilty, two of which were convicted by a French court. 653 For the radicals
649 The New York Times, 28 November, 1991
650 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, (FAZ), 4 June, 1991
651 Japanese authorities established that the suspect was a member of a previously unknown Islamist group
and had entered the country via China and managed to escape after the murder. See Police Report of
Tsukuba Police Authorities sent to Article 19, in Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
, see also The New York Times, 13 July, 1991
652 Le Monde, 22 August, 1991; Le Monde, 24 September, 1991
653 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p.248
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and Iranian Intelligence, the death of Bakhtiar as an influential exile opposition figure
was certainly seen as a vital step to consolidate post-war regime stability. For pragmatists
in the Iranian Foreign Office and regarding Rafsanjani’s intermediary role regarding the
hostages, these series of assassinations were counterproductive and prevented western
powers from trusting Iran as a political ally following the sweeping victory over Iraq in
Operation Desert Storm. 654
4. The Launch of the “Critical Dialogue”, Expelling Persona Non Grata and the German
Connection
Following the release of the last British hostage, the Rushdie Defense Committee
increased its lobbying efforts towards the British government and also sought more vocal
support from European governments. By the end of 1991, the British government seemed
to have developed a strategy of “quiet diplomacy”. During the hostage negotiations, the
Foreign Office expressed the view that the Defense Committee’s public campaigning not
only adversely affected the hostages in Lebanon but also compromised Rushdie’s own
safety. Thus, while correctly appreciating that the fatwa could never be repealed,
policymakers mistakenly thought the best strategy to be adopted was for the matter to
wither away. 655 In support of this assessment Minister for Foreign Affairs, David Gore-
Booth wrote to the Committee in March 1991: “On the second anniversary of the
imposition of the fatwa, in contrast with the first anniversary, no Iranian government
official repeated the fatwa or commented on it. There were no demonstrations at the
British Embassy in Tehran […] Interest there appears to have dwindled considerably.” 656
Moreover, a FCO diplomat when asked, in July 1992, about the Rushdie matter expressed
the view that it was now more of a Home Office problem, implying that the only issue
was Rushdie’s safety. He admitted, however, that this was “rather a Pontius Pilate” sort
654 On 12 September, 1991, the European Parliament condemned the murder and declared that “there are
some reasons to think that the assassinations was committed by Iranian government agents.” Iran Focus,
Vol.4, No.9, (September, 1991), p. 7
655 Interview with Chris Rundle, Former FCO diplomat at the Iran Desk, 2 October, 2004, London, see also
Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
656 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
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of thing to say.657 Quiet diplomacy was certainly necessary to achieve the deal on the
hostage front. However, with the negotiations on Lebanon over and faced with the attacks
on persons related to the publication of the Satanic Verses and the detention of the British
Third Political Secretary of the Embassy in June 1992 658, the British government
eventually had to put the Rushdie issue back on top of the agenda in bilateral relations.659
In Iran, the fatwa had certainly never ceased to be a potent issue in the country’s
domestic arena and when the Iranian Ambassador to Germany confirmed the death
sentence in November 1992 and went so far as to sanction its execution in Germany,
bipartisan parliamentary support for Rushdie in Germany and Britain was back on. 660
Iran’s continuous crack down on dissidents abroad and the attacks on persons related to
the “Satanic Verses” combined with Rushdie’s lobbying efforts in European countries
eventually resulted in increased international pressure on Iran to revoke the death
sentence. In March, 1992, the fatwa was particularly condemned in a UN Commission
Resolution sponsored by the EU. 661 While Britain in particular was using the UN
Commission as a channel to remind Iran of its legal obligations to uphold international
human rights standards, the EU was seen as the more effective political forum to exert
pressure on Iran.
It was therefore, not unsurprising that the “Critical Dialogue” with Iran was crafted under
British EU Presidency at the European Council in Edinburgh in December 1992. With the
resolution adopted, it started the first phase of constructive engagement towards Iran and
called for improvement in a number of areas, “particularly human rights, the death
sentence pronounced by a fatwa” […] “Improvements in these areas” it was stated “ will
be important in determining the extent to which closer relations and confidence can be
657 see The Guardian, 16 July, 1992
658 Geoffrey Brammer was arrested and held for several hours on 17 June 1992, the same day the last of the
European hostages, two Germans, were released. see IRNA, 18 June, 1992 ,
659see House of Commons, Hansard, 20 February, 1992, Column 226
660 The Iranian Ambassador was summoned to the German Foreign Office and warned to be declared
persona non grata and expelled from Germany. see Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, 117. Sitzung,
Bonn, Donnerstag, den 5. November, 1992, p. 9983
661 ibid, p.9978
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developed.” 662 Whilst it is true that no clear linkage was established under Critical
Dialogue between “improvements in behavior” and possible rewards, it is important to
note that Europe’s first phase of constructive engagement with Iran did not serve
economic interests either.
Contrary to charges by successive US administrations, that the Critical Dialogue was
designed to promote economic relations, it established a political framework for
negotiations between the EU and Iran, at a time of falling economic interdependence.
Exports from the EU to Iran between 1991 and 1995, fell by 44 %, decreasing from
$10,369 billion in 1991 to $4,622 billion in 1995. 663 During the same period British
exports fell by 57 % constituting $909 million in 1991 and $527 million in 1995. 664
Iranian oil imports to Britain decreased from 2982 thousand metric tons in 1990, to 1281
thousand metric tons in 1994 and, in fact, Britain ceased to import any crude oil from Iran
from 1999 onwards.665 From the beginning of the Critical Dialogue British
parliamentarians and human rights activists questioned the stance of the government not
to employ sanctions against Iran. 666 As established during the immediate fatwa, an
embargo of any kind was not seen as desirable to British economic interest. Nonetheless,
Britain’s uncompromising position on the fatwa and the refusal to upgrade relations with
Iran continuously maintained an unfavorable climate for British exporters and oil
companies. 667 It will be shown that, contrary to other EU member states (most notably
Germany), Britain enjoyed a relative asymmetrical relationship with Iran, characterized
by Iran’s increasing dependence on British hydrocarbon technology and investment in
that sector. In the end, Britain managed to translate this dependence into diplomatic
capital.
662 European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992; Conclusions of the Presidency, European
Council, RAPID, DOC/92/, paragraph 15
663 IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1996, p.76
664 IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1996, p.443
665 United Nations, 1991 Energy Statistic Yearbook (New York, United Nations, 1993), p. 160; United
Nations, 1995 Energy Statistic Yearbook (New York, United Nations, 1997), p.176; United Nations, 1999
Energy Statistics Yearbook, (New York, United Nations, 2002), p.182; United Nations, 2003 Energy
Statistics Yearbook, (New York, United Nations, 2006), p.190
666 see House of Commons, Hansard, 20 February, 1992, Column 845
667 Interview with Mr Ahmad Salari, BP Country Representative Iran, (Tehran, 25 August 2005)
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Whilst economic interests were certainly a factor for Iran to reciprocate the European
offer, 668 the government in Tehran also had a number of issues it wanted to raise during
subsequent Troika Meetings. Of particular concern to the Iranians was Europe’s role in
the Middle East Peace Process and they demanded more support for the PLO; the human
rights situation in the EU (with particular reference to the status of minorities); the fact
that the MKO was still permitted to reside and operate in Europe and had not been
labeled a terrorist group, and the role of Europe in the war in former Yugoslavia. 669
When the Iranian FM put these items on the agenda of the Critical Dialogue, Rafsanjani
approved Velayati’s advise to engage with Europe.670 Essentially, by presenting Europe
with Iran’s issues of concern, the President was able to sell engagement to radical
elements in and outside parliament and government. Regarding Rushdie and Britain, the
Iranians knew that the initiative of engagement came from Britain as John Major’s
government needed the EU to increase pressure on Iran. Though the Iranians genuinely
regarded this as politicizing a supposedly religious issue - not realizing or admitting that
the fatwa itself was a political act – they nonetheless believed that dialogue was more
important than backing off. The Iranian FM also wanted the opportunity to affirm that the
government would not send anyone to kill Rushdie.671
Between 1992 and 1993, there was certainly much “diplomatic signaling” from Tehran
regarding human rights and Rushdie’s freedom of speech, none of which, however, could
have been interpreted as positive steps towards a resolution. Within and without Iran, the
crackdown on dissidents continued on a large scale. The Special Representative for Iran
received reports indicating that hundreds of persons had been arrested following
demonstrations in Mashad, Arak, Chahar-Mahal, Hamedan, Khorramand, Shiraz,
Shushtar and Tehran. Demonstrations, most of which were directed at economic
mismanagement of the government, began in Shiraz in mid-April 1992 and spread to all
of the country. Members of the IRG and other security forces responded by using
668 Between 1991-1995, Iran was heavily dependent on imports from industrialised countries (mainly EU).
In 1991 it imported 68.6 % from industrialised countries, in 1992 72.6 %, in 1993 73.5 %, in 1994 64.3%
and in 1995 56. 3%. IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1996, p. 254
669 Interview with Dr Mahmoud Vaezi, , Former Deputy Foreign Minister (1988-1999), (Tehran, 6
September, 2004)
670 ibid
671 ibid
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excessive force and opened fire indiscriminately on demonstrators. The judiciary reacted
by sending more judges to the affected areas, so that as Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi,
Head of the Judiciary, said “swift and decisive action would be meted out to rioters”. 672
Equally, constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, opinion and the press as
contained in Article 24 of the constitution continued to be ignored. In 1992, Rafsanjani
stated that “criticism and discussion of problems in the press, dailies and periodicals,
without bearing grudges and without hatred, can help the growth and development of
society.” In reality, however, criticism of the government or any policies remained
subject to punishment. Whilst Iran witnessed a gradual proliferation of newspapers and
publications, they were by no means free and remained subject to self censorship and
government restrictions. Even though new newspapers opened, many were quickly closed
down, such as the sports monthly Farad, the cultural weekly Donya-e Sohan and the
women weekly Zan-eRous. 673 An editorial of Tehran Times of 27 July 1992 stated that:
[…] most newspapers were afflicted with self-censorship or with a kind of party or group vengeance
because, after the victory of the revolution, officials in charge of the country’s important newspapers
were mainly comprised of two parts: those who desired to use the newspapers as a ladder of success
to reach higher State posts or those who left posts as ministers or top officials and fell in status and
turned to be present in the country’s politico-economic scene. […] 674
The editorial added that “ it is below the dignity of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, that
after 13 years, a permit for the set-up of the country’s syndicate of journalists has not
been issued under conditions when land and automobile brokers have established their
powerful unions with government permits.” 675 Overall, by 1992, government control
over the media had increased. Possession of typewriters, photocopiers, computers, faxes
or short-wave radios not registered with the authorities incurred severe punishment. 676 In
672 Final Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Special
Representative Mr Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, pursuant to Commission Resolution 1992/67 of 4 March 1992,
UN Doc. Number E/CN.4/1993/41, 28 January 1993, paragraph 7
673 ibid, paragraphs 175- 179; 183-188
674 ibid, paragraph 179
675 ibid
676ibid, paragraph 181
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1993, publishers and journalists continued to be charged with various offences ranging
from “printing photographs violating public decency” against the weekly Avay-e Shomal
to the Tehran monthly Hamshahri which was closed down for “publishing articles
promoting western culture” and Abrar whose editor was summoned to court for the
publication of “different articles that were considered scandalous, slanderous and
offensive.” 677 It was, however, alleged by journalists and publishers that charges against
the above-mentioned papers as well as widely circulated dailies, such as Salam and
Kayhan, were purely politically motivated and constituted concerted efforts by the
government as well as judiciary to contain genuine criticism. As Salam wrote in
September 1993:
Unfortunately, when we report events, some people start a premeditated campaign
against us. This plot is now at work with the purpose of closing down our newspaper. On
the other hand, any time we try to get some information about affairs of the State, they
either do not give us any, or they give us cliché answers of which no reader will be
convinced. 678
In addition to direct efforts by the state to control the free exercise of freedom of speech,
it was alleged that gangs of vigilantes claiming to protect Islamic values issued death
threats against journalists and attacked publications they disapproved of. These unofficial
acts of intimidation and violence were allegedly carried out with the tolerance of the
authorities and without fear of prosecution. 679
Whilst the criticism expressed through media and demonstrations initially reflected
discontent with Rafsanjani’s inability to deliver on economic policy it gradually also
reflected popular feelings about the lack of political freedoms. Though Rafsanjani
677 Final report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran prepared by the Special
Represenatitive of the Comission on Human Rights, Mr Reynaldo Pohl, pursuant to Commission
Resolution 1993/62 of 10 March 1993 and Economic and Social Council decision 1993/273, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1994/50 2 February 1994, paragraph 133, paragraph 136, paragraph 127
678 ibid, paragraph 139
679 ibid, paragraph 130, paragraph 141; It should also be noted that on 13 August 1993, the authorities
ordered the withdrawal of all books by Aziz Nasin, a Turkish writer, because of his support for Rushdie.
The Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance warned all libraries in the country that they will be punished
if in possession of his books. see ibid, paragraph 142
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allowed a certain degree of criticism concerning economic issues, dissent in the political
realm, which seemed to be emerging, proved dangerous for the Rafsanjani-Khameini
alliance. The emergence of protests of such nature and scale proved intolerable for a
regime that by and large relied on popular acquiescence and ideological support. 680
Condemnations of human rights violations by western states were still being rejected by
the judiciary as false, and Ayatollah Yazdi reiterated that convictions of opposition
groups, such as the Freedom Movement of Iran was because these groups had endangered
the security of the state. He further stressed that: “We believe that Islam enjoys the
richest legal sources and supports and observes human rights more than any other school
of thought.” 681
The stepped up drive of the security apparatus to suppress the right to freedom of speech
largely was deeply rooted in the regime’s appreciation of the success of the Velvet
Revolution in East Europe. Whilst rising popular dissent proved a nuisance to the
establishment and was countered with a reorganization of the security apparatus 682,
opposition from within the religious circles proved more threatening for the regime.
Evidence of such clerical unrest was shown when 70 clerics were arrested in Qom in
November 1991 after clashes resulting from their opposition to the proposed elevation of
Khameini to Grand Ayatollah. Many of them were put under house arrest, such as
Ayatollah Rohani, who was categorically opposed to the principle of velayat-e faqih. 683
This incident in particular reflected a deeper factional divide about the future course of
the country and also explains the reasons for the stepped up suppression of the right to
freedom of expression. An editorial which appeared in Gozaresh-e Hafteh in November
1993 explains the situation of the press as follows:
680 Iran Focus, Vol.4, No.8, (September, 1991), p. 8
681 Iran Focus, Vol. 1, No. 10, November, 1991, (Aban/Azar 1370), p.6
682 Riot police were increasingly being used to implement curfews, which had been implemented on certain
cities where demonstrations occurred. Most significantly, the basij militia was increasingly used as anti-riot
security forces and thus given a new role following the end of the war with Iraq. Iran Focus, Vol. 4, No.9,
(October, 1991), pp.7-8; Iran Focus, Vol.4, No.8, (September, 1991), p.8
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When we started our work and chose journalism as our main profession we had the
impression that we would be able with our criticisms and fault-finding to rectify the
system’s shortcomings and establish a powerful transmission channel between the people
and the system. But unfortunately, it was proved we were wrong. Why is it that our press
lacks the kind of effectiveness and influence it should otherwise enjoy? Why is that some
officials continue to retain office despite all that documented press criticism? We think
we have the answer to this question. The genuine press draws its strengths from the
people. For instance, a critical article about an incompetent government organization or
office could immediately enlighten the public mind on what is really going on there, and
following that, the people, due to their authentic, practical involvement in their own
political destiny, should be able to influence and alter the state of affairs with the levers
they control. But unfortunately, in our country the people are not yet able to intervene or
partake in their own political destiny and do not have that lever. That is why our press,
despite the relative liberty it enjoys, is practically deprived of its true strength. And that is
why we journalists are writing in the “vacuum” and the authorities are going their way.684
What was also notable during that period was that the extension of human rights
violations abroad on part of the Iranian government directly affected Rushdie. A first and
last meeting between the Rushdie Defense Committee and an Iranian diplomat at the
Iranian Embassy took place in London in February 1992. During the meeting between
Mahmoud Mehdi Soltani and the Head of Article 19, Frances D’Souza respective
positions were exchanged on the fatwa. 685 As it was agreed that the meeting had been
informal and non-confidential, Rushdie’s Delegation informed Soltani that they would
put out a press release which included his comment that the bounty had nothing to do
684 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/50, paragraph 143
685 Following the usual letter to the Iranian Chargé d’Affaires in London at the anniversary of the fatwa, the
Rushdie Defense Committee was asked by the Iranian Embassy to meet the Chargé on 13 February 1992.
Though the Charge was not there as he had been recalled to Bradford, an Iranian diplomat, Mahmoud
Mehdi Soltani, received Rushdie’s Delegation. During what was the first and last direct contact between the
Iranian government and the Defense Committee, Head of Article 19, Frances D’Souza, explained their
concerns about the illegal death threat to Rushdie who, according her, had committed no crime. Whilst
acknowledging that some Muslims had been deeply offended by certain passages in the novel, the
delegation argued that those likely to be offended should avoid reading the book. When it raised the issue
of the bounty and vocally deplored the involvement of the 15th Khordad Foundation, Soltani replied that it
was a private foundation which had nothing to do with the government. He went on to enquire why “there
was such a fuss about just one writer, what was so special about this writer ?” Repeating the repugnance
that European and other countries felt about the death sentence and that underlying it was the conviction
that freedom of expression was an individual right, which lay at the heart of democracy, the delegation
ended the meeting with a reminder that the Iranian government is state party to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, from which “Article 19” derives. see Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of
“Fighting the Fatwa”
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with the government. What initially seemed to be first steps in the right direction seemed
to have reflected the complexity of the Iranian political system. On 17 February, the
Iranian Embassy issued a press statement which essentially denied that any meeting had
taken place by denoting Soltani to the status of local employee thus enabling the Chargé
to say “None of this Embassy’s diplomats has had a meeting with the representative of
the International Committee for the Defense of Salman Rushdie.” Significantly, the
statement went on to reaffirm the fatwa, which was referred to as “ a global Islamic
matter and absolutely irreversible […] it would be pure fallacy to suggest that the fatwa
may be withdrawn, now or at any time in the future. Any other interpretation of the
above-mentioned meetings and its contents is categorically denied.” 686 Less than five
months later, Mahmoud Soltani was one of three Iranians (two from the Embassy and one
student) requested to leave Britain because of “involvement with a foreign intelligence
service in the UK”. He and an Iranian on a student visa were believed to have conspired
to kill Rushdie. 687 The meeting may have served to gather information or come closer to
people associated with Rushdie. The denial of the meeting that followed must have
served to appease radical constituents in Iran.
In contrast to Britain’s uncompromising stance on Iranian intelligence activities stood
Germany which, historically, had always been the western power closest to Iran.
Following the end of the war with Iraq, Germany advanced to be one of Iran’s biggest
trading partners and by 1995 Iran had become Germany’s fourth biggest debtor country
owing the government 14,814 billion Deutsche Mark.688 This economic interdependence
largely dictated German policy towards Iran. German economic and financial power
could have been used as incentives for tangible improvements in human rights or on the
686 ibid
687 ibid, Concern that a plot to assassinate Rushdie through the Iranian Embassy and the “Union Islamist
Student Association in Europe “ was confirmed by a German police report based on surveillance on the
Iranian Ambassador’s Residence in Bonn. see “Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Bericht der
Arbeitsgruppe des BfV vom 29.06.1993, „Die Arbeit der iranischen Nachrichtendienste „ Paragraph 2.1.5
reprinted in Frankfurter Rundschau, 28. März, 1995, Nr. 74, see also „Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz“
VC11-247-S-350 146/93, a. April 2003, in Appendix of Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, 12. Wahlperiode,
Bericht des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses von Berlin zur Aufklärung möglicher Versäumnisse der
Sicherheitsbehörden im Zusammenhand mit dem Mordfall Mykonos, Drucksache 12/5949, p. 57
688 “Antwort der Bundesregierung – Iran Politik der Bundesregierung”, 13. Wahlperiode, Drucksache
13/3483, 16.01.1996, p.1
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Rushdie issue. This was, however, rejected by the government on financial grounds as
Bonn was primarily interested in Iran meeting its obligations rather than to linking any
new loans to improvements in Iranian behavior. What was striking about the “German
Connection” is that despite knowledge on activities of Iranian intelligence in Germany
and Europe, and considering Britain’s position / campaign on the fatwa, Germany’s
implementation of the Critical Dialogue was uncritical to say the least, but in practical
terms actually assisted Iranian efforts to clamp down on dissidents abroad.
From 1992 onwards, the Iranian leadership launched a new campaign to destroy the
Kurdish Democratic Party-Iran (KDP-I). Amongst the various opposition groups
advocating armed resistance, the KDP-I as well as the MEK continued to pose real
political threats to the establishment. The KDP-I for its part had established branch
offices in all of the major cities in Europe and enjoyed the support of the Socialist
International. 689 Hence, as had been seen with the deaths of Bazargaan and Quasemlou,
strikes against their infrastructure in Europe was seen as a paramount objective in order
to wipe them off the political map. As Minister of Intelligence and Security (MOIS),
Fallahiyan stated on Iranian TV in August 1982 with reference to Iranian intelligence
efforts abroad: “ We have succeeded to strike against many of those groups outside our
borders “ and further announced that “ we are continuing our operations against the DKP-
I. We are tracking them now and are observing them continuously outside of our country.
We managed to infiltrate their central organizational structures and are informed about
their moves. “ 690
The way MOIS coordinated attacks was divided between the “operational-team”, which
gathered information about the day to day life of the victim and the “hit-team”, which
eventually executed the assassination. 691 According to German intelligence, Kazem
Darabi, who was working for the Iranian intelligence service VEVAK and also an
affiliate of the IRG and the Hezbollah was first approached by the Consul in Bonn
689 Wilfried Buchta. Who rules Iran ? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic, p. 104
690 Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, 12. Wahlperiode, Bericht des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses von Berlin
zur Aufklaerung moeglicher Versaeunisse der Sicherheitsbehoerden im Zusammenhand mit dem Mordfall
Mykonos, Drucksache 12/5949, p. 22
691 Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe Iran des BfV vom 29.06.1993, Paragraph 2.1.2.1
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Mahmud Amani-Farani to gather information about Kurdish groups in Germany 692 and
eventually was charged with the assignment to kill the leaders of the party during their
participation at the Socialist International Conference in Berlin. 693
Generally, the German government made it rather easy for Iranian intelligence to locate
refugees and dissidents. This was due to the fact that the German Ministry for the Interior
insisted that Iranians living in Germany should continue to have their identity cards
reissued by the Iranian embassy and consulates. Quite often this was misused by the
Iranian authorities to recruit new informants in Germany. 694 What was more, Section II
of the “German-Iranian Agreement of Naturalization” of 1929 proved to be a fatal
bilateral treaty particularly for Iranian dissidents as it allowed the Iranian government to
veto any Iranian refugee obtaining German citizenship. It was only in December 1995
that this section was bilaterally abrogated. 695 Most crucially, however, was the practice
of German authorities to routinely present the Iranian embassy and consulates with the
questionnaire Iranian that asylum seekers had to fill in. This provided the Iranian
Intelligence Services with individual asylum seeker’s reasons for seeking refuge in
Germany, their residence there as well as details about relatives backs in Iran. 696
When the three KDP-I leaders, Scharafkandi, Abduli and Erdalan were assassinated on
17 September 1992 in a Greek restaurant called “Mykonos”, German authorities had
already gathered considerable evidence that such an attack was imminent, yet due to
internal lack of coordination failed to intervene.697 Following the assassination, Darabi
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1992 im Berliner Lokal „Myknoss“ see also Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort der Bundesregierung,
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697 Despite requests from the BfV (German Federal Intelligence) to the LfV Berlin (State Intelligence
Service for Berlin) to tap Darabi’s phone conversations, neither an anti-terror analyst nor linguists were
available and the suspect’s conversations, therefore, not monitored, see Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin, 12.
Wahlperiode, Bericht des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses, Drucksache 12/5949, p. 26. Another coordination
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and three Lebanese nationals were arrested on charges of murder. 698 Evidently, being
aware of the links to Iranian intelligence, the German government for its part, that had so
strongly advocated engagement with Iran, wanted to avoid immediate public
condemnation of Iran. In an attempt to “cover up” Iran’s state sponsored assassination,
the Chancellor’s Office applied pressure on the prosecutor not to reveal the Iranian link
as well as prolonging the investigation by refusing to provide crucial intelligence reports.
699
Whilst economic interests ranked high for Germany 700, equally important proved the fate
of four German nationals, who were imprisoned in Iran. The most prominent of these was
Helmut Szimkus, who had been sentenced to life for charges of espionage for the US and
Iraq and had already served one year in Iran’s Evin prison. When the investigations
finally started, Iranian authorities announced that the German prisoner would now be
executed. 701 This new development provided Iran with a bargaining chip and the
Germans with a justification to engage with high level Iranian officials for
“humanitarian” reasons. For that reason, the German government received an Iranian
parliamentary delegation from 26-30 April 1993 and the Iranian Minister of Intelligence
Fallahian in October 1993. Hassan Rohani headed the parliamentary delegation in his
function as Deputy President of the Iranian Majlis. During consultations with German
parliamentarians the Iranian delegation was approached on the issues of the possible
execution of Szimkus, the fatwa against Rushdie as well the “Mykonos murders.”
Rejecting any charges of human rights violations, Rohani pointed out that different
cultural circumstances provide for different interpretations of human rights. 702
Concerning the fatwa, he stated “that Iran never sent nor intends to dispatch any hit
failure was Berlin’s Senator’s refusal for special security precautions during the conference as well as
failing to provide information to parliamentary commissions after the attack, see ibid, pp.27-35
698 see Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Gruppe Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen,
Drucksache 12/4441, 1.März, 1993
699 ibid
700 In 1992, German exports to Iran constituted 5,105 billion $ US, which amounted to almost half of the
entire export volume of the EU to that country. Though exports were also declining over the years,
investment in Iran proved to be high on Germany’s agenda. see IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics
Yearbook 1996, p.76
701 see Norbert Siegmund, Der Myknos-Prozess, p.118
702 ibid, p.126
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squads to kill Rushdie.”703 During consultations with Foreign Minister Kinkel, Rohani
went further and stated that “If we had wanted to kill Rushdie, we would have done so
immediately after the fatwa.” 704 In a rather defensive manner Kinkel told Rohani that his
country was charged by the judicial system with terrorist activities in Germany and that
he hoped that the verdict would not negatively affect bilateral relations. 705 Rohani
reminded Kinkel that Iran was at war with the DPK-I and could destroy the entire group
whenever they wished to 706, implying they would not need to target them abroad. The
most crucial meeting however with reference to German commitment to promote human
rights in Iran, defend Rushdie, and generally stay true to the principles of the “Critical
Dialogue” 707 were meetings between Germany’s intelligence coordinator Bernd
Schmidbauer and Iranian Minister of Intelligence Fallahiyan.
At that time the Intelligence Minister’s prominent role in the assassinations was already
strongly suspected by the Prosecutor and as such he wanted to issue a warrant of arrest
against Fallahiyan while he was in Germany. 708 With reference to the official purpose of
Fallahiyan’s visit to Germany, the government stated that he “was an official
representative of the Iranian government who had followed an invitation of the German
government” and, therefore,” any attempt to arrest him would be inadmissible.” 709 Thus,
instead of being arrested, during consultations at the Chancellor’s Office and at the
Bureau for German Intelligence, Fallahiyan reproached Secretary of State and
Intelligence Coordinator Schmidbauer with the complaint that though Iran was
considerably involved in the efforts which led to the release of the German hostages in
Beirut, it now faced a court trial which accused Iran of state sponsored terrorism.710
703 ibid
704 FAZ, 30. April, 1993
705 IRNA, 30 April, 1993
706 IRNA, 30 April, 1993
707 Following Rushdie’s visit to Germany in 1992, the German parliament passed a resolution to increase
the pressure on Iran to annul the fatwa and provide for Rushdie’s safety, see Deutscher Bundestag, 12.
Wahlperiode, 117. Sitzung, Donnerstag, den 5. November, 1992,pp, 9976-9988
708 Deutscher Bundestag, 6. Dezember, 1995, Plenarprotokoll 13/76, p. 6684
709 ibid
710 Iran played an intermediary role towards the Hammadi Clan who was holding the two Germans captive
(from 1989-1992) in retaliation of a German court which sentenced two Hammadi brothers for their
terrorist activities. Demands to free the two convicts in exchange for the two Germans were categorically
214
During the meeting, Schmidbauer was asked several times to intervene in the trial which
he, however, categorically denied to even discuss, explaining that it was out of his hands
as it was a matter of the judiciary. 711 What was, however, agreed was cooperation of
both intelligence services with regards to training and 100,000 Deutsche Mark were
given in contributions to Tehran. 712
Iran’s other bargaining chip, which concerned the fate of German prisoners in Iran,
however, received more attention and first meetings between Schmidbauer and were held
in Tehran September 1993, which eventually ended in the release of one prisoner who
had been charged with fraud. 713 For the Chancellor, the release of the German prisoners
was seen as a humanitarian issue, and parliamentary accusations of negotiating with the
person who stood behind the assassinations were thus dismissed. 714
For the British Foreign Office, these meetings were unacceptable. The fact that the
Germans did not see it as “necessary to inform the British government about the meeting”
715 resulted in a communication from Hurd to Kinkel reminding the German government
about the spirit of Edinburgh and the significance of Rushdie’s case. Having summoned
the German Ambassador to Britain, Hurd demanded an enquiry about the meeting and he
reiterated further that contacts between intelligence services should only take place
between allies and not with a state sponsor of terrorism. 716
Whilst in 1993, German –Iranian relations seemed undeterred by Iranian intelligence
activities, Britain had changed its policy of quiet diplomacy towards Iran to a more
“confrontational policy”. During a meeting with Assistant Secretary, David Gore Booth,
Assistant Secretary Sir Michael Burton and Minister of State Douglas Hogg in February
refused by the German government and legally impossible. After months of negotiations between Picco and
Iran, the successful deal entailed the release of the hostages in exchange for a German commitment to
reopen the cases against the Hammadis, see Giandomenico Picco, Man Without a Gun, pp.274-295
711 Bundeskanzleramt, „Auszug aus dem Vermerk ueber den Ablauf des Gespraeches mit dem iranischen
Informationsminister Fallahian vom 7. Oktober, 1993“, Drucksache 511-15100- zu Er (VS)
712 Deutscher Bundestag, 12. Wahlperiode, 186. Sitzung, Bonn, Freitag, den 29. Oktober 1993, p. 16159
713 ibid, p.16162
714 ibid, p. 16160
715 ibid, p. 16159
716 FAZ, 15 October, 1993
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1993, Rushdie and D’Souza were told that the rationale for the shift lay in the fact that
quiet diplomacy had not, in any way, deterred the Iranian government inspired attempts
to assassinate Rushdie. According to the Ministers, the risk to his life was as great as it
had ever been. Therefore, the FCO had developed three new strands:
1. It demanded an undeniable statement from Iran that it would not attempt to
implement the fatwa.
2. An equally undeniable commitment to distance itself from the 15th Khordard
Foundation.
3. That Iran would enjoin Muslims around the world to obey the laws of the
countries in which they lived. 717
Whilst the new strategy was certainly an improvement compared with earlier half-hearted
government stances, the fact that it did not demand to withdraw the bounty resulted out of
the government’s conviction that the Iranians would not even consider such a request. For
the Defense Committee this contradicted the government’s earlier convictions that the
Foundation was totally removed from the Iranian government. Since the FCO knew that
it was not and had never been, it seemed that policymakers in Whitehall had mimicked
the convenient Iranian denials to avoid having to deal with the matter. What was clear
however for Rushdie’s defenders was that the FCO now openly endorsed the
campaignand even offered to help in raising Rushdie’s profile abroad by facilitating
visits. 718
Back in Germany, Fallahiyan’s visit would affect Rushdie even more when on 11
October, 1993, the Norwegian publisher of the Satanic Verses was shot three times at his
home in Oslo and left for dead.719 William Nygaard, who had only received police
protection in the immediate aftermath of the fatwa and continued to receive death threats
from Muslim organizations, recovered from his severe injuries and, according to the
717 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”; for the Prime Minister’s meeting with
Rushdie see also House of Commons, Hansard, 18 May, 1993, Column 122
718 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”;
719 The New York Times, 14 October, 1993
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Norwegian police, was the third victim related to the Rushdie affair 720 which created
outcries in Europe’s literary circles. 721
Due to slow Norwegian investigations, the alleged assassin, who was Pakistani, managed
to leave the country. The evidence, however, which was gradually revealed by
Norwegian authorities, strongly indicated that it was another contract hit man hired by
Iranian intelligence. 722 As with the previous attacks on persons related to the “Satanic
Verses”, Iran’s skillful mechanism of “cut outs”, again obscured attempts to pin concrete
blame on Tehran. A Syrian man questioned by the Norwegian police admitted he had
been approached by the Iranian Embassy and asked to spy on William Nygaard.723 What
emerged months after the shootings was that a few hours after the shooting the Pakistani
flew to Iran and after being denied entry at Tehran airport took a flight to Pakistan. 724
The police report also centered suspicion on an Iranian diplomat from the embassy in
Oslo who met with the Intelligence Minister in Bonn and never returned back to his post
in Norway. 725 What German Intelligence asserted was the fact that the Iranian embassy
in Bonn and certainly Fallahiyan himself, gave the green light for targeted assassinations
across Europe. Moreover, after the attack, Director at the Iranian Foreign Ministry in
Tehran, Ibrahim Rahimpour stated that because the Satanic Verses constituted “mind
terrorism” attacks such as that against Nygaard were justified. He further commented that
no one connected with Rushdie was safe, and Nygaard was only one of several potential
targets and that he prayed that Rushdie be killed. 726
720 The Times, 13 October, 1993
721 For the “Nygaard Correspondence” see Letters to the Editors in The Times, 15 November, 1993, 17
December 1993 and 7 January, 1994
722 As one NATO official put it: “ Unlike the Israeli Mossad, which uses mainly its own men to carry out
such killings, the Iranians can rely on freelances motivated by Islamic fervour on some occasions, see The
Times, 13 October, 1993
723 BBC Documentary “The Terror Network” shown on 19 May 1997, transcripts available on
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/panorama/transcripts/transcript_19_05_97.
txt, website accessed 5 February 2005
724 see Documentary on Nygaard’s attempted assassination broadcasted on Norwegian TV2 on 15 and 16
December 1997, handed to the author by Rainer Gatterman, Scandinavian correspondent in Stockholm for
“Die Welt”
725 ibid
726 For the interview with Ibrahim Rahimpour see ibid
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Though the Norwegian authorities never managed to present hard proof for Iranian
involvement in Nygaard’s shooting, the Iranians certainly did little to discourage the
fatwa from being implemented. Whilst German policy towards Iran continued to reflect
its own agenda rather than being guided by the principles of the Critical Dialogue,
Rushdie himself acknowledged that Germany, due to its close relations with Iran,
possessed greatest potential to influence Tehran. He further emphasized, however, that a
strategy of cooperation with Iran can only be effective if Tehran’s interests would be
affected. 727
Rushdie was right. The year 1993 proved to be difficult for Iran in economic terms.
Whilst the Human Rights Commission resolutions sponsored by EU member states
continued to put political pressure on Iran and particularly expressed concerns about the
fatwa and more general human rights violations within the country 728, economic
stagnation in the country constituted a more serious crisis for the leadership. Whilst
mismanagement of the economy was part of the economic decline, the sharp fall of crude
oil prices from $US 20.45 in 1990 to $ US 14.95 in 1993 729 deprived Iran of vital oil
rents. As a result, German exports to Iran, which were booming in 1992 with $5,102
billion fell by 48 % to $2,455 billion in 1993.730 Furthermore, in 1993 Germany only
imported 2484 thousand metric tons of crude oil from Iran, compared with France which
imported 11 818 thousand metric tons and Italy which imported 10 107 thousand metric
tons in 1993.731 In fact in 1994, crude imports from Iran to Germany fell by 20 % to 1993
thousand metric tons. 732 Since most of Germany’s crude imports came from Norway and
Russia, there was very little dependence on Iranian oil. As Rushdie had rightly remarked,
Germany was the most crucial player in the EU and in 1993/1994 it was in a key position
727 TAZ, 11 December, 1993
728 see Commission on Human Rights, Forty-Ninth Session, Agenda Item 12, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/L.35,
4 March, 1993, paragraph 5 ; Britain co-sponsored the resolution against Iran see Hansard, House of
Commons, 20 July, 1993, Column 91
729 The fall in crude oil prices mainly resulted from the fact that in the final quarter of 1993, supply ran
ahead of demand. see BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June, 1994
730 IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1995, p. 212
731 In the same year Britain only imported 2168 thousand metric tons of crude oil from Iran, the lowest of
all EU countries. see United Nations 1993 Energy Statistic Yearbook, (New York, United Nations, 1995),
p. 182
732 United Nations 1995 Energy Statistics (New York, United Nations, 1997), p. 176
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to turn Iran’s economic depression into political capital. German exports to Iran had over
the years been secured by state sponsored sureties and by the end of 1993 amounted to as
much as 10,8 billion Deutsche Mark 733 and thus bore financial risks both for Iran as well
as German exporters. Whereas German exporters, however, were covered by government
sureties, Iran, on the other side, was crucially dependent on imports from Germany. So
called “Hermes Sureties” 734 only constituted as much as 1.4 – 2 billion Deutsche Mark in
1993 and ranked Iran as a high risk country for German exporters. 735 By 1993,
outstanding Hermes accounts increased to 4.2 billion Deutsche Mark and by 1995
payment deficits from German exporters of approximately 15 billion Deutsche Mark
made Iran the Germany’s fourth largest debtor country. 736 Realizing Iran’s economic
decline, the Clinton administration attempted to persuade EU member states during a
Troika meeting in June 1993 to adopt more restrictive policies toward Iran. The US did
not campaign for a multilateral severance of economic relations with Iran, but it did press
for restrictions on arms exports to Iran and a moratorium on the extension or rescheduling
of new export credits to Iran. 737 Britain too recognized opportunities of a new direction
in Europe’s Iran policy. 738 What could have been a chance for conditional debt
rescheduling or potential positive sanctions with regards to human rights improvements,
was missed when the German government agreed in 1994 on rescheduling 1 $US billion
Deutsche Mark of non-“Hermes secured” export credits. 739
Whilst Iranian vulnerabilities towards Germany were quite high, so were German long-
term vulnerabilities towards that country. Iran had accumulated such debts that the
German government decided that to conclude reschedule debt servicing arrangements
with the Iranians ultimately were in the interest of Germany as “it would enable Iran to
733 Die Zeit, 7 August, 1993
734 Hermes Sureties [Hermes Bürgschaften] serve as export guarantees by the German government in order
to protect German exporting firms from potential payment deficits by the country of destination.
735 Die Welt, 7 August,1993, FAZ, 15 April, 1993
736 Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Grosse Anfrage zur Iran-Politik, BT-Drucksache 13/3483, 16
January, 1996 , p.2
737 Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions – Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, p.53
738 House of Commons, Hansard, 16 June 1993, Column 40
739 FAZ, 28 February, 1994; FAZ, 27 December, 1994
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meet its obligations to the Federal Government.” 740 The deal coincided with Deputy
Foreign Minister Vaezi’s visit to Bonn for consultations regarding the German prisoner
and promised “to push for an amnesty for Helmut Szimkus”. 741 Eventually, by June,
1994, Foreign Minister Velayatti announced that his government had granted the German
prisoner amnesty: 742 ironially genuinely turned out to have been a spy for the Americans
since 1980.743 In this regard, it is worth noting that during a meeting with Foreign
Minister Kinkel and Rushdie, Kinkel told the author that he “cannot change the foreign
policy of Germany for the sake of one man.” For Rushdie these remarks proved “frankly
inaccurate since the issue” he claimed “has not to do with me in any way. I just happen
to be the location of the issue. The issue has to do with threats against many other people,
with European businesses […] publishers, book sellers and it has to do with high matters
of principle which, of course, politicians try not to talk about. “ 744
5. Factional Politics: Explaining Human Rights Violations and Iranian Diplomacy
Rafsanjani drew his support from the middle class, including government employees,
technocrats and professionals as well as from Iran’s business community. When he was
elected President his agenda mainly reflected the interests and needs of this constituency.
Contrary to the radical leftist idea of governance, Rafsanjani inaugurated a “period of
pakazi (literally clean-up) within the administration, intended to remove some of the
diehard dogmatists from sensitive posts in the government”. Essentially, Ansari argues “
Rafsanjani was seeking to demobilize politics and society following the war, and to
rationalize them in the service of economic reform.” 745 It became evident that Rafsanjani
740 Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Grosse Anfrage zur Iran-Politik, BT-Drucksache 13/3483, 16
January, 1996, p. 3
741 IRNA, 25 February, 1994, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25 February, 1994
742 When Secretary of State Schmidbauer travelled to Tehran in July 1994 to accompany Szimkus home,
the Iranian government stole him the show by putting him on a Lufthansa place hours before the German
delegation arrived. see FAZ, 3 August, 1994.
743 see FAZ, 3 August, 1994
744 BBC Documentary “Panorama – The Terror Network” shown on 19 May 1997, transcripts available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/audio_video/programmes/panorama/transcripts/transcript_19_05_97.
txt; website accessed 5 February 2005
745 Ali M Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy- The Politics of Managing Change, p.58
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did not, however, intend to implement political reforms, thus avoiding any serious
ideological and systemic threats to the state. In fact, Rafsanjani sided with Khameini on
political terms and until 1994, when Khameini lend his entire support to the conservative
right, both figures continued to endorse each others’ positions. Khameini allowed
Rafsajani’s economic reform initiatives whilst Rafsanjani maintained religious rhetoric
particularly with regards to fundamental political and social issues. The executive’s need
to keep a balance between economic reform and religious rhetoric particularly applied to
the Rushdie issue as well as human rights in general. On relations with Britain,
Rafsanjani continued to emphasize for most time of his first term the need for Britain “to
abandon its intolerance and cease insulting Islam”. Once “a proper judgment [against
Rushdie] has been made by the British government, relations could be established again.”
746 Such rhetoric, which essentially catered to domestic constituents, particularly the
Majlis, dominated by the radical left, were meant to attain support for economic policies
aimed largely at attracting foreign investment and securing new export destinations for
non-oil exports. Economic policy was thus directly linked to improved relations with the
outside world, particularly with the West. 747 Yet Iran’s inflexibility on the Rushdie affair
obstructed these relations. This fundamental contradiction continued to dictate Iranian
diplomacy for much of the 1990s. Foreign as well as domestic policy thus had to cater to
both a “moderate and radical wing”. 748 Likewise, domestically, reforms did not translate
into political liberalization. Far from it, radicals and ultra-conservative figures replaced
key cabinet ministers appointed by Rafsanjani in 1992. Most notably, Ali Fallahian who,
having established a department within the Intelligence Ministry dealing with
“dissatisfaction and cultural and economic conspiracies” created an efficient security
apparatus able to violently crack down on emerging dissidents in Iran as well as in the
Diaspora. 749 Together with Mohtashemi who chaired the influential Majlis Defense
746 Rafsanjani when talking to domestic media reiterated this position on numerous occasions. Statement
quoted from presidential press conference on 11 June 1990, Iran Focus Vol.3, No.7, (July-August) 1990),
p.6
747 As stated by Mohsen Noorbakash, Economic and Finance Minister in Iran Focus Vol. 4, No.9, (October,
1991), pp.12-13
748 Mehdi Mozaffari, Revolutionary, “Thermodrian and Enigmatic Foreign Policy: President Khatami and
the “Fear of the Wave”’, International Relations, p.15
749 see Fallahian’s own statement on intelligence capabilities, Iran Focus, Vol.5, No.9, October, 1992
(Mehr-Aban 1361), pp.8-9
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Committee until 1992 and was instrumental in the reorganization of the Basij, 750 the
radicals effectively managed to suppress the gradual emerging popular discontent from
gaining any significant political momentum.
For the most part, violent riots and large-scale demonstrations in the 1990s exposed
underlying economic tensions 751 resulting from Rafsanjani’s post-war policies.
Essentially it was the average Iranian worker who had to bear the burden of the
government’s reconstruction policy and the high rate of inflation. By and large, major
economic policy strategies were not supported by extensive political and legal reforms,
which would have helped the country to replace oil as its sole income-generating basis as
well as build the social consensus necessary to mobilize the work force for any such
fundamental structural transformation. 752 Moreover, lacking domestic resources to
finance the ambitious growth and reconstruction plans, Rafsanjani did not hesitate to
challenge two of the economic linchpins of the Revolution by seeking international loans
and direct foreign investments. Declining oil prices in the 1990s, an increasing trade
deficit coupled with the inherent increase of foreign debt eventually stifled equitable
social and economic development. Essentially, Rafsanjani’s policies catered to his
mercantile bourgeoisie constituents and emphasized growth and trade over employment,
and export-orientated, government-owned industry over a privately owned grass roots
national industrial base. 753 The bazaaris, as an established trading and export orientated
mercantile community, benefited immensely from the newly established economic
climate and managed to increased their wealth and dominance in political-economic
affairs to that extent that by the mid-1990s “commentators were arguing that a new
“thousand families” were emerging”. 754 Many revolutionaries on the left as well as
increasingly conservative voices feared that the socio-economic imbalances of the
Phalavi regime had returned. As Mohatashami remarked: “The bazaaris’ interests would
foster an unhealthy dependence on the West and an economy where the bazaaris got rich
750 Iran Focus, Vol. 4, No. 8, (September, 1991), p.8
751 Iran Focus, Vol.5, No.7, July-August, 1992 ( Tir-Sharivar 1371), pp.6-7
752 Kaveh Eshani, “Tilt but Don’t Spill: Iran’s Development and Reconstruction Dilemma”, Middle East
Report, No.191, (Nov-Dec, 1994), p. 18
753 ibid, p.20
754 Ali M Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy- The Politics of Managing Change, p.59
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through land speculation, hoarding, and manipulation of the exchange rate.” 755 Far from
meeting the needs of the “oppressed” the revolution seemed being redefined in the
interests of this mercantile elite who secured a considerable client-patron relationship
with Rafsanjani. It is for this reason that Rafsanjani’s previously alliance with Khameini
and the conservative camp abruptly ended in 1992. With the aid of the conservative
dominated Guardian Council the conservative factions had managed to disqualify a
number of influential radicals in the 1992 parliamentary election, eliminating opponents
to Rafsanjani and thus securing themselves a more than two-thirds majority in the Majlis.
756 However, contrary to Rafsanjani’s expectations, the new Majlis proved no more
willing to rally behind the President than was the previous one. Whilst the conservatives
favored the traditional mercantile capitalism of the bazaar, they also wanted to avoid an
increasingly modern bourgeoisie based form capitalism as much of their personal fortune
as well as political power was linked to state owned-cooperatives (bonyads). The
conservatives’ vested interests in maintaining these statist elements in Iran’s political
economy proved fundamental for the upper reaches of the regime (including Khameini
himself). Whilst generally permitting Rafsanjani’s laissez-faire based economy, these
state-run conglomerates provided the very linchpin of this group’s patronage channels
and political power. Even though Rafsanjani won a second term in the 1993 presidential
elections, these “conservative detractors” enjoyed the backing of Khameini and
represented a formidable opposition to many of Rafsanjani’s policies. Whilst
conservatives were concerned about their stake in the economy, they also feared that
expanded relations with the West would inevitably increase the influence of Westernized
technocrats and experts within the state bureaucracy and public life. The crackdown
against dissidents from 1992 onwards largely reflected the conservatives’ concerted
efforts to curb this influence. As shown, this manifested itself in the crackdown of
journalists, academics and intellectuals and was designed to make sure that the agenda of
the most crucial government ministries were closer to theirs than to Rafsanjani’s. 757 It is
755 Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, p.165
756 The radicals saw their share of seats diminish to less that 15 % (40 deputies out of a total of 270 seats).
Ali Banuazizi, “Iran’s Revolutionary Impasse: Political Factionalism and Societal Resistance”, Middle East
Report, No.191, (Nov-Dec, 1994), p. 4
757 Many of Rafsanjani’s cronies, such as his brother Mohammed Hashemi who had been in charge of
Radio and Television were replaced by the Majlis. Fallahian’s authority and jurisdiction was also
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evident that both domestic as well as foreign policy were again subject to factional divide
and as much Rafsanjani sought détente with the West he seemed restrained by the rules
of the Two-Level Game.
6. Conclusion
When Rushdie was brought to court in Britain on charges including offences against the
sacred, respective verdicts, which dismissed the cases against him, established that what
was at stake was freedom of speech. By the same token, however, these rulings also
further sharpened the controversy concerning the scope of blasphemy laws in England
and Wales. Faced with what they considered blatant hypocrisy on the part of the state, the
Muslim Community in Britain felt alienated and frustrated. As such it was argued, the
Thatcher government failed to appreciate the changed multicultural character of British
society and failed to positively engage with that community.
Whilst the British government had to take these rulings as the normative basis on which
foreign policy towards Iran would have to be conducted, political leverage on the part of
the Iranian government did influence Whitehall’s diplomatic maneuvering in 1990-1991.
The Conservative Government refused to link the fate of the hostages to altering its
position on Rushdie (i.e. to condemn the book) and continued to defend Rushdie’s right
to freedom of speech, yet adopted more benign rhetoric towards Iran. This was mainly
based on the FCO’s assessment that, with Rafsanjani’s emergence, engagement with the
Iranians could prove beneficial and would ultimately result in the release of the hostages
and the resolution of the fatwa. The most significant factor, which shaped British
diplomacy, was Iraq’s defeat in Desert Storm, which had left Iran in an unrivalled
strategic position in the Gulf. Britain felt that it could not afford not to maintain relations
with Tehran and decided to upgrade relations to the Chargé d’Affaires level. 758
expanded. Ali Banuazizi, “Iran’s Revolutionary Impasse: Political Factionalism and Societal Resistance”,
p.5
758 Policymakers in Whitehall felt the need to have a British presence in Iran in order to monitor, what
many feared as Iran’s hegemonic aspirations in the region.
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Responding to this in a Tit for Tat strategy, initiated by the UN Special Representative,
Rafsanjani played the intermediary and achieved the release of all British hostages.
However, faced with ongoing human rights violations, particularly referring to the right
to freedom of speech, Britain felt unable to trust the new government as a political ally.
Concerning the respect and protection of the right to freedom of expression in Iran, the
years 1990-1994 witnessed stepped up efforts by the state to actively curb the exercise of
this right. Violations of Article 19 of the ICCPR expressed themselves on two levels: a)
the state, (the government and judiciary) actively sponsored violent acts inside and
outside the country as well as measures outside the law which violated the integrity of
individuals and violated their right to exercise their rights freely. Faced with the
emergence of widespread protest and dissent, the state responded with the use of violence
through the security apparatus as well as heavily relied on the judiciary, which,
dominated by the conservative-right proved a resourceful ally in the crackdown of
dissidents. Whilst the legal statutes governing the press and freedom of speech hardly
afforded a legal framework, which fully granted the exercise of free speech, the ongoing
political use of courts against writers, intellectuals and dissidents further contributed to an
environment of self-censorship. b) Parliament did not pass legislation which would have
confirmed the right to freedom of expression, neither did the legislature attempt to offer
any progressive amendments to the existing laws governing freedom of speech. The state
also failed to prevent the violation of the right to freely exercise free speech by state and
non-state actors. On the contrary, by 1994 so-called parallel institutions, (most notably
the basij paramilitary) were reorganized by the government in order to actively intimidate
and threaten critics. Non-state actors, who carried out such acts of violence enjoyed
impunity from prosecution.
The years 1992 – 1994 witnessed a change in Britain’s diplomacy towards Iran, which in
the face of severe violations of human rights within and without Iran and the attacks on
persons related to Rushdie, had no choice other than to adopt an uncompromising stance
towards Tehran. Particularly the attacks against persons associated with Rushdie or the
publication of the “Satanic Verses” were unacceptable and intelligence available to
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Whitehall indicated that the Iranians and other groups were committed to carry out the
fatwa. However, because of Iranian economic decline and financial dependence on the
West, this period also presented a window of opportunity for Europe to engage in
genuine conditional diplomacy. Against, Whitehall’s new strategy, however, stood
Germany, which followed its own agenda and in many ways jeopardized its own created
policy of “Critical Dialogue”. By and large, Germany’s long-term vulnerability, i.e.
potential Iranian failure to meet its financial obligations towards its creditor as well as the
fate of the German spy in Iran, dictated German diplomacy towards Iran.
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Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable
A. NA NA NA
B. Asymmetries in British-Iranian
interdependence were sources of power for
both sides and affected British as well as
Iranian diplomacy. (1990-1991)
The British government needed diplomatic
representation in order to secure the release
of all British hostages as well as prisoners in
Tehran. Policymakers in Whitehall also
could not afford not to have relations with
Iran faced with Tehran’s new and unrivalled
strategic position in the aftermath of
“Operation Desert Storm”. At the same time,
the Iranian government needed meaningful
détente with the West, particular with
Britain in order to facilitate the necessary
development and reconstruction efforts.
Britain and Iran re-established bilateral
relations to the Chargé d'affaires level. UN
channels initiated a TFT strategy in which
Arab prisoners in Israeli prisons were
exchanged for the release of Western
hostages in Lebanon. The Iranian
government under Rafsanjani offered its
good offices and achieved the release of all
British hostages as well as prisoners in Iran.
Because of severe human rights violations in
and outside Iran as well as attacks against
persons associated with Rushdie, the British
felt unable to trust the new Iranian
government as political ally.
C. With the launch of the “Critical
Dialogue”, the fatwa and human rights in
general were on the EU’s diplomatic agenda
towards Iran. However, German-Iranian
interdependence significantly affected British
efforts to resolve the Rushdie affair.
Germany’s perceived sensitivity and long-
term vulnerabilities to changes in its
relations with Iran (i.e. import of crude oil,
trade and especially Iranian debts to the
German government) allowed Iran to ignore
any EU or British initiatives. On the
contrary, German-Iranian intelligence
cooperation assisted Iranian efforts in
cracking down against dissidents in the
Diaspora.
Britain’s resolute position to link any
economic / commercial / financial
cooperation with Iran to meaningful changes
on the Rushdie front was impeded by the
German government.
D. Level I negotiations were subject to
Iranian domestic constituents. Iranian
diplomacy reflected domestic politics. Level I
a) Level II (domestic) “win-sets” were not
supported by “internationalist forces”, in
order to win “isolationists’ ” support for
domestic policies: For most of the 1990s
The Iranian government was forced by its
own constituents to defect from British
demands on Level I negotiations. Since
foreign and domestic policy had to cater for
Constructive Engagement: Hypotheses and Variables
CHAPTER FIVE
Table 3
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negotiations were unsuccessful because of the
lack of domestic consent.
Rafsanjani faced a hostile 3rd Majlis (1989-
1992) and 4th Majlis (1992-1996). Whilst
Rafsanjani had to cater to the former in
ideological terms (economic, cultural policy
and uncompromising position on the fatwa),
the latter felt that their political-economic
clientalist network was being jeopardized by
the government’s bid for privatization.
Ultimately, the government conceded on /
refrained from implementing political
reforms and worked to uphold the political
status quo.
a moderate and radical wing, Iranian
diplomacy continued to be contradictory. On
the contrary, intelligence available to the
British government indicated that the
government was still committed to carry out
the fatwa.
b) NA NA
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CHAPTER SIX
THE JUPPE INITIATIVE AND BRITISH-IRANIAN STALEMATE: THE YEARS
1994-1996
1. Introduction
In February 1994, a French court established Iranian intelligence involvement in the
killing of former Prime Minister Dr Shapur Bakhtiar and his aide Soroush Katibeh. 759
This legal ruling coincided with a series of political initiatives in Europe, which further
contributed to the isolation of Iran. In a way, Iran was caught in a vicious circle.
Moderate elements inside and outside government sought for détente with western
powers, and indeed Rafsanjani’s technocrats and his coalition with the mercantile-
bourgeoisie needed foreign investment. At the same time, radicals in the political arena
were attempting to regain lost ground, resulting in increased repression, which in turn
attracted international condemnation.
By 1994, Britain, which had now fully embraced Rushdie’s Defence, initiated a series of
public condemnations, which ended with the French (Juppé) Initiative in 1995.
To mark the fifth anniversary of the fatwa, Mark Fisher, MP, tabled a House of
Commons Early Day Motion, which was supported by Neil Kinnock and fifty other
parliamentarians from all parties and called for the government to double its efforts to
persuade the Iranians to rescind its threat. Prime Minister John Major issued a statement
saying that “It is now five years since the late Ayatollah Khomeini, […] issued a death
threat against Salman Rushdie and others associated with the publication of his book,
“The Satanic Verses”. I met Salman Rushdie last May to demonstrate the government’s
759Judge Jean-Louis Brugiere’s verdict was based on evidence which indicated their provision of logistical
aid to the assassins. He further confirmed charges of murder, conspiracy and terrorism against Iranian Ali
Rad Vakili, who was arrested in Geneva and extradited to France. Le Monde, 8 February, 1994; Former
chief of Iranian Radio and Television, Massoud Hendi was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment for helping
the killers enter the country. Another suspect of the assassination, Iranian diplomat, Zeynal Abedin Sharhai,
who had been charged with assisting the assassins to leave to Switzerland, was released from prison and
immediately expelled from France. Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights
in the Islamic Republic of Iran prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission, Mr Reynaldo
Galindo Pohl, pursuant to the Commission resolution 1994/73 and Economic and Social Council Decision
1994/262, UN Doc. Nr. E/CN.4/1995/55, 16 January, 1995, paragraphs 27-28
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full support for his fundamental rights. […] We all want to make it clear to the Iranian
government that they cannot enjoy full and friendly relations with the rest of the
international community unless and until we are satisfied that there is no further direct or
indirect threat from the Iranian authorities [..] ” 760 More eloquently, the French Minister
of Culture wrote an open letter to Rushdie saying that “ Today there are many people
who will pay tribute to you who, through your books, have incurred the wrath of those
wishing to restrict knowledge. [..] I hope [your supporters] will take part in the fight
against the wall of loneliness and anguish which the terrorists have built around you.
Each of them will add their voice to the uproar which one day will deafen the
oppressors.” 761 The Norwegian Minister of Culture led a torchlight procession to mark
the anniversary and stated that “ we will continue our efforts in support of freedom of
speech.” Irish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dick Spring
declared that “the incitement to murder of Mr Rushdie is an unacceptable violation of the
most elementary principle of civilized conduct, above all by purporting to deny Mr
Rushdie the most basic of all human rights, the right to life.” 762
2. Human rights developments, Increased Pressure on Iran and the Diplomatic Row with
Britain
Following more communications sent to Iranian embassies by respective national
Rushdie Defence Committees, Mahmoud Mahammadi, the Foreign Ministry’s
spokesperson reiterated that the judgment against the apostate, Rushdie was in fact the
judgement of the entirety of the Muslim World. Referring to European Union statements
as “attempts to discredit Imam Khomeini’s historic fatwa” and as “vivid example of a
western and Zionist plot against Islam and Muslims”, Mohammadi pointed out that the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference in its 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st assembly as well as
in its sixth summit conference had endorsed Khomeni’s edict.763
760 Carmel Bedford, Fiction, Fact and the Fatwa – 2000 Days of Censorship, pp.146-147
761 ibid, pp.147-148
762 ibid
763 IRNA, 14 February, 1994
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Whilst such rhetorical emphasis on international support in the Muslim World was
politically expedient, it also reflected the ongoing political divide in the political arena.
By and large, Rushdie had become a hostage to factional politics. Though pragmatists in
government did appreciate that Iran’s economic, scientific and technological leaning
towards the West needed a non-ideological foreign policy as prerequisite,764 an
uncompromising stance on the fatwa served to maintain religious authenticity and was
meant to appease a hostile parliament.
In the mid-1990s, Iran was plagued by economic decline and political dissent, which both
sides of the political spectrum used to criticise the administration. A vital aspect of the
First Five Year Economic Plan had been to increase imports of goods and services, which
had indeed risen to $25 billion dollars in 1991/1992. However, the Iranian economy was
nevertheless increasingly declining. By 1993 external debt was estimated to be between
$18 - $28 billion dollars. 765 As Iran’s external current accounts deteriorated, so was the
rate of growth of the GDP, which had sunk to 2.5 % for 1993/1994. Consequently,
imports of important raw materials and machinery for industry began to fall by 1994,
consumer prices rose and desperately needed private investment failed to be attracted due
to legal, political and economic uncertainties. 766 Economic decline was used politically
by the conservative dominated parliament against Rafsanjani’s government. By 1994,
day-to-day politics increasingly reflected ideological tension in the form of conflict
between radicals, conservatives and pragmatists. As Menashri put it “the revolutionary
regime displayed a trend toward pragmatism interrupted by occasional bursts of
radicalism, a pattern which persisted despite changes of personalities, issues and
alignments. “ 767 With a majority in parliament, conservatives (mainly represented by the
Militant Clergy Society) 768 had first systematically stymied Rafsanjani’s economic
764 see Mahmoud Sarioghalam, The Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Theoretical Renewal
and a Paradigm for Coalition, (Tehran, Center for Strategic Research, 2000), pp.7-10
765 see Vahle Petrossion, ”Special Report: Iran”, in Middle East Economic Digest, Vol. 19 (February 1993),
pp.7-15
766 Massoud Karshenas and M. Hashem Pesaran, “Economic Reform and the reconstruction of the Iranian
Economy”, in Middle East Journal, Vol.49, N.1, (Winter 1995), pp.90-91,
767 David Menashri, “Iran” in Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. XVIII: 1994, p. 298 (thereafter
MECS)
768 see Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Iran,- 4th Quarter 1994, EIU, 1994, p.5
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liberalisation policies and now moved on to claim that his economic reform agenda
would only serve the rich and charged him with being politically tepid and gutless. 769
Hojjatoeslam Mohtashami in particular criticised the President on the grounds that rapid
inflation meant that the lower strata achieved only insignificant salary raises, while the
rich accumulate more and more wealth.770 Rafsanjani had lost credibility amongst his
own mercantile-bourgeoisie allies as well as in Iranian society. Consequently, economic
crisis encouraged dissent, which, was partly directed at the government’s
mismanagement of the economy, but mainly mirrored the disillusionment with the
Islamic Revolution. Dissidents, including writer Ali Akbar Saidi-Sirjani, were arrested
and then forced to make public confessions on TV and eventually died whilst in prison.
771 Following Saidi-Sirjani’s arrest 772 and in the view of the overall level of censorship, a
group of over one hundred writers, artists and journalists sent an open letter to the
authorities, calling for freedom of expression and an end to censorship. The group
protested “against the frustrating obstacles, and humiliating attitudes that have to be faced
by those who do not respect the government’s dictates [..]” and announced the
establishment of an association of writers and artists “to oppose, collectively […] the
obstacles to reading, free circulation of thought and the freedom of expression.” 773
Retired General Azizollah Ami-Rahimi also added his voice to the growing criticism,
calling on Rafsanjani in an open letter to make the constitution more democratic. He
singled out the practice of vetting electoral candidates (which helped to create a
conservative majority in the 1992 elections) as a key example of the lack of democracy
and called for free elections. 774 As a response to increased dissent amongst society, the
conservative dominated parliament passed a law which prohibited the importation and
use of satellite dishes and charged the basiji with the task of dismantling existing
769 The New York Times, August, 1994
770 MECS, Vol. XVII: 1994, p. 304
771 ibid
772 Saidi-Sirjani’s contention that Iran possessed a pre-Islamic tradition of respect for individual rights and
opposition to tyranny led the government to ban his books in 1991 and eventually to his arrest in March,
1994. see Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia and the Soul of a Nation (New York, Penguin Books,
1996), p. 373
773 Commission on Human Rights, , UN Doc. Nr. E/CN.4/1995/55, pp.9-10
774 Following his statement Amir-Rahimi was detained briefly when he failed to respond to a summons
issued by the armed forces prosecutor, see Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Iran,- 4th Quarter
1994, p. 9
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antennas. More significantly, however, it enacted a law, which allowed the basiji to use
firearms on demonstrators “to restore law and order during illegal armed rallies, at time
of unrest and during illegal armed disorders and revolts.” By exempting them from
criminal prosecution,775 the basiji grew further as a powerful parallel institution in Iran
and proved to be an effective violent tool of the conservatives in restraining freedom of
speech and assembly. By far the most significant of those dissidents was Grand Ayatollah
Montazeri, who had been dismissed in March, 1989 and eventually put under house arrest
for criticizing Khomeini’s wave of executions in the 1980s. Montazeri’s disciples
continuously voiced resentment of the elite’s policies and staged occasional
demonstrations in Qom. 776 In October 1994, Montazeri himself published a statement in
which, whilst expressing support for the revolution, condemned the monopolization of it
by “a certain group.” He charged that the authorities had deviated from the correct
revolutionary path, and criticised the injustice toward, and lack of security for, the
people. What went largely unnoticed by the West, as it carried more theological
significance rather than immediate political authority, was Montazeri’s refusal to endorse
the decree against Rushdie until he had personally read “The Satanic Verses.” 777
Montazeri’s religious authority, who unlike Khameni was fit to attain the marja’iyya,
constituted a serious challenge both to Rafsanjani and the religious establishment and
provided considerable legitimacy to the intensification of public protest.
Following these developments in Iran, the European Parliament passed a resolution
condemning the Iranian government “for the use of force against individuals exercising
their right to free expression.” 778 Though such resolutions served to raise and condemn
human rights violations in Iran, Europe’s legislature’s main role during the critical
dialogue was to remind the member states to stay committed to conditional diplomacy.
This was particularly true for Germany (as previously stated) as well as Spain and
Austria. Spain entered into cooperation agreements with Iran and the Austrian State Bank
agreed to reschedule debt following an official visit by Deputy Foreign Minister Vaezi to
775 ibid, p. 6, p.10, see also The Guardian, 24 November, 1994
776 see MECS, Vol. XVI, 1993, p.343
777 MECS, Vol. XVII: 1994, pp. 296-297
778 Bulletin of the European Union, 10-1994, 1.3.106 Parliament resolution on human rights violations in
Iran
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Madrid and Vienna in March 1994. 779 Britain, however, continued to link moderate
economic pressure with Whitehall’s rhetoric on the fatwa. In December 1992, a
moratorium on export licenses to Iran was imposed, which effectively applied more
stringent conditions on the approval of any licenses for any equipment “where there was
knowledge or reason to suspect that it would go to a military end-user or be used for
military purposes.” The new guidelines also included the ban of “any exports for goods
and technology on the military or atomic list.” 780 Considering Iran’s aging military
equipment at that time (e.g. British made Chieftain Tanks and the need for advanced
radar equipment), the Iranian Foreign Ministry was aware that improvements on the
Rushdie front could possibly soften British strict export guidelines. Concerning Iranian
dependence especially on British military equipment as well as high-tech goods, the
moratorium had considerable effect on technocrats in the Iranian government, who were
seeking rapprochement with the UK and attempting to lobby conservative elements. 781
Nonetheless, Iranian intelligence continued to work against any détente orientated foreign
policy initiative. In 1994, the US administration linked the bombing of a Jewish Culture
Centre in Buenos Aires, which killed eight-five people to Hezbollah, which according to
the CIA, was working on behalf of Iran. By 1993, according to the US State Department,
Iran had become “the world’s most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism.” 782 While the
Israeli lobby in Washington certainly contributed to the increasingly uncompromising
stance of the Clinton administration towards Iran, Europe continued to follow a more
nuanced approach maintaining dialogue whilst condemning human rights violations.
Britain strongly criticized Tehran for what it referred to as “the assassination of dissidents
in exile” and co-sponsored another UN resolution in December 1994, condemning human
779 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”, Interview with Dr Mahound Vaezi, , Former
Deputy Foreign Minister
780 The moratorium effectively extended existing ELA guidelines see House of Commons, Hansard, 28
January, 1994, Column 446 – Column 467; House of Commons, Hansard, 18 January, 1994, Column 509
781 Interview with Former Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki, (Tehran, 6 September, 2004); IRNA 2
May, 1995
782 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, p.267; see also The Times, August 12, 1994, The New York
Times, 26 July, 1994; In 2006 an Argentinean court accused the Iranian authorities of directing Hezbollah
to carry out the attack and called for the arrest of Rafsanjani. accessed on
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6085768.stm , 15 February, 2007
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rights violations as well as the fatwa. 783 This allowed Britain to put considerable political
pressure on Iran, whilst at the same time abstaining from rhetoric, which would have
further fuelled estranged British-Iranian relations.
In May 1994, however, bilateral relations reached an all time low, when the British
government accused Iran of having contacts with the IRA. 784 According to British
intelligence, the IRA had attempted to procure a large shipment of weapons from Iran to
support more sophisticated terrorist campaigns against British interests. High on the
IRA’s list of priorities were high-tech surface-to-air missiles such as SAM-7s and Stinger
Missiles. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence allegedly offered to meet the IRA’s
“shopping list” in exchange for the assassination of three Iranian dissidents. The three
persons to be assassinated were former Iranian President Abdolhasan Bani-Sadr, Javad, a
spokesperson for the MKO and Farzaneh Taidi, a prominent Iranian actress. The list
prepared by the IRA included micro-communications and eavesdropping equipment,
semtex explosives, eight Stinger surface-to-air missiles, 400 pistols and 80,000 rounds of
ammunition, 100 Uzi submachine guns and 50,000 rounds of ammunition, $6 US million
in counterfeit dollar bills and $55 million in authentic bills. 785 Although the IRA turned
down the deal, the fact that Iranian intelligence sought contacts with that group proved
unacceptable to Britain. What was regarded as a legitimate political struggle for
independence by Iran was a terrorist group for the British government, which directly
targeted British interests. Britain’s response was to summon the Iranian Chargé
d’Affaires and Douglas Hogg stated that they continue, “to watch Iran’s actions very
closely to satisfy ourselves that there are no further exchanges.” 786 The Iranian first
secretary was then expelled not because of IRA contacts, but on rather curious charges of
forging a document purporting to be from Douglas Hurd, and attributed to the Iranians,
which suggested British sympathy for the Serbs in the Bosnian conflict.787 Iran eventually
retaliated and expelled 1st Secretary Hamish Cowell. Rafsanjani himself refuted these
783 House of Commons, Hansard, 19 January, 1995, Column 526
784 House of Commons, Hansard, 14 June, 1994, Column 397 – Column 399
785 House of Commons, Hansard, 14 June, 1994, Column 397 – Column 399; The Daily Telegraph, 30
April, 1994, Sunday Telegraph, 1 May, 1994, The Independent, 3 May, 1994
786 House of Commons, Hansard, 14 June, 1994, Column 397 – Column 399
787 Iran Focus, Vol.7, No.6, (June, 1994, Khordad-Tir 1373), p. 14
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allegations during a Friday sermon and argued that the real reasons the IRA allegations
had been made was to pre-empt Iranian anger about British surveillance. The President
claimed that that a 500 g listening device had been found embedded in the wall of the
newly refurbished Iranian Embassy in London. 788 Overall, this diplomatic row
exemplified the volatile nature of British-Iranian relations at that time. Despite pressure
from hardliner groups in Iran to severe relations with Britain, Rafsanjani stated that the
government:
[..] would not particularly benefit from a policy of severing relations […] I think the
existing weak relations must exist for ordinary dialogues. We have many students in
Britain. If we were to bring them all back it would cause damage. If they want to stay
someone has to look after their affairs. There are many Iranians there. There are,
naturally, ordinary economic relations and such like. We have to see our interests in its
totality. Yes of course we to have to reciprocate their actions in kind. 789
A more serious blow in Iran’s bilateral relations came in the form of Norway’s
uncompromising stance towards the fatwa. Even before the attempted murder on Nygaard
in Oslo, Norway and the rest of Scandinavia proved to be an outpost in defending
Rushdie’s freedom of speech. Norway’s Minister of Culture Ase Klevalnd was the first
government representative to meet Rushdie in August 1992.790 In 1994, following
increased pressure by Oslo (initiated by Rushdie’s visit to Norway), Iran’s Ambassador
to Norway, Abdolrahim Gavahi wrote a letter to the Foreign Ministry which stated ”As
regards the fatwa [...] I would like [...] to clearly state that the government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran would certainly honour and respect its mutual commitment to the
international laws and regulations, codes and ethic of diplomatic behaviour, and non-
interference in the host countries.” Fatally, the Norwegians interpreted this statement as a
” reversal of the fatwa in Norway.” 791 Foreign Minister Velayatti responded by
summoning Iran’s ambassador and by declaring any of his statements null and void and
788 ibid
789 Iran Focus, Vol.7, No.7, July – August, 1994, (Tir-Sharivar 1373), p.6
790 Niels Fried-Nielsen, Freedom of Expression: The acid test, pp.12-16
791 ibid, p.16
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reaffirmed the fatwa. 792 Norway, a country that was not a member state of the EU and,
therefore, could have pursued an uncritical dialogue, in fact broke relations following
Velayatti’s statement. That Norway really meant business was evident when the
government in Oslo stated that ”it would refrain from any publicly financed promotion of
trade with Iran and we will raise the the issue of Iran’s human rights records in
multilateral institutions like the World Bank.[...] Furthermore, Norway will continue to
work actively against the fatwa [...] at the Commission on Human Rights.” In fact,
Norway never resumed full diplomatic relations with Iran until after September 1998,
after Britain eventually resolved the fatwa with Iran. 793
3. Background to the Juppé Initiative and Developments on the Community Level
After a year of continuous pressure on Iran, which was mainly carried out via the
European Human Rights Commission, the Rushdie Defence Committee, including the
author himself, decided to put all previous negotiations with the EU together in a
package, and get the EU to submit a communication to Iran asking the government to
agree to three simple requests:
1. Not to promote or encourage anyone to carry out the fatwa and to condemn
terrorism
2. To abide by international law
3. To remove the bounty 794
The Committee believed that this would provide the Europeans with clear benchmarks. If
the Iranians refused then there would have to be consequences for the implied statement
of intent to carry out a terrorist attack. If they agreed to sign such a declaration then this
would have marked the first step towards normalisation of relations between Iran and
Europe and Britain in particularly. What became known as the Juppé Initiative (After
French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé who was approached by the Defence Committee
792 IRNA, 5 July, 1995
793 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
794 ibid
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early in 1995) coincided with the 5th anniversary of the ruling as well as with increased
EU pressure concerning human rights violations in Iran.
Before turning to the details of the Juppé Initiative it should be noted that the French
presidency of the EU also coincided with two crucial developments affecting the Union’s
external relations, particularly, towards the Middle East. One was the evolution of the so-
called “Barcelona Process” or what Hinnebusch refers to as a benign EU approach to
align the Middle Eastern states to international economic norms.795 In February 1995, a
Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, called for the establishment of a “Euro-Mediterranean partnership,
comprising a zone of peace and stability, embracing the Union, Central and Eastern
Europe and the southern and eastern Mediterranean.“ Whilst Iran was not one of the
countries which were given the prospect of entering a free trade area and of concluding
cooperation agreements with Europe (the first were Israel, Morocco, Tunisia and
Turkey)796, for the first time EU diplomacy took on concrete dimensions towards the
Middle East. The prospect of free trade with the Union, socio-economic development
programmes and increased political dialogue was linked to the respect for human rights.
797 Essentially, for the first time towards the Middle East, the EU attempted to make use
of its soft power (or “transformative power”) as well as hard power resources. As the
communication put it: “ Particular emphasis should be placed on those countries prepared
both to undertake far-reaching modernization of their economic and social systems and
are willing to cooperate with the Community in the management of the interdependence
that tie both sides of the Mediterranean.” 798 The human rights clause was referred to in
another communication from the Commission, which directed the “inclusion of respect
795 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Globalization and Generational Change: Syrian Foreign Policy between
Regional Conflict and European Partnership” in The Review of International Affairs, Vol.3, No.2, (Winter,
2003), pp. 190-191
796 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (COM (94) 427
final) in Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 2/95, pp.16-17
797 ibid
798 ibid
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for democratic principle and human rights in agreements between the Community and
third countries.” 799
It is against this background that one has to understand the Juppé Initiative and the
increased pressure on Iran. Following a wave of new repression against dissidents, the
European Parliament passed a resolution in May 1995, which strongly condemned the
government for the continuing massive human rights violations, including executions
without trial, torture, persecution and assassination of opponents of the government
abroad, and the repression of women and ethnic minorities. It called, moreover, for the
release of all political prisoners, guarantees of a fair trial, and urged the government to do
everything in its power to ensure real freedom of information and the press. 800 Again,
repression in Iran reflected the ongoing power struggle between the political factions.
Whilst political life in Iran showed “signs of resilience and even vitality”, political
openness in the country was not to be confused with political freedom. 801 As Human
Rights Watch observed, the “apparent intensity of public debate, variety of publications
and the wealth of artistic achievements” created only an illusion of unrestricted
discourse.” Freedom of expression was allowed as long as the inviolability of the Islamic
tenets, the irreversibility of the revolution, and the absolute sovereignty of the faqih were
not be questioned. “ 802 The Special Representative for Iran reported that in 1995 the
closing down of publications continued and publishers, such as of two periodicals
Gardoon in Tehran and Tous in Mashad, had been sentenced on charges of “publication
of lies, contempt and propagation of wicked deeds.” 803 Concerning the role of such Press
Tribunals, Vice-Minister Ashari of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and Culture, stated
799 The respect for human rights was made an “essential element” of agreements with third countries and
thus making human rights violations a “material breach” of any such agreements. Communication from the
Commission, “On the inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements
between the Community and third countries” in Bulletin of the European Union – Supplement 3/95, pp.12-
13
800 Bulletin of the European Union 4-1995, paragraph 1.2.9 Parliament resolution on human rights
violations in Iran
801 MECS, Vol. XIX:1995, p. 291
802 ibid; Human Rights Watch, Guardians of Thought: Limits of Freedom of Expression in Iran (New York,
1993), p.1
803 Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-second session, Report on the situation of human rights in the
Islamic Republic of Iran, prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr
Maurice Copithorne (Canada), pursuant to Commission resolution 1995/68 of March 1995, UN Doc. Nr/
E/CN.4/1996/59, 21 March, 1996, paragraph 77
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that “there is great freedom of the press […], but if a person feels insulted he can bring
the publisher/editor before a jury in the Press Tribunal. This jury” he added “ is the
personification of the culture of the society.” 804 The Special Representative considered
punishing the press in such circumstances to require a balancing of the interests of the
complainants on the one hand and the interest of the community in upholding the right to
publish criticism on the other. However, he saw no role for either imprisonment or
corporal punishment in such circumstances. 805 Followers of Mehdi Bazargan’s liberal
Freedom Movement continued to be subject to harassment and their publications and
gatherings remained banned. 806 What was striking also was that freedom of expression
even for devout revolutionaries was often restricted. In one instance, Mohtashami was
invited to address a conference at Tehran’s Teachers Training College in August but was
prevented from entering, thus restricting him giving a brief sermon outside the gates. 807
Similarly, Ayatollah Sadeq Rohani, an advocate of the separation of religion and the
state, was subject to harassment and claimed that armed men had attacked him in his
home and threatened to kill him unless he pledged allegiance to Khameini. He stated that
he could not “ remain a spectator while Islam is violated daily and the true religious
leader are silenced in a country claiming to be an Islamic Republic. “ 808 Faced with
Iran’s failure to uphold international human rights, the European Parliament concluded its
resolution that “all Member States should make relations conditional on respect for
human rights […] the disbanding of intelligence service Special Forces deployed against
members of the opposition, and a clear condemnation of terrorism and of the fatwa
against Salman Rushdie.” 809
It is evident that under Rafsanjani neither respect nor active protection of the right to
freedom of expression had been implemented either through pro-active government
policy or legislation. In fact Rafsanjani’s position on the press was one which stressed
press freedom as long as it served the national interest. Taking the British media as an
804 ibid
805 ibid, paragraphs 78 - 85
806 MECS, Vol. XIX: 1995, p. 291
807 ibid
808 ibid, p. 295
809 Bulletin of the European Union 4-1995, paragraph 1.2.9,
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example, which allegedly uncovered Iran’s contacts with the IRA, he argued that “it was
essential for the [British] press to work in harmony with the government for the benefit of
the whole country.” Urging the press at the country’s first Press Festival not to join in the
chorus of criticism initiated by the foreign media he added:
What is presented in the press does not have the necessary depth, is not comprehensive
and is not farsighted. Sometimes the articles are self-contradictory. It seems that if the
press is able to look ahead and consider the affairs in depth […] Society will grow and
benefit if our print media get away from narrow-minded likes and dislikes, financial
problems and trade preoccupations and at the same time consider national interests. 810
4. The Juppé Initiative, German Track-Two Initiatives and the Failure of Linkage
Diplomacy
The European Parliament eventually called on the Council of Ministers to agree the
proposal put forward by Juppé to enter into a formal dialogue with Iran, requesting their
agreement to the three statements, which had been formulated by the Rushdie Defence
Committee and conveyed to the French Foreign Minister. On 10 April, the Juppé
Initiative was agreed by the EU Foreign Ministers meeting in Luxembourg and on 19
April, 1994 the Troika country ambassadors in Tehran presented the EU démarche to
Deputy Foreign Minister Mohamand Javad Zarif, which read:
1. The Iranian Government undertake that it will take no action anywhere with a
view to the assassination of Mr Rushdie, nor will it incite, encourage or assist
others to do so.
2. The Iranian Government confirms that its relations with other countries are based
on international law, including non-interference in the affairs of other countries
and respect for international law and regulations.
3. The Iranian Government condemns terrorism in all its forms.
810 Iran Focus, Vol.7, No. 6, June, 1994, (Khordad-Tir 1373), p.12
241
D’Souza was told that the bounty question had not been agreed amongst member states
and would have to be taken up verbally with the Iranians. There was also no mention of
the monitoring period, the Rushdie Committee had argued for. 811 What the EU General
Affairs Council did, previous to the démarche, was to again publicly condemn the fatwa
and to regard it as null and void as it stood in clear defiance of universally accepted
human rights. 812
The Iranian government initially regarded the initiative as “an effective ceasefire in
treating the fatwa […] as a political dispute with Iran”, but still perceived the British
government as a block to the French proposal by making renewed claims that Iranian
Intelligence was still targeting Rushdie. 813 Another issue for Iran at this point, was
Europe’s failure to effectively intervene in the civil war in Yugoslavia. Following the
European Parliament’s resolution condemning human rights in Iran, Mahmoud
Maohammadi at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, criticised Europe’s failure to stop the
“repeated violation of the four-month ceasefire […] and the occupation of more than 70
per cent of the Muslim lands” 814 He further charged that “while the European Parliament
considers sentenced apostate Salman Rushdie’s insult of the beliefs of one billion
Muslims as guarantee of freedom, […] it ignores the political and spiritual rights of the
Muslim people of the world.” 815 What seemed to have made it hard for the British
government to take Iran’s guarantees of non-violence seriously was its active
involvement in supporting the cause of Bosnian Muslims. Together with the military
build up in the Gulf, Iran did little between 1995-1996 to reassure Britain that the
government did not follow an Islamic and interventionist agenda. 816
811 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa” also see IRNA, April, 13, 1995
812 see “Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Sixth Anniversary of the
Iranian Fatwa against Salman Rushdie”, Rapid Press Release: PESC/95/18, 13/02/1995
813 IRNA, 7 April, 1995
814 IRNA, 9 April, 1995
815 ibid
816 Iran was one of the first Muslim countries to come to the aid of the Bosnian Muslim government when
the civil war began, sending clandestine arms shipments and helping organize units of volunteers. The arms
embargo by the West on all former Yugoslav republics made Iranian assistance vital in building up Bosnian
forces. Whilst an Iranian training camp outside Sarajevo, discovered by NATO troops was disbanded and
Iranians expelled military cooperation between both countries continued. see The New York Times, 3
March, 1996 ; The New York Times, 23 March 1996, 1996; for Britain’s concerns on Iran’s ambitions in
the Gulf see House of Commons, Hansard, 24 July, 1996, Column 440; What was not known to the British
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Parallel to the Juppé Initiative ran a constructive Track Two initiative by the German
Orient Institute. On Iranian insistence, a second human rights roundtable, (the first one
had been held in 1992 and was largely of philosophical nature) was held in Tehran in
March 1995. Of particular concern to the German delegation was the importance of nulla
poena sine lege, no punishment without legal basis. Reminding the Iranian side that only
codified law can serve as legal basis for verdicts in a court of law, the Germans enquired
about the implications of shari’a law. Whilst the shari’a is being incorporated into the
constitution, the German envoy argued, it is not concrete in written and codified law, thus
allowing judicial and political arbitrariness. 817 Since the fatwa was used as an example of
such rulings “above the law”, the representative of the Iranian judiciary stated that the
Iranian government would abide by international law and thus refrain from the
implementation of the fatwa. This was a first step towards what the demarche demanded.
818 It should be noted that Europeans still hoped that another jurist could pronounce a
contrary judgment to that of Khomeini’s, thus solving the affair on purely legal grounds.
819 Considering the late Iranian leader’s position among Shi’a jurists, this idea was
inconceivable theologically as well as politically. However, the approach to resolve the
fatwa on a purely legal basis did go further when in May, Ayatollah Yazdi declared that
Khomeini’s verdict was outside the jurisdiction of Iranian courts and as such possessed
no meaning to them. What had been reached through the roundtable was that the Head of
Iran’s judiciary in fact affirmed that the fatwa, whilst sacrosanct, did not bear any legal
significance to the Iranian authorities. 820 In addition to these Track Two developments,
in Iran the 6th anniversary of the fatwa also passed rather quietly. Vaezi’s comments on
or Europeans was that the US covertly supplied arms to Bosnian and Croatian forces as well as shared
intelligence on Serbian troop movements. According to the UN, NATO had been manipulated to allow the
US to conduct its own unilateral policy in the Balkans. More than Iranian military support, the covert
supply of sophisticated US military technology and intelligence prolonged the conflict significantly. see
“Allies and Lies” BBC News Correspondent 22 June ,2001, on
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/correspondent/1390536.stm, website accessed 23 May 2006
817 The human rights roundtable is documented in FAZ, 28 March, 1995
818 ibid
819Baroness Frances D’Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
820 FAZ, 15 May, 1995; Another Track II initiative was launched in September 1995 by Sir Edward Heath
who had travelled to Tehran and was aimed at paving the way for breaking the stalemate by briefing
Velayatti about the British positions. His visit was welcomed by the Iranians and interpreted as an attempt
to “depoliticise” the Rushdie affair see IRNA 6 September, 1995
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the need to implement the verdict, which catered to domestic constituents, were hastily
amended and the Iranian Foreign Minister confirmed that whilst the fatwa was
irrevocable, it stressed that it was a purely religious matter, not exclusive to the Iranian
government, and that Iran had no intention of sending assassins after Rushdie. 821
Likewise, Iranian TV and Radio did not publicise the anniversary, and officials carefully
avoided reference to the verdict. Despite some mention of the irrevocability of the fatwa,
nobody of significance chose to labour the point or make political capital out of it. In line
with Yazdi’s legal position of the fatwa, it seemed that Iranian officials and pragmatists
alike intended to send positive signals to the upcoming Troika meeting whilst at the same
time saving face to domestic constituents. The fact that the Islamic Propagation
Organisation’s office of literature and art of resistance announced on 2 February an essay
competition, in which prizes would be given for the best short story describing Rushdie’s
“moments of fear and anxiety” 822 and that the 15th Khordad Foundation still held on the
bounty money showed how carefully Iranian diplomats had to manoeuvre in Iran’s maze
of power centres.
Before the Juppé Initiative was discussed at the Fifth Session of the Critical Dialogue on
22 June in Paris, developments on the political-economic side considerably affected EU -
wide as well as British leverage over Iran. By 1995, Iranian debt was estimated to be
between $28 billion and $32 billion. 823 Relatively weak international oil prices in 1995
of only $17.18 a barrel 824 and the fall of oil exports levels to 2.25 millions barrels / day
(due to the increasing volume of production from outside OPEC) 825 failed to create
sufficient external revenues to meet the capital requirements of economic planning.
Inflation, however was one of the most pressing problems. By 1995, the Rial lost over 2/3
of its value, which led to a sharp increase in the prices for consumer goods 826 and thus
affected the most vulnerable groups in society. Again ideological conflicts hindered the
821 see Foreign Minister Velayatti’s statement in May 1995 when he reiterated that the fatwa could not be
revoked but that Iran would not send anyone to kill Rushdie. IRNA, May 18, 1995; Iran Focus, Vol.8,
No.3, March 1995, (Esfand 1373 – Farvardin 1374), p. 12;
822Iran Focus, Vol.8, No.3, March 1995, (Esfand 1373 – Farvardin 1374), p.13
823 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Iran 4th Quarter 1995, (EIU, 1995 ), p. 23
824 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1996, pp.2-3
825 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Iran 4th Quarter 1995, p.16
826 FAZ, 12 May, 1995
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basic steps viewed by the government as essential to improving the economy. Rafsanjani,
the Central Bank, and some Iranian economists supported privatisation and the
introduction of foreign investment. Such policies, however, provoked opposition by the
Left. Thus, the government failed to abolish consumer subsidies and eighty per cent of
the industry remained state-owned and economically inefficient. 827 Hence, Iranian
dependence on the EU particularly concerning debt rescheduling presented European
countries yet again with potential for linkage diplomacy.
Simultaneously, in the U.S., the American Israel Political Affairs Committee (AIPAC)
wanted to use economic recession in Iran to advance its own agenda and managed to get
support for a tougher U.S. approach toward Iran. Clinton had been increasingly criticised
as his policy of dual containment had so far done little to persuade Iran to change its
behaviour but rather seemed largely to have become a policy which followed U.S.
economic interests. In fact, by 1995, American companies had become one of the largest
consumers of Iranian oil. 828 Therefore AIPAC and Republication Senator Alfonse
D’Amato pressed for a legislation, which would virtually ban all trade with Iran,
including overseas subsidiaries. 829 An executive order rather than the passing og the
D’Amato’ Bill through Congress was eventually issued by Clinton, banning all American
involvement in the development of the Iranian petroleum industry. 830 Secretary of State
Christopher also put increasing pressure on EU member states to follow suit.
The government in Bonn was not only approached by Christopher to deny any further
debt-rescheduling and credits to Iran, but its own parliament demanded to link tangible
improvement in human rights in Iran to any further monetary concession on behalf of the
German government. In the face of severe human rights violations, the motion put
forward by the Green Party demanded to put respect for human rights as precondition for
economic cooperation. 831 Refusing any such political linkages, the German government
827 ibid, MECS, Vol. XIX:1995, p. 287
828 Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, p.53
829 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 270-171
830 ibid, Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, p.54
831 Deutscher Bundestag 13. Wahlperiode, Antrag der Fraktion Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen, Drucksache
13/1620 2 June 1995
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renewed “Hermes Sureties” with Iran in 1995, which were increased to 100 million
Deutsche Mark for medium-long term transactions as well as 50 million Deutsche Mark
for repayment periods up to 360 days. 832 Whilst crude oil important from Iran certainly
affected German diplomacy towards that country, the decision to renew credit guarantees
largely reflected Germany’s trading relationship with Iran. In 1995 and 1996, Germany
had become Iran’s biggest trading partner and proved to be a reliable supplier of
sophisticated technology and the necessary capital to invest in Iran’s development
programmes.833
Britain was also opposed to Clinton’s total trade ban on Iran, arguing that sanctions were
“ a diplomatic instrument of the last resort and did not view [them] applying in the case
of Iran.” 834 Emphasising realities of economic interdependence and the apparent
influence of British diplomacy towards Iran, the FCO stated that “As a trading nation we
have taken the view that trade embargos are not an instrument of policy that we favour.
We are not convinced that they work. The US administration is well aware of that.” 835
Concerning the issue of debt rescheduling, however, Britain made it clear that it would
not extend any state sureties to Iran. In fact, pre-revolutionary Iranian debts to the British
government, which amounted to $100 million, were cleared in September 1995 in
bilateral talks between Bank Markazi and the UK’s Export Credits Guarantee
Departments (ECGDD). The Iranians hoped that this agreement would clear the way for
further accord on liabilities incurred by Iran after the revolution. Whilst these debts were
relatively minor, estimated at $30 million, Tehran hoped it would open the way for a
resumption of medium-and short-term cover by ECGDD for firms supplying Iran. As will
832 Deutscher Bundestag 12 Wahlperiode, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Auswärtigen Ausschusses,
Drucksache 12/3525 ; FAZ, 3 May, 1995
833 In 1995, Germany imported 1566 thousand metric tons from Iran. United Nations, Energy Statistics
Yearbook-1995, (New York, United Nations, 1997), p.178; In 1995, Iran imported US $ 1,7 billion from
Germany, which was more than the entire import volume from Asia (US $ 1,6 billion) together. In 1996, it
rose to US $ 2,1 billion. This compared to US $ 505 million and US $ 685 million from Britain
respectively. IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 2002, p.264; The German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce
was the biggest bilateral chamber in Iran and in the 1990s Germany has consistently been the biggest
foreign exhibitor on trade fairs in Tehran. Adam Tarock, Iran’s Foreign Policy since 1990: Pragmatism
supersedes Islamic ideology. (Commack, Nova Science, 1999), pp.91-92
834 IRNA, 2 May, 1995
835 Iran Focus, Vol. 8, No.5, May 1995 (Ordibehesht-Khordad 1374), p.13
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be seen, failing to resolve the Rushdie affair through the Juppe Initiative, the British
government refused to resume any such covers. 836
The most significant development, before the démarche was discussed at Paris, however,
was when the American oil company Conoco signed a deal with the National Iranian Oil
Company which awarded Conoco an estimated $ 1 billion production agreement for two
of its offshore fields. 837 What was a goodwill gesture by Rafsanjani to improve relations
with the U.S., was not interpreted as such and on 14 March, Clinton announced that the
deal was inconsistent with US policy and signed an executive order prohibiting all oil
development deals with Iran. 838
When the EU Troika received the Iranian delegation headed by Deputy Minister Vaezi in
Paris in June 1995, Europe possessed considerable political and economic leverage over
Iran. Following Clinton’s executive order, European countries and Japan alone were able
to invest in Iran, extend credits / demand debt-repayments as well as showing continued
willingness to engage in a political dialogue with Tehran. More than ever, Britain
particularly made it obvious that improvements in relations were conditional on
resolution of the Rushdie affair. 839 On the other hand, Iran was plagued by “economic
decline, political dissent and internal power struggles”. Consequently, domestic as well as
foreign policy was decided by “competition and trade-offs, generating inconsistency and
contradictions.” What the Europeans had to bear in mind during negotiations was that
“Iran spoke with many voices.” 840 By and large, the German Track II roundtable as well
as the Juppé initiative coincided with a period in Iranian politics, during which the
economic situation led the government to present merely a veneer of economic
liberalization and political moderation. Domestic pressure in and outside the parliament
was vehemently opposed to many of Rafsanjani’s economic policies, which aimed to
attract foreign investment and engage in effective privatization in order to supplement the
836 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Iran 4th Quarter 1995, pp. 23-24
837 The New York Times, March 7, 1995. It was the first contract rewarded to a foreign oil company since
the revolution.
838 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, pp. 271-272
839 Interview with FCO Official ”A” (FCO Official at the Iran Desk 1997-2000), 3 March 2006
840 MECS, Vol. XIX: 1995, p. 283
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country’s reliance on trade with a large-scale manufacturing industrial base. 841 Whilst
the previous Third Majlis (1989-1992) dominated by the radical left opposed
privatization on ideological grounds, conservatives in the Fourth Majlis (1992-1996) saw
it as a direct challenge to their political-economic clientalist structures. In an effort to win
over the conservative forces as well as radicals to at least have some of his economic bills
passed, Rafsanjani did, therefore, not extend any liberalization agenda to the political
realm. Overall, Rafsanjani’s task continued to be a difficult one: appeasing the West in
order to attract foreign investment and secure trust on part of the Europeans as well as
appeasing domestic hardliners. The 6th anniversary of the fatwa reflected these
developments. Whilst government agencies engaged in conciliatory rhetoric towards the
Europeans, state institutions, most notably the 15th Khordard Foundations, made it clear
that the bounty remained. In 1995, intelligence available to the German government, in
particular concluded that the bounty as well as Iranian intelligence activities abroad still
constituted a major impediment to any resolution of the matter. This perception led the
Europeans to regard any assurances on the Rushdie matter with suspicion. 842
During the 5th session of the Critical Dialogue, the Rushdie affair dominated the entire
meeting. Instead of the expected signed undertaking from Rafsanjani, the Iranian Deputy
Foreign Minister Vaezi offered a letter from Foreign Minister Velayatti, addressed to
Juppé, which authorized Vaezi to offer a verbal agreement which included the precise
wording on the fatwa which the demarche demanded, together with comments on other
issues. These included demands for a reciprocal EU statement which affirmed respect for
religions and condemned blasphemy and attacks against Islam. In addition, he expressed
his government’s anger at the declaration issued by the G7 four days earlier in Canada, in
which they condemned the death threat against the author and his associates and had
841 see Iran Focus, Vol.8, No.4, April, 1995 (Farvardin-Ordibehesht 1374), pp. 6-7
842 The German government decided that numerous comments on the bounty over the years “were vague
and contradictory” and failed to show any real commitment on part of the Iranians. Deutscher Bundestag,
13. Wahlperiode, 104. Sitzung, Bonn, Donnerstag, 9. Mai, 1996, Plenarprotokoll 13/104, p. 9207. In 1995,
German intelligence (BfV) rated Iran’s extensive intelligence activities in Germany as “threat to national
security”. According to the BfV, three Iranian intelligence and security services operated in Germany and
established a sophisticated and far-reaching network with the stated aim “of monitoring and destroying
opposition abroad” as well as “illegal procurement of weapons”. Most importantly, German intelligence
could not exclude the potential assassination of Rushdie by an Iranian operative in Germany. see
Abegordnetenhaus von Berlin , 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/5949, 6. Dezember, 1995, pp.64-65
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called on all countries to avoid any cooperation with Iran that might contribute to Iran’s
access to nuclear weapon capability. The EU Troika stressed that the EU was not
demanding that the fatwa be annulled immediately, although this remained its objective,
in line with its principles. What was proposed was a realistic approach in line with the
law (Ayatollah Yazdi’s statement, which stemmed from the German Track-Two
Initiative, was seen as a step forward) and the requirements of the moment and reiterated
that it attached “great importance” to Iran’s response for the future of the EU’s dialogue
with Iran. Iran’s response was that it refused to deliver a written statement to the
demarche (which was according to the German Foreign Ministry in line with diplomatic
protocol as the demarche was verbal too). Rather it conveyed Rafsanjani’s declaration
from 19 April, which said that his government will not send anyone to kill Rushdie. The
fatwa, however, could not be revoked, as it constituted an eternally valid religious decree.
843 Further Muhammad Jawad Larijani, Vice-Chairman of the Iranian Parliamentary
Foreign Relations Committee, defiantly said that the Rushdie issue “ is a problem created
by western politicians” and that “it is illogical [that the west ] demands that the Islamic
Republic of Iran change its stance”.844 Considering alleged past Iranian efforts to
assassinate Rushdie and his associates, Vaezi’s offer which he himself said essentially
carried the explicit reiteration of the “validity and inalterability of the late Imam’s
fatwa”845 was not even close enough for the Europeans to seriously consider. Europe’s
refusal was in line with the FCO’s assessment which stated that the “renouncement not to
send anyone to kill Rushdie” does not provide for his safety nor does the government
clearly distance itself from the fatwa. 846 The FCO believed that there was still too little
room for Iranian diplomats backed by pragmatist politicians to manoeuvre. According to
British diplomats, the Juppé Initiative failed because the Iranian side was looking for a
way out of the consequences of the fatwa without actually repudiating it. In 1995, the
FCO’s assessment was that political heavyweights in Iran were still seriously minded to
843 Carmel Bedford, ”Who will break the Deadlock ?” in Niels Fried-Nielsen, Freedom of Expression: The
acid test, pp.12-16; FAZ, 30 June, 1995; IRNA, 22 June, 1995
844 IRNA, 24 June, 1995
845 IRNA, 22 June, 1995
846 FAZ, 22 May, 1995. In 1995, the Conservative government under Major also experienced increasing
critique by opposition and backbenchers over economic mismanagement and recession and was, therefore,
careful not to add a foreign policy disaster by prematurely agreeing to the Iranian terms. see The Guardian,
19 June, 1995; The Independent 18 June, 1995; FAZ, 18 June, 1995
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carry it out and that there was little comparable weight to restrain them. 847 Therefore, on
17 June at the EU Summit in Cannes, the Council issued the following statement:
With regard to Iran, the European Union will continue to defend freedom of expression. It regrets
the lack of progress recorded with regard to the Salman Rushdie situation. The matter remains
before the Council. 848
The Iranian position reflected the domestic scene and ultimately dictated how far the
Foreign Ministry could go with regards to Rushdie’s case.849 Clearly it was not far
enough for Europe and especially for Britain.
The year 1996, which witnessed the sixth anniversary of the verdict, was marked by
stalemate on the Rushdie front. The Europeans increased pressure by tabling another
resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission condemning human rights violations in
Iran as well as the threat against Rushdie. 850 When the Special Rapporteur for Freedom
of Expression visited Iran in 1996, government representative conveyed that they will
continue to talk to the Europeans, but restated that “if Rushdie were considered free to
express himself to the point of hurting the religious sentiments of a billion Muslims, by
the same token, others should have the right to chastise and condemn him.” 851
Concerning development of freedom of expression, the Rapporteur noted that because the
very basis for all laws and regulations in the country were Islamic criteria, the
government was in a position to apply prior restraints and censorship on the press, media
and other forms of publication. 852 He also noted the continuation of threats and use of
violence and harassment, including persecution and intimidation, directed at persons
847 Interview with former FCO Diplomat ”A”, 3 March 2006
848 Bulletin of the European Union 6-1995, Conclusions of the Presidency, paragraph 1.17
849 According to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, they initially intended to give a positive response to the
initiative but, in the end, felt unable to do so for two reasons: Apart from the Iranian government’s efforts
to save face following the G7 Summit declaration, they conveyed to the Danish Foreign Ministry that they
had not been given enough help from the Europeans and decried the publicity surrounding the Juppé
Imitative. Singling out the Danes on this charge, the Iranian delegation felt that they were unable to
manoeuvre vis-à-vis domestic constituents. see Baroness Frances D’Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
850 see Commisson on Human Rights, Fifty-second session, Agenda item 10, UN Doc.Nr.
E/CN.4/1996/L.42/Rev.1 23 April 1996
851 Commission on Human Rights, Fifty-second session, Report in the mission of the Special Rapporteur to
the Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Doc. Nr. E/CN/1996/39/Add.2, 11 March, 1996, paragraph 17
852 ibid, paragraph 62
250
seeking to exercise their right to freedom of speech both by regular government security
forces and the judiciary as well as by parallel institution; all of which enjoy impunity for
these acts. 853
What should, however, be noted is that despite these restrictions, Rafsanjani’s relative
liberal approach to the press (compared to Khomeini) allowed for the gradual
establishment of non-governmental periodicals and newspapers. Since political parties
were not formally allowed, by the mid-1990s, the press virtually started to substitute for
this vacuum in formal partisan politics. In line with government restrictions of allowing
only ‘constructive criticism” the newspaper Hamshahri, run by the mayor of Tehran, with
a circulation of 150 000, became Iran’s most popular newspaper. The criticism expressed
in Hamshahri encouraged more statist, pro-government papers, such as Kayhan (circ. 150
000) and Etela’at (cir. 150 000) to establish clearer political lines. Whilst Kayhan shifted
more to the right and continued to serve as hard-line critic of the government, Etela’at
took on a more pragmatic approach and mirrored more Rafsanjani’s positions. On the
Left, Resalat with a circulation of 30 000 ( founded in 1936) was mainly associated with
the anti-government agenda of the leftist opposition in the Majlis. In 1994, Iran was
eventually founded by state-run IRNA as a response by the government to the politicised
press atmosphere and the government’s need to tilt the balance of anti-government
partisan papers. 854. While all papers reflected variations on pro-regime political opinion,
much of the press had become organs of the factional divide and served as forums for
political discourse whilst adhering to the restrictive legal framework in which the media
had to operate. However, Rafsanjani’s emphasis on “constructive criticism” was a far cry
from introducing new legislation or government policies allowing for Article 19 of the
ICCPR to be implemented in Iran’s legal statutes.
Faced with these ongoing restrictions, efforts were stepped up on the Community level.
Another session of the critical dialogue was held in Dublin, which demanded concrete
results on human rights and Rushdie. The European Parliament passed another resolution
853 ibid, paragraph 65
854 Iran Focus, Vol.8 No.6, June 1995, (Khordad-Tir 1374), pp.12-13
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calling on the Iranian government to make a declaration that it will not carry out the
fatwa and will do all in its power to prevent Iranian citizens from trying to do so. It also
urged the Council to insist on such a declaration and to reassess the value of continuing
the Critical Dialogue if the Iranian government proved unwilling to make enough
concessions. 855
Iranian defiance towards the EU at that time was largely dictated by developments of the
Mykonos Trial in Germany. In March 1996, the German investigating magistrate issued a
warrant of arrest against Intelligence Minister Fallahijan as he had been identified as a
key figure responsible for the assassinations of the Kurdish dissidents in Berlin. 856
Immediate efforts on behalf of the Iranians to refute any cooperation with the German
authorities regarding witnesses eventually turned more volatile when religious circles in
Qom extended threats against the two German prosecutors. Thousands of clerics and their
students passed a statement which said “that the mercenary prosecutors will have to pay
the highest price for this betrayal” and went on to warn that “ if these [..] fascist
prosecutors do not ask for forgiveness for insulting our sacred values, we will sentence
them like Rushdie”. 857 Threats like these did little to persuade the Europeans of any
good-will on behalf of the Iranian side to resolve the Rushdie issue and only stepped up
condemnation by the Council:
The European Union is concerned by recent developments in Iran, which have involved accusations
and threats directed at an EU Member State. These are taking place against an ongoing trial of
Iranian nationals which is being conducted in accordance with the principles of the rule of law in
that Member State.
The judiciary in all EU Member States is independent of Government and Parliaments. The Iranian
Government has recognized this principle in relations to Germany. […] In the context [of the
855 Bulletin of the European Union 6-1996, Conclusions of the Presidency, paragraph1.12; Bulletin of the
European Union 7/8-1996, paragraph1.2.10 Parliament resolution on the fatwa against Salman Rushdie
[OJC 261,9.9.1996]
856 Der Ermittlungsrichter des Bundesgerichtshofes, 2 B-Js295/95-8 Haftbefehl, Karlsruhe, 14 März, 1996,
pp.6-9
857 Suedeutsche Zeitung, 21 November, 1996, FAZ 21 November, 1996
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Critical Dialogue ] it urges Iran to restore calm in the current situation and, in particular, to
discourage threats against persons involved in the trial […] 858
Though Rushdie’s fate was still caught in a stalemate, it should be noted that the
Europeans were still holding on to their idea of engagement with Iran. Despite the
deadlock, isolation was not regarded as a viable strategy. This was particular evident
when the U.S. administration passed the Iran Libya Sanctions Act, which first advocated
a secondary boycott of any foreign firm trading with Iran. The démarches that followed
by the European Union to the U.S. eventually spurred the Clinton administration to
negotiate for a softening of terms of the bill, which still mandated sanctions on any
foreign company which invests more than $20 million a year in the Iranian or Libyan
energy industry. The EU quickly moved on to condemn the legislation and reserved the
right to challenge it through the WTO and other international fora. 859 The most
significant of such declarations came from Commissioner Papoutsis, who in fact affirmed
EU dependency on imported oil, which, according to the Commissioner, amounted to 80
%, of which Iran and Libya have a 20 % share. He also reminded them that the US
imports 50 % of its oil from Venezuela, Mexico, Saudi-Arabia, Nigeria and Norway.
Admitting to what extent EU diplomacy was subject to European-Iranian
interdependence, he reiterated that “a disruption in the supply of oil from these two
countries to world markets would have an impact on both volume and prices 860, as these
supplies at present amount to 10 % of world trade.” 861
858 Bulletin of the European Union 11-1996, paragraph 1.4.14 Council Conclusions
859 Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, p.55; Bulletin of the European Union EU-4-1996, paragraph
1.4.82 Council conclusions on the Helms-Burton Act; Bulletin of the European Union 7/8-1996 , paragraph
1.4.14; EU Rapid Press Release, Irish Presidency and Commission protested to the U.S. Administration
against the Iran Libya Sanctions Act. Rapid Reference IP/96/793, 9 August, 1996
860 Whilst global oil demand grew by 2.4 %, oil prices moved sharply higher in 1996 up to 21.1 % to $
20.81, the highest annual average since the second Gulf War, see BP Statistical Review of World Energy,
1997, pp.2-3
861 EU Rapid Press Release, “D’Amato Bill – Commissioner C. Papoutsis’ Reaction” Rapid Reference:
IP/96/778, 6 August, 1996; Between 1994 and 1995 crude imports from Iran to France increased by 28%,
rising from 7892 thousand metric tons to 10 306 thousand metric tons. Italian crude imports from Iran also
increased by 35 % rising from 7508 thousand metric tons to 11 402 thousand metric tons. By 1995 Italy
and France had become Iran second and third largest importers of crude oil respectively. By comparison,
British imports constituted merely 1161 thousand metric tons in 1995. In the same year, the U.S. imported
58 571 thousand metric tons from Saudi Arabia and none from Iran. see United Nations, 1995 Energy
Statistics Yearbook (New York, United Nations, 1997), p.176
253
5. Conclusion
Human rights developments under Rafsjani between 1994 and 1996 remained largely
unchanged and neither the Iranian government nor parliament implemented policies or
passed legislation respectively to provide respect as well as protection for Article 19. On
the contrary, the bill passed by the Majlis, which banned the use of satellite dishes,
obstructing free access to information and granting the basiji with more powers, proved
detrimental to freedom of speech. Though the decision for the bill was a political
compromise with the conservative-right as well as the leftist opposition in return for
support of the government’s economic policy 862, policies granting the full enjoyment of
the right to freedom of speech and expression were not part of Rafsanjani’s political
agenda. Whilst newspapers gradually emerged as a substitute for the lack of political
parties, the government’s insistence on allowing only “constructive criticism” and urging
the media to represent the national interest over its own political or intellectual agendas
did little to encourage the genuine free flow of ideas, criticism and intellectual discourse.
On the contrary, the government’s position ensured an environment of self-censorship
and intimidation for criticism or thoughts outside the restrictive legal framework. In fact,
faced with growing opposition amongst society, politicians and religious circles, the
government was keen to control dissent, and what followed, could best be described as a
“policy of co-optation” concerning public debate in general and the press in particular.
During the same period the British / EU approach to protect the right to freedom of
speech was largely confined to tabling of a UN Resolution at the Human Rights
Commission and condemnations through EU-démarches. Despite the 1992 Edinburgh
declaration of pursuing a Critical Dialogue with Iran, EU human rights diplomacy
towards that country failed to extend to a genuine linkage strategy in which economic or
political cooperation was subject to improvements in human rights. Britain, however,
because of its commitment to defend Rushdie’s right to freedom of speech, pursued a
genuine policy of constructive engagement in which the upgrading of bilateral relations
was conditional on Iranian assurances to guarantee the author’s safety.
862 see Iran Focus, Vol.7, No.9, October, 1994, (Mehr-Aban 1373), p.8
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It had also become evident that pragmatists represented in the Iranian government and in
the bureaucracy had to play by the rules of the Two-Level Game. As a result, efforts by
Rafsanjani to appease hardliner and conservative constituents whilst trying to meet
British demands were interpreted by Whitehall as falling short of guaranteeing Rushdie’s
safety. However, Track Two efforts by the German Orient Institute provided an effective
problem solving approach in which participants sought for legal solutions to the problem
and eventually led to Ayatollah Yazdi’s ruling that the fatwa, as a religious ruling, was
outside Iranian domestic jurisdiction and bore no political significance. 863 Again,
because of the factional divide and Rafsanjani’s uneasy alliance with the establishment,
Whitehall saw this as a step in the right direction but felt unable to give unquestionable
credence to this ruling. Alleged efforts to seek contact with the IRA, German intelligence
on the activities of Iranian security services in Europe, and Iran’s interventionist policies
in the Balkans had further contributed to this level of mistrust on the part of the British
government.
Eventually, with the launch of the Barcelona Process and the directive of the Commission
and resolution by the European Parliament to make relations with third countries
conditional upon the respect for human rights, linkage diplomacy on the Community
Level ceased to be a mere option and became a legal requirement for the EU’s external
relations. The German case, however, shows that this did not necessarily extend to
individual foreign policies of member states. During the period of the Juppé Initiative,
Iranian vulnerability on EU investment and financial investment allowed for effective
linkage strategies concerning the granting and extension of loans to Iran. Whilst Britain
followed such rationale until the Rushdie issue had been solved and refused any loans to
Iran, Germany’s perceived sensitivity on potential payment deficits on part of Iran led the
government in Bonn to renew the so called “Hermes Sureties”. Unlike Britain, Germany
863 It should be noted that Ayatollah Yazdi’s statement on the fatwa should be seen within the wider context
of his bid for political power. In the same month (May 1995), Yazdi also offered amnesty to Iranian exiles
and welcomed them back to the country. As this was seen as the prerogative for the Supreme Leader, Yazdi
was criticised by many of the conservative and radical camp alike for overstepping his authority. Though
no opposition was voiced to his ruling on he fatwa, Europeans felt that it was not representative for all
camps. Iran Focus, Vol.8, No.5, May 1995, (Ordibehesht-Khordaf 1374), p.7
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also imported a considerable amount of crude oil during that time, as did France and
Italy. There is little doubt, however, that trade interdependence in particular dictated
Germany diplomacy towards Iran and thus jeopardized Britain’s unilateral strategy of
conditionality.
What had become evident by late 1996, however, was that the EU and especially Britain
seriously advocated human rights in Iran and pushed for the Rushdie affair to be
resolved. Nonetheless, the deadlock on Rushdie was unlikely to be broken. Rather
Germany’s resolute stance following the developments of the Mykonos trial, presented
Iran with the loss of its most important European political ally and further aggravated
various power centres in Iran. What was also evident, however, was that economic
realities and fluctuating asymmetries in European-Iranian interdependence dictated
diplomatic manoeuvring on both sides. As will be shown, Britain, which enjoyed relative
independence towards Iran concerning energy (In 1996, Britain produced 2735 thousand
barrels / day, which amounted to 2.5 % share of world production and only consumed
1752 thousand barrels / day) 864 was able to use asymmetrical interdependence for its
advantage in its dealings with Iran. Thus, the final chapter in British-Iranian relations saw
a British, rather than an EU initiative to solve the stalemate.
864 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2005, p.6; p.9; see also footnote 856
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Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable
A. NA NA NA
B. NA NA NA
C. Iranian economic dependence on the EU
provided for potential linkage diplomacy as
means to solve the fatwa issue. Whilst
British-Iranian relations were relatively
asymmetrical (to the benefit of the former),
EU-wide, particularly German-Iranian
relations influenced EU diplomacy
negatively.
Iranian vulnerability on the granting of
foreign loans and debt rescheduling from
EU countries provided for linkage
diplomacy. Economically and politically, the
British government was in such a position as
to demand changes (concerning the fatwa
human rights) in return for any economic
concessions. At the same time, German-
Iranian trade interdependence and increased
Iranian debt towards Germany dictated
German diplomacy towards that country.
German vulnerability in terms of loss of a
crucial export destination and its sensitivity
on potential payment deficits on part of the
Iranian government precluded any
conditional diplomacy. Contrary to the US,
EU-wide energy dependence on Iran
excluded the use of negative sanctions for
political purposes (e.g. fatwa, human rights)
The British government enjoyed a relative
leverage over Iran, but bilateral linkage-
diplomacy was jeopardized by Germany’s
unconditional “Iran-Politik”.
D. Level I negotiations were subject to
Iranian domestic constituents. Iranian
diplomacy continued to reflect domestic
politics. Level I negotiations were
unsuccessful because of the lack of domestic
consent.
a) Level II (domestic) “win-sets” were
supported by “internationalist forces”, but
were significantly constrained by the
“isolationist” camp. Even though
pragmatists in the government were keen to
meet European demands and took part in
diplomatic initiatives, Iranian diplomats felt
The Iranian government was forced to defect
from EU demands on Level I negotiations.
Ongoing human rights violations in and
outside the country exacerbated this
stalemate.
Constructive Engagement: Hypotheses and Variables
CHAPTER SIX
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unable to provide what the EU considered
credible assurances.
b) NA NA.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE RISE OF KHATAMI AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE RUSHDIE
AFFAIR: THE YEARS 1997-1999
1. Introduction
Concerning the stalemate on the Rushdie front, the year 1997 initially saw few prospects
for any resolution. On the eighth anniversary of the fatwa, the Revolutionary Guards
insisted that Rushdie be killed. As the FCO had correctly assessed the previous year, the
pragmatists were in no position to make concessions on the issue, and the IRG went
further and “vowed to confront anyone seeking to dilute the fatwa or working to prevent
it from being implemented.” 865 Despite Rafsanjani’s statement that “he did not support
the move” the bounty was also increased to $ 2.5 million. 866 It was evident that Rushdie
had become a pawn in the power struggle between the moderate-pragmatists and the
hardliner faction. Therefore, sustained pressure by the EU on Rafsanjani, which in a
démarche demanded that he “take appropriate steps against any initiative [the bounty
increase] that might endanger ongoing efforts to reach a solution”, proved futile. 867 It
was, therefore, not surprising that opposition in the House of Commons over the overall
value of the FCO’s strategy with Iran intensified. As Conservative MP, Sir Cyril
Townsend commented:
Does my right honourable and learned Friend agree that nether western Europe’s critical dialogue
nor the United States’ policy of dual containment have been particularly successful in recent years?
When a new course is being decided, will he resist the temptation to turn Iran into a pariah state,
beyond the bounds of the international community? Does he agree that Tehran is just the sort of
place where a British ambassador, with his skills and expertise, would have plenty of work to do? 868
Resisting any such calls to upgrade relations to ambassadorial level, the British
government maintained its uncompromising stance.869 This position reflected ongoing
behind the scenes negotiations. Following the failure of the Juppé initiative,
865 The Times, 14 February 1997, IRNA, 15 February, 1997
866 The Times, 14 February 1997
867 Bulletin of the European Union 1/2- 1997, paragraph 1.3.11 ; see also Bulletin of the European Union
1/2- 1997, paragraph 1.1.7 Parliament Resolution on Iran
868 House of Commons, Hansard, 12 March, 1997, Column 344
869 see statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs Rifkind, ibid
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communications between Iran and the EU had been exchanged; all of which the FCO
rejected as falling short of any genuine commitments on the part of Iran. 870 At a meeting
of the Council of Ministers meeting in February 1997, all EU Foreign Ministers rejected
Iranian “follow-ups” of the Juppé initiative and espoused the principles of freedom of
speech and the necessity to uphold them, leading the Dutch representative to go as far as
to warn “not to give into Iranian blackmail.” 871
More serious than the Rushdie deadlock, however, proved to be the verdict by the court
in Berlin on the “Mykonos Case”. The judge eventually confirmed what the German
government had known since 1992. On 10 April 1997, the defendants Darabi and Rhayel
both received life sentences for murder. More importantly, however, the court ruling
established the primary role the Iranian political establishment had played in the
assassinations. The judge ruled that “decisions to carry out operations [against dissidents]
abroad lies with the secret and unconstitutional Committee for Special Affairs, whose
affiliates are the President, the Intelligence Minister (VEVAK), Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, Representatives of the security forces, as well as the Supreme Leader
himself.” 872 In the light of this ruling, European states, particularly the German
government eventually had to concede that the Critical Dialogue had lost its momentum
when atrocities, organised and implemented by the highest officials in the Iranian
political system, had been carried out parallel to diplomatic dialogue. 873 Following the
break of relations at the ambassadorial level between Germany and Iran, EU countries
followed suit and recalled their ambassadors from Iran. The Council Declaration on 30
April 1997 further agreed on the following:
870 In one draft communiqué the Iranians affirmed the blasphemous character of the book. Whilst reiterating
that “the fatwa is a valid and irrevocable religious injunction” it stated that “the government of Iran
however […] has not and will not send anybody to kill the apostate writer.” The draft also ambiguously
emphasized that “governments have a special responsibility to prevent actions that may encourage
blasphemy.” cited in Barones Frances D’Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”.
871 ibid;
872 “Pressemiteilung Nr.38/97 der Senatsverwaltung fuer Justiz vom 10. April 1997 betr. Urteil im
Mykonos-Prozess“, p.2, documented in Frankfurter Rundschau ,12 April 1997
873 see Entschließungsantrag der Fraktionen der CDU-CSU und F.D.P. zu der vereinbarten Debatte zur
Iran-Politik, Deutscher Bundestag 13 Wahlperiode, Drucksache 13-7441, 16 April, 1997
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Confirmation that under the present circumstances there is no basis for the continuation of the
critical dialogue between the European Union and Iran;
The suspension of official bilateral visits to or from Iran […];
Cooperation to ensure that visas are not granted to Iranians with intelligence and security functions;
Concertation in excluding Iranian intelligence personnel from European Union Member States. 874
2. The Triumph of the Reformists
The Mykonos verdict reflected a characteristic of Rafsanjani’s administration. Since
much of the President’s political power depended on his bazaari coalition 875, clientalism
became a dominant feature of the Iranian political system. As Mozafari put it “each group
had its own chief and its specific domains to control, its own members of parliament and
its groupe de frappe which could be mobilized at any time.” As a result “Iran witnessed a
flourishing of a multiplicity of decision-making processes. A parallel and complex chain
of decisions were installed which concurred with each other, neutralized mutually and
cooperated sporadically.” 876 The Rushdie stalemate was one aspect of this lack of
consistency and web of competing groups in the decision-making process. More
importantly, however, these parallel power centres essentially prevented economic
recovery as well as political liberalization.
It is against this background that one has to understand the elections in spring 1997.
Until shortly before the actually polling day for the new Iranian President, Majlis Speaker
Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri was confident of victory, having been groomed for
the post by the conservative establishment and enjoying the backing of the Supreme
874 Bulletin of the European Union EU 4-1997 paragraph 1.4.13 Council Conclusions
875 The Jamiat Mo’talefeh Eslami, or Islamic Coalition Society (ICS), formed in the late 1960s by bazaaris
increasingly gained influence in Iranian politics following Khomeini’s death and enjoyed greatest support
under Rafsanjani’s administration. Profoundly traditionalist in their religious outlook, baazaris like
Asgarowladi, Ali-Naqi Khamouchi and Asadollah Badamtchian also enjoy strong influence in the
Revolutionary Guards and as such have political clout that extends well beyond their extensive personal
wealth. For the ICS, an economic open-door policy was not seen as synonymous with political
liberalization. Rather the political status quo based on patterns of mercantile-nepotism had to be defended
against opposition and dissidents. see Farhad Khosrokhava “The New Conservatives Take a Turn” on
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer233/khosrokhavar.html website accessed 19 February 2006
876 Mehdi Monzaffari, “Revolutionary, Thermidorian and Enigmatic Foreign Policy: President Khatami and
the Fear of the Wave”, International Relations, Vol.XIV, No.5, (August, 1999), p.17
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Leader. The result, however, was a landslide victory of Muhammad Khatami,
representing the Majma-e Rowhaniyum-e Mobarez (MRM), the Militant Clerics Society.
Whilst Nateq-Nuri represented a symbol of establishment dogmatism and political status-
quo, Khatami was perceived by the young electorate as a symbol of pragmatism,
openness and change. Sensing the discontent and alienation felt by young people, his
campaign largely focused on reform and pressed for a modification of the revolutionary
path. 877 Khatami made democratisation, the creation of a civil society and the respect for
human rights fundamental issues of his platform. It was evident that his victory
represented a revolt from below, a peaceful referendum against the institutionalization of
people’s disempowerment on one side and the misuse of power on behalf of the elite on
the other. What was also evident was that for the first time in post-revolutionary Iran, the
government under Khatami did not regard human rights as alien to Islam.
3. The Early Khatami Years and the Impact on Freedom of Speech
Khatami’s project of reforming the Islamic Republic was largely based upon the rule of
law and respect for human rights. It should also be noted that the reformists’ agenda was
not otherwise substantially different from that of Khomeini. Unlike Khomeini’s treatises,
however, Khatami made a distinction of what is essential in religion and what is not.
Thus the new president emphasised ethics, derived from religion, instead of dogma. As
he states:
The other main problem we face is the parochialism and regressive visions of the dogmatic.
Religious dogma is nothing more than ascribing sanctity and eternity to the limited and incomplete
interpretations of human, and giving priority to emotions over rationality and realistic appraisal. 878
Overall, Khatami followed a liberal interpretation of the Iranian Constitution. This meant
that whilst he accepted the the faqih’s authority, he did not consider the leader as immune
from criticism, as nobody should be above the law. The central concepts of his
877 MECS, Volume XXI, 1997, pp.343-345
878 Mohammad Khatami, Hope and Challenge- The Iranian President Speaks (Institute of Global Cultural
Studies, Binghamton University, 1997), p.26
262
administration required the inculcation of democratic values and the establishment of
democratic institutions.879 Concerning the protection of human rights standards, two
aspects of Khatami’s political manifesto are of particular importance. They are the
institutionalization of civil society and the provision of the rule of law under which all
policies ought to operate. At the same time, however Khatami’s discourse emphasised an
Islamic civil society:
The citizens of Islamic civil society have the right to determine their destiny, supervise the
implementation of their affairs and question their rulers and statesmen. Furthermore, in such a
society, the state is the people’s servant not their patron, and, as such, it is at all times accountable to
the people upon whom God has bestowed the right of self-determination. 880
What was extraordinary was not necessarily that the head of the executive would
advocate the advancement of civil society, but rather what it meant for the course of the
Islamic Republic. It was with the election of Khatami that government and society gained
enough momentum in Iran to attempt to engage in the depersonalisation of power and to
manage to develop a “civic culture”. This was one in which pre-existing patrimonial
relationships would no longer govern politics and, most importantly, people would think
and write freely. 881 As human rights activist and Nobel Peace Price Laureate Shireen
Ebadi put it: “For a few stretches during the years 1998-1999, the country experienced a
flowering of open debate and freedom of the press that some optimist souls called a
Tehran spring.” In an attempt to end the practice of censorship Khatami gave “his Culture
Ministry free run to issue press permits for new publications, and for a brief time the
media operated in an atmosphere of relative freedom and independence.” 882
It was in the early period of Khatami’s presidency that intellectual and political journals,
which were not linked to the government, began appearing. The Special Rapporteur noted
that between mid-1997 and 1999 the new government succeeded to some extent “to
879 R.K. Ramazani, “The Shifting Premise or Iran’s Foreign Policy: Towards a Democratic Peace?” Middle
East Journal, Vol.52, No.2, (Spring, 1998), p. 181
880 Ali Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy, p.146
881 for Khatami’s discourse on civil society see Mehran Kamrava, “The Civil Society Discourse in Iran” in
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No.2 (November, 2001), pp.165-185
882 Shireen Ebadi, Iran - Awakening (New York, Random House, 2006), pp.147-148
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strengthen the public’s confidence in the press as circulation from 17 per 1000 population
increased to 35 per 1000 population. Moreover, during the same period, the number of
provincial publications had grown considerably to 281 of which 12 were dailies. Press
Licences in the country reached 1200 of which 800-900 were active. Across the whole
country, the Special Rapporteur noted the circulation of 50 dailies. 883 The press
essentially became an “agent of change” which set the terms of political discourse and
dictated the agenda.884
Concerning the respect and protection of Article 19, the Special Rapporteur noted that
“there were quite evident differences of opinion over the press law regime among the
executive, legislative and judiciary.” 885 Whilst Khatami attempted to push for greater
respect for the right to freedom of speech and favoured more progressive legislation to
ensure protection of this right, such efforts were largely frustrated by a hostile parliament
and the conservative-right dominated judiciary. In fact, Khatami’s press advisor said in
an interview published in an Iranian daily, that though she favoured an amendment to the
press law, with a conservative dominated parliament such efforts were likely to result in a
loss of freedom of the press. She further commented that it was the responsibility of the
Press Supervisory Board, which had representatives from the judiciary and the
legislature, rather than the courts to supervise the press. 886 Reiterating such pleas to the
judiciary to respect the right to free speech, Khatami’s Minister of Culture and Islamic
Guidance, referring to Article 24 of the Constitution, which provides that the press should
be free to express views and opinions subject to certain restrictions, also defended critical
accounts in the public sphere. This legal provision is echoed in Article 3 and 5 of the
Press Law, which also defines constructive criticism or fair comment. The Minister
reiterated that nine types of criticism are defined in the law as unconstructive; some of
these have, however, never been invoked. 887 Essentially, the government urged for
883 Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/32, 28 December 1999, paragraph 19
884 Ali Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy, pp.118-119
885 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/32, paragraph 15
886 ibid
887 ibid, paragraph 18
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greater press freedom and public debate without really being able to ensure protection of
the right to free speech.
Against this background Iran witnessed a tentative beginning of intellectual tolerance and
with it the publication of journals, such as Adineh (Friday), which were couched in Third
World idiom, denouncing poverty in Iran and advancing socialist ideas. Adineh was
followed by a journal containing short stories, poetry and essays for the first time in a
decade; all of which expressed criticism only euphemistically. However covert political
messages and philosophical debate eventually emancipated itself and became more
challenging of existing political realities. With the birth of Jame’eh (Society) and Rahe-
No (New Path), Iran-e Farda (Tomorrow’s Iran) boundaries of freedom of expressions
were constantly being pushed as the authorities were publicly questioned, politicians held
accountable, corruption at the elite level denounced and more rights for the people
demanded. 888 Most significantly, the short period of open debate, encouraged by the
government, witnessed the rise of Soroush, who openly questioned the rule of the
velayet-e faqih in his writings, in which he pointed out that the rule of the clergy was
“based on the logic of power, not the logic of liberty.” Using religion as an ideology, he
emphasised, “makes it intolerant and authoritarian.” He further claimed that “government
and economic were the province of intellect and reason, not the domain of faith.” 889 In
line with such hermeneutics, Hojjatoleslam Mohsen Kadivar, who was part of the
reformist camp, maintained that Islamic rulings had elicited different, often conflicting
views, and there could thus be no exclusive interpretation of Islam. In 1999, he went so
far as to claim that “ in order for a society to advance and flourish, the community must
free itself from the shackles of past traditions and adopt new practices in line with the
spirit of the era.” Openly advocating the separation of political and religious institutions
his published articles went further and claimed that “no government may claim a special
mission from God.” Such a prerequisite of any government, he believed would lead to
“tremendous problems in society” and was bound to suppress freedoms. What eventually
888 Zaris Merat, Pushing Back the Limits of the Possible: The Press in Iran, Middle East Report, No. 212,
Pushing the Limits: Iran’s Islamic Revolution at Twenty. (Autumn, 1999), p.33; Behzad Yaghmaian, Social
Change in Iran- An Eyewitness account of dissent, defiance, and new movements for rights, (New York,
State University of New York, 2002), pp.18-19
889 MECS, Vol. XXII, 1998, p. 258
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lead to his arrest was one of his articles in which we wrote “The basic problem of Iran is
the velayet-e faqih.” While according to Islam, he noted, “each person is considered adult
and mature (rashid and balegh), the principle of velayate-e faqih is based on the notion
that people are irresponsible and incapacitated (mahjur). 890 His and Soroush’s dialectics
on reform, civil society and human rights reflected the general intellectual and political
mood between 1997 and 1999.
4. The Road to Resolution
The same year when Khatami came on the political scene in Iran, New Labour won the
parliamentary elections in Britain. New Labour’s Third Way eventually spilled over to
British foreign policy when Foreign Secretary Robin Cook announced an ethical foreign
policy with human rights as a core commitment in the government’s foreign relations.
Cook spoke of the promotion of human rights in terms of both duty and self-interest in
that the United Kingdom is “better able to trade with countries that are stable and free.”
Advocating a strategy of seeking dialogue, on the observance of human rights, “long term
engagement”, Cook believed “provided the best means to secure sustained change.” 891
This paradigm in UK foreign policy objectives soon translated into the FCO’s strategy
towards Iran. By March 1998, the British government welcomed the changes that were
taking place in Iran since the election of Khatami and stated: “we hear the noises and see
the potential of warming relationships.” 892 That Khatami wanted to extend his reformist
agenda to the international level in the form of international rapprochement was obvious
when at the OIC summit in December 1997, he pledged a gradual assimilation of positive
elements of western society and politics in the Islamic world.893 For the British
government, a first step in the right direction was Iran’s ratification of the chemical
weapons convention as well as Iranian condemnation of terrorism and the terrorist attacks
890 ibid, pp.258-259; see also Azadeh Kian-Thiebaut, “Political and Social Transformations in Post-Islamist
Iran”, Middle East Report, No. 212, (Autumn, 1999) pp.12-16
891 Richard Little, Marck Wickham-Jones, New Labour’s foreign policy – A new moral crusade, p.187
892 House of Commons, Hansard, 18 March, 1998, Column 1267
893 for Khatami’s speech see Wilfried Buchta, “Richtungswechsel in Irans Außenpolitik in Internationale
Politik, Vol. 53/3, (1998/03), p. 44
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in Algeria and Egypt that year. Whitehall, however, also maintained at meetings with Iran
that “[the British government] is prepared to judge the new regime not by the rhetoric of
the past, but by its record and what it achieves and sets out to do in the future.” 894
Concerning Britain’s revised strategy, the FCO maintained a double-headed tactic, which
wanted to ensure encouragement of the reformist movement, while being cautious about
other developments and characteristics of the regime. 895 Blair’s government demanded
concrete and positive indications from the Iranian government. According to the Foreign
Minister, the fatwa against Salman Rushdie remained a significant impediment to better
relations with Iran and it would be “wholly alien to us to negotiate in any way or
conciliate about our own basic values. Salman Rushdie’s right to publish and his freedom
of speech are crucial elements in our political democracy, and we therefore, should not
allow those basic rights and principles to be negotiable.” Indicating that the government
was still waiting for a positive response on this matter, FCO Minister Fatchett reiterated
that “we know what the regime has said in the past, and it has not gone far enough.”896
Though UK-Iranian relations were still facing a stalemate, intermediary efforts by a third
country were dismissed as a way to make progress on the fatwa. Rather “the best way to
make progress on the fatwa […]” it was believed by the FCO “is through direct contact
between Iran, the European Union and the United Kingdom. The fatwa and Salman
Rushdie will be key elements in the development of the relationship, and they must be
tackled by the Iranians in discussions with the United Kingdom and our European Union
partners.” 897
Even more than under the previous government, it was obvious to British diplomats that
the drive for inward investment was an important factor in Khatami’s administration.
During meetings with the FCO, capital influx from Britain was always at the top of the
list of issues that the Iranians wanted to raise. The underlying assumption in and outside
the British government was to increase economic cooperation between both countries, to
894 House of Commons, Hansard, 18 March, 1998, Column 1267
895 ibid
896 House of Commons, Hansard, 18 March, 1998, Column 1267- 1268
897 House of Commons, Hansard, 18 March, 1998, Column 1268
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the extent that Iranian dependence would prevent hardliners from jeopardizing bilateral
relations. As Tam Dalyell, MP put it: “The demonising of Iran should be something of
the past, and the fatwa and the difficult case of Salman Rushdie should not cut out
negotiations with the new political leadership in Tehran. The more locked in we are in
commercial relations, the harder it will be for the hardliners to wreck relations.” 898
Efforts by the Iranian Foreign Ministry to attract FDI and transfer of technology, did not
only reflect Khatami’s overall economic policy of ending the mercantile-clientalist
structures in the country, but were largely dictated by economic realities.
The price of oil was still a crucial determinant of the Iranian economic bargaining
position, which again shifted into the political realm. In 1998, crude oil prices reached an
average of $13.11, which were 32 % below 1997 and the lowest since 1976. 899 The
continuing weakness of the crude oil market considerably lowered Iranian export revenue
and subsequently affected the government’s ambitious debt repayment programme. Since
late 1995, the government had adhered rigorously to this strategy, which was based on a
policy of import compression in order to maximise current-account surpluses. However,
with Iranian crude selling at close to $10 / barrel, Iran’s obligations in 1998/99 - both
external and internal - were in jeopardy. 900 As a signal of more serious intent to open up
to the West but also in response to the government’s financial problem, the new
government pushed through a legislative bill to encourage foreign investment in Iran’s
free zones. 901 At the same time, the external debt situation dictated Iran’s Central Bank
and Bank Markazi to seek $1 billion in advances each from Germany, Japan and Italy,
using pre-paid oil sales as collateral.
898 Notes on “Diplomatic Relations between Iran and the UK in the early reform period, 1997-2000”, by Dr
Michael Axworthy (FCO Official at the Iran Desk, 1997-2000 / FCO Official “A”) handed to the author on
19 June 2006. House of Commons, Hansard, 18 March, 1998, Column 1262
899 A crucial factor in the low oil price of 1998 was the UN Oil for Food Programme, which resulted in a
3.2 % increase in OPEC production which was largely due to an 80 % increase in Iraqi production, which
constituted 2.2 million barrels per day. BP Amoco Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1999, p. 3
900 The Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU Country Report 4th Quarter 1998 Iran, p. 15
901 ibid, p. 16
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Whilst Iran’s need for foreign investment certainly presented opportunities to British
firms 902, many saw the upgrade to full diplomatic relations between both countries as a
prerequisite to enter the Iranian market. 903 During negotiations, the Iranian delegation
explained that they needed such inward investment (especially in the non-oil sector) to
create jobs, to reverse the trend of rising unemployment, and to reduce the dependence on
oil.904 Now more than ever before, the Rushdie deadlock had become an intolerable
impediment, determining too many political and economic aspects of Anglo-Iranian
relations – both for the British as well as the Iranian side. At the same time, however, a
reform minded government and considerable leverage on the part of Britain, presented
the Labour government with a unique incentive for Iran to finally close the Rushdie
chapter in bilateral relations. The FCO also assessed that under Khatami there was a
measure of confidence that the Iranians would keep any commitments made over the
fatwa. 905 The key for the British government was to translate these crucial economic
assets it enjoyed over Tehran, into an incentive for the Iranians.
Prenegotiations between both countries solely on the Rushdie issue began after the
British government initiated a new series of talks between the EU and Iran. As the British
wanted to encourage the process of reform, the Council agreed that a first step was to
“resume ministerial bilateral visits and that exploration of the scope for enhanced
political dialogue should continue at the EU level.” 906 Under the British presidency the
“Critical Dialogue” was then replaced with a new “Comprehensive Dialogue” with the
Iranian Government. 907 During the meetings that followed under this revised framework,
902 Once relations had been restored in 1998, London hosted one of the first conferences on “Investment in
Iran’ which had been organized by an Iranian economic delegation. In connection with the ratification of
the Third Economic and Social Development Plan, investment opportunities for British firms in Iran were
discussed. Iranian Ambassador Sarmady emphasied that the government had provided ample facilities for
foreign investors so that they could freely repatriate their profits and principals. see “Conference on
Investment in Iran” in The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, IPIS, Vol. XII, No.4, (Winter 2000-
2001), pp. 719-723
903 Interview with FCO Official “B”
904 Notes on “Diplomatic Relations between Iran and the UK in the early reform period, 1997-2000”, by
Michael Axworthy (FCO Official at the Iran Desk, 1997-2000) handed to the author on 19 June 2006
905 Interview with FCO Official “A”
906 Bulletin of the European Union 1/2 - 1998, paragraph 1.4.101 Council conclusions on Iran
907 Bulletin of the European Union 6 - 1998, paragraph 1.4.101 Council conclusions on Iran
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which was guided by a “spirit of increased international cooperation” 908, the Iranians
appreciated the fact that Britain was the driving force behind the initiative for EU-Iran
détente. During the first rounds in Brussels on 25 May 1998, EU envoys paved the way
for more constructive relations between the EU and Iran. The incentive given to the
Iranians was increased political cooperation and the transfer of technology and
investment. 909
The Iranians eventually reciprocated by circumventing constitutional constraints in order
to attract the promised foreign investment. The problem was that the Iranian Constitution,
effectively prohibits private sector investment in the oil and gas industry. Since the 1987
Oil Law permits contracts between State organisations and Iranian and foreign
companies, in 1998, the government introduced the so-called Buy Back Scheme. Buy
backs are agreements under which the foreign company acts as a contractor. The
contractor finances capital investment in an oil or gas field and recoups that investment
over a short period of time, usually 3-5 years, through the sale of the product on a fixed
rate of return plus a fee from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 910 In the up
stream hydrocarbon sector, opportunities for foreign companies arose from the technical
and economic challenges facing Iran. NIOC needed the logistical, technical and resource
base of international petroleum companies to be applied to many of the older oil and gas
fields. Many of these older fields had (have) comparatively large remaining reserves, but
these required significant investment and the application of modern engineering
techniques. 911 Particularly in the gas sector, Iran needed foreign technology. In 1999,
proved reserves for natural gas constituted 812.3 trillion cubic feet, the second largest
908 ibid
909 IRNA, 15 May, 1998
910 British Embassy, Tehran, “Iran: Oil and Gas Sector (Upstream)” British Embassy, Tehran, June 2002,
handed to the author on 23 November 2003 by UK Trade and Investment
911 Practical engineering issues included: hole stability issues in fractured formations; reservoir testing and
monitoring procedures; management, monitoring and treatment of hydrogen sulphite; the application of
horizontal and multilateral drilling; scope to handle high gas-oil ratio and wet crude; the expansion of
increased oil recovery projects; the implementation of artificial lift; reservoir simulation and geo-modelling
of reservoir compartmentalisation and updating of old and war damaged onshore and offshore facilities see
UK Trade and Investment, “Study of the Oil and Gas Sectors in Iran”, (UK Trade and Investment, March
2003), given to the author on 15 December 2003 by UK Trade and Investment, pp. 47-50
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reserve in the world. 912 More than in the oil sector, the gas industry in Iran was largely
underdeveloped at the time and Iran signalled ambitions to export gas to India and to
construct a series of LNG plants. What gave Britain a particular margin over Iran in this
respect was the fact that British Petroleum and British Gas were two of only four firms
worldwide, which possess the required LNG technology. Yet, not only because of
Rushdie, but also in the light Britain’s historical baggage in Iran, neither BP nor BG
wanted to establish themselves without official British representation. 913
During the 1998-1999 buy back tender, a total of 24 development projects were
eventually offered for international participation. They included three gas injection
development projects, nine onshore-enhanced oil recovery projects, 8 offshore
development projects and four gas field developments. Especially interesting for foreign
firms was the South Pars Gas Development Project, which is the Iranian portion of the
largest gas field in the world (as it shares a territorial boundary with the Qatari North
Field.) 914 In this way Iran had set the economic foundation for increased commercial
cooperation with the West, what was now needed was a political commitment on behalf
of the government in Tehran.
5. The End of the Rushdie Affair and the Exchange of Ambassadors
Following the first roundtable which had paved the way for economic and political
cooperation between the EU and Iran, the British government continued to link potential
investment to renewed demands on the Rushdie front. On 22 July, 1998, Foreign Minister
Derek Fatchet emphasised that his government would “welcome a more constructive
bilateral relationship with Iran.” Fatchet proposed political cooperation with Iran
regarding Afghanistan, Central Asia and the international drug trade. Likewise economic
cooperation with Britain presented a prospect of mutual cooperation, yet was conditional
upon finding a solution to the fatwa. Avoiding any demands to lift the fatwa, Fatchet
912 BP Amoco Statistical Review of World Energy, June 1999, p. 20
913 Interview with Alan Stott, BG Country Manager for Iran, (Tehran, 4 September, 2004); Interview with
Farzin Aram, Country Representative for BP in Iran, (Tehran, 28 August, 2004)
914 UK Trade and Investment, “Study of the Oil and Gas Sectors in Iran”, (UK Trade and Investment,
March, 2003), p. 43
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proposed to remove the bounty on Rushdie’s head, which would be interpreted as a first
positive step on the part of the Iranian government. 915 Eventually this initiated a series of
roundtables at respective embassies in Tehran and London during which senior ministers
assured the British that the government distanced itself from the death sentence whilst at
the same time reminded them that they could not revoke the verdict.
During the meetings preceding a meeting at the UN between Foreign Ministers Cook and
Kharazzi, the Iranians were left in no doubt that significant European investment would
be contingent on a settlement of the Rushdie case. The only agenda item was how this
would be achieved with face saving all round. One agreement concerned the going ahead
with credit loans and oil industry investment prior to any resolution of the fatwa. The
exchange of ambassadors would also be separated in time from the statements about to be
made during the UN General Assembly in September in New York in 1998. 916 If an
agreement would be reached, the Iranians guarenteed that they would hold the first Buy-
Back Conference in London, which would be announced prior to the UN meeting, thus
underlying its commitment to renewed British-Iranian relations. 917 In August 1998 the
British government reciprocated and granted Iran a $ 2 billion credit loan and started to
refurbish the Embassy in Tehran presumably in readiness for the arrival of an
ambassador.918
In many ways, Britain’s strategy was paying off. The FCO believed that engagement with
Iran was beneficial all around, and that the longer it went on and prospered, the less likely
retrograde movement would be. The rationale behind this strategy was that increased
economic cooperation with Britain gave the Iranians something to lose, a vested interest
in the continuation of good relations, and most importantly, a reason to change its policy
in Britain’s remaining areas of concern, such as human rights. 919 During the last meeting
before the first encounter between a British Foreign Secretary and an Iranian Foreign
915 IRNA, 22 July, 1998; IRNA, 25 July, 1998
916 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”,
917 Interview with Former Deputy Foreign Minister for Iran,Dr Mahmoud Vaezi, (1988-1999), (Tehran, 6
September, 2004)
918 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
919 Notes on “Diplomatic Relations between Iran and the UK in the early reform period, 1997-2000”, by
Michael Axworthy (FCO Official at the Iran Desk, 1997-2000) handed to the author on 19 June 2006
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Minister since the Iranian revolution, the British further demanded for the Iranians to
dissolve the 15th Khordad Foundation in future and cancel the bounty money. Thus, it
was believed, Khomeini’s fatwa would be allowed to gradually whither away. Following
these last meetings, the FCO was absolutely confident that the Iranian government was
intensely serious about its commitment not to implement the fatwa. Derek Fatchet
himself made it very clear to his Iranian counterparts that the British Government had put
its own credibility on the line and would never have done so unless they had been
thoroughly convinced that this was a real deal. The final proof, which Britain received
from the Iranian Foreign Ministry about its commitment, was that there had been a prior
agreement between all factions in Iran, including Khameini, to issue a joint statement at
the UN on the Rushdie Affair and to refrain from negating it publicly at any later stage.
920 The Iranian Foreign Minister, backed by the President was indeed able to manoeuvre
in such new ways because of the momentum Khatami had created since his elections. The
reformists and the Iranian Foreign Ministry had been assured that Khameini would not
interfere in this matter anymore. 921
By September, the fatwa was eventually ripe for resolution and the 1998 UN General
Assembly plenary session was used to discuss the final statement between both countries.
Rushdie’s fate was eventually discussed at the highest level between Robin Cook and
Iranian Foreign Minister Dr Kamal Kharazzi.
It should be noted that moments prior to the statement, Derek Fatchet briefed Rushdie,
Frances D’Souza and Carmel Bedford about the breakthrough of what essentially was an
assurance not to kill the author. In her diary, D’Souza described the moment when
Rushdie, who had then been in hiding for the last nine years, was told about the
resolution:
Salman took off his glasses and covered his face. He held out against a belief that this might be the
breakthrough for a full 20 minutes, he could no longer hang on to his resistance. Could he now
allow himself to think that it was all over? Despite his public anger, his refusal to compromise on his
920 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
921 Interview with Former Deputy Foreign Minister for Iran, Abbas Maleki, (Tehran, 6 September, 2004)
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writings or his dignity, he was still terribly vulnerable. His best public defence had always been a
show of spirit, aggression even, but this is just the other side of someone who bruises very easily.
Carmel was tearful, the security men looked on in sympathy and some embarrassment. I put my
arms around Salman and then Carmel. Derek, with immense tact, left the room taking his officials
with him. He returned after a decent interval with a tray full of drinks. The New York press
conference, beautifully timed, one had to admit, was about to start. 922
At the press conference Kharrazi made the public assurance that the Iranian government
would not take any action to threaten the life of Rushdie or anybody associated with his
work, and would neither encourage anyone to do so. The Iranian Foreign Minister also
dissociated the Iranian Government from the bounty on Rushdie’s life. “ Accordingly the
Government disassociates itself from any reward which has been offered in this regard
and does not support it.” Kharrazi further stated that the “ Government of the Islamic
Republic of Iran remains firmly of the belief that the prevention of insults to religious
values and beliefs will greatly contribute to mutual understanding and confidence
between the Islamic World and Europe.” He further highlighted the he “ explained to Mr
Cook the offence and distress the book The “Satanic Verses” had caused to Muslims
throughout the world, and repeated the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s
strong condemnation of this book.” 923 Cook in return affirmed the UK’s commitment to
a constructive dialogue with Iran aimed at encouraging and supporting reform. 924
Ultimately, the elements set out in the Juppé initiative three years earlier were there: The
Iranian Government would not itself, nor encourage anyone else to carry out the fatwa
and it distanced itself from the bounty.925 The wording by Kharrazi whilst reflecting
careful manoeuvring in order to meet domestic constituent’s expectations went further
922 Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
923 The New York Times, 24 September, 1998; House of Commons, Hansard, 28 October, 1998, Column
199
924 House of Commons, Session 2000-2001, Foreign Affairs Committee, 2nd Report, Iran: Interim Report,
Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 30 January 2001, HC 80, p. 4; It should also be noted that
during the discussion Kharrazi informally approached Cook and asked whether the British Council could
be re-established in Iran as the Iranian Ministry for Higher Education felt the need for the British Council
to resume its works after it was forced to leave following the Iranian revolutions. Considering demographic
trends in Iran, the Council was seen as vital by the Iranians to cope with demand by students to learn
English and sit their English tests required for university entrance in the US and UK. Interview with Dr.
Mehrdad Zarinegad, Science Project Manager, British Council, (Tehran, 25 August, 2004)
925 House of Commons, Hansard, 28 October, 1998, Column 199
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than ever before. Most significantly, there was no reiteration of the validity of the fatwa.
With the press statement, both Ministers had ultimately closed a chapter in British-
Iranian relations, which in many ways was unique in international relations, as essentially
a book constituted the reason behind the break of relations. After an agreed monitoring
period during which British Intelligence indicated that Iranians kept true to their word
ambassadors were exchanged in May 1999926. On Rushdie’s express wish, the Rushdie
Defence Committee was dissolved in October 1998.927
Following the resolution, the British government was finally able as Viscount Waverly
put it “to plot a clear future path together [with Iran] – developing political and practical
cooperation.” What was the first expression of the mutual reward for the resolution was
the creation of a joint chamber with the Iran Chamber of Commerce, which aimed to pool
business communities from the UK and Iran. 928 During the period from April 1999 to
March 2000, the DTI also supported five outward missions and three exhibitions in Iran.
The Government also actively supported the formation of the British-Iranian Chamber of
Commerce and established an investment, promotion and protection agreement, which
was designed to provide UK investors with added confidence to invest in Iran.929
By the year 2000, limited term ECGD had been resumed. A bilateral agreement on
construction ventures had been agreed and negotiation on an Investment Promotion and
Protection Agreement started.930 Investment in the oil and gas sector was the real
“reward” for Iran and soon after the exchange of ambassadors, a number of British
companies such as Shell, BG, BP and LASMO started to actively pursue major business
interests offered by the Iranians under the buy-back scheme. In 2000, the first British
firm, Shell Exploration, an affiliate of the Dutch-Anglo Royal Dutch/Shell Group was
awarded a project under this scheme to develop two oil fields at a total cost of $ 800
926 House of Commons, Hansard, 21 May, 1999, Column 457
927 House of Commons, Session 2000-2001, Foreign Affairs Committee, 2nd Report, Iran: Interim Report,
HC 80 (13 February, 2001) p.4; Baroness Frances D'Souza’s diary of “Fighting the Fatwa”
928 House of Lords, Hansard, 11 November, 1998, Column 825
929 ibid, Column: 834
930 House of Commons, Session 2000-2001, Foreign Affairs Committee, 2nd Report, Iran: Interim Report, p.
5
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million. 931 In July 2000 BG also concluded a joint-venture agreement with the Oil
Industry Engineering and Construction Company (OIEC) to build gas liquefaction
facilities. The $ 1 billion project was initiated to produce liquid natural gas for the Iran-
Pakistan-India pipeline, which went on stream in 2006. The annual export capacity of the
two sites stand at 6 millon to 7 million tons of LNG. 932 In February 2001, BP, Reliance
and the NIOC endorsed a memorandum of understanding to undertake a feasibility study
on the building of an 8 million ton liquefied natural terminal in Iran. The two foreign
partners would each hold a 25% stake in the project and the remainder will go to NIOC.
933
Given Britain’s history in the Iranian oil market the British entry into the Iranian market
proved not to be without hurdles and tough negotiations between these firms and the
NIOC were lying ahead. What was evident was that political negotiations had ended and
opened the way for business negotiations, which quite often failed to offer lucrative
conditions for foreign investors. In fact, British exports between Britain and Iran actually
declined between 1997 and 1999 by 14 % falling from $ 649 million in 1997 to $559
million in 1998 to $395 million in 1999. 934 From 1999 onwards, Britain also ceased the
import of crude oil from Iran. 935 For the FCO the minor positive aspect of this
development was that the figures were a good answer to critics in Britain who accused
the government of selling out human rights for the sake of trade. 936 On the contrary,
human rights had become a fundamental guiding principle for Britain in its relations with
Iran. As will be shown in the period 2000-2004, it was the promotion of human rights and
the genuine attempt on the part of Britain and the EU to support the reformist agenda,
931 ibid
932 Iran Focus Vol. 13 No. 9, October, 2000 (Mehr–Aban 1379), p.3; The green light for the pipeline had
been given by the Pakistani government a months prior to BG’s deal. see Iran Focus Vol. 13 No 6, June,
2000, (Khordad–Tir 1379), p. 4
933 Iran Focus ( March 2001 Esfand 1379–Farvardin 1380) Volume 14 Number 3 p. 3; The most lucrative
aspect of BP’s re-entry into the Iranian market, however, was its cooperation with Castroil to produce GTX
motor oil in Iran for the world market. Interview with Farzin Aram, Country Representative for BP in Iran,
28. August 2004, Tehran
934 IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics – Yearbook 2003, p. 112
935 United Nations, 1999 Energy Statistics, p.180, p.182; United Nations, 2001 Energy Statistics Yearbook,
(New York, United Nations, 2004), p. 180
936 Notes on “Diplomatic Relations between Iran and the UK in the early reform period, 1997-2000”, by
Michael Axworthy (FCO Official at the Iran Desk, 1997-2000)
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which was a top item on the agenda of the comprehensive dialogue. Between 1989-1998,
Britain had been the only EU member states which was committed to constructive
engagement based on conditional diplomacy. Coupled with political will on both sides, in
the end, it was this strategy, which eventually managed to resolve the Rushdie issue. As
will be shown, with the launch of the comprehensive dialogue, the years 2000-2004
witnessed a unified EU stance on this matter.
6. Conservative Backlash
Whilst conservative elements refrained from jeopardizing Khatami’s diplomatic
breakthrough with Britain, the domestic scene witnessed a backlash against private and
public constituents of the reformist movement. The short period of freedom of speech in
post-revolutionary Iran was thus obstructed before it would have become a serious
political threat to the elite. Soon criticism of the government was interpreted by the
judiciary as “treason” and certain political publications labelled as “activities against
national security.” 937 Kadivar’s arrest in 1999 938 reflected the overall counter-offensive
launched by the judiciary, which backed the conservative majority in parliament and the
political establishment close to Khameini. In June, 1999, the Majlis eventually passed
new legislation that clamped down even further on the press. Ignoring the constitutional
clauses about press rights and freedoms 939, the legislation instituted a stricter degree of
legal censorship. It placed the press under the jurisdiction not of the Press Courts but of
the Revolutionary Courts and the Special Clergy Court. Under the new law, journalists
and publishers were also required to reveal their sources. Moreover, responsibility for
published material extended beyond the publisher to include photographer, editors and
journalists. The new legislation which further diluted the reformists’ control over
facilitating free public debate was, according to the reformist newspaper Salam, initiated
by Sai’id Emami, the former Intelligence Vice Minister. 940 What was more, however,
was that prior to such legal amendments to restrain freedom of speech, Emami had been a
937 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/32, paragraph 13
938 Kadivar was arrested on charges of “acting to weaken” the Islamic system and undermining the regime
939 see UN Doc. E/CN.4/1999/32, paragraph 15; paragraph 19
940 Ramin Karimiam and Sha’banali Bahrampur, “Iran Press Update”, Middle East Report, No. 212
(Autumn, 1999), pp.38-39
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key figure in the 1998 series of assassinations of several intellectuals and dissidents in
Iran. It was evident that the voices of dissent had reached such a degree that it was no
longer tolerable to the establishment. In 1997 and 1998, several prominent figures
disappeared and were later found dead. Amongst them were Daryush and Parvaneh
Forouhar (leading nationalist figures), who were murdered in their homes (November,
1998) and authors Mohammad Ja’far Puyandeh and Mohammand Mokhtari, who were
the founders of the Writers Association, who were also found to have been killed
violently. Ebrahim Zalzadeh, editor of the monthly magazine Me’yar was also reported
killed by officials of MOIS. The killing followed after Mey’ar had to be shut down for
publishing an article criticising the government. 941
The British, recognizing the changes that had been occurring in Iran, managed to read
between the lines and interpreted these serial murders as an attempt by the hardliners
within the Ministry of Information and Security to confront and discredit the new
President. 942 Whilst the British were still convinced that Khatami was someone to do
business with, it was raised at the EU level which immediately condemned “the
disappearances and killings of dissidents in Iran.” and “recognised the commitment of the
Government […] to investigate these incidents.” 943 Remarkably, Khatami’s enquiry into
the murders, which was backed by public pressure and liberal editorial serials, which
defended him as “the last chance for the survival and development of the Islamic
revolution”, eventually, produced the confession by the Intelligence Ministry. 944 In an
unprecedented move of transparency and accountability, the Ministry of Intelligence
issued a statement, in which it admitted. “With much regret, a number of our
941 MECS, Vol. XXII, 1998, p. 258; By 1998, the establishment of several professional press associations
had been an important milestone concerning freedom of speech. Founded in 1997, it had 1000 members by
1998 and had been actively engaged in defending the rights of journalists and in criticising some of the
procedures used against them. see also Interim Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic
Republic of Iran UN Doc. A/54/365, 21 September, 1999, paragraphs 39- 44; see also Report of the Special
Rapporteur, Mr Bacre Waly Ndiaye, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution
1997/61, UN Doc.E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.1 19 December 1997, paragraph 224 (b)
942 Notes on “Diplomatic Relations between Iran and the UK in the early reform period, 1997-2000”, by
Michael Axworthy (FCO Official at the Iran Desk, 1997-2000)
943 Bulletin EU 12-1998, Common Foreign and Security Policy (13/23) paragraph 1.3.12. Presidency
Statement on behalf of the European Union on the disappearances and killings of dissidents in Iran
944 Behzad Yaghmaian, Social Change in Iran- An Eyewitness account of dissent, defiance, and new
movements for rights, p. 130
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irresponsible, devious, and wilful colleagues in the ministry [who were] used as tools by
unknown [foreign] agents in furthering their cause, were among those committing these
crimes.” 945 For the first time in post-revolutionary Iran, the press had been effectively
used against the state machinery. Though it was a modest success for the advancement of
civil society in Iran, the British government judged that Khatami had strengthened both
his own position and the reform process. Overall, Whitehall appreciated that the
executive’s efforts at international rapprochement, now more than ever before, was
obstructed by conservative-rightist forces in the system. 946 Following the resolution of
the Rushdie affair, Khatami’s administration, in an effort to promote freedom of speech,
continuously expressed concern at efforts by the judiciary to limit free expression. On
one occasion Khatami himself declared that the “closure of certain journals and the trial
of some of the persons involved was a great loss for the system and society.” 947
Following the new legislation passed by parliament in 1998, the general courts (in
particular Tehran Branch 1410), the revolutionary courts and clerical courts had all
asserted jurisdiction over newspapers and their publishers. The legislated press control
system, as vested in the Constitution, which has its own tribunal had thus been
completely substituted. In fact one judge went so far as to bring the Press Tribunal to the
brink of being dysfunctional. Whilst the judge was reprimanded for dismissing five of the
Press Tribunal jurors, he was not removed and managed to challenge the integrity of this
body by insisting on sitting in with the jury during consultations. 948 In addition to courts
increasingly taking on the authority of closing publications and prosecuting journalists
for obvious political motives, the Majlis also continued to work against the executive’s
efforts to allow greater public debate. A bill, which addressed the definition of political
offences, had been drafted so broadly as to constitute a carte blanche for more severe
repressive measures to be taken against the press. 949
945 ibid, p. 131
946 Notes on “Diplomatic Relations between Iran and the UK in the early reform period, 1997-2000”, by
Michael Axworthy (FCO Official at the Iran Desk, 1997-2000)
947 Report of the Special Representative, Maurice Danby Copithorne, submitted pursuant to Commission
resolution 1999/13, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/35 18 January, 2000, paragraph 10
948 ibid, paragraph 11
949 ibid, paragraph 12
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The most serious backlash against public dissent, however, came in 1999 in the form of
raids upon student dormitories at the University of Tehran following large-scale
demonstrations in Tehran and Tabriz in which up to 1500 students had been arrested. In
the Special Representative’s view, many facets of their arrest, trials and subsequent
detention were in clear violation of international human rights standards. Four students
were sentenced to death for organising the demonstrations, however, their sentences were
subsequently commuted to various forms of imprisonment. Also two thirds of the 1500
arrested had been released by 2000.950 Following pressure by the government and public
alike, the instigators of the attack on the dormitories were eventually taken to court.
Twenty policemen and senior officers had to disclose the conduct of the police and
unnamed and uncharged paramilitary forces. Whilst the judge found that “the incident
had taken place on the whole as charged by the students and that 34 of them should be
compensated from state funds.” The judge, however, acquitted all but two of the accused.
951 Overall, during Khatami’s first term, two trends seem apparent. The government
explicitly promoted the exercise of free speech and critical public discourse and, in fact,
saw it as a prerequisite for genuine democracy in Iran. The judiciary, backed by the
conservative-right dominated legislature, responded with draconian new press regimes.
However, since much of Khatami’s authority stemmed from legitimacy and enjoyed
widespread support amongst the Iranian electorate, the government did manage to openly
challenge both the increasingly sweeping jurisdiction and extraordinary procedural
freedom which the courts had given themselves, as well as the traditional impunity
enjoyed by state security forces and non-state paramilitaries.
7. Conclusion:
Under Khatami’s first term the right to freedom of speech was explicitly being advocated
by the executive. Since the advancement of civil society and promotion of human rights
had been part of Khatami’s political agenda, his cabinet members and the President
himself frequently openly pleaded for freedom of expression and condemned the
950 ibid, paragraphs 62-63 ; Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights
on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Doc. A/55/363, 8 September, 2000,
paragraph 16
951 UN Doc. A/55/363, 8 September 2000, paragraph 18
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judiciary’s increased jurisdiction over the press. It was also evident that the judiciary and
security forces increasingly took over the role as agents of the conservative-right and
establishment to maintain the political status quo. This was largely due to the fact that
during the first term of Khatami, the press and intellectual public discourse had reached
such political momentum as to pose a serious threat to the political system. Thus, it can
be concluded that the executive promoted the right to freedom of speech without being
able to actually grant full respect of this right. Unable to fully control all organs and
agents of the state, only the government respected the right to freedom of speech whilst
the judiciary and security forces continued with “legal” (mainly through unconstitutional
and politically motivated court trials in violation of international human rights standards)
and violent measures respectively to crack down on the press and dissidents in the public
sphere. Concerning the protection of the right to freedom of expression, the Majlis,
dominated by the conservative-right factions, constituted a hostile legislature towards the
executive and rather than passing bills in support of the right to free speech, passed
legislation and amendments which gave various courts, most notably the Revolutionary
Courts, jurisdiction over the press. This created an environment in which legally defined
defamation ceased to be distinguished from politically incorrect and critical points of
views and judges took over the authority of closing down publications and sentencing
journalists based on their political agenda rather than according to Iranian Law and
certainly not in line with international human rights standards.
The resolution of the Rushdie case built on previous efforts by the Iranian and British
government, but also reflected the fact that newly elected government emerged in both
countries. Khatami sent all the right signals of sustainable détente with the West in
general and with Britain in particular, as well as showed genuine commitment to
domestic reform. On the whole, however, the successful resolution of the fatwa was due
to Britain’s commitment to constructive engagement. Rather than rushing into fully re-
establishing political and economic relations with the Iranians, Whitehall demanded
meaningful commitments on the part of the Iranians to ensure Rushdie’s safety. Aware of
the Two-Level Game the Iranian counterparts had to play diplomats in the FCO used
asymmetries in British-Iranian interdependence as economic incentives in order to extract
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formal assurances to withdraw support for the fatwa. The Iranians eventually reciprocated
these offers when they modified Iran’s economic framework so that foreign investment
and foreign oil firms could enter the Iranian market. In line with the model of
constructive engagement: due to the political momentum the “internationalist forces”
enjoyed during Khatami’s first term, they managed to agree to a “win-set” with the
isolationist camp which was also acceptable to the British during Level I negotiations. In
the end, both sides managed to reach a win-win outcome, which resulted in mutual
rewards for both sides.
The fatwa, however, never ceased to be an issue in Iran’s religious circles. Senior clerics,
including Khamenei continue to denounce Rushdie as a man who had insulted the name
of the prophet and who can therefore be killed. However, following the resolution of the
Rushdie affair, which closed an exceptional chapter in British-Iranian relations, such
rhetoric remained largely within the context of religious sermons and never translated
into government policy.
What also has been shown is that Britain’s commitment to constructive engagement was
by and large confined to solving the Rushdie affair and conditional diplomacy concerning
the promotion of human rights in general did not manifest itself until the Human Rights
Dialogue within the context of the EU Comprehensive Dialogue with Iran in the period
between 2000-2004.
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Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable
A. It was a strategy of constructive
engagement that managed to resolved the
Rushdie affair.
The British government offered a variety of
incentives in exchange for a resolution of
the fatwa.
A strategy of TFT resulted in a win-win
outcome for both parties: economic rewards
were exchanged for Iranian concessions on
the fatwa and British firms were able to
invest in the Iranian market.
B. Britain enjoyed a relative asymmetrical
relationship with Iran, which allowed
Whitehall to launch a new unilateral
diplomatic initiative.
Iran’s significant dependence on rents from
its hydrocarbon sector vis-à-vis Britain’s
relative energy self-sufficiency coupled with
the offer of technology transfer allowed
policymakers in Whitehall to initiative
“cooperative moves”, i.e. demanding
concessions and offering incentives in
exchange.
Iran reciprocated first economically (legal
framework for foreign investment) and then
offered credible and meaningful political
concessions concerning the fatwa.
C. NA NA NA
D. Level I negotiations were subject to
domestic constituents. Iranian diplomacy
concerning the fatwa was a reflection of
changes occurring in domestic politics
a) NA NA
b) All domestic camps support Level II
“win-sets”. “Internationalists” (i.e.
reformists) enjoyed more influence over
“isolationists” (i.e. conservatives, radicals)
Because of the popular momentum Khatami
enjoyed, rival factions refrained from
interfering in the government’s diplomatic
initiatives. Europe’s decision to engage
peacefully also contributed to the
empowerment of the reformists on the
international level.
The Iranian government was able to agree to
a “win-win” outcome with the British
government.
However, following the resolution, the
domestic scene witnessed a conservative
backlash against reformists.
Constructive Engagement: Hypotheses and Variables
CHAPTER SEVEN
Table 5
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE COMPREHENSIVE DIALOGUE: THE YEARS 2000-2004
1. Introduction
In 1999, the European Union considered entering into negotiations with Iran for a Trade
and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which it needed as a legal framework for its dealings
with Third Countries. By 2000, member states, most notably Britain, increased pressure
on the Commission to move towards such a TCA. The rationale behind the TCA was to
extract trade concessions from Iran, to demand economic and judicial reform and later
expanded its agenda to include issues such as the NPT. It was an attempt by the EU to
translate its economic power into political leverage. By offering the Trade and
Cooperation Agreement as an incentive for such political and economic concessions, the
EU wanted to create a stake for Iran which would tie the country closer to the EU both
politically as well as economically.952 Given Khatami’s rhetoric of détente and reform, it
was believed that by drawing Iran into a cooperation agreement, the EU would assist the
reformist agenda by tilting the balance of interests and encourage moderate policies and
improve the human rights situation in the country. 953 In 2001, a communication from the
Commission was eventually sent to the Council demanding a mandate for a TCA.
However, post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy, which classified Iran as part of an axis of evil,
ultimately dampened enthusiasm amongst member states to move towards closer
contractual relations with that country. In the end, however, it was the British government
which pushed for the mandate, provided that benchmarks for improvements in Iranian
behaviour were clearly expressed in the TCA proposal. In order to avoid alienating the
Americans, who continued with their policy of containment against Iran, as well as
having learnt lessons from the policy of diffuse linkage during the Critical Dialogue,
political conditions were clearly expressed in the proposal. 954
952 Interview with EU Commission Official, Commission of the European Union, Director for External
Relations with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, (Chief Negotiator for the TCA with Iran ) St
Andrews, 5 March, 2005
953 ibid
954 ibid
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2. The Framework and Strategy of the Comprehensive Dialogue
In its final communiqué sent to the Council, the Commission recognized the changes that
were taking place. It noted that the parliamentary elections in April 2000 witnessed
another victory for the reformist faction and recognized that Khatami continued to pursue
a peaceful civil and economic evolution within the existing political framework of the
Islamic Republic. 955 With regards to freedom of expression, the communiqué noted that
that matters had deteriorated under the previous parliament (dominated by the Militant
Clergy Association and other factions on the right) as it succeeded in adopting a more
restrictive press law before the February elections. Following this new legislation, more
than 20 reformist journals and magazines had been closed and their editors put on trial or
indicted. Moreover, following the reformists’ victory at the 2000 Majlis elections,
Khameini intervened to bloc a new progressive Press Bill from being debated in
parliament. 956 Given the fact that Khatami had made press freedom and judicial reform a
priority for his administration, the British government as well as the EU recognized that
the judiciary under Ayatollah Ali-Hashini Sharoudi remained a formidable instrument of
the conservatives. 957 However, the communiqué further assessed that “despite the mixed
955 Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 7/2/2001, COM (2001) 71 Final, Communication
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “EU Relations with the Islamic
Republic of Iran”, p.4; Concerning the improvement of human rights standards, the British government
appreciated that Khatami’s policies were being blocked by radical elements in Iran as Lord Moynihan put:
“It is true that rapid progress has not been made towards President Khatami’s goal of a tolerant and law
abiding society in which human rights are respected. This is not least because Iran stands at a critical
crossroads between the demands of conservative elements who would isolate Iran and take her backwards,
and reformists who would modernise and take her forward.” House of Lords, Hansard, 22 June 1999,
Column 864. Since the reestablishment of relations in 1999, Britain continued to push for tangible
improvements in human rights in Iran. Whilst Whitehall noted the Iranian government’s commitment to
building civil society based on the respect for the rule of law, it continued to take up with the Iranians
directly significant cases of human rights abuses. Two of which were the trial of 13 Jews in Shiraz for
alleged charges of spying for Israel as well as the trial of intellectuals participating in the Berlin
Conference. Despite vocal opposition by Britain and the EU both cases received harsh and what the
Europeans considered legally unjustified and solely politically motivated verdicts. House of Lords,
Hansard, 22 June 1999, Column 867; House of Commons, Hansard, 14 July, 1999, Column 320-325;
House of Commons, Hansard, 12 July, 2000, Column 229- 230 WH
956; Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 7/2/2001, COM (2001) 71 Final,
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, p.4
957 ibid, p.4p; see also House of Commons, Hansard, 18 July, 2000, Column 199
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picture […] the prospects for positive and gradual political evolution are better than they
have been since 1979.” 958
For Britain, the Comprehensive Dialogue and in particular the Human Rights Dialogue,
with the parallel running TCA negotiations as incentive, was considered as a viable
strategy to improve rights standards in Iran. The key incentive during the Critical
Dialogue was, according to the British, contact itself, that is for Iran to gain international
legitimacy and to be accepted as a power. The phase between 2000-2004, however, was
seen by Whitehall as crucial for Britain to actively empower reformist factions within
Iran. More than any other EU member state, the British government emphasized that
good relations could not be an end in itself. 959 As such it was made clear that the
deepening of economic and political relations between the EU and Iran should be
matched by similar progress in all other aspects of relations with Iran.
In particular, the EU was expecting significant positive developments on four areas of
concern: human rights, non-proliferation, support for radical groups and the Middle East
Peace Process. Reflecting this commitment, the Council adopted its recommendation on
the Iran policy based on following approach:
 Encouragement of political and economic reform through
- more frequent official and unofficial bilateral contracts.
- development of exchange/co-operation in areas of mutual interest and concern (such as drugs,
rule of law, refugees etc).
- readiness to engage in dialogue on human rights.
- strengthening the CFSP dialogue by deepening the dialogue in areas such as regional
security, weapons of mass destruction , nuclear proliferation).
- seeking appropriate ways of developing people to people contacts.
 Promotion of bilateral economic relations through
– negotiation of a Trade and Co-operation Agreement.
958 ibid
959 Interview with FCO Official “C”
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– continuation of Commission – Iran working groups on energy, trade and investment. 960
From an EU capitalist perspective, by strengthening Iranian economic capabilities, the
objective was to incorporate Iran more closely into the EU and international trade market.
Essentially, the aim was to increase political and economic interdependence between the
EU and Iran (as an expression of Europe’s transformative power) to such an extent that
Europe would be able to determine the political agenda in this relationship.
In terms of statecraft, the EU presented Iran with a much-needed political and economic
carrot. Politically, the TCA offered Iran a legal framework for diplomatic and increased
political relations with the EU. Economically, the Iranians welcomed the TCA
negotiations in order to secure more non-oil exports to the EU, increased foreign direct
investment from member states and more joint venture projects. 961 In fact, since the EU
was seen by all political factions as the only reliable provider of technology and capital,
some pragmatists and institutions associated with oil and energy went so far as to
advocate rapprochement with the US in order to reduce this dependency on European
economic might. 962
The principles agreed to engage in a genuine human rights dialogue with Iran was that it
was established without prejudice to the tabling of a resolution at the Third Committee of
the UN General Assembly or the UN Commission on Human Rights. The Iranians agreed
that all human rights issues can be discussed, each party can choose to terminate the
dialogue at any time and that the dialogue was based on realistic and concrete
benchmarks to evaluate progress. These benchmarks included, inter alia, Iran’s signing,
ratification and implementation of international human rights instruments; cooperation
with international human rights procedures and mechanisms; openness and transparency;
the fight against discrimination and improvement to the prison system. 963
960 Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 7/2/2001, COM (2001) 71 Final, pp.8-9
961 Statement by Shamsedin Khargani, Iranian Foreign Ministry – Director for Western Europe, IRNA, 28
October, 2002
962 Iran Focus, Vol.13, No. 100, November, 2000, (Aban-Azar 1379), p. 13
963 Interview with Catherine Magnant, European Commission - External Relations
Human Rights & Democratization Unit, April, 13, 2005; Council of the European Union, EU Annual
Report on Human Rights 2003, Doc No. 13449/03, Brussels, 10 October, 2003, p.39
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The strategy behind the dialogue was a multi-track approach as the format of the dialogue
consisted of a round-table and a restricted officials’ meeting. The round-table included, in
both the Iranian and EU delegations, academics, experts and members of civil society,
including representatives of some of the major international human rights NGOs, as well
as the Iranian Islamic Human Rights Commission. Representatives of the Iranian
government, judiciary, and parliament also took part in the roundtable. The restricted
officials’ meeting immediately followed the round-table and was conducted by the EU
Troika, the Iranian government and judiciary. Between 2002 and 2004, two sessions a
year were held in Brussels and Tehran. 964 During the talks, the Europeans were
demanding specific structural changes and new legislation for the protection of human
rights. Between these roundtables, EU member states coordinated carefully to monitor
alleged violations of human rights. On a regular basis, the German and British embassies
invited European NGOs and human rights experts, which as a German diplomat said,
“are able to confront the Iranian government on alleged violations without constraints.”965
These Track II initiatives were also meant to show to the Iranians that EU member states
themselves are subject to scrutiny by NGOs, as well as intended to encourage joint
ventures with Iranian Human Rights NGOs in order to support their technical knowledge
and advocacy work. 966
Overall, for the British, the key was to expose human rights violations and give credit to
efforts done by the reformist camp to introduce bills in the legislature aimed at protecting
political and civil rights.967 Thus, Britain’s strategy, as well as that of the EU in general,
964 The first session of the dialogue took place in Tehran in December 2002. The topics were
Discrimination and Prevention of Torture. The second session of the dialogue was held in Brussels in
March 2003, where the roundtable focused on the themes of fair trial and the rule of law. The third session
was held in Brussels in October 2003 where the topic of freedom of expression and the right to
development were discussed. The forth roundtable and last one before the Presidential election in 2005
discussed the issue of administration of justice and promotion of international cooperation and solidarity in
the field of human rights. Note on the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue given to the author by Catherine
Magnant, European Commission - External Relations Human Rights & Democratization Unit, 13 April,
2005;
965 Interview with Tjorven Bellman, 1st Secretary German Embassy in Tehran, (Tehran, 28 August, 2004)
966 ibid
967 One should bear in mind that it is not easy for British diplomats and Ministers to manoeuvre in Iranian
politics and often quite dangerous for the individual Iranian partner. It is particularly difficult for the British
FCO to establish effective working relationships or joint ventures in the political or human rights realm.
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was to name and shame Iran for any alleged human rights violations. Démarches in
particular were seen as valuable means for that purpose. The FCO knew that it may take
time until one sees results from such diplomatic communications or Council resolutions
in the form of political implementation. Appreciating the political system in Iran,
Britain’s calculation was that such pressure would stimulate like-minded agencies within
the system to lobby hardliners to respond to any such demands through a change of
policy or legislation. 968
Whilst this was certainly a viable strategy at trying to work with as well as against the
contradictory elements in Iranian politics, it also proved to be a very long-term approach
to say the least. As such, it will be shown that Europe’s decision to launch the
Comprehensive Dialogue in order to promote human rights resulted in some changes in
legislation, largely led to the depoliticising of human rights, gave Iranian NGOs and
activists a forum and voice and generally helped the human rights discourse in the
political realm to gain momentum. At the same time however, Europe’s carrots and sticks
approach was not without difficulties as the EU quite often found itself caught in the
maze of competing power centres in Iran with hardliners determined to thwart any human
rights initiative by the government or parliament. Since the roundtable, developments in
the area of freedom of expression and representations made on this subject are of more
relevance to this particular study, the other three thematic areas of concern are only
discussed briefly.
3. Roundtable on Discrimination and Prevention of Torture
Before the first Human Rights roundtable took place in Tehran criticism in Britain of the
Comprehensive Dialogue was increasingly voiced in and outside the British government.
Faced with ongoing human rights violations in Iran, Lord Clark asked whether “ the time
[had] come when we should recognise that constructive dialogue with the regime is not
bearing fruit.” He went on “It is not crumbs of comfort from diplomatic resolutions that
Any meetings with parliamentarians or academics may result in their arrest or harassment by the judiciary.
Interview with FCO Official “C”
968 ibid
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the people of Iran deserve; they want the free world to speak out loudly and firmly
against the barbaric methods of justice that the regime routinely uses in its endeavours to
cling to power.” 969 Moreover, following the post 9-11 U.S. declaration of the war on
terrorism, Britain came under pressure from the administration in Washington and on
numerous times had to defend what it now called a “twin-track approach in respect of
Iran.” A strategy, through which the UK “support[s] reform in Iran while maintaining a
robust dialogue on matters of concern, such as human rights and weapons of mass
destruction.” 970 What Britain and the EU, at that time, needed, however, were results
stemming from the dialogue.
Thus, during the first roundtable, which was preceded by negotiations over the directives
for the TCA 971 and the initial financing of some operations aimed to strengthen
transparency with 298,514 € , 972 the EU Troika focused on what it called “ the systematic
discrimination against women and girls, as well as against minorities” and recalled “its
longstanding position against the use of the death penalty […] and cruel forms of
executions such as stoning. “ 973 As the UN Special Representative noted, the status of
women in the Islamic Republic had over the years shown steady improvements in some
respects such as education, but witnessed no change in the “foundational, legalized
discrimination faced by women almost across the board.” 974 In this regard, the EU
delegation encouraged existing groups within Iran who were pressing to ratify UN
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). It
reminded the Iranian delegation that one of the ideas challenged by CEDAW was in fact
rooted in Iranian domestic law, that of a natural and desirable separation between men
and women. Emphasising that such divisions were culturally constructed rather than
969 House of Lords, Hansard, 25 April, 2001, Column 259
970 Statement by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for State and Foreign Commonwealth Affairs (Mr.
Mile O’Brien) House of Commons, Hansard, 23 July, 2002: Column, 845; Much of these demands from
the Bush administration soon translated into Britain’s Middle East policy to be more aligned with the U.S.
than with the rest of the EU. In many ways international security concerns over the Iranian nuclear
programme took precedence over human security in Iran.
971 Bulletin of the European Union, 6- 2002 paragraph1.6.78 Council conclusions on Iran
972 Bulletin of the European Union, 12 – 2002 paragraph1.2.10 Financing of operations to promote
democracy and human rights
973 see Bulletin of the European Union, 10- 2002 paragraph 1.2.4 Council conclusions on human rights in
Iran
974 UN Doc. A/56/278, Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, p.5
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enjoyed religious authority, the ratification of CEDAW would ultimately necessitate a
change in some principles of Iranian law and society and would provide women with
equal footing in the labour market and public sphere. 975 More generally, concerning the
issue of discrimination of national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, the EU
delegation urged the government to establish a national minorities policy and explained
numerous legal provisions against discrimination. 976 Such demands and concerns voiced
during negotiations reflected the Special Rapportuer’s concern, who referred to the
treatment of minorities in Iran as contrary to international norms and called it a “implicit
policy of assimilation”. 977 With regard to the use of torture, the delegation tried to urge
the Iranian government to ratify the UN Convention Against Torture and its Optional
Protocol but also emphasised that the prohibition of torture is a rule of customary
international law and therefore, binding on all states irrespective of whether they have
ratified any of the principal treaties.978 As Malcom Evans put it during the roundtable:
“Indeed, the individual criminal responsibility of those who are responsible for torture
has attained the status of a peremptory norm of international law (ius cogens) meaning
that it takes precedence over other rules of customary international law or treaty law […]
setting it apart as one of the fundamental principles on which the international
community is founded.” 979 These demands for changes in legislation and the emphasis
on personal accountability and responsibility for offences involving torture was indeed
reflected in legislation debated in the Iranian parliament. Prior to the roundtable a
substantial majority of the Majlis signed a petition identifying a number of acts of torture
that occur during the interrogation of prisoners and called for the creation of a council of
representatives of the judiciary, the legislature and the executive to supervise the
975 Danish Institute for Human Rights, Collected Papers From the First Roundtable Under the EU-Iran
Human Rights Dialogue, Tehran, 16-17 December 2002 “Discrimination and Prevention of Torture”,
(Copenhagen, Danish Institute for Human Rights, Copenhagen, 2003) (handed to the author by the Danish
Institute for Human Rights), pp.67-68
976 ibid, pp.47-48
977 Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/42, 16
January, 2002, paragraph 67
978 The EU Troika also pointed to Art. 38 of the Iranian Constitution which clearly prohibits the use of
torture
979 Collected Papers From the First Roundtable Under the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue, Tehran, 16-17
December 2002, p. 90
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treatment of prisoners, with the right to visit places of detention at any time and the duty
to report any act of torture to these three branches of government. 980
Overall, the agenda of reformist representatives at the roundtable was precisely to show
the parliament’s and Khatami’s efforts and the impediments his faction was facing in
implementing any such reforms. In fact, the first roundtable provided Khatami’s group
with a forum for voicing his determination to demand more presidential authority.
Coinciding with a bill presented by Khatami asking for more power for the president to
oversee the implementation of the constitution in October 2002, former Guardian Council
member, Hossein Mehrpour stressed Art. 113 of the Constitution during the roundtable
and emphasised the president’s responsibility at safeguarding and implementing the
constitution. Khatami’s argument centred on his conviction that in order to implement the
Constitution and hence safeguard the rule of law and human rights he will need
instruments to enforce constitutional provisions and penalise breaches of the constitution.
One of these instruments proposed in the bill was the creation of a “Constitutional Court”
overseen by the President with jurisdiction over state officials, including judicial figures.
The impact of the bill would have provided the president with the authority to take those
state authorities and individuals to court that undermine national interests in violation of
constitutional provisions. 981 The second bill proposed by Khatami was aimed at
abolishing the so-called Approbatory Supervision – the right that has been used by the
Guardian Council to disqualify candidates for elections. 982
Generally, the roundtable in 2002 coincided with a new phase and discourse in Iran’s
reform era. Vowing to bring about change not through revolutionary means but through
legal reform and détente, Khatami had, however, reached a stalemate. The parallel
institutions, most notably the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, representing the
underlying dichotomy between dogma and Khatami’s notion of political progress and
accountability, 983 had prevented the President from implementing his reformist agenda.
980 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/42, 16 January, 2002, paragraph 31
981 see Iran Focus, Vol. 15 No. 9, October 2002, (Mehr-Aban 1381). pp. 2-3
982 Both bills were presented to the Majlis on 24 September 2002, see IRNA, 25 September, 2002
983 see Mohammad Khatami Hope and Challenge – The Iranian President Speaks, pp. 26-27
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Ironically, the President himself was to blame for the deadlock. Since 2000, Khatami had
been under pressure from two groups. His reformist allies, who have been pushing for
him to take an active stance against the hardliners and have time and again approached
the President to shift to a more confrontational approach, for that they argued would be
the only language Iran’s nomenklatura would understand.984 The other group, which has
been lobbying the President to stay aligned with their agenda, could be referred to as
mainstream conservatives. Consisting of a number of political groups and individuals,
they tried to talk Khatami into accepting a more gradual top-down reform process that
would still be controlled by the political establishment.985 Taking advantage of Khatami’s
vow to adhere lawfulness, constitutionalism and a non-confrontational, approach the
latter group managed for much of the President’s first term (until 2002) to ensure a
somewhat political hegemony for themselves, thwarting the reform process and thus
alienating the people from the reformists. Hence, the launch of the EU Human Rights
Dialogue has to be seen against this domestic background. It coincided with a juncture
when Khatami had become determined to change the political status quo in the country
and together with the parliament wanted to find in the words of Deputy Majlis Speaker
Mohammad Reza Khatami – “legal solutions to [Iran’s] problems.” 986 Particularly with
regards to human rights legislation demanded by the Europeans, lawmakers in parliament
(6th Majlis) showed, as a MP put, it “vigour and eagerness to take charge of foreign and
domestic policy matters and adopted rational perceptions and solutions to the political
and economic difficulties Iran was facing.” 987 Following the roundtable, the Parliament
passed a bill on the ban of torture which was rejected for the second time by the Guardian
Council, despite the fact it had been amended by the Parliament in December to meet the
Guardian Council’s requirement.988 It was not until April 2004 and after renewed
984 This would have entailed the public naming and shaming of unlawful practices by conservative elements
by Khatami himself as well as the call for a public referendum on constitutional changes and crucial pieces
of legislation.
985 Iran Focus, Vol. 15 No. 9, October 2002, (Mehr-Aban 1381), pp. 3-4
986 ibid
987 Interview with Elaie Koualie, Former Member of the Iranian Parliament (6th Majlis), (Tehran, 27 August
2005)
988 see Iran Focus, Vol. 16, No. 5, May 2003, (Ordibehesht-Khordad 1382), p. 14
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pressure from the EU 989 that Ayatollah Sharoudi announced the ban and the subsequent
renewed passage of related legislation by the Parliament, which was eventually approved
by the Guardian Council in May 2004. 990 Concerning the demands by the EU on changes
on minorities’ legislation, the 6th Majlis approved a bill on 12 January 2003 granting non-
Muslim minorities the right to the same “blood money” as Muslims. Since Khameini had
supported the bill, the Guardian Council eventually approved it. 991 The law, which by no
means empowered Iran’s diverse minority communities also only applied to recognized
minorities, such as Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians, excluding the Bahá’ís, Iran’s
biggest religious minority. 992 Prior to this bill the Majlis deputies had also re-established
the Human Rights Committee of the Majlis 993 and established the National Committee
for the Promotion of Human Rights of Religious Minorities.994 Concerning the
advancement of women’s rights, a women parliamentary delegation from the House of
Commons visited Iran in January 2003 and made several representations with Iranian
officials to discuss the issue of gender inequality in Iranian family law. A bill, which was
passed by the Parliament granting women equal custody rights over their children was
rejected by the Guardian Council but later approved by the Expediency Council. Though
this piece of legislation certainly owes more to lobbyists and activists such as Shireen
989 Human rights problem solving workshops had been organised by the EU to discuss the ban on torture
and find alternatives to existing practices, see Interview with Achim Fabig, 1st Secretary, German Embassy
in Tehran, (Tehran, 28 August, 2004)
990 see Iran Focus, Vol. 16, No.1, January 2003, (Dey – Bahman 1831), p. 11; UN General Assembly
Resolution , UN Doc. A/C.3/60/L.45, 2 November, 2005, p. 2; The law bans any form of torture or
violence during arrest, interrogation or custody. Ayatollah Ahmad Djannati of the Guardian Council
declared in a communication to parliament that the law was in conformity with the Constitution and Islamic
principles, added, however, that torture was banned in Iran through Islamic Law anyway. Iran Report,
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.6/2004, p.8
991 The value put on the life of a Muslim man at that time in Iran was $ 19, 000, twice as much as that of a
woman. Female MPs were pressing for the bill to make women equal to men in this respect, have, however
failed so far. see Iran Report, Nr. 02/2003, pp. 8-9; After initial rejection of the bill, the Guardian Council
eventually approved of if in January 2004. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Iran – Third
Report of Session 2003-2004, House of Commons HC 80, 19 March, 2004, pp. 28-29
992 The human rights situation of the Bahá’ís far beyond the scope of this thesis, yet is of great importance
to the overall success of any human rights diplomacy pursued towards Iran. For the situation of the Baha’is
see Nazila Ghanea, Human Rights, the UN and the Baha’is in Iran
993 Also refered to as “Article 90 Committee” with reference to Article 90 of the Iranian Constitution. It
fulfils an omudsman-type role and spends much of its time investigating alleged miscarriages of justice. In
2004, the UN Working Group Arbitrary Detention noted that the Commission investigated situations of
arbitrary detention, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.2,
27 June 2003, paragraph 65 (2)
994 see Commission on Human Rights, Summary Record of the 49th Meeting, held at the Palais des Nations,
Geneva on 22 April 2002, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/SR.49, 26 April 2002, paragraph 12
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Ebadie and female Majlis Deputies than to the British delegation, it proved an important
follow-up visit after the roundtable. 995 The most significant bill passed by the Majlis,
which again directly corresponded to the benchmarks and demands by the EU, was the
Parliament’s decision to accede to CEDAW.996 On grounds that it was “against Islamic
principles” and backed by four grand ayatollahs, including Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi,
who issued a fatwa against the convention stating that it would lead to a higher divorce
rate and corruption, the Guardian Council, yet again, rejected the bill. 997 Another
significant and more sustainable development, which can be seen as a direct result from
the EU Human Rights Dialogue – though denied by Majlis deputy Jamileh Kadivar as
corresponding to EU talks – was the judiciary’s ban on death by stoning. During talks,
Commission negotiators talked in detail about cruel and inhuman forms of execution and
amputations of limps and pointed to existing bans on such practices in Iran’s statutes.
Essentially, the moratoriums by Ayatollah Sharoudi to ban death by stoning and juvenile
capital punishments were effective ways to circumvent the Council’s veto.998
4. Roundtable on the Rule of Law and Fair Trial
Before the next roundtable on the Rule of Law and Fair Trail started in Brussels in March
2003, it had become evident for the British government that demands for human rights
improvements were, yet again, caught in the factional power struggle between reformists
and hardliners. Khameini and those close to him were using the judiciary, the Guardian
Council as well as most of the senior ulema in Qom as levers of power to constrict
Khatami. Between 1997 and January 2004, when reformists lost control of the
parliament, the Guardian Council vetoed a total of 111 of Khatami’s 297 legislative
initiatives. 999 The most significant for Khatami’s own authority was the rejection of his
995 The delegation also met with Shireen Ebadie. see House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Iran
- Third Report of Session 2003-2004, House of Commons HC 80, pp.25-26. The bill also referred to the
establishment of equal divorce rights. see House of Commons, Hansard, 1 September, Column 801 W
996 Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.08/2003, p.7
997 Iran Focus, Vol. 16, No.8, September 2003, (Shahrivar – Mehr 1382), p.11
998 Interview with Commission of the European Union Official; It should be noted that after the EU had
managed to have the moratorium announced on stoning, several hardliners in the judiciary increased the
number of public hangings in towns near Tehran see Iran Focus, Vol. 16, No.1, February 2003, (Bahman-
Esfand 1381) p. 3; Interview with FCO Official “D”
999 Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran – History and the Quest for Liberty, (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2006), p. 137
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Twin Bills 1000, designed to strip the Guardian Council of its right of vetting candidates
for elections, and to grant the executive more power to implement policies.
For the diplomatic community in Tehran, one trend became increasingly obvious: The
conservatives’ tactic of limiting Khatami’s room of manoeuvre eventually had reached
such a political and economic stalemate for them to be able to accept arrangements of
economic liberalization without fear that it would endanger the ideological underpinnings
of the Islamic Republic. What diplomats referred to as the “Chinese Model” was
originally developed by the Centrist Technocrats (e.g. Kargozaran-e Sazandegi Party),
which favoured capitalist development whilst maintaining the political status quo. 1001
Essentially what presented itself to the EU, was top-down economic liberalization
without political liberalisation. An indication of this phenomenon was the conservative
establishment’s approval of some of Khatami’s economic reforms. Meeting EU demands
for the realization of the TCA, the following economic benchmarks were met: unification
of foreign currency exchange rates as pursued by the Central Bank of Iran; ratification of
the Law on Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment as well as Iran’s new
Direct Taxation Act. 1002 Yet, parallel efforts to close the lid on political liberalisation
manifested themselves on two levels: (i) a strategy to jeopardize reformist bills and
policies through the “legal process”, a role which was efficiently exercised by the
Guardian Council as well as judiciary; (ii) the intensification of systematic attacks on
Majlis Deputies, reformist intellectuals and clerics, as well as journalists by radical
vigilantes. Between 2000 and 2004, informal paramilitary groups, such as the Basiji and
Hezbollah stepped up their systematic grass-roots attacks against reform-minded
politicians and intellectuals close to Khatami. Despite the President’s open challenges to
these groups, which essentially amounted to constitutional warnings to the judiciary,1003
Ayatollah Sharoudi remained defiant and continued to pose a serious challenge to the
1000 Iran Focus, Vol.16, No.5, January 2004, (Orbibehesht-Khordad 1382), pp.12-13
1001 Interview with Roberto Tuscano, Italian Ambassador to Iran, (Tehran, 2 September 2004); Between
2000 and 2004 EU exports to Iran almost tripled as they increased from $ 4.94 billion to $14.80 billion.
International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2005, p. 36
1002 Interview with Antonio Hernandez, Spanish Embassy (speaking on behalf of the Spanish EU
Presidency in 2002) in Iran Focus, Vo.15, No.7, July-August, 2002, (Tir-Shahrivar 1381), p.7
1003 For Khatami’s strongest stance against Sharoudi see Iran Focus, Vol 14, No, 10, November, 2001,
(Aban-Azar 1380), p.12
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reformist cause. Acting through these radical and unaccountable parallel institutions, the
hardliners gradually managed to regain political momentum. Whilst the reformists had
only legitimacy as their power asset, hawks in the hardliner camp, enjoyed such an
established political, economic and military power base, for them to employ an effective
strategy of obstruction, intimidation and suppression outside the constitutional realm as
well as within the “legal process.”
Given this domestic background, it is, therefore, no coincidence that the next EU
roundtable dealt with the rule of law. In an attempt to push for an end to what it
considered the political use of the judiciary, the EU Troika was determined to establish
the basic rights of citizens as the benchmark of an independent judiciary, that through a
system of checks and balance, determines the constitutionality of policies and legislation.
However, the judiciary’s own perception of its role in governance was made candidly
obvious during Commissioner Chris Patten’s visit to Iran preceding the roundtable. 1004 In
his effort to approach the concern of rule of law via this very notion of division of power,
Khatami told him that with regards to Montesquieu, unfortunately, the government does
not have any power. Rafsanjani interpreted the idea of checks and balance as a bargaining
situation in which one can buy and sell according to leverage and demand and where rule
of law did not apply. Ayatollah Sharoudi, the head of the judiciary, simply replied that “
we don’t need to seek balance of power, the power is mine.” 1005 On 1 January 2003, just
before the roundtable and in an effort to promote basic negative rights, the parliament
approved the outlines of a law that would have made all officials accountable for
1004 Pattern explained to the Iranian FM that the reason for the EU member states refraining from tabling a
resolution at the UN General Assembly the previous year was to give the Iranians time to come up with
concrete results and improvements on concerns raised during the Dialogue. He also emphasised that the
same EU position cannot be expected for the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. For Pattern’s
speech in Tehran see “The Iranian Choice- An opportunity to embrace the Family of Nations” Speech by
the Rt. Hon Chris Pattern, Teheran, 5 February, 2003, in “Speeches and Viewpoints” The Iranian Journal of
International Affairs, The danger behind such tactic was, however, that some groups in Iran increasingly
saw engagement as an end in itself.
1005 Lecture given to the Middle East Society of the University of St Andrews by Christian Leffler,
Commission of the European Union, Director for External Relations with the Mediterranean and the
Middle East, (St Andrews, 4 March, 2004)
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violating the “personal freedom of individuals”. 1006 What was extraordinary for the
European delegation during the second roundtable was that Iranian Human Rights experts
and activists used Islamic principles and arguments to advocate the advancement of the
notion of the rule of law. 1007 The most critical statement concerning the lack of the rule
of law came from Ardeshir Amir-Arjomand whose main arguments centred on his
demand for the potential of the Constitution to be released in order to safeguard the rule
of law and protect basic human rights. Pointing to the fact that the general policies passed
by the Supreme Leader “are more goal and aspiration than a legal rule with fixed
boundaries and unconditional and specific orders and prohibitions” he emphasised that
Khameini has not been designated the legislator of the country. In fact he went so far as
to state that “legislation by one individual is strictly contradictory with both the
philosophy of the rule of law and the democratic principles of republicanism.” 1008
Referring to the close political and clientalist relationship between the Supreme Leader
and the Guardian Council and the latter’s unconstitutional prerogative of vetoing
parliamentary bills, which it deems inconsistent with “general policies”1009, he concluded:
The general policies of the system become the last and effective link in the chain of reducing […]
particularly the Islamic Consultative Assembly to the Leader’s Office and the principle of the
separation of powers to the pure and simple separation of functions […] and of transforming the rule
of law to a police state.” 1010
Iranian delegate Mohammad Rassekh made an equally authoritative contribution. Using
Islamic sources on the significance of justice in Shi’a doctrine, Rassekh argued that
according to the Islamic Mu’tazilite school of thought 1011, justice is a rational principle in
1006 According to the new law, the officials would have to be imprisoned if they violated the personal
freedoms of citizens or deprived them of rights stated in the Constitution. see Iran Focus, Vol. 16,
No.1January 2003, (Dey – Bahman 1831), p. 11
1007 see Interview with Drewery Dyke, Iran Desk Officer, Amnesty International, (London, 3 March, 2004)
1008 Danish Institute for Human Rights, Collected Papers From the Second Roundtable Under the EU-Iran
Human Rights Dialogue, Brussels, 14-15 March 2003 “Rule of Law and Fair Trial” (Copenhagen, Danish
Institute for Human Rights, 2003), p. 123
1009 referring to rulings by the Supreme Leader
1010 ibid, pp. 129-130
1011 Rassekh summarized the underlying principles of Mu’tazilism as follows: (1) the principle of
rationalism – that justice is determined by reason’ (2) the principle of voluntarism – that man’s acts are the
product of his own free will (ikhtiyar); and (3) the principle of responsibility – that man would ultimately
be rewarded or punished in accordance with his choice between justice and injustice. According to this
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the sense that it can be understood by human reason. Taking on the notion of Republican
Islamism, as vested in the Constitution, he argued that “Islamism provides us with a
license to appeal to rational theorizing as to justice while Republicanism is in fact one of
the most tenable conceptions of justice and a just state at any moment.” On this footing,
he concluded that in fact “Islamism is a restatement and reinforcement of republicanism.
Therefore, a proper reading of the Iranian Constitution authorizes us to take the
Mu’tazilite approach seriously for a republican Islam: an Islam that takes democracy and
rights seriously.” 1012
Considering the fact that the notion of the rule of law constitutes the very political
foundation of any state, the question is whether there were any results stemming from
this particular roundtable. Again, important positive developments, which met EU
demands, were the formation of two supervisory committees. Immediately following the
roundtable, the executive formed a special commission for monitoring the judiciary’s
performance. Formally approved by parliament on 3 September, 2003, the Majlis
spokesperson claimed that the commission was founded in response to numerous
complaints the deputies had received about the judiciary and its violation of the
Constitution regarding political activists and the press. 1013 The other initiative was a
response to the Guardian Council’s rejection of Khatami’s bill demanding a
Constitutional Court. Instead he founded the parliamentary Supervisory Committee for
the Implementation of the Constitution. Lacking the mandate of a Constitutional Court,
the committee adopted a mechanism to follow up individual cases of alleged human
rights violations and unconstitutional actions by state institutions, thus trying to ensure
the respect for procedural, structural and individual human rights. This entailed
representations or communications to the judiciary demanding enquiries and insisting on
the right of the accused to appear before the appeals court. Furthermore, judges were
asked to give explanations for their respective verdicts and reminded to grant fair trials
within the legal framework of the ICPCR. The Committee mostly had to deal with cases
Islamic school of thought, God would be commiting an injustice were he to punish man, devoid of
responsibility; such an act is inconceivable according to reason and is also contrary to the revealed which
stats that “God is never unjust unto his servants” (Qu’ran 8:51) , ibid, pp.164-165
1012 ibid, pp. 170-171
1013 Iran Focus, Vol. 16, No.8, September, 2003 (Sharivar-Mehr 1382), p.11
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where the hearings were not held publicly and persons were arbitrarily detained. In most
cases the committee reminded the judiciary that Iran is legally obliged to follow the two
UN covenants it ratified. By establishing this group, Khatami gave the legislative power
an additional control mechanism to scrutinize the judiciary, who often, according to the
President of the Committee, had no choice but to implement the necessary changes and
follow ups. 1014
Concerning the issue of fair trial, the British government made several representations
that acknowledged the re-establishment of the prosecutor’s office which reduced the
absolute discretion the judge was enjoying 1015 as well as the re-introduction of res
judicata, which granted referral to the Supreme Court for a second hearing. 1016 However,
in an effort to reduce the prosecutor’s power and his politicized role in the courtroom the
British engaged in a number of joint ventures with the Iranian judiciary to tackle this
issue. 1017 British efforts to depoliticize the judiciary were matched by Iranian NGOs
working to train and educate professionals in the legal fields, which contributed greatly to
the general understanding of human rights for both state officials and civil society. 1018 In
2004, the Special Prosecutor of the Clergies Court, Jaafar Ghadyani reflected on a trip to
the UN Human Rights Commission by stating that “human rights organizations pursue
1014 Interview with Hossein Mehropur, President of the Supervisory Committee for the Implementation of
the Constitution (Iranian Parliament), (Tehran 3 September, 2005)
1015 Prior to this, in most courtrooms judge and prosecutor were the same person. In some instances jury,
defence and counsel as well. Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on
the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Doc.A/56/278, paragraphs 20-21
1016 ibid, paragraph 26; It should be noted, however, that 2005, the General Assembly passed a resolution
condemning Iran for the “absence of due process of law, the refusal to provide fair and public hearings, the
denial of the right to counsel and access to counsel by those detained, the use of national security laws to
deny human rights, the harassment, intimidation and persecution of defense lawyers and legal defenders.”
UN General Assembly Resolution, UN Doc. A/C.3/60/L.45, p. 2 November, 2005; The EU, however,
welcomed the decision to separate civil and criminal courts. see Bulletin of the European Union, 3-2003,
paragraph 1.2.4
1017 Organised by FCO official Harriet Austin an Iranian judiciary delegation met with the British judiciary
in London in 2003. Interview with Drewery Dyke
1018 The most important NGO in this field is the Organisation for the Defence of Victims of Violence
(ODVV), which organises workshops for law students, judges and other judiciary officials. The training
course lasts three months and ends with a visit to UNOG. The first phase is designed to improve the
knowledge of HR. Judges have legal knowledge but often lack the expertise on HR Law. The second phase
(i.e. the visit to UNOG), particularly, deals with the misperception that human rights are a western
construct and alien to Iran and Islam. The workshop as well as the exposure to the UN system shows that
international human rights standards are not Western and are compatible with Islamic law and values.
Effectively, the main aspect and effect of this phase is to depoliticize HR issues for members of the
judiciary. Interview with ODVV Public Relations Officer Pouria Askary, (Tehran, 25, August, 25, 2005)
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truth and justice rather than follow imperialist agendas”.1019 Fifty-seven years after the
declaration of universal human rights, such conclusions are hardly spectacular and also
too late for many victims. Also, any such rhetoric is only as good as its translation into
policies and changes of legislation. It does, however, indicate the significance of
Europe’s multi-track approach of depoliticising human rights by emphasising their
universal legal value.
Overall, the roundtable confirmed that the significance of the rule of law did encourage
likeminded groups in the Iranian system to advance this cause. Again it proved a valuable
forum to point to existing statutes in the Iranian Constitution supporting human rights and
allowed activists to criticize the judiciary’s actions from within an Islamic discourse. As
shown following the roundtable, legislation was passed by parliament with the intention
of supervising the judiciary.
Overall, Khatami’s presidency was significant in that it attempted to change the rules of
the game in Iranian politics. By emphasizing accountability and rule of law, proposed and
written into legislation by the Majlis, the President bound the executive, the legislative as
well as the judiciary to the concept of legality (qanoun-mandi) and partly succeeded in
reducing the arbitrary use of power by political leaders and unelected state-institutions.
Ironically, however, to a considerable extent, the reformists became victims of their own
commitment to this concept. By focusing on the form of law, without looking at its
context, it helped foster a culture of obedience to power. By abstaining from questioning
the very foundations and structures of the Islamic Republic, the reformist project
ultimately failed to change, what one could call power based law, into rights based law.
1020
1019 The Organization for Defending Victims of Violence, Defenders, Special Issue, (Spring, 2005), p.35
given to the author by ODVV
1020 For criticism from Iranian scholars on interplay of modern law and Iranian politics, see Democracy
Activity Brief, 6-8 February, 2006, FRIDE-IWA Workshop, “The Relationship between shari’a and the
Rule of Law in Iran”, February 6-8, 2006, available on www.fride.org
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5. Roundtable on the Right to Freedom of Expression
As noted before Khatami’s election in 1997, criticism from within and outside religious
circles was quietly voiced and found certain niches in liberal publications, such as
“Kiyan”. After 1997, such critics, as well as intellectuals and critics gained enough
momentum to in fact form part of the reform discourse. Dissent ranged from high ranking
religious authorities, such as Montazeri, who argued that the Supreme Leader should be
elected directly by the people, that his mandate is by no means God given and rather a
social-contract, to Hojjatoleslam, Mohsen Kadivar, who openly contradicted the
prevailing view that the velayat-e faqih is one of the irrefutable principles of Shi’a Islam
to journalists such as, Akbar Ganji, who wrote on the disregard for the rule of law and
advocated regime change. Under Khatami, the right to freedom of expression and speech
also became the most crucial contention between reformists and hardliners. Whilst the
propagation and the free exercise of it served as catalyst of the former, the latter did their
outmost to put a stop to it. Ironically, under Khatami, freedom of expression was the
political right, which was exercised extensively by members of the public as well as state
officials, yet granted the least. As such, Iran was described by “Reporters without
Borders” as the world’s largest prison for journalists and writers. 1021
Before assessing the impact of the 3rd roundtable it should be noted that British - Iranian
relations had been placed under particular strain by two incidents. In February 2002, the
Iranian Government rejected Britain’s nominee as Ambassador in Tehran, David
Reddaway, who was accused in the hardliner press as “a Jew who is an MI6 agent”. It
took eights month until September when the Iranian government eventually accepted the
nomination of Richard Dalton as Ambassador. 1022 The second incident referred to the
detention in the UK of former Iranian Ambassador Hade Soleimanpour under a warrant
for extradition served by the authorities in Argentina. The former Ambassador was
suspected of involvement in the bombing of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires
in 1994. Despite British insistence that it could not interfere in a judicial process, the
1021 Katajun Amirpur, “The Future of Iran’s Reform Movement”, in Walter Posch (ed) Chaillot Paper No.
89, Iranian Challenges, (Institute for Security Studies / EU, Paris, May 2006) p. 33
1022 House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Iran – Third Report of Session 2003-2004, pp.9-10
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Iranians saw the arrest as politically motivated. The diplomatic row eventually resulted in
an attack on the British embassy in Tehran by motorised gunmen. Though the British
government assessed that this would be unlikely to occur without the consent of the
Iranian authorities as well as noted undeclared sanctions against British companies in the
country 1023 the FCO decided to respond with a mixture of “firmness and tact” to both
affairs. 1024 The Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that despite such short-term
setbacks, it is more important that the British government “act as a good friend to Iran in
that journey [towards freedom], criticising when necessary, but supporting where it can.”
1025
The roundtable on the Right to Freedom of Expression and the Right to Development 1026
was again preceded by financing of operations designed to “support the creation of
adequate conditions for concrete improvements in human rights in Iran” with a modest
amount of 222 678 €. 1027 Negotiations focused on legal as well as political impediments
to the exercise of freedom of speech in Iran and covered Iran’s obligations under the
ICCPR, the parliamentary dimension, notably the right of politicians to express their
views, as well as on the freedom of the press.1028 Again, Europe’s multi-track approach
proved valuable for the Iranians to express their views on problems and deficiencies
concerning free speech. Particularly, La’ya Joneydi, Associate Professor at Tehran
University and Attorney at Law, condemned the way the Law of the Press (1986) limits
Art. 24 of the Constitution 1029 and stated that the “regime foreseen by the Constitution
1023 ibid, p.10
1024 ibid, p.3; Soleimanpour was eventually released on bail.
1025 ibid, p.63
1026 Since the focus is on the right to freedom of expression, an assessment on the right to development will
not be discussed.
1027 Bulletin of the European Union, 7/8-2003, paragraph 1.28
1028 Allesdandro Fallavollita, Human Rights Department, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Danish
Institute for Human Rights, Collected Papers From the Third Roundtable Under the EU-Iran Human Rights
Dialogue, Brussels, 8-7 October 2003 “The Right to Freedom of Expression And The Right to
Development”, (Copenhagen, Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2004), p. x
1029 On Art. 24 see Chapter III; His argument was that the Press Law provided an odd interpretation of the
general rule. The law inferred that “its” – the possessive adjective referring to the “exception” mentioned in
the latter part of Art. 24 – was a reference to the general rule on “freedom of the press” in the first part of
the Article and not a reference to the exceptions that could be taken to the rule. in Danish Institute for
Human Rights, Collected Papers From the Third Roundtable Under the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue,
Brussels, 8-7 October 2003, p. 29
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has been transformed into a preventive one.” 1030 Joneydi concluded that the new
amendment of the Press Law (2000) bears considerable discrepancies with the
Constitution (Art.24, 9,12, 13, 14 and 25) and given the supremacy of the Constitution
over the statute, judges, he demanded should interpret the Law of the Press in conformity
with the Constitution “so that all the […] restrictions be in turn restrictively interpreted.”
1031 The Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, who was
welcomed back by the Iranian Government following the roundtable 1032, also regarded
the Press law passed by the 5th Majlis as a grave restriction to freedom of speech. Article
12 of the new law requires the Press Supervisory Board to ban a publication that violates
Articles 6, 24 to 29 and 32 of the Law, which deal with issues such as “publishing atheist
articles or issues which are prejudicial to Islamic codes” or which promote “subjects
which might damage the foundation of the Islamic Republic”, national security, dignity
and interests, insulting Islam or offending the Leader and religious authorities, publishing
libel against officials or institutions or insulting legal or real persons who are “lawfully
respected” publishing writings “containing apostasy and matters against Islamic
standards” and quoting articles from the “deviant press, parties and groups which oppose
Islam.” 1033 The Rapporteur also questioned the competence of the Revolutionary Courts
in dealing with press or opinion or press-related offences. Emphasising that these courts
only have jurisdiction over serious security related cases, that is, against internal and
external national security, espionage, sabotage and terrorism 1034, he condemned the
political use of such and other courts. He also pointed out that many press offences
relating to the peaceful expression of an opinion listed in the Penal Code are punishable
by prison terms and/or flogging. 1035 Picking up on the Rapporteur’s findings, the British
government regretted the “deterioration in […] freedom of association” in the country.
The Foreign Secretary further condemned the closure of several newspapers and the
1030 ibid
1031 ibid, p.30
1032 see Bulletin of the European Union, EU 10-2003, paragraph 1.2.11; During his visit in Iran the Special
Rapporteur met with judiciary officials including hardliner Tehran Chief Prosecutor Abbasali Alizdeh and
openly criticized its role in the restriction of freedom of speech. see Iran Focus, ) Vol. 16, No. 10,
November 2003, (Aban-Azar 1382), p. 13
1033 Report by the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mission to the
Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/Add.2, 12 January, 2004, paragraph 26
1034 ibid, paragraph 27
1035 ibid, paragraph 33
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increased restrictions on Internet access and the fact that the media had been subject to
heavier, official censorship. Furthermore, journalists and intellectuals had been arrested
and intimidated, and lawyers had been prosecuted for speaking out on behalf of their
client. 1036 Overall, the roundtable was dominated by EU demands to conform to Iran’s
obligations under Article 19 of the ICCPR to welcome the Special Rapporteur back into
the country, and to let the current Majlis introduce the progressive amendments to the
Press Law. 1037
6. The Right to Freedom of Expression: Agents of Change
In order to get a complete picture of the situation of the right to freedom of expression in
Iran between the years 2000-2004, one has to look at the bigger picture rather than at the
immediate impact of the EU roundtable. Just as intellectuals, public figures and the media
acted as catalysts during the Constitutional Revolution (1906) and the Islamic Revolution
(1979) so have writers, intellectuals, members of the ulema and new technology, such as
the Internet also spearheaded the process of reform since 1997. As in any other politically
mature society, the intelligentsia in Iran was vital in formulating, interpreting and
conveying the reformist project to the public. They were / are what Ahmad Sadri called
“public intelligentsia since they straddle the fence between intellectual production and
political agitation.” 1038
6.1 The Clergy and Intelligentsia
A powerful example of the reformist discourse and the hardliner response proved to be
the Berlin Conference in 2000 as well as the trial of Hashem Aghajari. Following the
parliamentary victory of the reformists (6th Majlis), a German think tank linked to the
then ruling Green Party invited leading intellectuals and writers to openly discuss the
1036 Third Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2003-2004, Iran, Response of the Secretary
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, House of Commons, Cm 6198, May 2004, p.7
1037 see Bulletin of the European Union, EU 10-2003, paragraph 1.2.11; UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/Add.2,
paragraph 95. The Special Rapporteur was invited back to Iran in 2003.
1038 cited in Ramin Jahanbegloo, Iran – Between Tradition and Modernity (Oxford, Lexington Books,
2004), p. 117
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future of the reform movement and that of the country.1039 Hojjatoleslam Eshkevari’s
reflection on the reform process was undoubtedly the most significant contribution at the
Berlin Conference. He outlined social and political conditions needed in Iran for
democracy to flourish, warned of hardliner plots and their lack of commitment to
democracy and human rights and condemned the large-scale repression of some members
of the ulema since the revolution. 1040 On a question from the audience on the relationship
between religion and state, Eshkevari answered that he opposed the rule of the jurist
consult, as it is equal to rule by one individual. He concluded that “government is a
human matter; it is human [not divine]; therefore government must have a democratic
base.” 1041 His second speech at the conference “Reformist Islam and Modern Society”
characterised the reformist mindset as well as portraying the theoretical-religious
foundation on which many Iranian human rights NGOs would base their advocacy work.
Modernist Muslims, he argued “while welcoming developments in the modern world,
neither see the old Islamic tradition and knowledge as entirely worthy of following, nor
do they surrender absolutely to modernity. In fact they challenge and criticize the legacy
of both and desire the progress and evolution of the positive and renewable aspects of
each. ” 1042 Following a Mu’tazili and Shi’a line of thought, Eshkevari emphasised the
notion of rationality. A modern Islam advocates reform and seeks the reconstruction of
social and religious institution and through the assimilation and adoption of positive
elements of modernity, reformists are able to design what he referred to as “indigenous
modernity (Oriental-Islamic)”. 1043 That way, reformist Muslims will excavate Islam from
the dust of time, superstition, and non-religious and irrational thoughts and custom. By
reviving and reconstructing it, he claimed, with scientific knowledge and the experience
of today’s advanced humanity, they will eventually contribute to help humankind and
Muslims in particular to improve their personal, ethical and social lives. He concluded
that the slogans “Return to Islam” and “Return to the Qu’ran” have no other meaning that
1039 FAZ, 20 April 2000
1040 For his full speech see, Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Richard Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran –
Eshkevari and the Quest for Reform, (London, I.B. Tauris, 2006), pp.150- 152
1041 ibid, p. 154
1042 ibid, p. 157
1043 ibid, pp.157-158
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this. 1044 Though he acknowledged that there is no single spokesperson for Muslim
reformists he summarized the major points of agreement amongst them:
1. A belief in “Islamic Protestantism” and the realization of an Islamic renaissance consisting of the
renewal and reconstruction of religious thought.
2. A distinction between fundamental religious knowledge and religious principles implying that no
understanding can ever be judged as complete or correct.
3. An emphasis on ijtihad; advocating a renewal and reconstruction of religious thought and dogma
through progressive reasoning.
4. Denial of an intermediary between God and people, and denial of an official, custodial religious
establishment.
5. Planning of a kind of Islamic humanism, which implied a firm conviction in human
“discernment”, and discovering in human elements such as will-power, creativity, free choice,
freedom and the right to choose.
6. A belief that all humans have natural, inalienable and unconditional rights.
7. A belief in democracy, the realization of rule by the people and popular sovereignty in civil
affairs.
8. Opposition to state religion, and consequently [a belief in the] total and unconditional freedom of
every religion and every ideology, freedom of speech and being within the framework of the
democratic laws and regulations of society.
9. A belief in the mutability of the social laws of Islam implying that social rulings (such as penal,
economic or governmental laws) are in essence mutable and inevitably change with the change in
subject matter.
10. Relations with the West based on “difference” and “mutual understanding” (tafvot va tafhom). 1045
Much of what Eshkevari said at the Berlin Conference reflected both the reformists’
mindset and eagerness for change in Iran. By the same token, most of the charges
subsequently brought against him mirrored a common pattern of silencing such
influential intellectuals or clerics. On his return to Iran, a Special Clergy Court tried him
in secret and found him guilty of a long list of crimes, some carrying an automatic death
sentence: these were being a heretic (ertedaad), acting as a corrupter on Earth (mofsed-e
fel arz) and engaging in act of war against God and his Prophet (mahaareb). 1046
1044 ibid, p.160
1045 ibid, pp.160-162
1046 Iran Focus, Vol. 13 No. 9, October 2000, (Mehr–Aban 1379), p. 13
307
Following his trial, he lodged an appeal, which eventually revoked his death sentience
and reduced it and sentenced him in 2002 to four years in prison for insulting the
sanctities and one year for taking part in the conference and propaganda against the state.
1047
The trial against Hashem Aghajari was another high profile case revealing the dichotomy
between legal constraints on the right to free speech and the reformist agenda. Aghajeri, a
history professor at Tarbiat Modares University, and member of the “Mojahedin of the
Islamic Revolution”, was arrested on 8 August 2002 after he gave a speech in Hamadam
entitled “Islamic Protestantism.” 1048 His discourse largely centred on his charge that the
ruling clergy has not only monopolised God and religion but also secular power. Unlike
during Shariati’s time, when Iran witnessed a traditionally orientated form of Islam, he
claimed that Islam had now become fundamentalist and occupied the realm of political
power, which allows those who rule to violate the individual’s rights. Given this reality,
they arbitrarily torture critics, force public recantations, or have dissidents killed.
“Islamic Protestantism”, Aghajari asserted, would not only openly challenge ancient
Islamic hermeneutics, but also serve as a normative basis for the protection of human
rights and human dignity. 1049 He was eventually sentenced to 74 lashes, five years
imprisonment, given seven years suspension from teaching, five years deprivation of his
civil rights and the death penalty, for insult against Islam and religious leaders, apostasy
and heresy. 1050 What followed were large-scale protests by students 1051,
1047 Eshkevari’s trial and sentence resulted in large-scale protests and public support amongst politicians,
intellectuals, fellow members of the clergy and students, Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.09/2002,
p.7 ; On the 2nd anniversary of the Berlin Conference, Iranian journalist Alireza Alavitabar reflected on the
summary arrests and convictions against participants of the Berlin Conference and published an article in
“Bonjan” which read: “ The system of political decisions in Iran is constructed in such a way as to miss out
on the best opportunities and to achieve the worst results.” According to him, the Berlin Conference was
such a case when Iran could have shown to the world that the country now permitted a plurality of opinions
in which critics have the opportunity to voice their opinion. The conference could have silenced those
critics of Iran and could have resulted in a gradual acceptance of Iran. However, the reactions by the
political establishment only reinforced propaganda pursued against the country and in fact played into the
hands of those, which the religious elite is so eager to oppose. Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.
03/2002, pp.7-8
1048 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.2, paragraph 50
1049 Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.9-2002, pp.6-7; Iran Report, Nr.4/ 2003, Heinrich Böll Stiftung,
pp. 6-7
1050 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.2, paragraph 50
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parliamentarians, condemnation voiced by Khatami himself as well as the British
government. 1052 The British based “Index on Censorship” awarded him the International
Award for Freedom of Expression. 1053 It was only when Khameni himself intervened
that the Supreme Court lifted the death sentence. 1054 This disproportionate sentence
against an intellectual and leading reformist politician, exemplified what aspirations
Sharoudi had of further developing the judicial authority into an even greater lever of
power in the country’s maze of power centres.
Notwithstanding the establishment’s master plan of stifling dissent, the reformist
movement enjoyed the backing of religious heavyweights, most notably such as
Ayatollah Hossein Montazeri, Ayatollah Jalaleddin Taheri, Ayatollah Taromi and
Ayatollah Boujnourdi. Forming an authoritative religious backbone for Khatami’s
discourse of democracy, they actively defended the dissidents’ right to freedom of
expression by openly challenging the elite’s legitimacy, particularly that of the Supreme
Leader. Undoubtedly, Montazeri constituted the most significant of such religious
dissidents. Whilst he upheld the principle of clerical supervision to ensure that legislation
and government policy remain in accordance to Islamic principles, he openly questioned
Khameini’s authority and demanded that the Supreme Leader should submit himself to
popular elections, curtail his power, and be accountable and open to public criticism. 1055
With reference to Khatami’s lack of power, he demanded a change in the Constitution -
of which he was a leading drafter- in such a way to accord the President to control over
the military and security forces. 1056 Montazeri’s Shi’a hermeneutics on human rights and
democracy provided an authoritative blueprint for the reformist movement.
1051Student demonstrations eventually resulted with the resignation of the judiciary’s spokesperson Mir-
Mohammad Sadeghi's, who stated that “the ruling had damaged Iran.”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2562845.stm, accessed on 14, December, 2003
1052 Following the verdict, Straw met with his Iranian counterpart. House of Commons, Hansard, 23
February 2003, Column 122; A resolution by the European Parliament demanded to immediately suspend
the death sentence against Aghajeri or to commute the appeal in line with the ICPCR. It also reminded the
Council and Commission that the TCA was conditional on the improvement of human rights in Iran, see
Bulletin of the European Union, 11-2002, paragraph 1.2.2
1053 Iran Report, Nr.4/ 2003, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, p. 6
1054 Iran Focus, Vol. 15, No 3, (Esfand 1381-Farvardin 1382), p.9
1055 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2699541.stm, website accessed 30 October, 2003
1056 ibid
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6.2 The Press, Students, NGOs and the Blogger Community
In 2004, the Special Rapporteur noted the dramatic increase in the number of requests for
the registration of publications and according to the Ministry of Islamic and Cultural
Guidance an average of 99 % were granted. 1057 Another welcoming development for the
Rapporteur was the increase of numbers of books published in the country, which
amounted to 35,000 tittles in 2002, compared to 1,700 in 1979. 1058 Whilst
acknowledging that there is no prior censorship in the media (with the exception of
IRNA, which is subject to rigorous monitoring by the state), the restrictive Press Law as
well as the 1960 Preventive Restraint Act, both of which carry severe punishments,
“effectively repress any expression in the press criticizing the establishment, in particular
religious authorities, calling for reform, or in any way deemed unlawful”. 1059 Given these
ramifications, carried out in an environment where courts largely seem to follow political
objectives, journalists and writers in Iran became increasingly subject to self-censorship.
The Rapporteur further noted that the great majority of cases of prosecution of press
offences brought to his attention have resulted in the ban (temporary or definitive) of the
publications concerned and the sentencing of journalists concerned to prison terms. Not
surprisingly, this development was a direct result of the significance of the written press,
which turned out to be one of the main pillars of the reform movement. To put it simply,
with reference to the reformist movement and the advancement of human rights the press
acted on several levels:
1. They actively contributed to the reformist discourse to such an extent that it
gained enough momentum in cultural, socio-political and religious terms, to be
recognized by the public as a genuine movement for change as well as to be
perceived as a direct threat to the establishment. Particularly, prominent writers
such as Ganji helped to shape the reform movement’s culture of critical discourse
1057 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/62 Add.2, paragraph 35
1058 ibid, paragraph 36
1059 According to statistics of the Office of the Prosecutor General for Tehran indicated that 81 publications
were closed down – 59 after judicial decision and 22 after decision by the Press Supervisory Board.
Unofficial statistics indicate that 98 publications were closed since 1999 – 59 after court decision and 39
after a decision of the Press Supervisory Board or after a temporary ban under the Preventive Restraint Act.
ibid, paragraphs 39-42; 45;
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by contributing to the “reform speak”. By coining phrases like “follower of a
different life style” (degar-andish) writers challenged the cultural hegemony of
the ulema and the stratum of the pious believers and thus helped legitimize
pluralism by foregrounding the second-class status of those citizens who want to
think and live by standards not sanctioned by the state.1060
2. A vehicle of information and investigation: Naming and shaming of unlawful
practices and tactics of state authorities and parallel institutions had some impact
on the notion of accountability and rule of law. 1061
3. State run-media outlets were increasingly being challenged by genuine political
publications criticizing both establishment as well as reformists. Despite the
restrictions faced or maybe especially for this very reason, this intellectual and
political emancipation constituted, undoubtedly, the most advanced expression of
Khatami’s vision of civil society in Iran. 1062
4. The press served as a source of ideas, critique, reflection and encouragement to
the reform movement.
5. It was the most outspoken force against the restrictions on free speech. Writers
and journalists themselves became the most fervent advocates of the right to
freedom of expression.
Following a renewed wave of crackdowns against journalists, Majlis Deputy Rajab-Ali
Mazrouei, Head of Iran’s Press Guild Association, charged Khatami and his Ministry of
1060 Ramin Jahanbegloo (ed.), Iran-Between Tradition and Modernity, pp.122-123
1061 Amongst, investigative journalists, Ganji ,was again the most outspoken and influential. Before his
imprisonment for his participation at the Berlin Conference, he wrote extensively as a journalist in a series
of reformist newspapers, many of which were shut down by the Judiciary. Collections of his articles
appeared in books, notably, "The Dungeon of Ghosts" and "The Red Eminence, The Grey Eminences"
focusing on the involvement of Rafsanjani and Ali Fallahian in the Mykonos murders. Before his release in
2006, he continued to write his critiques in prison which were smuggled out and widely distributed,
especially on the web. Most notably he wrote a Republican Manifesto in six chapters in March 2002 laying
out the basis of his proposal for a fully-fledged democratic republic for Iran. FAZ, 17 July, 2001; The New
York Times, 12 July, 2006
1062 Most editors started printing under a new name and license after their paper had been shut down.
Amongst the most important pro-reform newspapers in Iran were Bahar (Spring), formerly Entekhabat-e
Majlis-e Panjom (Elections of the 5th Majlis) Nowsazi (Reconstruction), Sobh-e Karun (Karun Daily),
Iraniaan (Iranians) Hayat-e No ( New Life), Fatth which was followed by Ray-e Mardom (People’s Vote)
after it was banned, Towseh (Development), Naghsh-e Jahan (name of a famous square in Esfahan),
Akabar ( News) and Mellat (People) , Iran Focus, Vol. 13, No.5, May 2000, (Ordibehesht-Khordad 1379),
p. 11
311
Culture for “failing to defend journalists who are paying the price for democratic reforms
in Iran.” 1063 What Mazrouei referred to was the systematic purging of liberal media
outlets as well as the arrest and prosecution of reform minded journalists. Under Sharoudi
the judiciary developed into a formidable machinery of not only restricting the right to
freedom of speech through arbitrary charges and blatant politically motivated trials, but
also became an effective instrument with the ambitious aim of ridding the country’s
political landscape of reform minded intellectuals and activists. Together with radical
vigilantes, who continued to remain unaccountable for their anti-reformist grass-roots
pogroms, the judiciary created an environment of arbitrary prosecution and persecution,
which actively contributed to the hardliners’ successful usurpation campaign of removing
the reformists from the political landscape. Essentially it was a systematic campaign to
silence the country’s attempt at political emancipation through the press. Most
fundamentally, Ayatollah Sharoudi directly challenged any critical accounts of political
realities as they would essentially “constitute treason against the Islamic Republic and
serve only foreign enemies at undermining the achievements of the Islamic Revolution.”
1064 Said Mortazavi, who as a judge had become infamous for his arbitrary verdicts
against liberal newspapers and publishers, was appointed Prosecutor for Tehran in June
2003.1065 In him, Sharoudi found a willing executioner to systematically crack down on
the press. 1066 The most crucial element in the judiciary’s campaign was that under
Sharoudi the judicial authorities founded their own intelligence service, which provided
respective information on dissidents and journalists. Mohssen Mirdamadi, Chairman for
the Majlis Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy as well as Khatami
himself described this tactic as “illegal, which had the sole aim of ridding Iran’s
opposition.”1067 The fact that one of the most prominent newspapers Hayate-No was
ordered to shut by the Special Court for the Clergy on grounds of defamation, reflected
both the arbitrariness and level of power the judiciary enjoyed. Hayat-No was closed
1063 Iran Focus, Vol. 16, No.3, (Esfand 1381 – Farvardin 1382), p.12
1064 Iran Report, Nr.9 / 2003, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, pp.3-4
1065 Iran Report, Nr.6 / 2003, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, pp. 6-7
1066 In fact it was under Mortazavi that Iranian-Canadian photo journalist, Zahra Kazemi died in custody
after she had been arrested for taking pictures of families protesting outside Evin Prison. Article 90
Commission of the Majlis concluded in its report that Mortazavi and other members of the prosecutor’s
office were directly involved in Kazemi’s death. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/Add.2, paragraph 71-78
1067 Iran Report, Nr.2/2003, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, p. 7
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down for publishing a cartoon from 1937 depicting former U.S. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt pressing his thumb to the head of a former U.S. Supreme Court Justice. The
court ruled that the image of the judge - who is elderly, bearded and wearing a black robe
– bore a resemblance to the late Ayatollah Khomeini. 1068
Increased censorship coupled with continuous and systematic intimidation and
persecution eventually expressed itself in a phenomenon, which is increasingly becoming
synonymous with Iran’s struggle for freedom of speech: Iran’s blogging community.
According to a 2004 NITLE Blog Census, there are more than 64,000 blogs written in
Persian (more than there are Spanish, German, Italian, Chinese or Russian blogs). By
avoiding the risks associated with the printed press, blogs provided a safer place for
Iranians to express their views ranging from the most frivolous topics and online diaries
to serious domestic and international socio-political and economic issues. For NGOs,
activists and students they provided a forum to coordinate activities and to report on
political developments. For journalists they became an outlet to say and write what they
could not in the press. 1069 The most famous of Iran’s blogger was Mohammad Ali
Abtahi, Vice President for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs under Khatami. Despite being
of a slightly narcissistic nature, his blog regularly commented (still does)1070 on the
factional struggle for and against reforms and openly portrays and criticises the ruling
Iranian ulema for not holding elected positions, for failing to move the country forward
and for failing to interact with Iranian society and in particular the youth. 1071 With such
web logs becoming a popular forum for dissent, the government eventually responded by
cracking down on this virtual community. 1072 According to the OpenNet Initative, Iran
moved on to adopt “one of the world’s most substantial Internet censorship regimes […]
using the most sophisticated state-mandated filtering systems in the world.” The judiciary
1068 ibid, p. 7
1069 For a compilation of the most influential blogs see Nasrin Alavi, We are Iran – The Persian Blogs
(Broklyn, Soft Skull Press, 2005)
1070 see http://www.webneveshteha.com last accessed 23 September, 2006
1071 see “Iran reform politician goes online” BBC News, website: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/1/hi/technology/4315455.stm, accessed on 4 March 2006
1072 The first wave of arrests of bloggers started in 2000 and continued throughout Europe’s human rights
dialogue with Iran, see “The price paid for blogging Iran: BBC News, website
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr//fr/-/hi/technology/4283231.stm, accessed on 4 March, 2006
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itself acknowledged that it is using the commercial filtering package Smart Filter – made
by the US-based company Secure Computing – as the primary technical engine of its
filtering system. Backed by the existing restrictive Press Law, the judiciary and
intelligence services demand that all Internet Service Providers (ISPs) install filtering
mechanisms that cover both websites and e-mail and, if in breach of the law, disclose the
“offender’s” personal details to the authorities. 1073 Faced with the scale of webloggers in
the country, the crackdown against the Internet dissidents witnessed the re-emergence of
a pattern, which had reached its peak during the revolutionary 1980s: the practice of
forced public recantation, which served the function of humiliation and deterrence.
According to Abtahi the webloggers’ testimonies “had made committee members
weep.”1074 [Referring to the Supervisory Committee for the Implementation of the
Constitution] An example of such forced recantation is the statement that Rozbeeh
Mirebrahimi had signed and, which was published in “Etemaad”. It read in part:
I, Roozebeh Mirebrahimi, have been one of the accused in connection with the file of
Internet sites […] During the past few years, I and others like me had fallen into the
hands of those […] who made use of people like me in order to implement their evil
projects […]. Unfortunately, whatever I wrote during that period […] undermined the
reputation of the Islamic Republic of Iran […] I strongly attacked various pillars of the
system, especially the judiciary, by making various allegations against them, and I have
portrayed them as being against human rights […] During the past few years, there
existed […] a frightful network, one end of which was inside the country and the other
end outside its borders […] Due to my weakness, I also joined that network […] I was the
source of reports and interviews with foreign and counter-revolutionary radio stations
[…] The involvement of some organizations and individuals from outside the country or
supporting individuals such as me is shameful, because people like me have trampled
upon the laws of this country […] The claim that I was in solitary confinement is not true.
I experienced nothing but kindness and respect from those who were dealing with us.
Here, I wish to express my gratitude for the kindness of individuals for their success and
well-being.1075
1073 For in-depth research on internet filtering see OpenNet Initative, Country Study “Internet Filtering in
Iran, 2004-2005” available on www.opennetinitative.net/iran
1074 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Human Rights – Annual Report 2005, House of Commons, CM
6606, p. 58
1075 Reprinted in The New Yorker, 21 November, 2005
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The claim that he had been held in solitary confinement and tortured was, however, true
and reflected a wider pattern of Prosecutor Mortazavi’s “internet campaign”. By
November 2004, PEN reported 25 cases of Internet activists who had been taken into
custody. Mirebarahimi, former political editor of Etemad was amongst that group of
webloggers and was accused of “spreading propaganda against the regime, threatening
national security, incitement to rebellion and insulting leading figures in the regime.”
Following their release after they had been held incommunicado and in an effort to clear
their names, they testified before the committee about their mistreatment during detention
and testified that “secret squads” operating on behalf of the judiciary had indeed tortured
them. 1076 These allegations eventually prompted the Supervisory Committee for the
Implementation of the Constitution to investigate. 1077 When the Committee stated that
torture had indeed taken place, Khatami himself approached Sharoudi to intervene. The
British government too reminded the Iranian government that online publishing had been
in complete accordance with their right to freedom of expression and condemned the
judiciary’s treatment of the webloggers. 1078 Faced with such pressure, Sharoudi
eventually appointed a committee of three judges to review the bloggers’ files, which
cleared seven, but kept the files of the other four open. 1079
If one could refer to the press and blogger community as the most advanced expression of
Iran’s nascent civil society with regards to its political and intellectual impact, so was the
emergence of the student movement with the rise of Khatami the most dynamic socio-
political force in the country. Often referred to as the “Children of the Revolution”, the
student movement gradually transformed itself from Khatami’s most loyal social base to
a group, which by 2000, became increasingly critical of the failure of the reformist
movement to implement its policies. In particular with regards the active advocacy for the
protection of human rights in the country students unions were the most zealous rights
campaigners. Truly expressing the society’s discontent with the status quo, the unions
1076 Written Statement submitted by International PEN, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/NGO/117, 14 February
2005, p.3
1077 ibid
1078 Interview with FCO Official “D”
1079 The New Yorker, 21 November, 2005
315
broke the political taboo, which manifested itself in numerous demonstrations, open
letters to the establishment and political mobilization going so far as to call for the
resignation of Khameni as well as Khatami. They also openly demanded amendments to
the constitution in order to bring an end to the Guardian Council’s political role and to
allow sustainable political reforms to be implemented. 1080 In view of such
confrontational rhetoric, the state authority’s reaction was generally disproportionably
forceful against students. During the most large-scale demonstrations held in 1999 and
2003, students were attacked by Basiji and Ansar Hezbollah, both of which are directly
dependent on the authority of the Revolutionary Guards and Khameini respectively. Like
journalists, students arrested at such demonstrations are charged after long periods of
incommunicado detention with “threats against national security”, “confusing people’s
minds”, and / or “propaganda against the state.” 1081
Here the difference between British / EU and U.S. diplomacy is particularly notable.
Whitehall saw these demonstrations in the context of exercising the freedom of
expression and not necessarily as catalysts for revolution. Many in the U.S.
administration and Congress, however, demanded an Iran policy, which would openly
advocate regime change. This manifested itself in the increasing pressure put on the EU
to achieve a resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue as well as in the vocal support for
dissidents and regime critics both in the Diaspora and in Iran. A good example of this
mindest was the “Iran Democracy Act” presented to Congress in June 2003, which
openly advocated regime change. 1082 Rather than actually helping civil society in the
country, this neo-conservative constructed emphasis on regime change only made it
easier for the judiciary to charge activists with “espionage and advancing U.S.
propaganda”. Although by that time, Washington had immensely influenced Britain in its
1080 Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.7/ 2003, pp. 6-7; Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.12 /
2003, pp.3-4
1081 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/Add.2, paragraph 35, see also UN Doc. A/53/363, 8 September, 2000
1082 The bill demanded for an “internationally-monitored referendum in Iran by which the Iranian people
can peacefully change the system of government”. For this purpose Radio Farda and any other radio or TV
stations were to be provided with financial assistance to “after consulting (A) Iranian-Americans and other
Iranian exiles who (i) support a referendum […] (ii) oppose the current Government of Iran […] ” see “Iran
Freedom and Democracy Support Act”; 08th Congress, 1st Session, H.R. 2466 To encourage democratic
reform in Iran and to strengthen United States policy toward the current Government of Iran. In the House
of Representatives June 12, 2003, p.3; p.4-5
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Middle East policy –most notably reflected in Blair’s decision to support the U.S. led
invasion of Iraq in 2003 – Whitehall’s Iran policy strongly opposed regime change. Even
if the FCO increasingly focused on the non-proliferation issue, human rights in Iran were
best supported, as Lord Phillips of Sudbury, First Secretary of the British-Iranian
Parliamentary Group, put it, “through the help the government is giving in terms of Iran’s
judiciary and legal profession”. Although he acknowledged that the human rights
situation and impediments to reform was frustrating, to place Iran in an axis of evil was “
a historic error, and the sooner that the Americans can withdraw from that, just as they
have withdrawn from the ludicrous notion of effecting regime change, the better” 1083
However, unlike the students, who were by and large not actively incorporated in the
EU’s multi-track approach, NGOs benefited from their participation. Even if Britain was
cautious in engaging in open capacity-building ventures with Iranian NGOs, and their
participation at these roundtables may have not granted genuine immunity, it did provide
them with more leeway for advocacy efforts. It should also be noted that EU member
state embassies, particularly the British, approached Iranian NGOs with caution, as it was
not always exactly clear whether the “N” stood for “Near” or “Non”. 1084 One of the
NGOs, which participated at the roundtables, was the Islamic Human Rights Commission
(IHRC) 1085. Like many other activists and non-governmental groups, the IHRC has to
1083 House of Lords, Hansard, 13 November: Column 1717 - Column 1718; Within the context of neo-
conservative’s influence on U.S. Iran policy, Lord Wallace of Saltaire called John Bolton “as an actively
destructive force in international diplomacy.” House of Lords, Hansard, 13 November: Column 1719;
Following the massive students demonstrations in June 2003, the Council of the EU demanded ‘the swift
release of those detained for having exercised their right to freedom of expression.” Bulletin of the
European Union 7/8-2003, paragraph 1.6.109
1084 Having to work in Iran’s complex political environment NGOs faced many problems and constraints
which usually include legal barriers, too much government control exercised through multiple and
uncoordinated decision-making centres, and the proliferation of quasi NGOs which do not pursue a civil-
society agenda as serving as buffer between state and the civic arena. see M. Baquer Namazi, Non-
governmental Organizations in the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Situation Analysis, UNDP Technical
Papers, (Tehran, UNDP, 2000); Interview with, FCO Official “D”; The FCO provided the IHRC with
various capacity building ventures, see House of Commons, Hansard , 5March, 2003, Column 317 WH
1085 The structure of the IHRC consists of the domestic monitoring committee and the appeals office, which
receives respective victim’s reports and then tries to follow up the case. The IHRC follows a basic strategy
of naming and shaming through the media. In addition, communications are being submitted to the
judiciary and demand to investigate certain cases, which had been reported to the IHRC. Whilst the
judiciary has, as such, no obligation to justify decisions and procedures to a third non-governmental party,
they do respond and often follow up respective cases. This is due to the fact that IRHC sends two
communications of complaint: one to the individual judge and another to a higher official in government,
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work within the framework of the Islamic Republic. This means having the judiciary as a
constant “control agent” and the clergy acting as ideological monitors. Yet, like other
such organizations, the clergy was increasingly being used as a facilitator for change.
The tradition of ijtihad, an intellectual progressive interpretation and innovation practiced
by Shi’a jurists and clerics over the centuries, is effectively being used by the IHRC to
lobby likeminded Ayatollahs to reinterpret Qu’ranic sources in a way as to be compatible
with international human rights standards (as proposed by Eshkevari). Whilst the IHRC
extended human rights training to the public and human rights defenders, such lobbying
efforts proved particularly valuable when they won over religious heavyweights, such as
Ayatollah Bojnourdi, as influential human rights advocates. 1086 Overall, NGOs, such as
the IHRC and more significantly, high profile activists, such as Shireen Ebadie actively
support victims of human rights violations, challenge the judiciary, lobby legislators as
well as religious authorities and undoubtedly, have contributed to moving the country
towards a “rights-based” society. As one British diplomat in Tehran observed it:
Human rights activists here are working to improve the Islamic Republic and to uphold the Islamic
Republic - not change but improve; this is stated in order to avoid harassment and to show that they
do not constitute a threat. In the end, the elite also realizes that suppression of human rights
eventually threatens the survival of the regime. 1087
6.3 The 6th Majlis
The legislative assembly was regarded as crucial for the British to achieve the demanded
changes in legislation to ensure the protection of human rights. With Deputies, such as
Abtahi, the reformist dominated 6th Majlis saw the right to freedom of expression, quite
who can then refer the matter to a disciplinary committee, which deals with misconduct committed by
judges. Whilst judges enjoy a powerful political and social position in Iran, bureaucratic hierarchy does
have an impact on individual behavior and legal accountability. For the time being, this loophole used by
the IHRC, seems to some extent be a viable mechanism at scrutinizing proper administration of justice.
Information based on Interview with the President of the Islamic Human Rights Committee, (Tehran, 15
September, 2005); Interview with Mahya Saffarinia, International Affairs and Communications
Department, Islamic Human Rights Commission, (Tehran, 28 August, 2004)
1086 Information based on Interview with the President of the Islamic Human Rights Committee
1087 Interview with FCO Official “D”
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literally, at the very core of their legislative duties. Given the political significance of
freedom of speech, it is, therefore, also not surprising that those political institutions
controlled by hardliners did their utmost to contain the 6th Majlis. Tactics of jeopardizing
reformist policies manifested itself on two levels: a. The Council of Guardian’s rejection
of bills directly corresponding to the right of freedom of speech, b. Intimidation and
prosecution of deputies by the judiciary for speeches and contributions they made in the
legislature. With regards to legislation, the following bills were proposed to be
implemented into law:
1. Meeting specific EU demands for changes in legislation, the Majlis adopted a law
banning the use of the Preventive Restraint Act against newspapers. This
amendment would have made the banning of newspapers more difficult and
demanded a public court hearing for anyone accused of press offences. The
Guardian Council rejected the law on the grounds that the interpretation of the
Act in this law excluding the press from its implementation was “discriminatory.”
1088
2. An alternative amendment to the Press Law was then suggested by the Majlis in
October 2003, which contained the provision to temporarily limit any banning of
media outlets, as well as demanded a public hearing before a jury. This initiative
directly corresponded to the judiciary’s modus operandi of “temporarily” closing
down newspapers until a final verdict, which usually took a number of years and
was then done through secret trials. Khameni eventually intervened personally
and prohibited the Majlis from even discussing the new legislation.1089
3. Other efforts by the legislature included to a bill, which intended to define certain
offences more precisely. This law defining insult and defamation would have
made it more difficult for judges to charge writers with these offences, which
carry corporal punishments. Again the Guardian Council rejected the law. 1090
1088 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/Add.2, paragraph 43 ; The 5th Majlis proposed new progressive amendments to
the Press Law as early as August 2000, yet had to withdraw the bill following direct intervention by
Khameini and extrajudicial demonstrators which intimidated Majlis deputies. see UN Doc. A/53/363,
paragraph 14-15
1089 Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr. 10/2003, p.5,
1090 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/Add.2, paragraph 43
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4. Another bill rejected by the Guardian Council, intended to grant more liberties
was a bill forbidding eavesdropping and tapping telephone calls or other means of
communication. 1091
5. If the right to freedom of expression was seen as a direct challenge to the political
status quo, so was the right to information from outside Iran seen as bearing just
as much “counterrevolutionary” potential. In fact, the concern for the potential of
Western media was based on the appreciation that the Islamic Revolution could
not have been possible without the BBC. As such, the state had made continuous
efforts since 1979 to ban and jam TV and radio services from abroad. However,
since the Majlis had passed the law in 1995 banning the use of all satellite dishes,
over three million dishes had been sold in Iran. Given the bill’s evident
ineffectiveness, the 6th Majlis revoked it in January 2003 and permitted the use of
all such devices. 1092
The 6th Majlis, undoubtedly, proved to be the most influential forum for voicing dissent
with the status quo, undertook reform through legislation and, for the first time since the
Iranian Revolution, provided for genuine political debate with a plurality of opinion and
criticism. A dramatic symbol of both the parliament’s commitment to human rights, as
well as its powerlessness at protecting them through the rule of law, was the decision in
October 2003 of 109 Majlis Deputies to go on hunger strike in protest against the
violations of the basic rights of political prisoners. 1093 Essentially, what presented itself
to Britain was the imbalance of power in the Iranian political system. More than ever
before, the Majlis had become a battle ground between Iran’s democratic elements and
the Guardian Council as well as the judiciary. The latter institutions, backed by the
1091 Iran Focus, Vo.16, No. 8, September, 2003, (Shahrivar-Mehr 1382), p.11
1092 Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.1/ 2003, p.3
1093 The main target of their protest was the plight of pro-reform figure Abbas Abdi, who had been detained
for publishing an opinion poll suggesting that the Iranian people favored better relations with the US. Iran
Focus, Vol. 16 No. 9, October, 2003, (Mehr–Aban 1382), p .12; At the height of factional debate in
parliament (between 2001 leading to May 2003 when Khatami’s Twin Bills were rejected) a number of
Deputies were even summoned by the judiciary because of speeches they made during plenary sessions.
The Majlis presiding board eventually decided to ignore such judicial actions and decided not to pass on the
summonses to deputies as they “enjoy parliamentary immunity.” Iran Focus, Vol. 16, No. 5, May, 2003,
(Ordibehesht-Khordad 1382), p.14
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Supreme Leader and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 1094 presented, however, a
formidable force obstructing the protection of human rights in general and that of Article
19 in particular. As Ghanea stated: “Increasingly the evidence has shown that Iran has a
Constitutional system that has the veneer of democracy and balance of powers, but that in
reality its framework makes the very notion of the independence of the judiciary […]
impossible.” 1095 Concerning this stalemate, Lord Sudbury at the House of Lords
commented that the “checks and balances [in Iran] have led to immobilism and deep
frustration” and whilst existing British efforts at depoliticising the judiciary proved
crucial what was fundamental for Britain was to assist “the Iranians to evolve their own
constitution in a peaceable way [...].” 1096
7. The EU’s Priority Shift: From Human Rights Concerns to Strategic Interests
Given this constitutional deadlock and the principal role of a reformist dominated
parliament in the advancement of human rights, EU and British human rights diplomacy
should have been led by the principle of supporting this very linchpin of democracy in
Iran. Nonetheless, in the run up to the 2004 parliamentary elections, it became obvious
that the EU had shifted to the U.S. stance on pressuring Iran to comply with the NPT and
to fully expose its nuclear facilities to the IAEA.1097 Moreover, in the aftermath of the
Iraq invasion by the U.S. and Britain, Iran’s strategic role in a post-Saddam Iraq and
Persian Gulf became another priority for Britain.1098 This diplomatic paradigm
effectively shifted attention away from concerns over human rights. What had been a
fundamental support for the reformist cause, played now directly into the hands of the
1094 It should be noted that Ayatollah Mowaheddi Kermani, Deputy Chairman for the IRGC “reminded”
Majlis Deputies that it was the IRGC’s role in monitoring their loyalty to the velayat-e faqih and Islamic
principles. Given the level of power as well as the impunity the IRGC enjoys in the Iranian political
system, their role in intimidating the Deputies proved considerable. For Kermani’s speech see Iran-Report,
Nr.6 / 2003, pp.5-6
1095 Written evidence submitted by Nazila Ghanea in House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee,
Human Rights – Annual Report 2005-06. HC 574, Ev 133
1096 House of Commons, Hansard, 13 November; Column 1718; Notable projects by the British government
included: technical assistance relating to the rule of law and administration of law, specialised training for
judges working with juveniles through UNICEF, human rights training for young adults and a
familiarisation visit by 5 Iranian judges to the UK in March 2002. see House of Commons, Hansard,
Column 317 WH
1097 see Bulletin of the European Union, 10/2003, paragraph 1.29.66
1098 for Foreign Secretary Jack Straw’s visit to Iran to secure Iranian commitment to play a positive role in
Iraq. see IRNA, 10 June, 2003
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hardliner establishment and actively undermined the reformists’ position. In fact, the
British government noted the deterioration of human rights months prior to the elections
1099 as did the General Affairs Council of the EU: “ On the eve of the parliamentary
elections scheduled for the beginning of 2004, it remained troubled by the situation with
regard to freedom of opinion and expression and the resultant arbitrary detention. […]
and urged the government to speed up reform of the system of administration of justice
[…]” 1100
7.1 Roundtable on Administration of Justice
The roundtable held in June 2004 dealt with exactly these issues and raised concerns
brought up by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary detention, which stated in its findings
that prisoners of conscience are punished twice over as they have not only been denied
their right of freedom of expression but also the right to fair trial. It also noted that
situations of arbitrary detention were essentially related to infringements of freedom of
expression and opinion. 1101 Hence, the EU delegation pushed for reforms concerning the
due process of law, abuse of “solitary confinement”, the continuous role of revolutionary
courts in convicting prisoners of conscience and the failure to appreciate the principle of
proportionality in passing sentence. 1102
7.2 Disempowering the Reformists
Europeans fully appreciated that the political environment before and during the
roundtable on administration of justice had drastically changed. Following the
1099 House of Commons, Hansard, 19 October, Column: 177WH- 190WH
1100 Bulletin of the European Union, 10-2003, paragraph 1.2.11
1101 UN Doc. E/CN.42004/3/Add.7, 27 June 2003, p.20
1102 see Danish Institute for Human Rights, Collected Papers From the Fourth Roundtable Under the EU-
Iran Human Rights Dialogue, Tehran, 14-15 December 2004 “Administration of Justice and Promotion of
International Cooperation and Solidarity in the Field of Human Rights”, (Copenhagen, Danish Institute for
Human Rights, Copenhagen, 2004); It should be noted that the British FCO launched several projects for
joint ventures with the Iranian and British Judiciary and Iranian and British Bar Association. together with
Penal Reform International, launched several projects in 2001 and 2002 in order to improve the
administration of justice. A Juvenile Detention Centre in Tehran became the pilot project. Stated
improvements included the overcrowding and alternative punishments for prison detention of people, such
as drug addicts, petty offenders and economic crimes. IRNA, 13 April, 2003
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“parliamentary coup d’état” in the election of the 7th Majlis in February 2004, the EU had
not only lost a reformist majority in the Iranian legislative, but in many ways had lost
credibility. Because it put all its diplomatic weight on the NPT issue, thus only staying
committed to human rights in rhetoric, the EU and especially Britain had in fact
contributed to the revival of hardliners in mainstream Iranian politics. By solely dealing
with Hassan Rohani, specially appointed by Khameini to negotiate with the nuclear issue,
Khatami’s cabinet was being completely undermined and increasingly marginalized.
When the EU-3 (Britain, Germany. France) proposed a package of inducements to Iran in
December 2003, including new trade talks for the TCA, an EU commitment to supply
Tehran with enriched uranium and the prospect of WTO membership,1103 the elite in Iran
eventually conceded. Though the inducement excluded any real security arrangements,
thus evidently lacking a vital element for sustainability and trust on part of Iran, the
Iranian delegation did concede and signed the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, thus committing itself to all cessation of uranium enrichment and
subject itself to IAEA inspections.1104 For Straw, Fischer and de Villepin, this proved
critics in the US wrong and as Ansari put it “was a showpiece event, intended to prove to
the world that diplomacy and the methods of Old Europe could yield results.” 1105 For the
Iranian establishment the support of the protocol reflected more a wider strategy for
regime survival rather than genuine commitment to concession on the nuclear dossier.
The intention was to show to the EU and the USA that the conservative establishment is
capable of moderation, that only they possess the necessary power to do business and,
most importantly, was a move intended to avoid a possible US-reformist pact.
First indications of a hardliner resurgence came with the May 2003 municipal elections,
when reformists lost their majority in local councils. Even if the factor in this defeat was
1103 Initial inducements offered Iran to attain “Most Favoured Nations Status” as a dry run for WTO
membership. Interview with FCO Official “B”, Full fledged WTO membership was offered to Iran in 2004;
House of Commons, Hansard, 10 January, 2005, Column: 37W; Interview. M. Lamek , French Embassy in
Tehran, (Tehran, 2, September, 2004)
1104 see “Iran Commission welcomes Iran’s signature of the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, EU Press Service No. IP/03/1782, Brussels, 18 December, 2003
1105 Ali M. Ansari, Confronting Iran – The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust
(London, Hurdst& C., 2006), p. 205
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not increased popularity for the conservatives rather than low turnout 1106 the reformists’
legitimacy had now become undermined both internationally as well as among its own
constituents. As Khatami said: “ Results of the recent elections increase concerns about
the future of the Revolution.” He added that “People become disillusioned when they get
the impression that the policies of the leaders do not correspond with their expectations
and they end up turning their backs on the whole system.” 1107 The most devastating blow
to the embattled president and his reformist camp came with the February 2004 elections
for the 7th Majlis which in quite a literal sense constituted a earthquake on Iran’s political
scene. Following the signing of the Additional Protocol in November 2003, the IAEA
established Iran’s failure to “make a full disclosure of its nuclear activities” and
concluded that Iran had been developing more sophisticated uranium enrichment
centrifuges than it had previously admitted. 1108 Whilst this was information the
Europeans and the British had known all along, the EU conveyed to Tehran that faced
with the clandestine programme, now officially acknowledged by the UN, the promised
rewards for nuclear cooperation, could not be granted. When the National Security
Adviser, Rohani, on Khameini’s order, withdrew from the Comprehensive Dialogue,
Europeans decided to manoeuvre cautiously in order not to jeopardize what they
considered crucial international security concerns.1109 It is against this background of
deadlock that one has to understand European reactions in the face of the “parliamentary
coup d’état” in February 2004. Further tilting the balance in favour of hardliner factions,
the Guardian Council decided to debar over 2000 reformist candidates for the elections of
the 7th Majlis thus securing a hardliner majority. 1110 After four years of “hard struggle”
the hardliners thus finally managed to regain control over the Majlis through what Tehran
1106 Only 12% of Tehran dwellers went to the polls, compared with a turnout of only 25% in other big
cities. This was far lower than any previous elections. Another reason for the reformists’ failure as four of
the 18 reformist groups were competing for seats on the Tehran council.
Iran Focus, Vol.16, No. 3, May 2003, (Esfand 1381–Farvardin 1382), p. 10
1107 ibid, p.4
1108 see “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Resolution
adopted by the Board on 13 March 2004” IAEA - Board of Governors Un Doc. GOV/2004/21 13 March
2004
1109 Interview with Commission of the European Union, Director for External Relations with the
Mediterranean and the Middle East, (Chief Negotiator for the TCA with Iran) St Andrews, 5 March, 2005
1110 Asian Affairs, Vol.8, No.89, March 2004, pp.10-14
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Deputy, Mohsen Mirdamadi called “ a non-military coup d’état.” 1111 Such frustration
was equally voiced by Deputy Mussavi-Khoeniha who said:
According to the constitution, after electing the supreme leader, the Assembly of Experts should
also control his actions. … Was there any control over the organs under the supreme leader for the
elections to satisfy justice, sincerity or fairness? […] Why spend so much money to organize such
elections? It would have been better value not to have them at all and just put the government in the
hands of a minority.1112
The two most important reformist organisations - the Islamic Iran Participation Front and
the Association of Combatant Clerics (Majma’e Rohaniyoun-e Mobarez ) - were
amongst the most severely hit parties affected by the disqualification. Before these
groupings together with ultra-reformist groups, such as the Organisation of Mojahedin of
the Islamic Revolution, lost almost all of their seats in the Majlis they staged sit-ins,
resigned in protest and voiced their outrage in the reformist newspaper, two of which
were shut down days before the election. Essentially, the disqualification of reformist
candidates constituted the end of a reform orientated dominated parliament, which had
proven so important and cooperative with European demands for improving human rights
standards. What the reformist needed at that time was unconditional commitment by the
EU to support their cause. With regards to the stated objectives in the Human Rights
Dialogue, a strong and united EU position against the election fraud would have been
needed to save the reformist cause from hardliner usurpation. However, what the EU
response reflected was a commitment to what they considered international security and
strategic concerns rather than to human security. In an effort not to further alienate the
hardliners and keep them in negotiations over the nuclear issue, the Europeans responded
with acquiescence rather than strong condemnation. 1113 What was more significant than
this lack of genuine diplomatic protest on behalf of the EU, in particular with regards to
British – Iranian relations, was Britain’s humanitarian reaction to the earthquake in Bam.
1111 Iran Focus, Vol. 17, No. 3, March 2004, (Esfand–Farvardin 1382), p.9
1112 ibid, pp. 8-9
1113 The General Affairs Council mildly “regretted that many candidates, including sitting members of the
Majlis were prevented from standing in the February elections, thus making democratic choice impossible,
Bulletin of the European Union, 1/2 2004, paragraph 1.6.122; Information on the EU tactic to get hardliners
back to the negotiation table is based on Interview with EU Commission Official
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1114 Iranian politicians and their constituents were outraged to discover than far from
condemning the electoral fraud, the British government had decided that this was an
appropriate opportunity to send Prince Charles on a humanitarian visit to the shattered
city of Bam. What was the first royal visit since 1975 was seen by many as a blessing
conferral on the coup. 1115 Concerning the right to freedom of expression, the 7th Majlis
moved quickly to propose a bill, which included provisions for prison sentences of one to
three years for publishing “information that poses a threat to the country’s internal or
external security”, and five to fifteen years if the information is passed to “foreign States
or foreign organizations”. Moreover, the dissemination of “false information” about the
Supreme Leader or other state officials would be punishable by six months in prison and
10 million Rial fine. The bill also gave the police the right to search Internet users’ homes
without a judge’s authorization and the right to confiscate any computer equipment and
files of any persons involved in Internet activities. 1116 Legislation of this kind was just a
taste for the EU of what was to come with a conservative dominated Majlis. If human
rights had really been Europe’s priority, member states, particularly the EU-3, should
have empowered the reformists rather than contributed to their marginalization.
8. Conclusion: Defending the Right to Freedom of Speech in Iran: A Question of Power
Findings on Europe’s “Comprehensive Dialogue” with Iran between 2000-2004 indicated
strengths and limits of a policy of constructive engagement. By and large, success and
weakness of this policy directly reflected fluctuating power asymmetries between sender
and target state as well as imbalances of power within the complex political system of the
latter.
Europe’s TCA negotiation with Iran proved an effective political and economic carrot.
Given socio-economic realities in Iran, this economic incentive exerted considerable
1114 For EU humanitarian efforts responding to the earthquake see Bulletin of the European Union, 1/2-
2004, paragraph 1.6.95
1115 The Times, 9 February, 2004
1116 Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received. Commission on Human Rights,
UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/64/Add.1, 29 March 2005, paragraph 468
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influence over Tehran. The fact that various economic bills had been passed by the Majlis
and approved by the Guardian Council in an effort to meet EU demands supports this
argument. By the same token, however, reformists, as represented in government and
legislative, were unable to match these initiatives of economic liberalisation in the
political realm. The Guardian Council and the judiciary, backed by the Supreme Leader,
armed forces as well as parallel institutions proved to be a formidable impediment against
progressive legislation being implemented into legal statues. This was particularly the
case for bills concerning the protection of human rights. As has been shown, the 6th
Majlis passed vital legislation in order to ratify various international human rights
regimes; all of which had been vetoed by the Guardian Council.
The reformists, as represented in the executive and legislature as well as civil society
proved to be Europe’s primary facilitator for change concerning both respect and
protection of human rights. Under Khatami, the government provided mechanisms and
inspection procedures dealing with human rights violations. Efforts to protect the right to
freedom of expression ranked particularly high on the reformists’ agenda as reform-
minded activists, politicians and lawmakers themselves became subject to restriction on
exercising Article 19 of the ICPCR. Such unconstitutional constraints, as well as coercion
tactics on behalf of the judiciary and vigilante groups coupled with Khatami’s comittment
to constitutionalism inherently stemmed the political momentum of the reformist
movement.
Since the reformists’ only real power asset had been legitimacy, Europe’s multi-track
approach of giving members of Iran’s activist community, intelligentsia and members of
the reformist government an active stake in the dialogue, proved an effective strategy of
empowerment. This is particularly true for members of civil society, which following
their participation at these roundtables enjoyed a certain level of immunity in their
advocacy work. EU as well as bilateral British initiatives at depoliticising human rights
and emphasising their legal value proved equally vital. Most significantly, the
roundtables provided a forum for Iranian civil society to approach the human rights
discourse from within Sh’ia discourse and to point to existing constitutional provisions
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for the protection of human rights, thus uncovering the very secular realities of human
rights violations in the Islamic Republic.
Whilst reformists had been locked in a constitutional deadlock, which was maintained by
hardliner elements, enjoying considerable levers of power in Iran, so was the
“Comprehensive Dialogue” subject to changed asymmetries of political and economic
interdependence between Europe and Iran.1117 Europe’s priority shift from concerns over
human rights to the nuclear issue largely reflected these power fluctuations. These
realities were essentially a product of Britain’s decision to invade Iraq and had ultimately
jeopardized the EU’s policy of constructive engagement with Iran. For all its wider
domestic and international implications, the invasion of Iraq, which was not only contrary
to the UN Charter but also witnessed a series of war crimes committed by the occupying
forces, had seriously damaged Britain’s credibility at promoting human rights. More
significantly, however, it left Iran in an unrivalled position in the Middle East and as the
Foreign Affairs Select Committee put it possessed “the potential to be a destabilising
factor in Iraq.” 1118 Britain was quite literally in Iran’s backyard and increasingly felt its
vulnerability towards Iran’s influence over Iraq’s Shi’a majority. The extent of this
strategic vulnerability became evident when an Iranian Revolutionary Guard patrol boat
intercepted two British vessels in the Shatt al-Arab waterway, captured the eight sailors
and threatened Whitehall with their prosecution. 1119 Whilst Britain managed to solve this
diplomatic crisis 1120, there was little doubt left that Iranian military and political
capabilities could directly threaten Western interests in the region. The seemingly
increasing strategic threat that Iran was posing coupled with its alleged nuclear ambitions
proved unacceptable to Europe. Essentially, concerted efforts to sway Iran to give up
these ambitions reflected the West’s fear of allowing Iran to attain regional hegemonic
status as well as nuclear capabilities. Ironically, Iran’s security perceptions on which such
1117 Following the invasion of Iraq, crude oil prices grew steadily and reached $ 38 by 2004, which was
almost $ 10 above the 2003 level, see BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2005
1118 House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Iran – Third Report of Session 2003-04, 9 March
2004, HC80, p.14
1119 see The Guardian, 23 June, 2004
1120 For the Conservatives’ criticism of Straw’s timid efforts to have the servicemen released see House of
Commons, Hansard, 13 July 2004: Column 1250
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ambitions were based, directly corresponded to the West’s decision to, yet again, change
the political map of the Middle East.
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Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable
A. The “Comprehensive Dialogue” (CD)
adopted by the EU was an effective policy for
promoting human rights in Iran.
EU economic and political power used its
economic and political might in order to
engage in a human rights dialogue with Iran.
Both parties followed a strategy of TFT. The
EU offered a Trade and Cooperation
Agreement (TCA) for improvements in
human rights. The Iranian government
reciprocated and passed respective pieces of
legislation, but was impeded by C. and D.
B. Economic and political asymmetries in
EU-Iran relations, allowed the European
Union to dictate the terms of the dialogue and
demand political land economic changes.
Iran’s vulnerability to the EU being capable
of making changes in their relationship,
made the EU for most of the CD more
powerful than Iran. This allowed the EU to
initiative “cooperative moves”, which
influenced Iran’s decisions.
The Iranian government and parliament
reciprocated these “cooperative moves”
TFT followed. In anticipation of economic
rewards, the Iranian executive and
legislative met EU demands in political and
economic terms. (i.e. new economic and HR
legislation, creation of institutions to protect
HR, genuine commitment on part of the
government to implement the rule of law
and promote and protect HR in the country)
Efforts were jeopardized by C. and D.
C. Strategic shifts in EU-Iran relations
affected the EU’s ability to sway Iran
concerning HR.
The EU’s perceived sensitivity to strategic
changes taken place in the Gulf (i.e. alleged
Iranian nuclear ambitions and the
occupation of Iraq) led the EU to shift its
priority from human rights to security
concerns.
The EU, in an effort to keep Iranians at the
negotiation table on the nuclear dossier,
acquiesced when conservative forces staged
a major “election coup d’état » in the
February 2004 parliamentary elections. This
had severe ramifications for the protection
of HR in Iran.
D. Level I negotiations were subject to
Iranian domestic constituents. Level I
negotiations were caught in domestic power
struggles.
a) Level II (domestic) “win-sets” were
supported by “internationalist forces” (i.e
reformists), but were constrained by the
“isolationist” (conservatives and their
political allies in unelected state institutions)
Whilst the Iranian government and
parliament met EU demands and introduced
new HR legislations and procedures to
protect HR, conservatives and their various
allies and cronies worked against most of
Constructive Engagement: Hypotheses and Variables
CHAPTER EIGHT
Table 6
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camp. these efforts and thus prevented most
changes in HR legislation and protection of
HR to be implemented.
b) NA NA
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis was to prove that a strategy of constructive engagement is best
suited at promoting human rights in foreign policy. The case of British-Iranian relations
and Britain’s policy of “Critical Dialogue” and “Comprehensive Dialogue” towards that
country was used to test this thesis.
On theoretical grounds, the aim was to elaborate on the idea behind a strategy of
constructive engagement. Drawing essentially on liberal-institutional, game-theoretical
findings on inter-state cooperation and diplomatic practices, the model of constructive
engagement helped to conceptualize British efforts at exercising influence on Iran.
Overall, the premise was that soft-power and non-coercive “hard power” resources, such
as positive sanctions, are sustainable means in promoting and protecting human rights as
well as resolving conflict. It was argued that the EU-CFSP is mainly based on its
transformative power and was identified as a foreign policy strategy of constructive
engagement based on soft power and non-coercive hard-power assets.
Given the fact that the main contention between Britain and Iran was the Rushdie affair,
which was treated as the right to freedom of expression, the focus throughout the thesis
was, therefore, Article 19 of UDHR and the ICCPR. The methodology used throughout
was to identify extents of power and diplomatic leverages in order to explain negotiation
behaviour and negotiation outcome. Reports by the UN Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and by the
(former) Special Representative on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic
of Iran, were used to identify developments in that area of human rights.
Empirically, the thesis was thus divided into two parts:
1. British implementation of the European Union’s “Critical Dialogue” seeking to
resolve the Rushdie issue
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2. British human rights diplomacy towards Iran within the European Union
framework of the “Comprehensive Dialogue”
The Fatwa
Khomeini’s fatwa against British citizen Salman Rushdie resulted in the break of
relations between both countries and was followed by numerous attempts to kill the
author and persons associated with the Satanic Verses. Essentially, British diplomacy
towards Iran in the aftermath of the fatwa attempted to resolve an issue, which was
unique in international relations history. When Rushdie was brought to court in Britain on
charges including offences against the sacred, the respective court rulings which
dismissed the cases against him, established that what was at stake was freedom of
speech. By the same token, however, these verdicts also further sharpened the
controversy concerning the scope of blasphemy laws in England and Wales. Faced with
what they considered blatant hypocrisy on behalf of the state, the Muslim Community in
Britain felt alienated and frustrated. As such it was argued that the Thatcher government
failed to appreciate the changed multicultural character of British society and failed to
positively engage with that community. Given the fact that the motivation for Khomeini
to issue the death sentence against Rushdie should be seen more in the light of Iran’s
domestic political scene rather than solely from a religious perspective, a more sensitive
approach by the Home Office - whilst holding on to the principle of Article 19 - could
have diffused outrage felt by believers in Britain and abroad. Britain’s commitment to
Rushdie’s right to freedom of speech initially failed to convince the Iranians of the
unintentional non-political, non-blasphemous character of the novel. In fact, the
government in Tehran under Khomeini’s leadership had become alienated by the fact
that, what religious and political elements considered to be an offence against the sacred,
was so vehemently defended as a human right by Britain.
The immediate period following the fatwa also demonstrated to what extent economic
and political interdependences between both countries influenced British statecraft and
the capability to sway Tehran. It has been shown that several political and economic
factors, which referred to the fate of the hostages in Lebanon and British prisoners in
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Iran, as well as the possible impact upon trading prospects, proved fundamental in
crafting a strategy towards Iran. At the same time, though it was evident that what was at
stake for both countries were fundamental belief and values systems. It was apparent
during that period that the respective export and defence of either of such belief systems,
was subject to power leverages caused by asymmetries of interdependence. In fact, the
fate of the hostages as well as Iran’s crucial strategic position in the Gulf following the
defeat of Iraq in 1991, left Britain no choice but to seek re-establishment to the Chargé
d’Affaires level.
The years 1992 – 1994 witnessed a change in British diplomacy towards Iran, which in
the face of severe violations of human rights within and outside Iran and the attacks on
persons related to Rushdie, had no chance other than to adopt a firm stance towards
Tehran. As demonstrated, a Tit For Tat approach with Iran, as an active intermediary,
was successful at bringing the British hostages in Lebanon back. This was particulary
important as their fate had also been linked to the Rushdie issue. For this reason, this
period presented a window of opportunity for Europe to engage in genuine conditional
diplomacy as pragmatist-technocrats under new President Rafsanjani were genuinely
seeking détente with the West. Given the level of human rights violations inside and
outside the country, which were all directed against dissidents and actively sought and
perpetrated by the Iranian government, it was evident that Rafsanjani was more interested
in developing Iran’s political economy than in political reform. The technocrat’s tactic
was to create an economic stake for the West in Iran, rather than follow an agenda for
political reform, which could have positively impacted the situation of human rights in
Iran.
Most importantly, against Whitehall’s new firm stance, stood the German government,
which followed its own agenda. Perceived asymmetries in German-Iranian
interdependencies dictated German diplomacy and considerably jeopardized the policy of
Critical Dialogue, which it had advocated so vehemently. On paper, the Critical Dialogue
constituted a policy of constructive engagement. Germany, however, a key player in the
EU with regards to Iran, followed more a policy of unconditional diplomacy towards
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Iran. Rather than demanding meaningful changes on the human rights situation and on
the Rushdie front, good bilateral relations became an end in itself rather than an
incentive, as originally stated at the Edinburgh Summit in 1992. It is evident, that
asymmetries in interdependence between both countries were in favour of Iran.
Findings indicated that Britain was serious about brining about change in Iran. In fact, the
initiative of launching the Critical Dialogue with Iran owes much to Downing Street’s
commitment to achieving a diplomatic solution to the Rushdie affair. Domestically,
however, it has also been revealed that the government’s pledge to defend Rushdie’s right
owes a lot to lobbying efforts by human rights groups, most notably “Article 19”.
Nonetheless, the British government was instrumental at keeping the Critical Dialogue
going and gave that particular Common Foreign and Security Policy an urgent and
tangible objective.
By 1995, EU member states eventually aligned themselves with the British position and
adopted a unified approach. This manifested itself in the Juppé initiative, which in line
with the theory outlined, consisted of problem-solving roundtables designed to
depoliticize the matter for the Iranians. Ironically, Germany’s resolute stance following
the developments of the “Mykonos Trial”, presented Iran with the loss of its most
important European political ally and further aggravated various power centres in Iran. In
addition to the Two-Level game Iranian diplomats had to play, Britain demanded genuine
commitments from the Iranians for Rushdie’s safety. When Iranian behaviour failed to
convince the British of their sincerity, negotiations eventually reached a stalemate.
This diplomatic deadlock proved, however, the vital element on which the FCO could
build a renewed initiative for a final resolution. By then, the Rushdie affair had become
ripe for resolution. Pre-negotiations and confidence building measures, which had been
taking place under Foreign Minister Velayatti, but which failed to reflect a genuine
sustainable political commitment from all political players in Iran, paved the way for
Khatami to settle the dispute. With the arrival of Khatami on Iran’s political scene, the
British dealt with a new Iranian government, which genuinely sought détente abroad and
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political and economic reform at home. Given the momentum Khatami enjoyed in the
country, he was able to manoeuvre diplomatically to that extent, which allowed him to
meet British demands for a sincere commitment to guarantee Rushdie’s safety without
loosing face in Iran. Whilst EU member states were largely subject to fluctuating
asymmetries in European-Iranian interdependence, Britain enjoyed relative independence
towards Iran. This allowed the British government a margin for diplomatic manoeuvring
and for offering economic incentives to the Iranian government to finally close the
Rushdie affair.
In conclusion, Britain managed to resolve an international crisis through a diplomatic
strategy of constructive engagement. Essentially, Whitehall successfully ended an affair,
which had directly threatened the life of a British subject and his associates and in fact,
had killed two persons related to his work. More than that, the fact that an author was
sentenced to death for writing a novel caused a worldwide intellectual and political
debate about the role and impact of religion in politics, law and international relations.
With Huntington’s book three years later, many commentators went so far as to label the
“Satanic Verses” as an example of the coming clash of civilizations. On a less portentous
level, it also added the concept of fatwa to the practise and discipline of international
relations. Because, of these fundamental implications, the Rushdie affair affected more
than just bilateral relations and Whitehall’s decision to engage with rather than contain
Iran was crucial to find a sustainable solution. Ultimately, the Rushdie affair would not
have been possible to solve without a policy of constructive engagement.
Impact on the Right to Freedom of Expression in Iran
Unlike US diplomacy towards Iran since 1979, the critical and comprehensive dialogue
was implemented based upon the appreciation that Iranian politics could evolve towards
an emergent Islamic democracy managed by the Iranian polity rather than imposed by
exogenous forces. Europe’s constructive engagement acknowledged the fact that Iran, as
a civilizational entity, had a sophisticated philosophical occupation with the notion of
human rights and continued to be one of the most politically mature countries in the
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Middle East. For Europe’s diplomatic approach, this meant the need to support liberal
tendencies within Iran, allowing them to influence the conservative and undemocratic
elements and essentially supporting them in their endeavour to institutionalise rule of law
and respect for human rights.
As has been concluded, during the early years of the Critical Dialogue, the stated EU
efforts of promoting and protecting human rights were considerably jeopardized by the
lack of coordination and commitment amongst member states as well as perceived power
asymmetries in favour of Iran. Because of the Rushdie affair, the British government had
been the most critical EU member state (together with the Nordic countries) towards the
Iranian government. Human rights diplomacy during the phase of the Critical Dialogue
mainly consisted of EU efforts at the UN Human Rights Commission to table and pass
resolutions condemning Iran for violations. As such, the Critical Dialogue was by and
large a policy of naming and shaming through the UN mechanisms. Such international
criticism did affect the ruling elite and efforts were being made to diffuse such
condemnation rather than to actually deal with these concerns expressed by the
international community. Therefore, concerning the situation of freedom of speech in the
country, Iran witnessed the paradox of pragmatists engaging with the West and of radical
elements, mainly associated with the Ministry of Intelligence, continuing to crack down
on dissidents at home and abroad. Ironically, what was lacking during the Critical
Dialogue were effective mechanisms to constructively engage with Iran and findsolutions
to what Europe and the UN considered to be violations of human rights. In conclusion,
with the exception of the British government, EU member states largely followed a
policy of diffuse linkage, failing to clearly make relations conditional upon tangible
human rights improvements.
This changed with the launch of the Comprehensive Dialogue. The framework of this
dialogue contained political and economic incentives for Iran in exchange for the
realization of European demands for change. In addition to conventional Track I
condemnation of human rights violations, EU diplomacy intended to promote a rights
culture in which rights make sense through a multi-track approach involving international
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and Iranian NGOs and activists. This proved particularly effective and was based on the
appreciation that rights are best seen as a by-product of a functioning ethical community,
and not as a phenomenon that can be taken out of context and promoted as a universal
solution to the political ills of Iran. It provided a valuable forum for members of Iran’s
emerging society in their efforts to build such an ethical community based both on the
rule of law as well as on Islamic principles. The fact that the 2003 Nobel Peace Price was
awarded to an Iranian human rights activist sustains this notion that Iranian civil society
needed support and an international platform and that reform can come from within an
Islamic discourse. Overall, the assessment of the human rights dialogue has produced the
following findings:
1. Conditional diplomacy towards Iran was effective in the sense that reformists
represented in government, parliament and the Foreign Ministry positively responded
to incentives and offers by the EU. Looking solely at these groups, the policy of
constructive engagement was effective in that it succeeded in dialogue and the
extraction of political concessions. However, the research findings also showed to
what extent ideologically driven elements in Iran’s political system, managed to
jeopardize these efforts by what one could call rationally guided groups.
2. The multi-track approach adopted by Europe actively incorporated Iran’s civil society
at a time when it needed support in terms of capacity-building and a forum to voice
dissent as well as to elaborate on the reformist agenda in a human rights discourse.
The dialogue certainly helped reformists to gain political momentum.
3. Concerning the right to freedom of expression, the outcome has been twofold:
a. Under Khatami’s presidency, the right to freedom of expression was a
political right granted to Iranians the least, yet exercised the most. The
administration attempted to encourage open political debate and an
independent media. Before the judiciary’s backlash against media outlets, in
the early years under Khatami, Iranians enjoyed and exercised their right to
freedom of expression. To a considerable extent, the Iranian parliament (6th
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Majlis) had been instrumental in the right of freedom of speech being upheld,
for it constituted a genuine plenum of a plurality of opinions and passed
legislation intended to guarantee freedom of speech. Thus, the executive and
legislative advocated the right to freedom of expression without fully being
capable of providing legal protection for this right.
b. The political implications of the right to freedom of speech were such that the
judiciary, acting on behalf of the unelected establishment, actively
undermined any efforts by the legislature and executive to protect this right.
The organised crackdown against Iranians voicing their opinion still carries
serious consequences for persons, all of which are contrary to Article 19 and
other clauses in the ICPCR to which Iran is a state party.
4. EU demands for the ratification of international human rights regimes were met by
the Iranian parliament, which passed several bills and the judiciary passed moratoria
(even though controlled by the conservatives), which corresponded to respective
thematic roundtables.
5. EU demands for the proper implementation of the International Covenant for Political
and Civil Rights and the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights into Iran’s legal statutes were not met. Corresponding to the concerns raised at
the roundtable, the Iranian government failed to implement and adapt legislation in
such a way as to meet the benchmarks set by the EU and by these universal human
rights regimes in general.
Over a decade of European engagement with Iran has shown both achievements and
limits for a policy of constructive engagement to promote and protect human rights in
that country. An advocate for the continuation of such a strategy with Iran would point to
the fact that there is no real alternative to engagement.
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Although this thesis did not base its findings on a comparative analysis with U.S. foreign
policy towards Tehran, containment on its own clearly failed to achieve any tangible
improvements of human rights in Iran. Whilst, it is true that, to a certain extent, the EU
and the U.S. played a “good cop bad cop” game, engagement rather than containment is
the only option for the West in its dealings with Iran. It must, however, be backed by the
political will to take human rights seriously. Whilst the EU has so far not entered into a
Trade and Cooperation Agreement due to the failure to considerably improve the
situation of human rights, the EU’s priority shift towards security concerns over Iran’s
nuclear programme clearly reflected changed asymmetries in political and economic
interdependence. Europe’s acquiescence to the “parliamentary coup d’état” in February
2004, which by and large contributed to the gradual marginalisation of reformists,
attested to this paradigm change. Nonetheless, these new security perceptions felt by
Europe as well as Iran are closely intertwined and are directly related to the invasion of
Iraq - an event over which Iran had no influence. For all its wider political implications in
the Middle East, the Iraq invasion had two immediate consequences on the EU-Iran
human rights dialogue. Firstly, Iranians rightly pointed to the blatant disregard for the UN
Charter and subsequent war crimes committed by the occupying forces in Iraq.
Ultimately, Britain’s decision to take part in the invasion of Iraq deprived the Europeans
of some considerable legitimacy to condemn human rights violations in Iran. Secondly,
the political and military implications inherent in an occupied post-Saddam Iraq left Iran
in an unrivalled strategic position in the Middle East. It is from this perspective that one
should see Europe’s policy shift from focusing on Iranian commitments under ratified
international human rights regimes to demands to live up to its obligations under the non-
proliferation regime. Thus, it is somewhat ironic that the perceived military danger Iran is
posing to Western interests largely reflected the West’s decision to, yet again, change the
political map in the Middle East. After all, the experience from engagement with Iran
should have shown EU policymakers that Iran’s young and educated society as well as
reformist movement constituted a genuine and sustainable future guarantor for the respect
of human rights. Rather than dealing with an unelected elite for the sake of alleviating
concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme, one should appreciate the fact that a truly
democratic government in Iran, backed by a great majority of Iranians, is the only true
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safeguard for human security in Iran and could well be the only one for international
security outside Iran.
341
Recommendations
1. Since the assessment of the Comprehensive Dialogue with Iran indicated both
structural strengths as well as weaknesses of that policy, the most important
premise is for the EU to get it right. During the period of the Critical Dialogue,
member states largely relied on a tactic of naming and shaming through the UN
mechanisms and “outsourced” much of their self given responsibility to promote
and protect human rights in third countries (especially after 1995) to procedures
and mechanisms within the UN system. When the European Union eventually
initiated a genuine form of conditional diplomacy towards Iran, policy-makers
tended to give Iran the benefit of the doubt and abstained from tabling resolutions
at the UN Human Rights Commission. Such premise, i.e. a peaceful dialogue
among states, carries the risk that friendly relations will become an end in itself.
Therefore, the primary rationale for the EU’s engagement with Iran should be to
demand meaningful changes in the field of human rights, which involves own
initiatives as well as to continue to work through and with the UN system. A
starting point for such work would be the re-appointment of a Special
Representative on Human Rights for Iran.
2. It is true that the irregularity in EU-Iranian interdependence dictated diplomacy
on both sides. It has, however, also been shown that through concerted efforts on
the part of the EU, the CFSP towards Iran does enjoy considerable leverage and
that the use of positive sanctions can be effective. Thus, economic and political
incentives must continue to be used as a precursor for entering an international
regime with Iran, which can serve as short-term problem-solving mechanism and
long-term mechanism to exert implicit influence over that country. In the long
run, the European Union’s soft power strategy does have the potential to
accomplish respective political and legal reforms in Iran. This, however, needs a
revised approach.
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3. A revised approach for the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue would need to treat
the issue of human rights on the same level as security concerns. The
parliamentary coup d’état in February 2004, and more significantly, the election
of Ahmadinejad in 2005, which witnessed the rise of the conservative-right in
mainstream politics -which carried the inherent repercussion on the deterioration
of human rights in the country- are facts that support such argument. Europe is
unlikely to find a sustainable solution to the nuclear issue: a) without giving Iran
genuine security commitments; b) if it fails to involve Iran directly into efforts to
stabilize post-war Iraq; c) and most significantly, if it turns a blind eye towards
ongoing human rights violations in exchange for Iranian assurances on the issue
of non-proliferation. What is needed is the political will to build on existing
efforts to protect human rights in the country rather than an underlying readiness
to sacrifice them for the sake of security. Democracy and the rule of law are the
most fundamental safeguards for a stable Iran, which, as a result, could become a
genuine ally to the West
4. Improvements of the multi-track aspect of the Human Rights Dialogue are
fundamental for Europe to implement successful human rights diplomacy. Iranian
NGOs and human rights activists must be recognized not only as equal
stakeholders but also as effective agents for change. Whilst the EU incorporated
some of these groups into their initiatives - which gave them some degree of
immunity- there is still reluctance to accept the fact that groups and individuals in
civil society do advocate human rights rather than follow the government’s
agenda. Capacity-building joint ventures with domestic NGOs either through
western human rights groups, through the EU or member states are essential and
must be seen as a primary objective. It is through initiatives, which strengthen
civil society that a human rights culture can emerge in which people are aware of
their rights and in which rights make sense.
5. A very important component of the human rights dialogue was that it succeeded
in depoliticising human rights. Exchanges on various thematic aspects of
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universal human rights between practitioners and experts stressed the legal value
of human rights as well as highlighted the notion of justice; a concept which is in
fact fundamental to Shi’a doctrine. Hence, instilling a human rights culture must
also apply to Track I. As shown, the British government already invited a
delegation of the judiciary for technical cooperation. But the key is consistency
and commitment on both sides. The FCO together with the British judiciary must
continue these exchanges on a regular basis and with more emphasis on education
and legal training. It may be true that judges, prosecutors and lawyers in Iran
practice law in a framework, which leaves too many loopholes for political
manipulation and which fails to provide sufficient safeguards for the protection of
human rights. One should, however, also bear in mind that human rights
education of practitioners has an effect as it raises awareness and understanding of
how human rights ought to be implemented into domestic legal statutes. In 2006,
Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran is the only institute of higher education,
which offers a Masters degree in human rights law. Thus, on a purely educational
level, Iran lacks the capacity concerning human rights training. Clearly, the
promotion and protection of human rights by member states of the EU, must
translate into technical cooperation as well as education. The FCO should launch
several programmes in the UK designed for Iranian judges, prosecutors and
lawyers respectively to study human rights law in order to consolidate proper
administration of justice, the rule of law and judicial reform.
6. By and large, the course of the right to freedom of expression in Iran reflects the
evolution of the post-revolutionary reformist and pro-democracy movement in the
country. Thus, more than any other human right, Article 19 of the ICCPR and the
UDHR seemed to carry significant political significance with apparent potential to
jeopardize the very political foundations of the Islamic Republic. As Jürgen
Habermas put it after visiting Iran in 2002: “ Do these heads contain a powder keg
that the regime of the Ayatollahs has to fear more than anything else?” 1121 In this
light, reform of domestic legal statutes allowing for the genuine exercise of
1121 FAZ, 14 June 2002
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freedom of expression will inherently generate a dynamic environment in which
political and intellectual discourse can flourish and in which ultimately a
sustainable form of democracy is able to emerge. The following steps must be
implemented by the Iranian government to ensure the right to free expression:
(a) Amendments to the existing Press Laws must be passed in order to impede the
suspension or prohibition of newspapers and publications and the arrest of
journalists, writers, intellectuals, and artists on the basis of offences against
national security. The Press Law carries too much ambiguity, allowing for the use
of laws relating to national security as pretext to deny or restrict genuine freedom
of expression, opinion and thought. As such, the limitations set out in the Press
Law and Penal Code fail to conform to the permissible restrictions set out in
Article 19, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR. As the Special Rapporteur on the right to
freedom of expression noted: “ In most cases the grounds for these limitations
“disturbing the security of the country”; “insult against Islam”; “criticism”;
“propaganda” against the State; “issues prejudicial to Islamic codes”; “matters
against Islamic standards”; “deviant parties, parties and groups”; “anti-
revolutionary forces”; “anti-establishment activities” lack any objective criteria
and clear definition, and are thefore open to subjective and arbitrary interpretation
by judges implementing them.” 1122 In this regard the Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 2003/42 also stressed the “need to ensure that unjustified
invocation of national security […] to restrict the right to freedom of expression
and information does not take place.”1123 The role of EU member states and the
EU itself is vital in this context and specific demands should be made to the
government of Iran to implement these changes.
(b) Whilst under Khatami the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance virtually
approved all license applications for publications, it is contrary to universal
human rights for a political body to exercise censorship. Moreover, the role of the
1122 UN Doc.E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.2, paragraph 95
1123 ibid
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Ministry contributed to the practice of self-censorship on the part of writers and
journalists in fear of reprisals. Legal amendments must, therefore, be passed
which would abandon this prerogative given to the Ministry of Culture and
Islamic Guidance or any other political body. In addition to 6 (a), restrictions,
which are imposed on the basis of Islamic principles or values, need to be clearly
defined. The current practice of monitoring and restricting publications or
opinions in the public realm with reference to morality and values owes more to
crude political decisions and fails to provide clear distinctions between offences,
such as defamation and incitement to hatred, and opinions or publications which
are merely considered “offensive” to the majority of society. Since there is no
consent amongst clerics themselves what constitutes permissible critical religious
discourse and what are considered offences against Islamic Principles, clear
definitions of such offences have to be written into law. In line with the ICCPR,
any such amendments have to protect and promote the right to freedom of speech
whilst maintaining respect for religion and public morals.
(c) A revised system of restriction of freedom of expression should be created which
is in accordance with Article 19 of the ICCPR and which essentially should
follow a clearly defined and legitimate aim, be transparent and accountable as
well as subject to independent review. Restrictions must only be imposed after
any given work has been made public. The criteria for review should be clearly
stipulated in law and be in accordance with Article 19 of the ICCPR. All
restrictions must be publicly explained and based on decisions by judicial bodies
in accordance with human rights standards. Also any restrictions should be
subject to an independent body to ensure conformity with the law.1124
(d) A reformed legal framework concerning the right to a free trial, the right to
counsel and the field of administration of justice must be proposed and
implemented by the Iranian government in order to enable prisoners of conscience
1124 see Article 19, Unveiled: Art and Censorship in Iran (London, Article 19 MENA Programme, 2006),
pp.49-50
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to effectively make use of legal procedures, which fulfil international human
rights standards. As the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention noted in 2004: “
These prisoners are punished twice over. Many of them have, on the one hand,
simply peacefully exercised their fundamental right to freedom of opinion and
expression and, on the other, have been unable to benefit in most cases from the
guarantees which are essential to the right of fair trial […]” 1125 The continued use
of Revolutionary Courts, initially set up to deal with collaborators of the previous
regime, has, according to the Special Rapporteur “a negative impact on the
exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression.” The jurisprudence
given to these courts is particularly restrictive of the right to freedom of
expression as well as due process and the right to a fair trial. 1126 Any such
reforms would again benefit from EU initiatives and technical cooperation
between member states and the Iranian judiciary as well as the office of the
prosecutor. Such efforts must also carry continuous pressure on Iran to release
prisoners of conscience and grant them due process of law and the right to fair
trial as well as public support for individual prisoners of conscience on the part of
Council resolutions and démarches.
(e) Human rights initiatives towards Iran must also include effective measures to
remind Iran of its legal obligation under international human rights law to
abandon the practice of using non-state actors to intimidate persons wishing to
exercise the right to freedom of speech. As has been shown, violence by such
parallel institutions is tolerated by the state and carries no legal retribution. EU
efforts should include clear demands to bring any such perpetrators to justice as
well as demanding denunciation on the part of the government followed by
appropriate legislation indiscriminately banning the use of violence by non-state
actors.
1125 UN Doc.CN.4/3004/3/Add.2, paragraph 65 (3)
1126 UN Doc.E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.2, paragraph 100
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(f) The data indicated that reforms aimed at granting genuine respect and protection
of human rights were obstructed by political factions, who successfully exploited
a political system, which ultimately lacks democratic checks and balances as well
as legal-political structures of accountability and the rule of law. It is evident that
EU support of domestic endeavours aimed at making respective constitutional
changes through peaceful means, such as public referenda, should have highest
priority in any human rights dialogue with Iran. Since free intellectual and
political debate is a cornerstone in the process of democratisation, the EU can, in
fact, proactively support Iranians wishing to exercise their right to freedom of
expression. Unlike other political rights, international support for Article 19 can
actually express itself on a practical level. Currently, the U.S. government,
through its federally chartered International Broadcasting Bureau in conjunction
with the software “Anonymizer” is assisting Iranian Internet users to bypass
content filtering and surveillance on the part of the state. 1127 Given the BBC’s
historical role in the course of the Iranian revolution, it seems only appropriate for
the FCO through the BBC/ BBC World Service and the application of
circumvention technology software to promote freedom of Internet access and
publications on the web. This would provide a service allowing Iranian Internet
users to visit the web as well as enable them to post weblogs without disclosing
any potential information, which could identify them. By acting as proxy,
circumvention technology is able to circumvent filtering mechanisms as well as
prevents Internet Service Providers in Iran to identify and disclose the user’s
information to the authorities. As data indicated, the use of the Internet has
become a crucial rallying point for political debate and dissent in Iran. Therefore,
technological support on part of the EU and member states enabling Iranians to
express their right to freedom of speech on the web is likely to carry fundamental
political ramifications for the future of the Islamic Republic. 1128
1127 see http://opennetinitiative.net/advisories/001/#ibb website accessed 19 November 2006
1128 The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights already runs a range of projects aimed at
supporting media and free speech. Any initiatives on Internet censorship by EU member states will
ultimately benefit from initiatives on the EU level. see European Commission, “Report on the
Implementation of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights in 2000”, SEC (2001) 801,
Brussels, 22 May 2001, paragraph 1.2.1
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Theoretical Implications for Future Research
The data on the Rushdie affair (1989-1999) indicated that constructive engagement is
a viable strategy at resolving conflict between states. Equally, findings on the
Comprehensive Dialogue with Iran (2000-2004) implied that human rights could
successfully be promoted through such a strategy. Overall, it has been shown that
reformists represented in the executive and legislative branch responded rationally to
demands by the Europeans and positively reciprocated respective incentives. Given
the fact that Iran is one of the most ostracised states in international relations, which
is largely based on the perception of it being an ideologically driven “rogue state”,
these findings underline the potential of constructive engagement in general. Thus, it
seems sensible to conclude that if constructive engagement has (limited) effect on
Iran, it is likely to have even more far-reaching impact on other states. Theoretically,
this proves the validity of neo-liberal approaches to inter-state cooperation and the
significance of negotiation to achieve win-win outcomes in international relations. As
such, the findings highlighted the relative effectiveness of constructive engagement
and its associated neo-liberal means of statecraft, such as the use of positive sanctions
and non-coercive conditional diplomacy with its inherent mechanism of positive
reciprocity.
Ultimately, the CFSP of the European Union presents a wealth of empirical data for
future research on the effectiveness of constructive engagement to promote human
rights. The Lomé Convention in 1995 demanded concrete action in the promotion of
human rights and for institutional reform, in the context of democratisation and the
rule of law. The relations between the EU and the ACP states were thus largely based
on institutional and administrative reforms concerning the rule of law and
democratisation, including constitutional reforms, judicial reform, assistance for
legislative reform and the parliamentary system as well as support for regional
systems to protect and monitor human rights. 1129 Moreover, the Cotonou Agreement
1129 Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the
Measures Intendend to Promote Observance of Human Rights and Democratic Principles in External
Relations For 1996-1999, Brussels, 14.11.2000, Com (2000) 726 Final, paragraph 2.1
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between the EU and the ACP states signed in 2000 made the respect for human rights
an essential element and thus contains a “consultation procedure” as well as a
suspension clause in the event of violations of human rights. 1130 This political and
economic partnership, which was concluded with 77 African and Caribbean States,
provides a wealth of empirical data in order to assess the effectiveness of
conditionality as a strategy to promote human rights in international relations. More
significantly, however, is the EU’s Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and
the Middle East. Though much current and future scholarly analysis is dedicated to
the situation of post-war Iraq, research on the EU’s approach to the Middle East at
supporting human rights and democracy will, undoubtedly, provide valuable insights
at the merits of Europe’s transformative power and, therefore, bear long-term
implications for the ambitious state building exercise in Iraq. Research on the
Barcelona Process and on the more recent Strategic Partnership will produce findings
on the effectiveness of supporting the “rule of law and good governance, with
emphasis on legal reform and human rights with a constructive involvement by
national authorities.” 1131 It is evident, that the European Union fully embraces a
policy of constructive engagement of entering political dialogue and economic
partnership with third countries. Ultimately, research on this soft power approach will
potentially produce vital answers of how to sustainably solve the social, political and
economic challenges with states in the Middle East rather than against them.
1130 see Article 9 and 96 in European Commission, ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on
23 June 2000 (Brussels, Directorate General for Development, 2003), p.8, pp. 53-54
1131 European Commission, Final Report (approved by the European Council in June 2004), “EU Strategic
Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East” on
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Partnership%20Mediterranean%20and%20Middle%20East.pdf website
accessed on 20 November, 2006, p. 8
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APPENDIX A
British Iranian Relations: Historical Background
I am of opinion, that provided our policy be bold and decisive, we have the power of
always possessing a decided influence in the Persian Empire; and in the event of the
Court of Teheraun being inclined to favour our enemies, we might raise such a
commotion in the state as to render it incapable of affording them any material
assistance.
John MacDonald Kinneir: Journey 534
1. Britain’s historical legacy in Iran
Any contemporary study on British diplomacy towards Iran has to reflect on Britain’s
imperial legacy in that country. Undoubtedly, it was British strategies and plots in Iran
which shaped perceptions and misperceptions on both sides, and which ultimately have to
be taken into account if one wants to understand the wider historical context of the
impact which the “Satanic Verses” had on British Iranian relations. If one thinks of
Iranian nationalism and Islamism as crucial determinants of post-1979 Iranian foreign
policy, revolutionary anti-imperialism has certainly to be depicted as a third of such core
components. In fact, the impact of anti-imperialism not only on Iranian foreign policy but
also on Iranian identity as a whole can be directly linked to Britain’s legacy in that
country. Iranian resentment to foreign influence and the rejection of superpower
hegemony largely derives from this experience and have, as Abrahamian observes, led to
a conspiratorial mindset among all periods and factional of Iranian politics. 1132 As the
British Foreign Affairs Select Committee itself conceded in its 2003 Report on Iran:
“Given this history, it is hardly surprising that Iranians are said to see the hand of the
United Kingdom behind every suspicious development in their country […]” 1133
Following historical milestones in British-Iranian relations undeniably serve as a
prerequisite to understanding Iranian perceptions towards Britain: the Definitive Treaty
with Britain in 1814, which made Persia a pawn in the Great Game, the Reuter
1132 Shilbey Telhami and Michael Barnett, Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, 2002), p.101
1133 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Iran – Third Report of Session 2003-2004, HC 80,
published 19 March 2004, p. 7
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Concession of 1872, the tobacco concession awarded to Britain in 1982, Britain’s
ambivalent role in the Constitutional Revolution between 1905 and 1911, Britain’s role in
the rise of Reza Shah from 1921-1941, the Allied invasion of 1941 and above all the
ousting of Prime Minister Mossadegh by the British-American instigated coup d’état in
1953.
2. A Pawn in the Great Game
Britain’s primary rationale for its relations with Persia at the beginning of the 19th century
1134 was a direct derivative of the European balance of power theory and thus reflected
British strategic interests in its dealings with France and Russia. Thus, following
Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, St Petersburg again proved itself a valuable ally for
Britain in Europe. In order to end hostilities between Russia and Persia 1135 and free
Russian troops for the war with France, British diplomats were instructed to negotiate a
peace between Iran and Russia. 1136 The outcome favoured British interests, as Persia was
compelled to accept substantial territorial cessions, including Georgia, and had to grant
rights to Russia on the Caspian. 1137 Eventually, Persia’s inferior military and political
position towards the Russians provided Britain with a good bargaining position to
convince the Shah to sign a protectorate agreement with His Majesty’s government. The
Definitive Treaty, negotiated by British special agent Henry Ellis in 1814 then formed the
basis of British relations with Iran until 1838. With this document Persia declared all
alliances contracted with European powers, (which were in hostility with Britain) null
and void and undertook to oppose the passage of any European army into Persia or India.
British obligations foresaw that in case of aggression against Iran by a European power,
1134 For earlier contacts between Britain and Iran see; Ekbal Kamran, Der Briefwechsel Abbas Mirzas mit
dem britischem Gesandten MacDonald Kinneir im Zeichen des zweiten russischen-persischen Krieges
(1825-1828) (Freiburg, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1977), pp.15-16;
1135 Following Russia’s invasion of the Persian province of Georgia, Fath Ali Shah had in fact initially
turned to Britain to meet its obligations under its bilateral treaty from 1800, a pledge which Britain refused.
see M.E. Yapp, Strategies of British India – Britain, Iran and Afghanistan 1798-1850 (Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1980), pp. 36
1136 ibid, pp.82-83
1137 Rose Greaves, “Iranian Relations with Great Britain and British India, 1798-1921” in Peter Avery (ed.)
The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 7, From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 385
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Britain would either send a military force to Persia or pay an annual subsidy. Article 6
undertook, in the event of war, between Persia and any European power, which was at
peace with Britain, to offer mediation, or if that failed, to pay the subsidy for the duration
of the war. 1138 The signing of the Definitive Treaty made Persia a pawn in the Great
Game. The Shah genuinely hoped that Britain would help defend Iran against Russia and
use British military assistance to rebuild his army. However, Britain had agreed to do so
as a quid pro quo at a time when her hostile relations with Russia made it possible for her
to give such help. But now that the older harmony between the two European powers had
seemingly been restored, it was obvious that Britain would not come to Persia’s aid
anymore. Whilst there were differences in strategies and perceptions about the Persian
question between British India and the British government, it was always regarded as a
buffer state. Britain wanted an independent Persia, stable and strong enough to withstand
a Russian attack but not strong enough to constitute a threat to India itself. 1139 In 1826,
the Persians launched an offensive into the Caucasus in order to regain the territories they
had lost in 1813. The new frontier of Gullistan had never been defined on the ground and
the Iranians had accused the Russians of illegally occupying the district of Gokcheh. As
attempts to persuade the troops to withdraw failed, and under strong pressure from
religious group, the Shah eventually commanded an attack on the Russian troops. 1140 The
British envoy MacDonald was immediately confronted with a demand for British
assistance as provided under the Treaty. Whilst the British diplomat knew that Art. 4 of
the 1814 Treaty gave the Persians a claim to the subsidy, Britain was allied to the Russia
against the Ottomans in the War of Greek Independence. As any provision of assistance
to Persia would have been regarded as outright hostility by Russia, Britain refused to pay
the subsidy or to mediate between the warring parties. 1141 Ironically, one could argue that
it was Persian reliance on their ally Britain to meet its obligations under the Definitive
Treaty, which led to the military enterprise in the first place. Without British aid,
however, Persian forces soon were systematically demolished and by 1828 the Shah was
1138 Alvin Cottrell, “Iran’s Armed Forces under the Pahlavi Dynasty”, in George Lenczowski (ed.) Iran
under the Pahlavis (Standford, hooever Institution Press, 1978) p. 389, 1138 M.E. Yapp, Strategies of British
India – Britain, Iran and Afghanistan 1798-1850 pp.88-89
1139 William E. Griffith, “Iran’s foreign policy in the Pahlavi Era”, in George Lenczowski, (ed.) Iran under
the Pahlavis, p. 366
1140 M.E. Yapp, Strategies of British India – Britain, Iran and Afghanistan 1798-1850, p. 103
1141 ibid, p. 104
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forced to sign the humiliating Treaty of Turkmanchai, which confirmed all Persian
territorial losses and moreover granted economic concession and extraterritorial
privileges to Russian citizens. 1142 Clearly, this was a huge political and economic burden
for Persia, but, more importantly, it showed that they were not perceived as an equal ally
to a European power rather than perceived as a buffer zone to Britain and weak rival to
Russian expansionism.
3. The Reuter Concession of 1872
Following the British-Persian war of 1856-57, which succeeded in driving Persian forces
out of Herat and thus secured to keep Afghanistan as a buzzer for possible aggression
against India, British policy towards Persia changed. Military expenditures were to be cut
and “masterly inactivity” was advocated to be the best strategy to keep Persia and Britain
out Afghanistan, and Britain in Persia in order to keep an eye on Russian activities. 1143
Domestically, the Persian state increasingly felt the impact of foreign powers as well as
the consequences of the costly wars the rulers had fought. Ecological problems, such as
desertification and economic challenges, most notably changing trade patterns, the
growth of European manufacturing (which produced better goods more cheaply than
traditional Iranian craftsmen) and the persistent problems of communications across
Iran’s vast territory contributed to decrease economic development and social standards
and ultimately weakened the central authorities in Tehran. 1144 Ultimately, the military
defeats, which had led to diplomatic concessions, produced commercial capitulations;
commercial capitulations then paved the way for increased economic penetrations by
European powers. The Qajars responded to these challenges in ways which did not
improve the predicament of the Persian, nation rather than increased dependence on
foreign powers. During the first half of the century the Qajar bureaucracy tried to initiate
two large scale programmes for rapid, defensive and nationwide modernization. But
having failed, they settled upon reform projects on a smaller scale. These reform
1142Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle – The Conflict between Iran and America, (New York,
Random House, 2004) p.14-15
1143 Rose Greaves, “Iranian Relations with Great Britain and British India, 1798-1921”, pp.396-397
1144 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle – The Conflict between Iran and America, p. 15
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initiatives eventually translated into collaboration with rather than challenging the West
and introduced 1145 what Abrahamian refers to as, “ piecemeal, court-based rather than
wholesale state-wide changes.” 1146 Yet, the drive for modernization, initiated by Mirza
Muhammad Taqi, also known as Amir Kabir, saw the revival of the standing army, the
establishment of fifteen factories to supply this army and the cut of foreign imports,
which was partly substituted with the domestic production of cannons, light arms,
woollens, cloths, paper, cast iron, lead, copper and sugar. 1147 Unfortunately, forces from
within the government and outside the country blocked this genuine effort for Persian
political and economic emancipation. To finance this large scale initiative at
modernization, Amir Kabir reduced court expenses, increased import tariffs and
introduced a new tax on fief holders that no longer contributed men to the armed forces.
Not surprisingly, British and Russian envoys protested vehemently against the new
import duties and, together with the elite at the court, managed to lobby the Shah, who
eventually dismissed the modernizer and banished him to the provinces in 1851, where he
was executed soon after. The new reforms that followed Amir Kabir’s efforts did little to
achieve economic and social development. By refusing to curb the spending of the state,
the ruling elite increased foreign borrowing. When debts continued to mount, they started
selling concessions and the meagre manufacturing capability that they had to foreigners,
in order to pay off their debt, which eventually reduced revenue and on the contrary,
made them ever more dependent on the Europeans. 1148 Because the concessions virtually
deprived the state of imposing revenues on foreign goods, the state instead imposed
internal taxes, which further undermined domestic manufacturing and industrial
production. 1149 The time when British and Russian investors were searching for ventures
abroad coincided with Naser al Din Shah ‘s fateful initiative to attract foreign
investments. The most detrimental of these concessions for Iran was when Baron Julius
Reuter, a German who had become a naturalized British subject, obtained his Persian
concession in 1872. For the purchase prize of £ 40,000 and 60 per cent of the profits, for
1145 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982), p.52
1146 ibid, p. 52
1147 ibid, pp.54-55
1148 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle – The Conflict between Iran and America, p.15
1149 Said Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York, Oxford
University Press, 1988) pp.31-33
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a period of seventy years Reuter received exclusive rights to the railway (from the
Caspian Sea to the Persia Gulf), for tramways throughout the country, mining, irrigation,
water works and exploitation of the states forests and all minerals (except gold and
silver). Moreover, he was given a twenty-year monopoly over the Persian Customs and
the first option on any concession for public utilities, roads, postal services,
manufacturing plants and banks. In return the Persian government would receive only 20
per cent of the railway’s profits and 15 per cent of profits of other activities undertaken
by Reuter. 1150 The Reuter concession was what Curzon called the ‘complete surrender of
the entire resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has ever been dreamed of, much
less accomplished, in history.” 1151 Whilst the Reuter concession was withdrawn
eventually, due to much opposition in Iran and Russia, he retained the mining and
banking privileges. Iran’s economic development was important to Britain for two
reasons. Economic interest in Iran was great and British investors were keen to exploit
the potential the country had to offer. Nevertheless, railway and telegraph construction,
which began as early as 1863, also mirrored the strategic stake Britain had in Iran.
Mindful that the key to Iranian independence from Russia was a genuine community of
interest with Great Britain, economic prosperity, it was believed, would in the long run
provide the means for training and equipping an efficient Iranian army. This in turn could
lead to political stability and would render the country a more effective bulwark against
Russian expansion. 1152 To some extent the maintenance of the Persian buffer depended
on the willingness to provide finance to the Persian government. After 1890, due to the
ever-increasing economic demise, the Shah was desperate for money and found in Britain
and Russia willing creditors. Much to the resentment of the middle class and the
bazaaris, he borrowed £ 500,000 from British financiers in 1892 and managed to
negotiate a massive Russian loan of £ 2.400,00 in 1900.1153 Realizing that their
government was becoming more and more dependent on these two foreign powers and
aware of the growth of their influence on Iranian politics and the Persian market, the
1150 see Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-194 – a study in Imperialism, ( New Haven.
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dissent came to a boil in 1891 when a Briton, Major Gerald F. Talbot secured a fifty-year
monopoly of the production, sale, and export of Persian tobacco. Whilst the Shah was
assured that this deal would benefit the share holders in Britain as much as the
downtrodden Persian cultivators, it was soon evident that the company’s profit had to be
found somewhere between the cost of production and the price paid by the Persian
consumer. Protests started when the agents of the new Imperial Tobacco Corporation
arrived in the Shiraz and the ulema used this occasion to pass a judgment of the Shah’s
policy of welcoming foreign investors. After this fatwa prohibiting the use of tobacco the
protests soon translated into a nationwide rebellion, and when the safety of the European
expatriate community was at stake, the Shah revoked the concession outright. 1154 This
protest demonstrated that various social and political forces were able to unite to express
their dismay at the Shah’s policies. Whilst the tobacco revolt did not change the direction
of the country, it should have been an indication to the ruling elite of what was to come.
4. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906
The Tobacco concession ended, but the movement which was responsible for the
cancellation of the concession, spread among society and eventually lead to the
assassination of Nasirud Din Shah on May 1, 1896. Nevertheless, his son Muzaffar al-
Din Shah continued his father’s policies and continued to secure loans from Russia and
Britain. 1155 Britain tried to stay ahead in the game of giving out loans to Persia in order
to maintain the court’s dependence on the Treasury in Whitehall. Under-secretary at the
Foreign Office, Charles Hardinge, went so far as to order two British agents to Iran in
1903 in order to improve British contact with the Persian ulema. “The more openly the
British worked with Persia’s spiritual leaders”, he asserted “ the greater would be
Britain’s prestige at Tehran and the more the Shah would fear Britain’s capacity to have
him excommunicated or even dethroned as a result of public agitation.” The ulema was
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thus regarded as the last resort for preventing the Persian monarch from virtually selling
his country to Russia. 1156 Nonetheless, in 1900-1902, the Persians secured three large
loans from St Petersburg to pay off their existing debt and finance the court. In return, the
Iranians agreed to further lower the customs duties on Russian imports and pay all of
their debts to Great Britain and not take out new loans from London with Russia’s
consent.1157 By securing loans with dangerous economic and political conditions, the
Shah had become a Russian pawn and by 1900, northern Persia seemed firmly in Russian
hands. In an attempt to not fully alienate the British, the Shah had granted a British
subject, William Knox D’Arcy, a concession in 1901 giving extensive rights over
petroleum. At the time this concession did not seem to amount to very much, but it was to
have disastrous ramifications for British Persian relations during the second half of the
century. By 1906, Persia owed £ 800,000 to Britain and £ 3.250,000 to Russia. 1158 When
in 1905 a Belgian official was put in charge at Bushir to enforce the tariffs on exports to
Belgium with greater severity, Iranian merchants eventually resented and refused to clear
their goods. 1159 These grievances with the governing elite ultimately expressed
themselves in organized popular dissent. Persia witnessed the establishment of the
country’s first state-wide stock company in order to preserve the country’s economic
independence by fostering modern industries. In the political spectrum, political parties
were formed, such as the Social Democratic Party, which was mainly influenced by the
revolutionary socialism of Russian Marxism and demanded worker’s rights, the right to
strike and pensions, distribution of land among those who tilled it, freedom of speech and
press and toleration of all religions. 1160 The Secret Society, which drew its members
predominantly from the traditional middle class, met in February 1905 for the first time
and formulated demands such as a national code of justice, a House of Justice, a just tax
structure, encouragement of internal trade and an investigation into government salaries.
Together these parties and secret societies were rapidly moving towards a constitutional
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revolution. 1161 When Russia was unable to provide any more loans, as it had just been
defeated in a costly war with Japan, the government in Tehran responded by raising
additional internal custom duties. The raising of more tariffs on native merchants
eventually triggered three public protests and culminated in the revolution of August
1906. 1162 Having formulated programmes and demands, the Secret Society established
contact with two influential ayatollahs in Tehran, Sayyid Abdullah Behbehani and Sayyid
Muhammad Tabatabai, which helped to appeal the constitutional cause to the masses.
When in December the governor of Tehran ordered two prominent bazaaris publicly
bastinadoed for failing to comply with an order to lower the price of sugar, Behbehani
and Tabatabai led two thousand people to take basti1163 at a shrine in Tehran to protest
the governor’s order and to provoke a dispute with the ruling elite. 1164 More
demonstrations and protests followed and when soldiers opened fire on the masses, the
bastis approached the British Legation and asked the Chargé d’Affaires for permission to
take refugee. In the view of the acknowledged traditions in Persia, the Charge d’Affaires
granted refuge, and in the end allowed sixteen thousand bastis to camp in the garden of
the British Legation. 1165 Acting first as intermediaries, the British arranged a meeting
between the government and the popular leaders. When the Shah refused to sign the
Regulations for the National Assembly, the British and Russian representatives
intervened and compelled him to ratify and enact the Court of Justice as well as the
National Assembly. 1166 The Russian cooperation with the British on this matter was not
surprising as negotiations were being held at that time for an entente between both
countries. These talks eventually resulted in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The
agreement recognized and defined respective British and Russian spheres of influence,
designating the northern part to Russia, the south to Britain and the middle part
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generously to Persia. The contracting parties assigned themselves “not to seek for
themselves and not to support in favour of the subjects of third powers any concessions
of a political or economic nature – such as concession for railways, banks, telegraphs,
roads […]” The provision also read that St Petersburg had to recognize that Afghanistan
is outside of Russian influence and that Great Britain shall not change the political
situation in Persia. 1167 The latter soon turned out to be rather difficult to commit to,
when in 1908 the new Shah Mohammad ‘Ali, who was not interested in a constitutional
monarchy, joined forces with the Cossack Brigade and, in a coup d’état, restored royal
authority in Tehran. From the outset the British had sympathy for the reform movement
in Iran - especially if it worked to their advantage.1168 Yet, bound to the agreement and
fearful of German activities in Persia and of increasing German military power in Europe,
Britain needed Russia as an ally and as a potential eastern front in case of war. Thus,
Britain was horrified but accepted when Russia claimed its right to police the territory
adjacent to its frontier. In 1909, when the siege of the nationalist stronghold at Tabriz
endangered Russian lives, troops were sent to occupy Kazvin, which eventually helped to
break the Shah’s siege. 1169 Whilst Russia favoured a gunboat diplomacy and the use of
force to restore order in Persia, Britain’s help for the reform movement eventually
expressed itself in the field of finance. Convinced that if a constitution was granted to the
Persian people, peace and order would be restored in the entire country, the British
convinced the Russians to sent a joint communication to the Shah, which urged the
monarch to rid himself of his reactionary advisers, to re-establish the constitution, grant
amnesty for all those who had taken arms up against the Shah and to announce dates for
the parliamentary elections. 1170 Aware of the Shah’s finances, Britain offered an
incentive, yet made it clear that a loan would only be given after the reestablishment of
the constitutional regime and the transaction being approved by an elected Assembly. 1171
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When British backed Bakhtiyari tribesmen, along with constitutionalists from Azerbaijan
marched on Tehran, the Shah quickly issued a decree to reinstate the old constitution.
However, by July 1909, the constitutionalists, aware of the treacherous and revengeful
nature of their monarch were in the political and military position to depose the Shah and
replace him with his young son Ahmad Mirza. 1172 Back in power, the constitutionalists
attempted to implement the reforms that they demanded at the beginning of their
movement and which the Shah’s counter offensive had so far prevented. During the next
few months the new government succeeded in negotiating the withdrawal of all the
Russian troops in the north and obtained another loan from the Imperial Bank in order to
rebuild the administrative structure. Appreciating that central government authority and
dealing with foreign debts was their greatest challenge, but refusing to give Britain and
Russia any more of a role in their country, the formation of the Persian gendarmerie was
to be commanded by Swedish officers and the task of reorganizing the state finances was
to be dealt with by an American financial adviser. 1173 Whilst internal divisions in the
Majlis weakened the reform process and constitutional movement as a whole, they were
soon faced with British and Russian demands, who were afraid of loosing their influence
in Iranian affairs and trade. In 1911, British forces occupied the city of Shiraz claiming
that fighting between clans terrorised the merchant community of that city and thus
necessitated the immediate presence of troops. Russia, who objected that an American
was put in charge of finances eventually occupied Enzeli and Rasht in November 1911
and managed to convince Britain that their division and control of Iran was at stake. The
joint Anglo-Russian threat, which followed the occupation of the North and South,
demanded the dismissal of financier Morgan Shuster and the promise not to hire any
foreign advisers without the consent of Britain and Russia. 1174 In Tehran, the government
and the security forces, lead by Colonel Reza Khan, who had risen through the ranks to
head the Cossack Brigade in Qazvin all pressed the Majlis to comply with the demands.
When the Majlis, reflecting popular outrage at British and Russian interference, refused
to comply, the assembly was forcibly disbanded in December 1911. Iran’s genuine
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attempt at democracy was thus successfully strangled by Britain and Russia. Though the
Constitutional Revolution ended in defeat, it was a catalyst event, heralding the modern
era in Persia. This period in Persian/Iranian history witnessed a period of unprecedented
political debate in a burgeoning press. New institutions, new forms of expression and
political thoughts and a new social and political form eventually replaced the ancien
regime, which the Qajar Dynasty had struggled for so long to sustain.1175 Nonetheless, in
the light of contemporary British human rights diplomacy towards Iran, it seems ironic
that Britain was instrumental in initially supporting the Constitutionalists and leading
them to victory, but then acquiesced when the newly established Majlis was increasingly
marginalised by authoritarian forces and eventually turned into a rubber stamp to the
monarch. A fact, which would not only have fundamental consequence for the course of
20th century Iranian politics but was yet another factor, which contributed to deep
resentment and mistrust towards the British government.
5. Britain and the Rise of Reza Khan
After the outbreak of World War I, the Third Majlis refused to declare war against
Germany and the Ottoman Empire and formed a Committee for National Resistance,
which resided first in Qom and when Russian troops invaded their sanctuary moved to
Kermanshah. When the committee established contacts with pro-German Swedish
gendarmerie and formed an alliance with Qashqayi and Baluchi tribesmen, who were
receiving German arms, the British formed a police force known as the South Persian
Rifles. 1176 The British diplomat Percy Sykes was charged with the mission “to create a
force for the restoration of law and order in south Iran and to this end was to raise, with
or without the cooperation of the Iranian government a force of 11,000 men to take the
place of the unreliable Gendarmerie.” 1177 In 1917, Sykes installed governors in Shiraz,
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heavily subsidised by the British in order to restore order or rather British control. Events
in Europe also accelerated Britain’s influence in Iran. The Russian Revolution and the
defeat of Germany and the Ottoman Empire left Britain as the predominant power in
Persia. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, in particular, was eager to increase Britain’s
military and economic hold over that country, which would have effectively reduced Iran
to a protectorate. This new agreement put forward by Curzon, stated that Persian military
and financial affairs would be placed under British control and in return Britain would
lend £ 2 Million to Persia. In an attempt to push ahead with the implementation of the
agreement, Curzon ignored parliamentary ratification by the Majlis altogether and bribed
the Prime Minister to accept the document. Nevertheless, due to increasing pressure from
the Majlis the Prime Minister eventually resigned and the new government suspended the
agreement in 1920. 1178 It was against this background of disunity and strife that
eventually Reza Khan, the commander of the Cossack Brigade entered the stage. His
coup d’état was a gradual consolidation of power and it wasn’t until 1925 that the Majlis
deposed of the Qajars and installed Reza Khan as Shah. The rise of Reza Shah as the new
monarch of Persia was closely connected with the rise of a modern standing army, the
creation of a Persian navy and air force. This military base increasingly strengthened his
political power, which ultimately provided him with the control he needed to pursue his
reform and modernization policies. Having gained full control of his country, the
monarch used Iran’s oil revenues effectively to create and develop much of the modern
Iranian state. 1179 Paradoxically, just as a modern state and bureaucracy was being created
so was the Iranian rentier state, which was to haunt Iranian political economy for decades
to come. For Reza Shah, the greatness of Iran was in the future as well as in the past and
his large-scale economic development and social, legal and educational reform projects
combined this push for modernization with, what Ansari calls, “invention of
tradition.”1180 Nevertheless, much more depended on financing these initiatives with oil
revenues. This proved to be the first instance of contention between Reza Shah and the
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British. Arguing that the concession with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had been
obtained through misrepresentation and under duress by a regime now deposed and
irrelevant, the Shah pressed for fundamental changes in the terms of the oil concession. A
study, which the Shah had commissioned, showed that APOC was not only
underreporting its profits to the Persian governments but moreover was:
[…] charging £ 10,000 a year for maintenance of the pipeline and then charging exorbitant amounts
supposedly to repair it, deducting interests paid on bonds by its subsidiaries but excluding these
from profits, paying 3 percent to Britain’s tribal proxies in the country and then deducting this from
the money paid to the Persian government, and selling oil to the British government at cut-rate
prices. 1181
The company’s board was aware of the disaffection within in Iran, as BP’s historian
notes: “The Company had become a double scapegoat. On ideological grounds it was
caricatured as an imperialist bogey, a capitalist bloodsucker. In religious circles it was
characterized as being a partner in an unholy alliance with the government in overturning
traditional values and introducing alien principles.” 1182 When in 1931 the company
informed the Shah that the government’s royalties would be down by 76 per cent from
the previous year (from £ 1,288,000 to £ 306,872) Reza Shah unilaterally cancelled the
concession. The Agreement of 1933, which followed the termination of the concession
reflected the extent of British Iranian economic interdependence, as neither side was able
to exert any real leverage. This new agreement provided some modest improvements for
Iran in terms of revenues per ton and guaranteed a minimum annual payment to the
government. APOC promised not to interfere in internal Iranian affairs and reduced the
concession area to 100,00 square miles. In return it was exempt from all taxes other than
those provided in the original concession and had managed to extend the concession for
another 60 years – to 1993. 1183 Having squeezed the APOC for all he thought he could
obtain, Reza Shah relied on internal resources to finance the country’s economic
development plans. Indirect taxes, such as monopolies on tea and sugar ensured that the
cost of modernization would fall most heavily on the poorest section of society and
especially on rural Iran.1184 Overall, Reza Shah inaugurated an impressive range of
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modernization, industrialization and reform projects. This new political and military
infrastructure served the centralization of power and strengthened his patrimonial rule
over Iran. In the end, his reign would, like many of his predecessors, come to an end as a
result of external events and interferences. After the German invasion of Russia in 1941,
Iran’s neutrality was inevitable, as it could not afford to alienate Germany, Britain or the
Soviet Union. However, the supplies of civil and military goods, on which Iran’s
development programme depended on dried up, oil revenues fell and foreign currency
reserves were frozen. It was not until the Anglo-Russian alliance, which followed the
German invasion, that Iran once again became a pawn to these two powers. 1185 In
Britain, the government soon considered the desirability of joint military action with the
Russians in order to expel the German community present in Tehran and, most
importantly, to secure the oil fields in southern Persia. 1186 In view of the recalcitrance of
the Persian government to comply with their demands, British and Russian forces
prepared to first occupy the oil fields and then march towards Tehran. When the joint-
Anglo note of August 17 met with the expected Iranian refusal British, American and
Russian troops invaded southern and northern Iran respectively. Iranian resistance
collapsed almost immediately and after the abdication of Reza Shah in favour of his son
Mohammed Reza Shah, the Iranian government agreed to the conditions imposed by the
two powers. These were the cessation of all resistance, the ejection of Germans,
neutrality in the war and the Allied use of Iranian communication for the transits of war
supplies to Russia. 1187 Whilst the occupation of Iran during the Second World War
provided Russia with essential supplies and secured Allied access to oil, it also
prematurely ended the reign of Reza Shah and had a significant impact on Iran’s
endeavour at economic development, emancipation and independence.
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6. Britain, Mosaddeq and the Nationalization of Iranian Oil
The end of the war also witnessed the rise of American interest and influence in Iran,
which at first was a genuine advocate of an independent Iran free from foreign meddling.
In fact, it was an American initiative in 1942, which led to the Tripartite Pact, in which
the three allies guaranteed Iran’s territorial sovereignty and independence and pledged to
withdraw their troops from Iran no later than six months after the end of the war. 1188
After the war this assurance was soon to be challenged by Stalin, who not only demanded
an oil concession in the northern provinces but also used Soviet presence to capitalize on
the chronic discontent of the northern tribes, particularly the Kurds and Azerbaijanis.
Efforts at stirring up these separatist sentiments and at mobilizing and actively supporting
the newly formed Marxist Tudeh Party eventually paid off when in December 1945 the
Azeris proclaimed the Azerbaijan People’s Republic and the Kurds declared their
autonomy in January 1946. 1189 Unable to regain control over the provinces, the Iranian
government turned to the United States and the United Nations to resolve what had
become the first crisis of the Cold War. Despite Russia’s protest the Security Council
discussed the case during its very first meeting and after a few months of public
diplomacy and President Truman’s threat that US combat divisions in Austria will be
deployed to Iran, Moscow eventually agreed to pull out of Iran. The Security Council
retained its cognizance of the issue by putting and keeping Iran’s complaint on the
agenda. However, the agreement the two parties reached did not only provide the
complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iranian territory. It also affirmed Azerbaijan
as an internal Iranian affair and, most importantly, established a joint Iranian-Soviet oil
company, with a majority Soviet holding.1190 On balance, Iran had ultimately struck a
deal, which traded in economic concessions in return for the withdrawal of foreign
troops, which had illicitly occupied its own territory. Thus, the Azerbaijan crisis was a
diplomatic triumph for the United States, an economic gain for the Soviet Union and
proved, yet again, to be a humiliation for Iran. Whilst the British used this opportunity to
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reinforce anti-Soviet feelings and their own position in Iran, Muhammad Reza Shah
exerted his leadership for the first time as constitutional Commander-in-Chief of the
Iranian armed forces and successfully led operations against the secessionists in
Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. 1191 Although the new young Shah lacked his father’s base
immediately after the occupation at the end of 1947, Mohammad Reza was on the verge
of rebuilding Pahlavi power. Through strategic clientalist manoeuvring, he managed to
regaine control of the army, the government and bureaucracy and recovered the lost
Pahlavi estates. Having completed the destruction of the left and having strengthened his
position against the Majlis by establishing a second chamber under his control and giving
himself the prerogative to dissolve parliament, the Shah now needed capital to relaunch
Iran’s modernization programme. 1192 Aware of the fact that in Saudi Arabia a 50:50
agreement had been signed between Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company) and the
Saudi ruling family, a re-negotiation with the Anglo Iranian Oil Company, as it was now
called, seemed, a convenient solution to cover the substantial funds required. This new
agreement should have dealt with demands, such as the amount of revenues accruing to
the government of Iran, the supplying of the British Navy and Air Force with Iranian oil
at advantageous process, the need to have access to the accounts of the company, the
improvement of the status of the Iranian employees of the company and the revision of
the length of the concession. The result nonetheless, reflected AIOIC’s interests rather
than the changes Iran had demanded. The Supplemental Agreement of 1948 provided
only a modest increase in revenues to Iran by raising the royalty from 22 cents to 33 cent
per barrel. 1193 This and other factors, most notably the disregard of the working
conditions for Iranians, lead the 16th Majlis to decline the ratification of the agreement.
This perceived plunder of Iranian resources to foreign powers as well as the corruption of
traditional Iranian values both coincided with and encouraged the growth of a popular
and distinctive national consciousness. 1194 Three groups supported the liberal nationalist
idea, which increasingly gained popular momentum in and outside parliament. The group
with the widest support base, was the non-religious intelligentsia, for which liberal
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democracy constituted an end rather than instrumental political values. The second group
was made of the bazaaris or commercial middle class, which required a government that
thought and acted in national terms and that looked with sympathy on the commercial
needs of trade. The third support base for the nationalist cause and political change was
the clergy, which regarded an alliance with the intelligentsia as a means to gain the
strength to break the hold of Christian imperialist powers, which was considered a
prerequisite for Islamic revival.1195 Dr Mohammed Mosaddeq emerged out of the first
group as the most vocal and popular opponent of not only the agreement, but of what the
nationalists regardeded as the plunder of Iran. Mosaddeq, whose political career began as
deputy of Tehran, became a leading spokesman for the newly formed Jbha-yi Milli
(National Front). The National Front, which was a loose grouping of the various political,
mercantile and religious elements of Iranian nationalism, provided him with the platform
he needed to be associated with the political battle for Iran’s national independence and
dignity. 1196 After appointing a series of pliant Prime ministers, the Shah, who was
himself unable to either harness or curtail the public mood was compelled to appoint
Mosaddeq, who was now increasingly regarded as the only autonomous politician willing
and capable to stand up against the Shah as well as the British. Binding himself to the
principle of nationalisation, the prime minister insisted that his acceptance be predicated
on the ratification of the nationalisation law, which the assembly dutifully approved on
28 April 1951, followed by the Senate and the Shah. 1197 Promising that compensation
and providing for the continuation of employment of British staff and expertise, he
founded the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) to exploit Iranian oil, on the basis of
full Iranian ownership and control. 1198 This move, which previously had not been taken
seriously, proved unacceptable to the company as well as to the British government.
After initial threats and warnings over the impact on bilateral relations, Prime Minister
Clement Attlee announced in the House of Commons that “although his government
could not allow Iran unilaterally to cancel the AIOC’s contract, it was prepared to accept
some of nationalization, provided […] it were satisfactory in other respects” This
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presumably meant the payment of adequate compensation to the company and for it to
regain control of Iranian oil. It was obvious that the British government would accept the
term nationalization because it would allow the Iranians to save face, but the concept of
nationalization, that the British had in mind would not have allowed the Iranians to gain
control of their oil industry. 1199 Whilst the British maintained channels of negotiation
with Tehran, they soon started to find ways to destabilize the government through
economic pressures, such as the oil blockade, by giving encouragement, financial and
moral to Mosaddeq’s opponents as well as by using the International Court of Justice and
United Nations as respective fora to get decisions in their favour. 1200 Unfortunately for
Britain, the International Court of Justice ruled that it had no jurisdiction in this case and
the Security Council stated that the issue of nationalization of Iranian oil did not
constitute a threat to international peace and security. 1201 Whilst at first the United States
offered good offices to Iran and Britain and made some genuine attempts to arbitrate
between both parties, they were soon persuaded by Prime Minister Eden’s proposal of
creating an international oil consortium in Iran, that would take over the AIOC’s
operation. American participation, it was believed, would dilute the power of the AIOC
and thus assuage Iranian fears of British domination. 1202 In the view of the deadlock,
Britain and Washington eventually concluded that the best solution to the crisis was a
coup d’état, which would remove the Mosaddeq government with a more compliant
prime minister, headed by the Shah. The Shah’s role seemed feasible since after his initial
support for nationalization, he was subsequently unwilling to approve either the
Mosaddeq’s methods or his attempts to limit the powers of the monarchy; attempts which
eventually forced the Shah to leave Iran temporarily in mid-August 1953. 1203
1199 Mary Ann Heiss, Empire and Nationhood – The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-154
(New York, Columbia University Press, 1997), p.70
1200 The AIOC threatened the six major Western oil companies with a law suit sould they purchase any
Iranian oil. This resulted in a complete boycott of oil tankers at Iranian ports and had profound economic
consequences for that country. see Mary Ann Heiss, Empire and Nationhood – The United States, Great
Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-154, p. 78; Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921 – The Pahlavis and After,
p. 117
1201 see “Security Council”. International Organization, Vol.6, No.1 (February, 1952), pp.76-88; “Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. Case (Jurisdiction), United Kingdom v. Iran”, The American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 46, No.4 (Oct.,1952), pp.737-751
1202 Mary Ann Heiss, Empire and Nationhood – The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-
154, p. 104
1203 Rose Greaves, “Iranian Foreign Policy, 1921-1979”, p. 441
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Domestically, the situation for Mosaddeq worsened. As Britain continued to export oil
from other countries in the Middle East, the British lead economic blockade proved more
harmful to Iran than for the AIOC and its buyers. Iran’s oil production decreased to 10%
of its pre-nationalization capacity resulting in a dramatic drop in oil revenues.1204 The
more Iran had to suffer economic hardship since the nationalization of oil, the more
discontent increased in opposition to Mosaddeq. In the end, two developments prompted
the Eisenhower administration to actively assist in the overthrow of Iran’s prime minister.
Whilst the Tudeh Part was never wholeheartedly behind Mosaddeq and the National
Front, they did constitute the backbone of the nationalist movement and matured
increasingly as a political party and ideological movement under his premiership. The
second reason, which convinced the US administration to take their global strategy
against communism to Iran was the fact that the military was by and large anti-
Mosaddeq and pro-royalist and thus formed a powerful collaborator in a coup d’état.
Although Mosaddeq appeared politically dominant with a powerful appeal, by late 1953
the foundation of this power, in the absence of key social, military, and religious groups
was never weaker and he had essentially become the “demagogue” that the British had
always portrayed him. 1205 In the end, “Operation Ajax”, a covert operation, coordinated
by CIA and MI6 succeeded, as it facilitated royalist forces to overthrow Mosaddeq’s
government in favour of the Shah.1206 The international oil consortium, which was then
created after the coup, was a far cry from the nationalization that Mosaddeq had
envisioned. To maintain the façade of nationalization, the Iranian government, through
the National Iranian Oil Company, would retain formal title to the nation’s oil. But
because Iran lacked the technical expertise of exploitation and marketing, actual control
was vested with the companies owned by the consortium. While these companies would
be registered in Iran they were subject to Dutch law. Iran was to receive 50 per cent of
the industry’s net profits from production but nothing from its marketing or distribution
operations. Iran also signed an agreement, in which it agreed to pay the AIOC a net sum
1204 ibid, p. 443
1205 Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921 – The Pahlavis and After, pp. 121-122
1206 see Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Mean-An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror,
(New Jersey, John Wiley & Sons, 2003), pp. 167-192
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of £ 25 million. 1207 The legacy of the British Iranian oil dispute and the overthrow of
Muhammad Mosaddeq are ever-prevalent events in the collective memory of many
Iranians. Whilst it may be true that Mosaddeq had alienated important segments of the
Iranian elite through his own policies and attitudes – principally his categorical refusal to
compromise with the British and the concentration of power to the office of the prime
minister - the British as well as Americans did help to exacerbate discontent against
Mosaddeq and certainly contributed to intensify trends and movements against the
government. The significance of this chapter in British-Iranian relations is that the
Mosaddeq phenomenon represented a critical moment in a period of exceptionally rapid
change in Iran in which there was some real potential for the institutionalisation of liberal
democratic, secular and nationalist norms. When Britain and the USA entered into a
conspiracy to eliminate what they considered a demagogic agitator, who was leading his
immature public in a policy direction that could only enhance the Soviet subversive
potential in Iran, they calculated that it would send a signal to the Soviets that America
was serious about containing them in their own lair. 1208 However, the real legacy of this
period was that Mosaddeq’s political agenda took on everlasting legitimacy and has ever
since profoundly shaped Iran’s foreign policy after 1979.
7. British-Iranian Relations: Perceptions and Misperceptions
With the rise of Reza Shah, the times when Whitehall dictated the terms in Iran were
finally over as Washington now acted as a “Patron Power”, preserving the monarchy and
influencing the direction and agenda of its policies in line with western regional and
international interests. In return for Iran’s dependence on the US and alliance with the
West, the monarch expected the consolidation of his rule. Undoubtedly, extensive U.S.
support, which helped the Shah to transform the country from an inefficient autocracy
into a neo-patrimonial state, initially enabled him to manipulate the nation in favour of
his regime but eventually resulted in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Nonetheless, it was
1207 Mary Ann Heiss, Empire and Nationhood – The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-
154, p. 214
1208 James, A. Bill and WM Roger Louis (ed) Musaddiq, Iranian nationalism, and Oil , p.24.p.37
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the fundamental role of the British government, which had sown seeds of anti-
imperialism, and Khomeini’s agenda against “foreign oppressors”. More than that,
Britain’s continuous conditional and coercive diplomacy towards Iran shaped an entire
mindset of Iranian politicians as well as intelligentsia, which essentially reflects deep
suspicion of Western, particularly British policy towards Iran. Ironically, however, this
negative undercurrent also carries an admiration for British statecraft in the sense that
whilst Iranians resent the British the most, they also perceive Britain as a powerful player
in international relations. 1209 Ultimately, Khomeini’s fatwa against Rushdie can only be
fully appreciated if one takes this historical context and reciprocal cycle of interference
and mistrust into account.
1209 Interview with Italian Ambassador to Iran Roberto Tuscano, (Tehran, 2 September, 2004)
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APPENDIX B
The Satanic Verses
Walking in the footsteps of Orientalists, such as Maxime Rodinson 1210, Rushdie
questions the authenticity of Mohammad’s divine revelation. He was particularly
fascinated with the contested incident of the “Satanic Verses”, which he came across
when he was studying early Islamic history at Cambridge. This incident, which made
such an impression on Rushdie, concerned a revelation to Muhammad, which he later
denounced as false - as a Satanic rather than a divine one. Although at the time Rushdie
did not know what to do with it, he told himself that it “ would make a good story”. 1211
Thus, Rushdie did not invent the satanic verses, for they form part of the historical record
in the writings of exegetes and biographers. The most reliable, yet contested source of
this alleged incident is al Tabari’s account. Much of the prosperity and political power of
1210 French sociologist Maxime Rodinson provides in his account “Mohammed” a highly contested account
about the life of the founder of Islam. Whilst Rodinson rejects Wellenhausen´s theory that the “evolution
from polytheism to monotheism was linked with the development of a common Arab culture transcending
tribal, social and political groupings” (G.R. Hawting, The Idea of Idolatry and the Emergence of Islam,
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.2), and clearly states that Mohammed was the key
figure in the rise of this new religion, it was his narrative on how his revelation is to be explained and how
many suras of the Koran were written, which earned much criticism. Rejecting Christian accusations of
fraudulence, Rodinson used psychological explanations for Mohammed’s revelations. He argues that like
other mystics the proclamation of his ideology derived from images produced by the unconscious rather
than of divine origin. Throughout his life as Prophet, Mohammed genuinely believed that the visions and
spoken messages, which he received were of divine origin. His wahi or Quranic trances seemed to make a
far deeper impression on his mind than any other ordinary human experience could, and consequently
considered them as supremely real. In some incidents later on in his life, however, Rodinson found reason
to cast doubt on the genuineness of instances of Quranic trance. There are cases where the divine messages
received during the wahi were just too convenient not to look like Mohammed’s self-serving fabrications.
The best-known instance, according to the writer, is when Mohammed received permission from God to
marry Zeynab, the repudiated wife of his adopted son Zayd. Under Arab customary law, this union would
have been forbidden, but in a timely revelation (Quran 33:37, 33:50), Mohammed was exempted from this
law. Unlike Christian polemics, Rodinson does not regard the Zeynab episode as proof of Mohammed´s
insatiable lust nor is it an indication of the self-serving manipulation of the wahi by Mohammed. For
Rodinson, he was not guilty of falsification by deliberately attributing to God his own thoughts and
instructions rather than was victim of his unconscious. From this very Freudian angle, Rodinson concedes
that some disturbing characteristics did appear and that the narrative in the Quran did not retain the same
lyrical style in Medina. Mohammed had to take day-to-day decisions, decisions of a political, practical and
legislative nature, which could not wait for some random revelation. It is this argument by Rodinson, which
has earned him much criticism amongst Muslim scholars. see Maxime Rodinson, Mohammed, (London,
Penguin Press, 1971) other contested accounts on the life of Mohammed include John Wansbrough,
Quranic Studies (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977); Patricia Crone and Michael Cook, Hagarism:
The Making of the Islamic World (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977)
1211 Pradyumna S. Chauhan, Salman Rushdie Interviews – A Sourcebook of his ideas (London, Greenwood
Press, 2001), p.93
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pre-Islamic Mecca and its ruling elite, the Quryash depended on the fact that Mecca
constituted a religious centre hosting an abundance of shrines with idols. Evidently,
Mohammad’s monotheistic message posed a direct threat to the polytheistic ruling
Quraysh tribe in Mecca. Thus, members of this tribe approached Mohammad and
suggested that he take a more flexible attitude to their idols and, in return, they would be
more conciliatory to his preaching. “If you make some mention of our goddesses, we
would sit beside you for the nobles of the Arabs come to you, and when they see that
those who sit beside you are the nobles of your tribe, they will have more liking for you.”
1212 According to Tabari, Mohammad experienced an inner struggle as he wished to bring
him and his people together and thus “Satan cast on his [Mohammad’s] tongue, because
of his inner debates and what he desired to bring to his people, the words: These are the
high flying cranes, verily their intercession is accepted with approval.” 1213Allegedly
making reference to the most prominent Meccan goddesses, Mohammad recited the
following verses in the Qur’an:
Have you considered El-Lat and El-‘Uzza
and Manat the third, the other?
(Qur’an 53: 19)
According to Tabari’s records the incident occurred while Mohammad was reciting the
above Shurah (Shurah An-Najam) in the mosque. At the end of the Shurah the Prophet
and all of his followers prostrated themselves. Likewise, the polytheists of the Quraysh
and others who were in the mosque prostrated themselves because of the reference to
their gods, which they heard. 1214 Tabari further recounts that Muslims, who had fled
from Mecca to Abyssinia heard about this incident and returned to their home city.
Eventually, Gabriel appeared before Mohammad and told him that he recited words that
had not been brought by God, which upset the Prophet. Through another revelation which
states:
1212 Al-Tabari cited in Daniel Pipes, The Rushdie Affair – the Novel, the Ayatollah and the West, (New
York, Birch Lane Press, 1990), p. 57
1213 Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, Distorted Imagination – Lessons from the Rushdie Affair
(London, Grey Seal, 1990), p. 149
1214 ibid, p. 147
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We sent not ever any Messenger
Or Prophet before thee, but that Satan
Cast on this fancy, when he was fancying;
But God annuls what Satan cases, then
God confirms His signs – surely God is
All-knowing, All wise –
(Qur;an, 22:52)
the sorrow, which Mohammad felt was removed and God eventually revealed the
following Surah:
Have you considered El-Lat and El-‘Uzza
and Manat the third, the other?
What, have you males, and He females?
That were indeed an unjust division.
They are naught but names yourselves
Have named, and your fathers; God has
Sent down no authority touching them.
They follow only surmise, and what the
Souls desire; and yet guidance has
Come to them from their Lord.
Or shall man have whatever he fancies?
And to God belongs the First and the Last.
(Qur’an 53:19-25)
When Mohammed brought this revelation to the people, the Quraysh declared that he had
altered the words he had previously uttered. Members of the Quraysh tribe were all aware
of the verses which confirmed the divinity of their goddesses and their abrogation
subsequently led them to become ill disposed and more violent to the Muslims. At this
point followers of Mohammad returning from Abyssinia arrived, but could only enter the
city under protection or secrecy. 1215 This is the classical story told by Islamic historian
al-Tabari, which has, however, been subject to widespread criticism amongst Muslim
scholars and been rejected as a spurious invention that does not form part of the authentic
1215 ibid, p. 147
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tradition. 1216 Traditionally, any event in the early Islamic history is only accepted as
authentic if it is reported by most, if not all classical historians. The satanic verses story is
either ignored or rejected as preposterous folklore by all the major historians including
ibn Ishaq, ibn Hisham, al-Suhayli, ib Kathir, al-Bayhaqi, Qadi Iyad, ibn Khuzayamam al-
Razi, al-Qurtabi, al-Ayni and al-Shawkani. 1217 Furthermore, Al-Tabri is considered the
most uncritical of classical historians, because he was a chronicler who reported every
event and narrative that was circulating during the time of Mohammad in Mecca. 1218
Much of the rejection of this incident results from chronological examination, which
reveals irrational elements. The story allegedly happened after the first group of Muslims
sought refuge in Abyssinia. We know that this migration took place in the month of
Rajab during the fifth year of Mohammad’s mission, or eight years before the exodus to
Medina - the hijra. The verses (17:73-5) which state “They are constantly trying to tempt
you away from which we have revealed to you, so that you may substitute in its place
something of your own, in which case they would have actively taken you as a friend.”
(Qur’an, 17:73-5) were interpreted by al-Tabari as to warn the prophet. However, these
verses were not in fact revealed until after the ascension of the Prophet, which occurred
two to three years before the hijra. The verses (22:52), which were revealed to abrogate
the so-called satanic verses, were revealed in the first year of the hijra, that is eight to
nine years after the incident. Thus, it seems somewhat hard to believe that the Prophet
was “admonished” six years after the event; that the offending verses, which undermined
the very basis of the Qur’anic message and bear no relation whatsoever to any other
Shura or reference in it, were tolerated for nine years before they were annulled. Sardar
further argues that on purely rational grounds the satanic verses constituted the antithesis
of everything the Qur’an had said up to that particular event and continued to say after
the incident. Scholars contest that if there was an aspect of truth in this story, it would
have caused a major incident in the early history of Islam and would have been
mentioned in the extensive literature of the hadith. 1219 Contrary to the hadith and Muslim
historical accounts on the life of Mohammad, which on the basis of riwaya (the statement
1216 ibid, p. 148
1217 ibid, p. 148
1218 ibid, p. 149
1219 ibid, p.149; also see Syed Ali Ashraf, “Nihilistic, negative, satanic” in Impact International, 28 Oct-10
Nov. 1988
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based on the chain of narrators and the text of the hadith ) as well as diraya (credibility of
the statement) reject the incident of the satanic verses, numerous Orientalist accounts
depict it without reference to the debate amongst Islamic historians. In fact, at the core of
the Orientalist view on Islamic history is the assumption that if central matters of the faith
are concerned, Muslims cannot possibly be “objective” and must have distorted the
records themselves. An example of this would be W. Montgomery Watt’s who,
emphasising Mohammad’s political role, summarizes the incident as follows:
Muhammad must have had sufficient success for the heads of the Quraysh to take him seriously.
Pressure was brought to bear on him to make some acknowledgement of the worship at the
neighbouring shrines. He was at first inclined to do so, both in view of the material advantages such
a course offered and because it looked as if would speedily result in a successful end of his mission.
Eventually, however, through Divine Guidance as he believed, he saw that this would be a fatal
compromise, and he gave up the prospect of improving his outward circumstances in order to follow
the truth as he saw it. The rejection of polytheism was formulated in vigorous terms and closed the
doors to future compromise. 1220
In this light, contemporary Orientalist, Daniel Pipes, takes an apologetic view towards
Rushdie “because the Satanic verses incident derives from Tabari and several other
impeccable sources of information about the life of Muhammad, Muslims must deal with
it.” 1221
Similar to such hermeneutics of Mohammad’s political ambitions, Rushdie sees the
incident as a confusion of the sacred and profane of good and evil, and of revealed truth
and man made fiction. It is the interdependence and ambiguity of these oppositions that
interests Rushdie. In the novel “Satanic Verses”, Mahound 1222, is the prophet-founder of
a religion, which Rushdie calls “Submission” and which is based on Mahound’s divine
revelations and recitations. For Rushdie, the episode of the satanic verses constitutes
some kind of secular confrontation with the idea of divine revelation. Essentially, he
1220 W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad in Mecca (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1953), pp.108-109
1221 D. Pipes, The Rushdie Affair – the Novel, the Ayatollah and the West, p.61
1222 The Oxford English Dictionary explains “Mahound” as the “false prophet” Mohammed, in the Middle
Ages, often vaguely imagined to be worshipped as a God, and used as the name for the devil. Oxford
English Dictionary (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970), Vol.6 p.38
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intended to portray the visionary, mystical imaginative act as an extreme form of the act
of imagination in general. During one of Gibreel Farishta’s paranoid delusions he dreams
about Mahound and how he strikes a compromise with the Grandee of the city Jahilia 1223
by approving of the city’s idols, not because the devil put false verses in his mouth, but
rather he saw an opportunity to advance his cause.
At this point, without any trace of hesitation or doubt, he recites two further verses. “Have you
thought upon Lat and Uzza, and Manat, the third, the other?” – After the first verse, […] the
Grandee of Jahilia is already standing very straight. And Mahound, with silenced eyes, recites: “
They are the exalted birds, and their intercession is desired indeed.” As the noise – shouts, cheers,
scandal, cries of devotion to the goddess Al-Lat – swells and bursts within the marquee, the already
astonished congregation beholds the doubly sensational spectacle of the Grandee Abu Simbel
placing his thumbs upon the lobes of his ears, fanning out the fingers of both hands and uttering a
loud voice the formula: “Allahu Akbar.” 1224
The reader then learns that the Mahound himself in fact forces the Archangel Gibreel to
the revealation. Gibreel explains Mahound’s “old trick, forcing my mouth open and
making the voice, the Voice, pour out of me […] made it pour all over him, like sick.”
Having wrestled with Gibreel, Mahound tells himself that “ “It was the Devil”, he says
aloud to the empty air, making it true by giving it voice. “The last time it was Shaitan.”
This is what he has heard in his listening, that he has been tricked, that the Devil came to
him in the guise of the archangel, so that the verses he memorized, the ones he recited in
the poetry tent, were not the real thing buts its diabolic opposite, not godly, but satanic.”
1225 Mahond then rushes back to the city to renounce what he had said in order “to strike
them from the record for ever and ever, so that they will survive in just one or two
reliable collections of old traditions and orthodox interpreters will try and unwrite their
story.” 1226 Nevertheless, from the top of the mountain Gibreel watches Mahound eager to
expunge the verses and “knows one detail, just one tiny thing that’s a bit of a problem
here, namely that it was me both times […]. From my mouth, both the statement and the
1223 Thus, Rusdhie renames Mecca jahilia (the time of ignorance before the arrival of Mohammad), which
in itself was considered offensive
1224 Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses, (London, Vintage, 1998), p. 114
1225 ibid, p. 123
1226 ibid, p. 123, It seems that Rushdie refers here to al-Tabari’s account and the controversy it has caused
amongst Islamic historians.
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repudiations, verses and converses, universes and reverses, the whole thing […] “.
Reinforcing that he is obliged to utter verses according to Mahound’s needs, the
Archangel concludes that “we all know how my mouth got worked.” 1227 After the
repudiation of the Satanic Verses, which was followed by a persecution against followers
of “Submission”, Mahound shares with Khalid, the water carrier, that to cover up his
deception he came up with the notion that Satan made him do it.
Awkwardly, he [Khalid] says: “Messenger, I doubted you. But you were wiser than we knew. First
we said, Mahound will never compromise, and you compromised. Then we said, Mahound has
betrayed us, but you were bringing us a deeper truth. You brought us the Devil himself, so that we
could witness the workings of the Evil One, and his overthrow by the Right. You have enriched our
faith. I am sorry for what I thought.
Mahound replies: “ “Yes.” Bitterness, cynicism. “It was a wonderful thing I did. Deeper
truth. Bringing you the Devil. Yes, that sounds like me.” ” 1228 In another part of
Rusdhie’s narrative he uses the real historical character of Salman (the first Persian
convert to Islam) and makes him the scribe of Mahound. Bored with this task, and
realizing that he himself could claim to be Gibreel, the source of Mahound’s revelations,
Salman decided to gradually change certain details of the recitations, inscribing
increasingly longer parts of his own into what is considered by the followers of
Submission the revealed word of God. Reflecting on the incident when Mahound
received false revelations Salman, the Persian recounts, “Maybe I was Shaitan. The
realization of this possibility gave him the diabolic idea. After that when he sat at the
Prophet’s feet, writing down rules rules rules, he began, surreptitiously, to change
things.” 1229 Having successfully altered certain passages, Salman concludes:
Here is the point: Mahound did not notice the alterations. So there I was, actually writing the Book,
or rewriting anyway, polluting the word of God with my own profane language. But, good heavens,
if my poor words could not be distinguished from the Revelation by God’s own Messenger, then
what did that mean? What did it say about the quality of the divine poetry? 1230
1227 ibid, p. 123
1228 ibid, p. 125
1229 ibid, p. 367
1230 ibid, p. 367
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It is true that Rushdie did not invent the issue of the Satanic verses. However, as these
sequences form part of a fictional narrative, Rushdie inherently fails to elaborate on the
discussion of this episode within the historical record. Hence, he also does not give any
play to the reasons why this incident has been rejected. His offence ultimately lies in the
fact that he goes beyond the charge that Mohammad adapted verses according to his
interests and changed circumstances. Rushdie’s narrative implies that Mahound’s entire
recitation did not derive from the Archangel Gibreel, but rather from Mahound himself.
Essentially, the holy book on which “Submission” is based, is merely a human artefact
built on deceit and imagination. Rushdie’s premise for writing the “Satanic Verses” was
that “there are no subjects which are off limits and that includes God, includes prophets.”
Being an atheist himself he felt that it was a “completely legitimate exercise” to write
about religion and revelation from the point of view of a secular person.” Most
importantly, however, Rushdie was fascinated with the historical figure of Mohammad,
which he described as “ the only prophet who existed even remotely inside history. He is
the only one about whom there is some […[ more-or-less factual historical information.
That makes him a human being and doubly interesting.” 1231 Thus, by humanizing
Mohammad as well as Islam, Rushdie went far beyond the Orientalist venture and was
ultimately considered to “satirise the Prophet and His Companions” as well as to
“ridicule religious consciousness of people” and “to remove any sense of reverence for
angels, prophets, holy books, and hence any faith in God.” 1232 Whilst most of the
reviews on the novel praised Rushdie’s literary and artistic merit, the “Satanic Verses”
evidently caused a furore, inciting religious passions in Britain, on the Indian sub-
continent and elsewhere. Few people who protested against the publication actually read
the book. As Taheri argued “the very idea of using the prophet Muhammad as a character
in a novel is painful to many Muslims. The entire Islamic system consists of the so-called
Hodud, or limits beyond which one should simply not venture.” 1233 On the other side,
those critics, who have read the book, stated that Rushdie’s claim that his narrative
1231 Sharbani Basu interviews Salman Rushdie “Of Satan, archangels and prophets” in Sunday, India 18 -24
September, 1988
1232 Syed Ali Ashraf, “Nihilistic, Negative, Satanic” in Impact International, 28 Oct.- 10 Nov. 1988
1233 The Times, 13 February 1989
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consists of fictional figments of the imagination could not be considered an excuse for his
insult. Referring to offending passages, such as the brothel “The Curtain” [English for
hijab] in which the prostitutes of Jahilia adopt the names of Mohammad’s wives to
titillate the clients, M.H. Faruqi, editor of Impact International called the Satanic Verses
“obscene, libellous and blasphemous with clear undertones of racism and racial
incitement”. Faruqui’s argument was that “there is no problem about it being fiction or
not. It doesn’t matter if it’s a fiction, a serious book, a dream – the point is that the
language should be decent. The problem is the abusive and insulting way the Prophet is
described in the most filthy language.” 1234 It is against this background that one has to
understand the furore which followed.
1234 M.H. Faruqi, Impact International, 10 February, 1989
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